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ABSTRACT
This dissertation reveals how religious factors affected the development of the 
Korean War. Much prior research has analyzed the causes and nature of the Korean War, 
in part because of the war’s impact upon later events, from the Cold War to the present- 
day geopolitical standoff. Though the war has been much-studied, religious factors have 
rarely been included in these analyses. This de-emphasis of religion may be a justifiable 
simplification in general war historiographies, but not in the specific case of Korea. This 
current study uncovers the unique role of religion in Korean-American relations and in 
Korean culture and politics, prior-to-and-during the time of the Korean War.
The Korean War ushered in a time of intimate collaboration between state and 
non-state actors, unparalleled in American diplomatic and military history. Because 
American missionaries had been working among Koreans for many years, they possessed 
the language skills, human connections, and geographical knowledge that the US military 
lacked. From the early days within the Pusan Perimeter through the late period at 
P’anmunjom, American missionaries were highly visible on the frontline, at the 
negotiation table, and in the POW camps. They were also important to the battle of 
propaganda. Their letters and reports aroused sympathy in America for the Korea people.
In addition to the contributions of American Missionaries, the effect of Korean 
Christians was an equally important factor to the shaping of the conflict. Churches were 
rather influential within Korean society; clergymen were active in Korean politics; and 
many of the top politicians were Christians. Christianity was a major obstacle to 
Communist control of the North and subversive activities in the South. With the 
assistance of foreign funding, churches were transformed by the ravages of war into an 
important source of charitable assistance for millions of impoverished refugees.
Although this study looks at religious factors in general, the discussion focuses 
primarily on Protestant churches and Protestant missionaries. These Protestant churches, 
of all religious institutions in Korea, exerted an influence far disproportionate to their per- 
capita membership. Similarly, these Protestant missionaries, of all religious actors, had 
significant influence upon the American military and upon the American public. In 
particular, the majority of missionaries who stayed behind and worked effectively with 
the Korean government and US military were from the American Presbyterian missions. 
They took the initiative on relief efforts and set the standard for others to follow.
This dissertation makes an important contribution to religious history as well. In 
the process of assessing the impact of Christianity upon the Korean War, this dissertation 
begins by examining Christianity’s development within Korea, primarily from the arrival 
of American missionaries in the late Choson period. Christianity is found to have had a 
strong impact upon Korea’s social development, internal politics, and foreign-relations. 
The Christian community was an important part of the independence movement against 
Japanese control. When one considers that South Korea has emerged today as one of the 
most Christianized of nations, that every elected Korean president has been a Christian, 
and that Korea now sends out more missionaries than any nation besides America, then 
the historical value of such a study of into Christianity’s origins becomes clear.
xii
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INTRODUCTION
More than fifty years after the signing of the Korean Armistice (1953), the Korean 
peninsula continues to be one of the most contentious areas of the globe and a regular 
subject of the evening news. Under the dictatorships of Kim Il-sung and his son Kim 
Jong-il, North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) has become 
one of the most isolated countries in the world. After experiencing rapid economic 
growth in the 1960s and 1970s, the North’s economy began declining in the 1980s. The 
food crisis in North Korea began, according to the report by the United States Institute of 
Peace in August 1999, when the country received “a sharp reduction in heavily 
subsidized food, equipment, and crude oil from the Soviet Union and China in the early 
1990s.” 1 Then, in 1995, the country suffered a severe nationwide famine due to a 
prolonged period of successive floods and droughts coupled with severe soil depletion 
caused by long period of intensive farming and deforestation.2 Nevertheless, despite its 
constant food shortage and lack of foreign aid, North Korea successfully tested a nuclear 
bomb on October 9, 2006. Today, North Korea poses a great challenge to the security of 
Northeast Asia and creates serious diplomatic problems for the United States.
Standing in sharp contrast, South Korea (the Republic of Korea, ROK) has broken 
the chains of military dictatorships and emerged as a model of democracy in Asia. It has
1 Andrew Natsios, “The Politics of Famine in North Korea,” United States Institute o f  Peace Special Report 
51 (2 August 1999): 1, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990802.html.
2 Ibid.
3 With North Korea’s nuclear program threatening the stability of the region, the United Nations Security 
Council imposed new economic sanctions pressing Kim Jong-il to abandon his nuclear program.
2
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3become fully integrated into the world market economy and developed into an export- 
oriented industrialized nation. From the 1980s onwards, South Korea has been regarded 
by economists as one of the “Four Little Dragons” -  the four strongest growing 
economies -  in Asia.4 Since its economic and political stabilization, South Korea has 
hosted two Asian Games (Seoul in 1986, and Pusan in 2002),5 the Olympic Games in 
1988, and the World Cup in 2002 (co-host with Japan). South Korea is now one of the 
Top Ten Athletic Nations of the world.6 Changes in its religious demographics have 
been just as profound. South Korea is currently the second largest Christian missionary 
sending nation in the world, after the United States. The South Korea of today is hardly 
recognizable as the same country that stumbled out of the rubble of the Korean War with 
the larger portion of its population in abject poverty and most of its natural resources 
permanently cut off to the north.
The two Koreas represent two strikingly different models of political and 
economic development. To understand the two Koreas of today, one must look to the 
origins, nature, and development of the Korean War. Historians generally agree that a 
civil conflict among Koreans was inevitable in the aftermath of Japan’s defeat, due to the 
political struggles between leftists and rightists.7 But the scope, nature, and meaning of 
the war would have been completely different without foreign intervention. Outside 
influences were primarily responsible for the emergence of two separate Korean nations. 
The origins of the war were inextricably linked to the global Soviet-American political
4 The Four Little Dragons are South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
5 South Korea was supposed to host the 1970 Asian Games but had to drop the plan because of a security 
threat from North Korea.
6 In 1984, South Korea rose to be one of the top 10 gold medal winners in the Olympic Games and 
continued to keep its position, except during the Sydney Games in 2000. In addition, from 1986 onwards, 
it replaced Japan as the second gold medal winner in the Asian Games, except for the Hiroshima Games in 
1996.
7 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 71.
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and ideological rivalry that was intensifying at the same time as the Korean peninsula 
was liberated from Japanese colonial rule.
Originally, the United States pursued a policy of gradual disengagement, letting 
the Koreans work out their political differences and restore stability in the peninsula; but 
the consolidation of the Cold War, the sense of national prestige, and public pressure 
arising out of anti-communist hysteria would not allow the Truman administration to 
fully withdraw from Korea. Concerns over America’s strategic position in East Asia, the 
security of Japan, and the fear of Soviet expansion elsewhere prompted the Truman 
administration to actively defend South Korea when war broke out in June 1950.
American intervention under the banner of the United Nations, followed in turn 
by Chinese involvement, prolonged the war and led to the destruction of nearly all major 
infrastructures on the peninsula. Gradually, both North and South Koreans lost control 
over the course of the Korean War, as foreigners began to take larger roles in the fighting 
and truce talks. From 1950 to 1953, a large number of foreigners from every inhabited 
continent participated in the war. Most were soldiers, but some were civilians -  mainly 
UN officials, relief workers, educators, medical workers, and missionaries. While the 
majority of the soldiers returned home after the war, most of the civilian workers stayed 
behind to take charge of reconstruction programs.
This study is an effort to investigate the role of a particular group of foreigners, 
American missionaries and their American supporters, and especially their religious ideas 
and activities before, during, and after the Korean War period. It attempts to facilitate a 
new understanding of the origins and development of the division of Korea, which had 
been a unified and independent country with more than a thousand years of recorded
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
history. Because of the influence of American missionaries, Christianity emerged as an 
important theme in the ideological struggle of the Cold War. Missionary activities and 
relief efforts attracted great interest in the US home front that transformed the 
understanding of the Korean War from a mere police action for collective security to a 
religious crusade with strong humanitarian connotations. Moreover, the war gave 
missionaries the golden opportunity to reassert a leadership role in Korean churches that 
marked a growth of religious and cultural exchange between the two allies. It was also a 
key factor that elevated the impact of Christianity on Korean political, economic, social, 
and religious life that eventually changed Korea from a Confucian-Buddhist society to a 
Christian dominated society.
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE KOREAN WAR
Historians across five decades have investigated who started the war. Journalists 
such as I. F. Stone and Melvin B. Voorhees presented the earliest analysis of the Korean 
War. Rather than giving any definite answers to the origins of the war, their publications 
set the stage for historical debates in the years to come. Stone’s book, The Hidden 
History o f the Korean War, was met with an almost complete press blackout and boycott 
when it was first published in 1952. The author introduced “a conspiracy theory” that the 
South Korean government, and probably Chiang Kai-shek and General Douglas 
MacArthur, had foreknowledge of the surprise attack by the North Koreans on June 25, 
1950. Nevertheless, Stone alleged, they all remained silent in order to bring the United 
States into the Korean conflict. This theory later became the backbone of the revisionist 
interpretation.
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6Traditionalists, who agreed with the government’s interpretation, rejected this 
theory. They assigned most of the blame to the Soviet Union, arguing that Stalin was 
ultimately behind the surprise attack. Adam B. Ulam suspected that Stalin might have 
intended to divert the increasing U.S. military pressure in Europe after the formation of 
NATO.8 Raymond L. Garthoff stressed the Soviet misperception of U.S. intentions due 
to Dean Acheson’s National Press Club speech on January 12, 1950 and Truman’s 
inaction in saving the Nationalists in China.9 Others suggested that Stalin might have 
planned the Korean War to trap Communist China into political isolation.10 Based on 
these arguments, traditionalists, such as A. Doak Barnett and Harold Hinton, argued that 
by taking China as its junior partner the Korean War was part of the Soviet Union’s grand 
strategy to “communize” Asia.11
Concerning American involvement, traditionalists put forward the credibility 
argument that, since South Korea was basically an “American creation,” President 
Truman had no choice but to stand behind his allies in facing the Communist challenge. 
Military personnel and diplomats, such as General Matthew B. Ridgeway and Dean 
Acheson, also presented their stories to echo the government perspective, supporting the 
President’s decision to intervene in Korea and later to fire General MacArthur.12 
According to Hakjoon Kim, a leading contemporary Korean War historian, missionaries
8 Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), 
167-169.
9 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1965), 72.
10 Edgar Snow, The Other Side o f  the River: Red China Today (New York: Random House, 1962), 654- 
655; see also, Wilbur Chafee, ‘Tw o Hypotheses of Sino-Soviet Relations as Concerns the Instigation of the 
Korean War,” Journal o f  Korean Affairs 4 (October 1976-January 1977): 10-11.
u See A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper, 1961). See also Harold Hinton, 
Communist China in World Politics (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1966).
12 See Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge; How All-Out Asian War Was 
Averted; Why MacArthur Was Dismissed; Why Today’s War Objectives Must Be Limited (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1967); also see Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971).
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7and their children who had worked in Korea also contributed greatly to the initial analysis 
of the war in the 1950s and 1960s.13 Philip West called this stage of historiography the 
“heroic phase” where “historians dwell on the sins of the enemy and the virtues of their 
friends.”14 Research efforts were mainly concentrated on issues such as the Truman- 
MacArthur controversy,15 Chinese intervention,16 domestic political problems,17 and the 
idea of limited warfare. Only a few, such as Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, questioned the 
motives of American intervention.18
In the 1970s and 1980s, America’s failure in Vietnam sparked a new wave of 
revisionist efforts to reinterpret the origins of the Korean War. Edward Friedman and 
Mark Selden were among the early group of revisionists who criticized the traditionalist 
interpretation.19 Rather than viewing American intervention as a forceful reaction to 
Communist aggression, revisionists believed that strong anti-revolutionary and anti­
nationalist drives governed American overseas expansion.
Bruce Cumings took the lead in exploring Korean motivations, using many new 
documents and microanalyses of key Korean provinces to support his arguments in The 
Origins o f the Korean War (1981). He concluded that the conflict was in fact a civil war, 
or even an internal revolution. Border clashes between the North and the South had
13 Hakjoon Kim, “Trends in Korean War Studies: A Review of the Literature,” in Korea and the Cold War: 
Division, Destruction, and Disarmament, ed. Kim Chull Baum and James I. Matray (Claremont, CA: 
Regina Books, 1993), 10.
14 Philip West, “Interpreting the Korean War,” American Historical Review 94 (Feb 1989): 81.
15 John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1959).
16 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1960); Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean 
War and its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).
17 Ronald J. Caridi, The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968).
18 Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits o f  Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
19 See Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., America’s Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American 
Relations (New York: Pantheon, 1971).
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already claimed more than one hundred thousand lives prior to June 25, 1950.20 In his 
second volume published in 1990, Cumings further argued that due to Acheson’s 
hegemonic guidance and global vision, American leaders refused to accept the Korean 
War as an internal struggle between two political entities in Korea and intervened with 
the selfish hope to expand and sustain the world market system. 21 Cumings’ 
interpretation became the most influential revisionist study of the subject. Under his 
leadership, the revisionists challenged the traditional orthodox heroic interpretations by 
exposing the United States’ self-interest and its ignorance of Asia’s political and social 
conditions. The historiography of the Korean War entered into its “academic phase,” as 
Philip West suggested, noting that “the study of the conflict [moved] from melodrama to 
tragedy.”22
Cumings’s view, however, was challenged by Dutch scholar Erik van Ree’s study 
on the Soviet occupation of North Korea, Socialism in One Zone (1989). By using 
memoirs of Soviet officials in Korea, Van Ree pointed out that the Soviet Union had 
direct control over its occupation zone, playing a far more dominant role than Cumings 
had described. Although the Soviet Army did not establish a formal military government, 
Van Ree argued, it ruled over the northern section just as the American Army in the south 
did 23 Van Ree observed that the prominent political position of rightists in the city of 
P’yongyang threatened the plan of having a Communist dictatorship in the north, forcing 
the Soviet Union to seek a coalition with the Christian nationalists.
20 Bruce Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, V ol.l, Liberation and the Emergence o f  Separate 
Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).
21 Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, Vol.2, The Roaring o f the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
22 West, 81.
23 Erik van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford, New York, & 
Munich: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989), 112.
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While traditionalists generally assumed that the Chinese intervened according to 
Stalin’s world conquest scheme, revisionists discussed the rationale behind Chinese 
intervention. Earlier in the 1960s, Allen S. Whiting rejected the traditional Chinese 
conspiracy theory and argued that instead of following Soviet direction, Chinese 
Communists acted according to their own military and political concerns when an 
impending American victory in North Korea became a threat to their national security.24 
His ideas were widely shared by other revisionists in the 1980s, thinking that even if the 
Chinese had known North Korea’s intention to attack, they could find no evidence of any 
active Chinese involvement in the process. Chen Jian, however, put forward more 
complicated arguments in the 1990s, pointing out that rebuilding China as a great power 
in Asia was Mao Zedong’s real political ambition behind Chinese intervention. 
Therefore, despite the fact that the Soviet Union broke its promise to provide air support 
in early October 1950, Mao was determined to go ahead anyway in order to drive the 
American imperialists from Korean soil.
Inspired by Cumings’ in-depth analysis of Korean internal conditions, historians 
began to combine Cumings’ ideas of the origins of the Korean War with the international 
aspects of the conflict. New syntheses came out in John Merrill’s and Burton I. 
Kaufman’s studies. They both agreed that the Korean War was a great power struggle 
between the two superpowers locked in a civil conflict.26 Callum A. MacDonald further 
regarded the war as a multi-dimensional struggle. Since the revisionists employed more
24 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York:
Macmillan, 1960).
25 Jian Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making o f the Sino-American Confrontation (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
26 See John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins o f the War (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 
1989) and Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command 
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986).
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original sources from both American and foreign archives, historians began to discuss the 
Korean War in more general terms and to include Chinese and Korean materials in their 
analyses. Some looked specifically at North Korean factors, arguing that the internal 
power struggle among Communist leaders in the North sparked the march to the South. 
Robert Simmons explained that Kim Il-sung was determined to occupy South Korea in 
order to strengthen his position as “national liberator” in the power struggle against his 
Communist rival Pak Hon-yong.27
William Stueck, however, did not agree with the revisionist assumption that Stalin 
was ignorant of the attack.28 By using Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs, Stueck reasoned 
that Stalin not only had full knowledge of the planned invasion, but also had control over 
Kim Il-sung’s action. Without Stalin’s approval, Kim could not have taken any 
aggressive actions. U.S. intelligence documents also confirmed Soviet domination of the 
North.
The opening of Soviet archives in the early 1990s further strengthened Stueck’s 
argument and unleashed a new phase of debate. As a result, Cumings’ revisionist 
interpretation came under constant fire. Some Korean historians, such as Jin-chull Soh 
and Youngho Kim, challenged the revisionist arguments, blaming the Soviet Union as 
“the chief architect” behind the attack.29 According to James I. Matray, a new consensus 
among western historians concerning the origins of the Korean War has prevailed in
27 Robert Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, P ’ydngyang, Moscow and the Politics o f the Korean 
Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1975).
28 See William Stueck, “The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War,” World Politics 28 (July 
1976): 622-635.
29 Jin-chull Soh, “A Review on the Causes of Korean War In the Light of ‘New Documents,’” Korean 
Observer 31 (Autumn 2000): 345-377; see also Youngho Kim, “International Dimensions of the Korean 
War,” Korean Journal 38 (Winter 1998): 130-146.
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recent historiography.30 Historians from both sides of the debate up to this point were 
more willing to accept the importance of domestic factors, as well as to recognize the 
international dimensions of the conflict. A recent synthesis The War for Korea, 1945- 
1950: A House Burning (2005) by Allan R. Millett, who has written several books on the 
Korean War, argued that “the two Koreas may have been the accidental product of the 
Soviet and Allied rush to liquidate the Japanese imperial presence, but they also 
represented the political expression of two different visions of a modern Korea, built on 
the wreckage of the colonial experience and the resistance to Japanese imperialism in all 
its forms.” 31 He believed that the Korean War was inevitable because “the 
revolutionaries would have fought one another in some form even if not a single 
American or Russian soldier had set foot in Korea.”32
Although the origins of the war seemed to be getting clearer, the discussion of the 
Korean War was far from over. More in-depth research work is needed to analyze the 
development of the Korean War, especially issues such as atomic diplomacy, voluntary 
repatriation of POWs, and particularly, the role of Syngman Rhee towards the end of the 
war. Edward Keefer, John Gaddis, McGeorge Bundy and Roger Dingman have tried to 
assess the effectiveness of atomic diplomacy in bringing the war to an end. Due to a lack 
of solid evidence from the Chinese side, however, it was hard to determine the level of 
usefulness of Eisenhower’s atomic pressure on China. Surprisingly, what the historians 
and practitioners discovered was that Truman came closer to using nuclear weapons than
30 James I. Matray, “Revisiting Korea: Exposing Myths of the Forgotten War, Part 1,” Prologue Magazine 
34 (Summer 2002): 1.
31 Allan R. Millett, The War fo r  Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning (Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 2005), 5.
32 Ibid.
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his Republican successor. The threat of using the atomic bomb against China was in 
fact far less effective than the Eisenhower administration had claimed. Dingman further 
argued that the war ended not due to Eisenhower’s nuclear threats, but mainly due to 
Moscow’s success in convincing Beijing and P’yongyang to accept the principle of non­
repatriation of prisoners of war after Stalin’s death.34 This analysis of how the war was 
ended shed new light on the crucial role of Stalin throughout the Korean War period. A 
clear conclusion of how the war was ended, nevertheless, has not yet been reached.
Meanwhile, the impact and the legacy of the Korean War have also been 
examined by other historians as well. Nancy B. Tucker regarded the Korean War as a 
crucial turning point in the development of Sino-American relations.35 Lawrence S. 
Kaplan pointed out that without the Korean War, the importance of NATO would have
- i / r
been downplayed. Walter LaFeber agreed and observed that the Korean War gave the 
Truman administration an opportunity “to develop new American policies around the 
globe.”37 In particularly, “the six months between June and December 1950 rank among 
the most important of the Cold War era,” LaFeber pointed out, because the United States 
adopted an offensive approach rather than being content with mere “containment.” The 
war in Korea was used “to create a new framework for global affairs.”
33 Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” International Security 13 (Winter 1988- 
1989): 50-91. See also Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions o f the 
Korean Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
34 Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” 50-91. Dingman’s research also supported by 
Appu K. Soman, Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and 
China, 1950-1958 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 58-100.
35 Nancy B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 
1949-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
36 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington, KY: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1984).
37 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 111.
38 Ibid., 111-112, 116. LaFeber’s arguments were also supported by Thomas G. Paterson, J. Gary Clifford, 
and Kenneth J. Hagan’s book American Foreign Policy: A History, 3rd ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Health 
and Company, 1991).
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However, historians have not thoroughly assessed the impact of the Korean 
conflict on the home front. As the United States had come so close to using the bomb 
during the war, the fear of a coming nuclear holocaust induced enormous pressure on 
American society as well. Paul Boyer and Alan Winkler examined the impact of the 
nuclear threat on changing the American mind set and way of life permanently.39 H. W. 
Brands further pinpointed the way in which American officials sought to exaggerate 
Soviet power in order to create a “devil” for Americans to fight.40 In the end, the specter 
of an enemy searching both at home and abroad haunted American social development in 
the post-Korean-War decades.
As Michael Hunt introduced religious themes in his cultural analysis of American 
foreign policy in the late eighties,41 religion began to draw attention in the academy. 
Historians have recently begun to look at the role of religion in the general development 
of the Cold War. Following the trend, SHAFR (Society for Historians of American 
Foreign Relations) organized a conference on the role of ideology in the Cold War. In 
his conference paper about religion and U.S.-South Asian relations, Andrew J. Rotter 
pointed out that “the sense of religious mission carried into the Cold War.”42
While this argument might not necessarily apply to every struggle throughout the 
Cold War, the religious factor had a unique role in the Korean War. What is lacking in 
the Korean War historiography is the sense of the continuity of missionary influence in 
Korean-American relations. Since the presence of American missionaries in Korea was a
39 See Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn o f the Atomic 
Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985). See also Allan Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety about 
the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
40 H. W. Brands, The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993).
41 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).
42 Andrew J. Rotter, “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and U.S.-South Asian Relations, 1947- 
1954,” Diplomatic History 24 (Fall, 2000): 596.
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major factor in American involvement in Korean affairs since the 1890s, to overlook the 
role of missionaries during the Korean War is to ignore a major element of American 
containment policy on the peninsula. Evidence shows that the participation of 
missionaries in the war shaped the nature, perception, and development of the overall war 
efforts. It is ironical that the press in the 1950s gave more coverage to the presence of 
missionaries than did historical texts in the decades to come. It is not historically 
accurate to ignore the essential role of religious groups that were deeply affecting the 
public sentiment and opinion towards American foreign policy. Therefore, this research 
effort aims to explore the background of missionary activities in Korea and to put these 
missionaries and their supporters back into their proper context as influential players in 
the historical developments of the Korean War through documenting their actions and 
examining their influence throughout the war period.
A CULTURAL APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
In 1950, East Asian historian John K. Fairbank strongly advised that the US 
government ought to make full use of non-state actors to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives in Asia. He pointed out that “American individuals, whether in business or in 
social services, with all their variety of talents and the multiplicity of organizations which 
they represent, [were] the apostles of the democratic idea.” Thus, Fairbank argued, “to 
keep them out of Asia [was] to tie one hand behind us.”43 In order to enhance America’s 
competitiveness against Communism in Asia, Fairbank suggested that the US 
government should arrange more private American contact with Asian governments and
43 John K. Fairbank, ‘The Problem of Revolutionary Asia,” Foreign Affairs 29 (October 1950): 112.
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expand programs for educational and cultural exchange.44 Along lines similar to 
Fairbank’s reasoning, the availability of a number of experienced American missionary 
veterans and well-established Christian institutions in Korea would, in fact, prove to offer 
a convenient vehicle for state and non-state partnerships during the post-World-War-II 
and Korean-War period, when the US government was not capable of carrying out its 
political and military objectives without civilian help.
Because of Fairbank’s influence upon the study of East Asia and China-American 
relations, the role of missionaries as effective non-state actors in the conducting of 
foreign relations during the late nineteenth century is a well-recognized factor in the 
study of diplomatic history, although less work has been done to extend this analysis into 
the Korean War period. Missionaries functioned not only as evangelists, but also as 
educators, social workers, and medical providers. They were important promoters of 
“cultural diffusion,” transmitting western ideas, customs, and religious beliefs into other 
parts of the world. Through their churches, schools, hospitals, and circulated printed 
materials, missionaries did more than preach; they set up new institutions that brought 
vital, sometimes even revolutionary, changes to the native populations. As historians 
Kenneth Scott Latourette and James E. Wood, Jr. have observed, the influence of 
Christianity, Christian workers, and Christian institutions often served as “catalysts for 
change” that “was far out of proportion to the relatively small number of people 
involved.”45
In Korea, missionary activities were responsible for the rapid growth of Korean 
Christianity throughout the twentieth century. Starting in 1905 when Japan controlled
44 Ibid.
45 James E. Wood., Jr., “Editorial: Religion, Revolution, and Nationalism in Asia,” Journal o f  Church and 
State 14 (Winter 1972): 9.
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Korea, the church, which was seen as an advocate for Korean nationalism, began to gain 
popular support. The process of cultural diffusion initiated by Protestant and Catholic 
missionaries never completely stopped, even after the Japanese annexation of Korea in 
1910. Missionaries continued to carry out their work despite the many pressures and 
restrictions that Japan imposed upon them. Because a large number of them were 
Americans, their missionary work and sympathetic attitude toward Korean independence 
generated a pro-American sentiment within Korean society. After a four-year 
interruption because of World War II, individual missionaries began to return to South 
Korea in 1946. American missionaries, in particular, experienced an unprecedented 
expansion of their personal influence during and after the Korean War period.
This research contributes to the historiography of the Korean War by drawing 
upon primary sources from various church, government, and public archives in the 
United States and South Korea to analyze the influence of these religious institutions and 
their activities during the war period and the years leading up to it. By doing so, it not 
only adds new materials to the study of the war, but also sheds new light on the 
development of Korea-American relations and the growth of Christianity in South Korea.
There are three levels of analysis in this study. First, it traces the development of 
indigenous Korean Christianity, and evaluates its political impact upon Korea. Second, it 
investigates the role of American missionaries in Korea, particularly those who remained 
during the Korean War period. Third, it examines the impact of missionaries and 
American churches on official US policy towards Korea. These three levels of analysis, 
however, are interdependent and inseparable from each other.
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In the pioneering stage, Korean Protestant churches, unlike their counterparts in 
China and Japan, enjoyed a high level of autonomy as a side effect of the lack of mission 
funding and missionary personnel. But later events would reverse this autonomy. 
Intense Japanese persecution of the church, followed by the death of many prominent 
Protestant leaders before and during the Korean War produced a leadership vacuum. In 
response, missionaries were called upon to provide assistance. They began to exercise a 
greater influence on the preservation and reconstruction of Korean churches. Their 
guidance at this crucial time ensured the survival and continued growth of Christianity in 
South Korea.
Missionaries gained another sort of influence as well. With the Korean War 
dominating the headlines, missionaries found themselves in the spotlight. Korean 
political and religious leaders, lacking communication channels or resources of their own, 
would seek out missionaries to give voice to their causes before the American people and 
the western world, hoping to gain political support and foreign assistance to revive and 
rebuild their war-torn country and religious institutions.
Meanwhile, American churches also turned to these missionaries for information 
and advice. As a result, with solid support from their home churches, individual 
missionaries and the overall missionary activities not only shaped the development of 
Korean Christianity, but also influenced the views of American policy-makers in 
Washington and American civilian officials and military generals stationed in Korea. 
The Korean War, therefore, marked an unparalleled intimate collaboration between state 
and non-state actors in American diplomatic history. It not only maximized American
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political, economic, social, and cultural influence in Korea, but also led to the exceptional 
growth of Christianity in postwar South Korea.
On the whole, missionary activities accomplished what foot soldiers and 
diplomats alone could not achieve: a sentimental connection between South Korea and 
the United States. Through religious publications (magazines and pamphlets), mission 
reports, circulated letters, personal testimonies, documentary movies, and radio 
broadcasts, missionaries and religious groups connected the war zone to the American 
home front. They described the extensive war damages and unprecedented human 
suffering caused by the war. Because of the missionaries and their sponsoring 
denominations’ tireless efforts to promote relief for Korea, Americans church-goers and 
the general public felt a stronger personal responsibility for the Korean people and the 
rebuilding of their country.
Though religion played a significant role in developments within both America 
and Korea during the war period, it would be too simplistic to suppose that the religious 
community spoke with one voice. While American churches might band together for 
relief programs, the church community was composed of many people with varied 
political ideologies and opinions on foreign affairs. This complexity of the religious 
factor in shaping US foreign policy was shown in the relationship between 
missionary/church activities and the official direction of American policy in fighting the 
Korean War. On the one hand, the religious interests and humanitarian concerns of the 
American churches and missionaries helped to justify American intervention in Korea 
and fed the popular sentiment of religious anti-Communism in the United States. But on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
the other hand, religious interests promoted the desire for peace and the idea of fighting a 
“limited war.”
On another occasion, when General Douglas Mac Arthur and South Korean 
President Syngman Rhee wanted to expand the war by using atomic weapons, some 
Protestant Church leaders in the United States cautioned Truman against starting a third 
world war. It so happened that the more liberal elements of the church held many of the 
key offices in various missionary organizations and inter-denominational agencies, 
thereby strengthening their influence over the Truman administration. Yet, missionaries 
in the fields of China and Korea, Protestant fundamentalists, and the American Catholic 
Church all held deeply anti-Communist sentiments and tended to rally behind General 
MacArthur and President Rhee in advocating a tougher stance.
To demonstrate the role of religion in the Korean War, this dissertation divides its 
discussion into two major parts. Part one consists of four chapters on the role of 
missionaries and religion on Korea and U.S.-Korea relations prior to the outbreak of the 
Korean War, whereas part two contains another four chapters on the influence of 
religious actors (missionaries, church leaders, evangelists, and individual lay Christians) 
on US military and relief efforts dining the war period.
Chapter 1 describes long-established American religious interests in Korea since 
the 1890s and explains how missionary activities affected the rise of modem Korean 
nationalism. The religious factors of the Korean War were deeply rooted in the influence 
of religion on Korean nationalism. Famous Korean nationalists, such as An Ch’ang-ho 
(1878-1938), Syngman Rhee (1875-1965), and Cho Man-sik (1882-1950), were mostly 
Christian educators who favored a non-violent approach to secure Korean independence
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after Japan colonized Korea in 1910. When Christians, together with other nationalist 
groups, eventually rose up to support Korean independence during the March First 
Independence Movement in 1919, missionaries reported Japanese atrocities to their 
Mission Boards, seeking to mobilize public opinion at home to support their Korean 
brethren. Although their efforts failed to bring forth any immediate political support for 
Korean independence from the West, these activities became the prologue to the potential 
political and social influence of American missionaries and the Korean Christians on 
post-liberation Korea when the peninsula was under the shadow of Communist 
domination.
Chapter 2 analyzes religious factors and political developments in the northern 
zone. The end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945 brought forth an intensive postwar 
power struggle between two opposing groups of nationalists. For the convenience of 
accepting the Japanese surrender by Russian and American troops, Korea was divided 
along the 38 Parallel. The Allied occupation in the two separate zones intensified 
domestic competition. In the north, the power of domestic Communists was not strong 
because only a few Communist organizations of significance existed before 1945. 
Instead, Christians were more influential and a coalition with different political groups 
was necessary to form a new government. Cho Man-sik’s new government in 
P’yongyang, however, was cut short due to his anti-trusteeship position and his 
unwillingness to compromise with the Soviet officials. As soon as Cho was kept under 
house arrest, Kim Il-sung rose to power and began a new land reform program at the 
expense of the capitalists, landlords, collaborators, and Christians. Many fled south in 
order to escape Communism.
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Chapter 3 analyzes the role of Christianity in the political development of the 
southern zone. Political competition between leftists and rightists, as well as among 
different rightist factions caused serious instability below the 38th Parallel. While the 
Christian population in the north was shrinking, the Christian community in the south 
was growing in numeric strength and political influence. The role of Christianity was 
strengthened when individual American missionaries began to return to Korea by taking 
up positions in the American Military Government (AMG). Because of their ability to 
speak some amount of English, or even, in some cases, because of their relationship with 
missionaries, Korean Christians found many job opportunities in the military government. 
From 1946 to 1949, Christians gradually moved from the political periphery to the 
political center, taking up important roles in the formation of a separate regime in South 
Korea. With the support of the Christian community, refugees, and rightists, Syngman 
Rhee emerged as the victor in South Korean politics.
Chapter 4 discusses the role of religion in US foreign policy prior to the outbreak 
of the Korean War. Most cultural historians agree that Christianity was a key factor in 
the formation of American nationalism,46 anti-Communism, and a uniquely American 
Cold War culture.47 The formation of an American “civil religion,” according to 
religious historian Donald Swift, was one of the important characteristics of how the US 
differentiated itself and its role in the world from that of the Soviet Union.48 Religious 
beliefs and values were essential in shaping the American perception of and response to
46 See John Fousek, To Lead the Free World (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2000).
47 See Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996).
48 Donald C. Swift, Religion and the American Experience (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998), 261.
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the Soviet Union.49 President Harry Truman carefully defined the Cold War contest 
through a religious lens. He emphasized the importance of religious freedom in western 
democracy and hoped to build a western religious alliance to counter the Communist 
threat in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In addition, American churches (both 
Catholic and Protestant) had vast religious interests in East Asia, especially in China, 
Japan, and Korea. Church leaders wanted the United States to keep the door to China 
open, to transform postwar Japan, and to assist Korea in obtaining its independence. 
Taking advantage of the American religious climate, Syngman Rhee’s publicity team in 
Washington tried to mobilize public support for economic and military aid to South 
Korea through religious channels. Missionaries in Korea also offered their assistance by 
urging their American patrons to continue their support for the freedom of Korea.
Chapter 5 first traces political and diplomatic conditions in the Korean peninsula 
in the months prior to the Korean War and examines the role of religious interests in 
justifying an American military intervention to save South Korea. The civil conflict 
between the North and the South intensified between 1948 and 1950. Frequent border 
clashes made the 38th Parallel a very dangerous boundary. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union restrained their client states from launching an all out attack against their 
enemy. The situation, however, began to change in early 1950. The Soviet Union 
reversed its policy and decided to support Kim U-sung’s military unification strategy.
In the south, Syngman Rhee’s government pressed for more military and 
economic aid from the United States, but very little aid actually materialized. Meanwhile, 
for the first time since its creation, Rhee’s government succeeded in taking control of the
49 Dianne Kirby, “Religion and the Cold War -  An Introduction,” Religion and the Cold War (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, Ltd., 2003), 1.
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guerrilla-infested Cholla regions, minimizing the impact of Communist subversive 
activities. Tension along the 38th Parallel, however, continued to mount. Mixed signals 
of a potential all-front attack from the North clouded the political atmosphere in Seoul. 
In the midst of uncertainty and fear, the South Korean Christian community organized a 
multi-city evangelical crusade. Political and religious visitors from the United States 
brought hope and assurance, but all these efforts were dashed on June 25, 1950 when the 
North Korean army finally launched a full scale surprise attack along the 38th Parallel. 
Seoul fell within days and all American civilians were ordered to evacuate to Japan. 
While the future of South Korea depended on the reactions of the United States 
government, the future of the Korean churches depended on the decisions of individual 
missionaries.
Chapter 6 describes the activities of American missionaries in the war zone and 
evaluates their contribution to the overall war effort. Sixteen Presbyterian missionaries, 
who volunteered to stay behind, offered their services to the US military and organized 
relief efforts to assist the refugees. Later, some who had evacuated returned by re- 
enlisting themselves as civilian chaplains, medical officers, intelligence officers, and 
interpreters. Their language skills and knowledge of the Korean terrain were invaluable 
assets for the US Army. They participated in General MacArthur’s famous Inch’on 
Landing and the battle for the liberation of Seoul. Meanwhile, with limited resources, 
civilian missionaries within the Pusan Perimeter organized private relief efforts to assist 
refugees. Throughout the war, their letters and reports on the war provided information 
that was crucial for the American churches to organize a successful nationwide relief 
effort.
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Chapter 7 discusses the work of missionaries among North Koreans and examines 
their efforts in preserving and expanding the influence of Christianity in South Korea. 
When the tide of the war turned in favor of the UN side, the United States decided to 
cross the 38th Parallel. Following the troops, missionaries marched to North Korea. In 
P’yongyang, Chinnamp’o, Wonsan, Hungnam, and Seoul, missionaries helped hundreds 
and thousands of Christian refugees in their efforts to flee south. In addition, they also 
assisted in the establishment of a Christian-dominated Chaplain Corps for the South 
Korean Army that placed Christianity in a key position to further political and social 
expansion in the postwar years.
Chapter 8 examines the influence of American church leaders on Truman’s 
Korean War policy and assesses the importance of religious factors upon the POW issue. 
Because of China’s intervention, the war turned into a military stalemate along the 38th 
Parallel. Different opinions on how to fight the Korean War deeply divided the US 
government. In the United States, the war grew more and more unpopular as the prospect 
of victory grew less and less. But truce talks snagged over the issue of the repatriation of 
the prisoners or war (POWs). American missionaries worked among the refugees and the 
Communist POWs. The conversion of these Communist soldiers brought a serious 
problem to the US government, however, because many of the newly converted prisoners 
refused to be repatriated back to North Korea or Communist China. The United Nations 
POW camps suddenly became a new war zone between pro-Communist and anti- 
Communist prisoners. Delivered through the missionaries, anti-Communist prisoners 
presented petitions signed in their own blood to the US government and the American 
public. The idea of granting ex-Communist soldiers voluntary repatriation inspired
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President Truman to seek a “psychological victory” in Korea. His (and Eisenhower’s) 
insistence on voluntary repatriation prolonged the war for an additional two years.
The role of religion in U.S. foreign policy has usually been subtle or invisible, but 
throughout the Korean War, because of missionary activities, religion emerged as a key 
factor in redefining American war aims. When Eisenhower accepted the Republican 
nomination for president in 1952, he said, “You have summoned me... to lead a great 
crusade -  for freedom in America and freedom in the world.”50 Obviously, the battle for 
freedom in Korea was in the mind of the presidential candidate. The idea of leading a 
crusade, so common in the American terminology of the 1950s, signifies the influence of 
religion upon American ideology in the early Cold War decades.
50 Quoted in Rotter, “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and U.S.-South Asian Relations, 1947- 
1954,” 596.
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Christianity in Korea and U.S.-Korean Relations 
Before the Korean War
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CHAPTER 1
Christianity and the Rise of Modern Korean Nationalism 
INTRODUCTION
Historian Walter B. Jung pointed out in his book, Nation Building: The 
Geopolitical History o f Korea, that “Korea’s precarious endeavors in defending the 
national identity in the early periods and the division of the nation into two parts at the 
outset of the cold war era can be comprehensible only through an adequate understanding 
of the dynamics of the regional geopolitics.”1 How did geopolitics relate to Christianity, 
the rise of Korean nationalism, and the Korean War? There are three aspects of analysis 
needed to untangle this complex relationship.
The first geopolitical consideration is Korea’s relationship with its neighbors. 
The location of Korea has a vital strategic value to its neighbors, particularly China and 
Japan. By taking control of Korea, it would increase the security and the expandability of 
its controller (or conqueror). In order to survive, Korea had, for centuries, balanced these 
surrounding powers. The history of collaboration and conflict between Korea and its 
neighbors during the late Choson period illustrated this geopolitical condition.
The second aspect of geopolitics is Korea’s relationship with the West. Korea, 
unlike much of East Asia, was slow to attract the attention of the industrialized nations. 
It was never colonized by a Western imperial power. Nevertheless, the powers of Europe 
and America did gradually come to recognize Korea’s value to their own political,
1 Walter B. Jung, Nation Building: The Geopolitical History o f Korea (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, Inc., 1998), v.
27
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economic, and cultural aspirations. Their desires for political influence, their hope to 
extend commercial activities, and their responsibility to protect their missionaries and 
shipwrecked seamen motivated the Western powers to send more gunboats to the Korean 
coast. Imperialism in East Asia also destabilized the geopolitics of the entire region. The 
West’s imposition of an unequal treaty system upon China contributed to the decline of 
the Manchu (Qing Dynasty) empire thereby, in turn, weakening Korea’s ability to keep 
Japan and other nations at bay.
The third aspect of geopolitics is Korea’s internal condition. As Korea’s 
independence became endangered by the escalation of foreign aggression, it stirred up 
new nationalistic feelings among the people. The first American missionaries arrived in 
the midst of this unpredictable period of change. Their activities served as a catalyst and 
a navigator that not only facilitated the process of transformation, but also to a great 
extent directed it according to their own ideas. Their vision for Korea influenced the 
long-term development of Korean society. Christianity emerged as an important political 
and ideological force to be reckoned with by anyone who would rule Korea.
KOREA AND ITS NEIGHBORS IN EAST ASIA
Located on the far eastern end of the Asian continent, the two Koreas of today 
now border China and Russia to the northwest by two rivers (the Yalu and Tuman) and 
face the islands of Japan to the southeast, across 112 miles of water known as the Korean 
Strait. Throughout most of its history, however, Korea did not border Russia. This 
border was established in 1860, after China ceded the maritime region east of the Ussuri 
River to the Czar under the Treaty of Beijing (Peking), which enabled the Russians to
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reach the Tuman River and to construct a naval base in Vladivostok. Prior to its contact 
with Russia and other Western powers, China and Japan were the major forces that 
affected the stability and development of the Korean peninsula.
Korea’s Relations with China and Japan before the Choson Dynasty 
Though many Western observers of the early twentieth century perceived Korea 
as a weak tributary state of China or as a poor victim of its powerful neighbors, more 
recent research by both Korean and Japanese historians have revealed that Korea 
maintained its own high level of civilization. In some areas of technological achievement 
and cultural heritage, Korea was completely independent of and different from China. 
Far from always being under the control of its neighbors, Korea greatly influenced the 
development of the Yayoi culture and the formation of a new Yamato state in ancient 
Japanese history. In fact, throughout its long history, Korea not only retained its 
independence (most of the time), but also preserved its identity, culture, language, and 
customs. This identity as a people was the strong force that kept the nation united in the 
midst of its neighbors.
In its lengthy history of contact with the Han Chinese and other powerful tribal 
groups of northeastern Asia, Korea had successfully resisted the political and territorial 
expansion of China. Except for a brief period when the Han emperor, Wudi, set up four 
provinces in the northern part of Korea in 108 B.C., Koreans remained in full control of 
the peninsula. Korean independence was hard fought. The Chinese emperor, Sui 
Yangdi, invaded Korea in 598 A.D., with one million troops, but was decimated. Korea 
also repulsed the Tang emperors’ multiple attempts at conquest.
2 See Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: The Story o f a Phoenix (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 23-36.
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The military strength of Korea could not, however, stand against the powerful 
Mongol invasion of 1234. Once subjugated, Khubilai Khan (1215-1294), immediately 
forced Korea to participate in the expeditions designed to conquer Japan in 1274 and 
1281. Both attempts, however, failed because Mongol forces were was not experienced 
in fighting sea battles. In 1592, three hundred years after the Mongol assault, the 
Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598) decided to invade Korea as part of 
his plan to take over the Middle Kingdom (China). He sent 150,000 troops, under the 
command of Konishi Yukinaga (1555-1600), a devoted Japanese Catholic,3 across the 
Korean Strait and launched a surprise attack on Pusan. Among Konishi’s troops, there 
were about 18,000 Christian warriors. Father Gregoria de Cespedes, a Spanish priest, 
was also sent to minister to the troops.4 Seoul was lost within the first twenty days and 
the king fled first to Pyongyang and then to the northern border city of Uiju.
Despite suffering great initial losses, the Korean navy, under General Yi Sun-sin’s 
leadership, was able to seize control of the sea, dividing the Japanese forces from their 
homeland. In 1598, the Korean militia, with Chinese assistance, successfully pushed the 
Japanese army back to its own shores after six years of grueling war.5 The war came to 
an end when Hideyoshi died in 1598. Hideyoshi’s invasion completely devastated the 
Korean peninsula, caused great suffering to the Korean people, and further weakened the 
Choson Dynasty, marking the beginning of its long decline. When the Manchu rose to
3 Konishi Yukinaga brought with him a Spanish Jesuit, Gregorio de Cespedes, to minister to the Japanese 
Christian warriors. See Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: The Story o f  a Phoenix (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1997), 109.
4 W. J. Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 
in Korea’s Response to the West, ed. Yung-Hwan Jo (Kalamazoo, MI: The Korea Research and 
Publications, Inc., 1971), 43.
5 Lee, Korea and East Asia, 98-107.
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power, Korea was left with little strength to defend itself against its invasion in 1637 and 
opted to serve the Manchu and end its relations with Ming China.
Chosdn’s Diplomacy 
In order to survive between these two potentially aggressive neighbors, Korea 
adopted the diplomacy of sadae (‘serving the great’) toward China and kyorin 
(‘neighborly relations’) toward Japan.6 In dealing with China, Korea paid tribute in order 
to obtain an informal defensive alliance against Japan. In dealing with Japan, Korea 
skillfully established an equal-footing, ceremonial relationship. Korea would send 
occasional “communication envoys” to Edo (Tokyo), and carefully controlled the trading 
activities in designated trading ports. According to Japanese historian Takemichi Hara, 
the Korean government tried throughout the Choson Dynasty to “bar all intercourse” of 
any non-official activities between Korea and its two neighbors, hoping to maintain peace 
and to minimize contact that might jeopardize the survival of the nation.8 Thus, it began 
a rigid foreign policy that would earn Korea the nickname, “the Hermit Kingdom.”
According to the traditions of the tributary system, the Korean king would send 
tribute to China once a year. He was to send the best of native Korean products, such as 
gold, ginseng, and celadon art works, to offer to the Chinese Emperor. In return, the 
Chinese would give them a large amount of Chinese goods as “gifts” from the emperor to 
bring back to their king. Historians regarded these sorts of annual exchanges as bilateral 
trading activities under the control of the two governments.9 The tributary relationship
6 Takemichi Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century 
Korea,” Modern Asian Studies 32 (May 1998): 392.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Warren I. Cohen, East Asia At the Center: Four Thousand Years o f  Engagement with the World (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
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between Korea and China served as a political and military alliance to guard against their
potential common enemies. In this way, Korea not only enjoyed full independence, but
also enhanced its national security and strengthened its economy.
Christianity Entered Korea through Tributary Missions
Try as the government might to be a “Hermit Kingdom,” outside influences could
not be totally avoided. Those Koreans who were sent on the tributary missions to China
brought back with them not only goods, but also new ideas. Korean leaders wanted to
maintain national peace and security by keeping foreigners at bay. But once Korean
emissaries stepped on Chinese soil, they were out of the control of the Korean court.
During the months when the members of the missions stayed in Beijing, they usually
crowded into bookstores, searching for the latest Chinese publications.10 They also
visited the Nan-t’ang (South Church), where Jesuit priests, who served in the Manchu
court as directors of the Imperial Board of Astronomy, lived. These Catholic priests
would give them both scientific and religious materials (books about “the Lord of
1 1Heaven”) printed in Chinese. Nan-t’ang thus served as a tiny window for the Korean 
visitors to have a glimpse of the mysterious Western world.
"When all these materials were brought back to Korea, a small group of officials 
and scholars that belonged to the sirhak (Practical Learning) school would read them 
with great interest.12 Some of these officials were also members of the tributary missions 
who were experts in Chinese literature and language. Through these written materials,
10 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 43. 
See also Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 
393.
11 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 43; 
Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 393.
12 Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 393.
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Catholicism gained its first convert, Li Sung-hun, the son of a senior member of a 
tributary mission.13 By the time a Chinese Catholic priest, Chou Wen-mo, was sent by 
the bishop of Beijing to Korea in 1794, there were already four thousand converts waiting 
eagerly for his arrival.14
Catholicism, however, aroused new social conflicts between its converts and the 
traditional Korea society, because the Korean Catholics were instructed to abolish the 
practice of ancestral worship.15 Fearful of the subversive nature of Christianity, tensions 
began to build and anti-Catholicism fomented among conservative officials and the 
gentry.
‘Shinyu’ Persecution 
The growth of the Korean Catholic Church came to an abrupt end a few years 
later during a political power struggle at the Korean court. Some of the Catholic converts 
were high officials under King Chong-jo (1777-1800). When the king died in 1800, the 
political rivals of these converts found an easy excuse to stir up trouble for them. The 
Queen Regent, the young king’s mother, having a personal dislike of Catholicism, saw an 
opportunity to assert her political power. She issued an edict in 1801, which was called 
the year of Shinyu by Koreans, to exterminate those who persisted in the “evil teaching,” 
which referred to Catholicism. When the Chinese priest tried to stop the persecution by 
turning himself in, the Korean government immediately beheaded him without getting 
permission from the Manchu court.
The wrath of the Queen Regent and her supporters against Catholicism was 
further intensified when a secret letter to the Bishop of Beijing was found in the
13 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 44.
14 Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 393-394.
15 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 44.
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possessions of a young Catholic scholar, Hwang Sa-yong. The letter, written on a thin 
piece of silk, described the persecution of Korean Catholics, the power struggle inside the 
Korean court, the victimization of Korean converts by opportunistic officials, the unjust 
execution of the Chinese priest, and the desire for foreign intervention to stop the horrible 
persecution. The request for a Chinese annexation of Korea and the suggestion that 
European gunboats be sent to protect Korean Catholics served not only to justify the 
court’s charge of treason, but also to confirm the court’s fear of the subversive nature of 
Christianity.16
In order to avoid any diplomatic problems over the hasty execution of the Chinese 
priest, and so as to have a free hand to exterminate all Christian elements, the Queen 
Regent sent a distorted report to the Manchu emperor, explaining the death of the 
Chinese priest. Upon hearing the report, the Manchu emperor praised the young Korean 
king’s efforts to exterminate the evil bandits in his country, but he refused to 
acknowledge that the source of Korean Catholicism was China. The emperor only 
ordered his border officials to return all Korean-Catholic fugitives back to Korea.
Diplomatic Crisis Caused by the Execution of French Priests
Since Koreans could not completely control border traffic and the Chinese 
emperor refused to give any help to cut off the source inside China, Catholicism survived 
the Shinyu purge and regained its strength within two decades, despite the harsh 
conditions imposed by the Korean government. The success of Korean Catholicism later 
caught the attention of the Catholic Church in the Western world. In the 1830s, French 
priests began to arrive, disguising themselves in native clothes. They came either by 
crossing the Korea-China border or by being dropped off by fishing boats along the
16 Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 396-397.
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17coast. They were Father Jacques-Honore Chastan, Father Pierre-Philibert Maubant, and 
Bishop Laurent-Joseph-Marie Imbert. As soon as the Korean government discovered 
their existence, they were promptly executed by the Korean court.18
At about the same time as these Catholic priests arrived, “strange” ships were 
being sighted more and more frequently along the Korean coast. Some of them, like the 
Lord Amherst, a ship belonging to the East India Company, came in search of trade, 
while others, such as the British ships, Alceste and Lyra, requested food provisions and 
water. In most cases, the Koreans either rejected their demands for trade politely or 
answered their requests for aid cordially. However, things began to change in the 1840s 
following the execution of the three Catholic priests by the Korean government in 1839 
and the conclusion of the First Opium War (First Anglo-Chinese War) (1840-1842).19 
Korea witnessed China’s humiliating defeat when the Manchu government signed its first 
unequal treaty, the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), with the British, yielding to their demands 
for a large indemnity, more treaty ports, extraterritoriality for British citizens, most- 
favored-nation status, a fixed tariff, ceding Hong Kong, and evangelical rights of foreign 
missionaries in the interior part of China. Since then, more hostile gunboats with 
aggressive commanders soon came knocking on Korea’s door, demanding the country to 
be opened for trade and evangelization.
17 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 45.
18 Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 401.
19 The First Opium War started in 1840 because of the conflict caused by the illegal opium trade conducted 
by British traders and the effort of the Manchu government to confiscate and destroy opium. The British 
government sent warships with a large force to revenge the destruction o f three million pounds of opium by 
Commissioner Lin Zexu. Although Lin initially succeeded in defending Guangzhou (Canton), the British 
moved northward to attack other coastal towns at will. Eventually, the British took Guangzhou with 
another bigger force and sailed up the Yangtze River. They also seized the Manchu government’s tax 
barges, jeopardizing not only the revenue of the imperial court, but also threatening the security of the 
interior. Fearing further loss of money and face, the Manchu decided to seek peace. The Treaty of Nanjing 
was signed in 1842.
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In 1845, fearful of further foreign encroachments, Korea asked the Manchu 
government to restrain Western powers from sailing into Korean waters. The Manchu 
court tried to assist Korea, but with very limited results. In 1846, the French Admiral 
Cecille brought three gunboats and presented a letter questioning the execution of the 
three French priests. He left with a promise to return in a year for an answer.20
The French returned in 1847 with two gunboats under the command of Captain 
Lapierre, but before they could reach Inch’on, the two ships ran aground near the 
southwestern coast of the peninsula. When the Korean court received Lapierre’s called 
for assistance, it immediately prepared an informal reply that included an explanation of 
the Korean government’s decision to execute the priests and its desires to avoid trade 
relationships with Western countries. Unfortunately, by the time the note was delivered 
to Lapierre’s location, the crew had been rescued by the British and was on its way to 
Shanghai. With no other choice, the Korean government submitted a report to the 
Manchu court and requested that their informal note be forwarded to Lapierre.21
Taewdn’gun’s Anti-Foreignism and Isolationist Foreign Policy
Foreign encroachment on China in the late 1850s further endangered the position 
of Korea in defending itself against Western intruders. The conclusion of the Second
20 This event caused serious diplomatic concerns within the Korean court because it had never reported the 
death of the three French priests to the Chinese court and it could not answer Cecille’s request directly due 
to their tributary relations with China.
21 Qiying, the governor-general of Guangdong, passed the note to the French, but because he paraphrased it 
according to his own ideas and tune, the note did not reflect the exact Korean’s tone and rationale of their 
policy. To make the matter worse, the Manchu government failed to inform the Korean government of 
Governor Qiying’s recommendation to treat the French courteous to avoid further incidents. Koreans, 
therefore, found themselves poorly prepared diplomatically to handle new confrontations with the French 
and other foreign gunboats when they appeared again in 1866. See Hara, “Korea, China, and Western 
Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 409-414.
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Opium War in China (1858-1860)22 disheartened Koreans and threatened the security of 
Korea. In the Treaty of Beijing (Peking) of 1860, the Manchu government agreed to cede 
to Russia the maritime provinces of eastern Manchuria down to what is now Vladivostok. 
These lands used to be controlled by the states of Puyo, Koguryo, and Parhae, who shared 
a common ancestry with the Korean people. Koreans had tried to reoccupy them after the 
fall of the Yuan Dynasty in 1388, but Ming forces had claimed the area instead. The 
Manchu’s concession to Russia not only deprived Koreans of their hope of reclaiming 
their ancestral land, but it brought a Western power, Russia, right up to Korea’s border. 
As Russian gunboats began to appear along the Korean coast to survey the shoreline, the 
Korean court took serious consideration of its security.
Meanwhile, in early 1863, the young Choson king, Ch’ol-jong, died without 
leaving an heir. The second son of his third cousin ascended to the throne and became 
King Kojong. Kojong was only a boy, so his father, Taewon’gun, controlled the court as 
regent. Judging that the Manchus had made too many concessions to foreigners and that 
the power of the Middle Kingdom was in decline, Taewon’gun decided to take a tough 
stand against foreign encroachment and initiated an ambitious but extremely conservative 
reform aimed at strengthening the power of the central government. One of his strategies
22 The Second Opium War was also known as the Arrow War because it broke out following the arrest of 
the crew o f the Arrow, which was a British-registered, Chinese-owned merchant ship. The British used this 
incident as an excuse to attack Guangzhou (Canton) and seek a new treaty to expand their interests in 
China. An initial truce was concluded in 1858 when both sides agreed to sign the Treaty o f Tianjin. The 
peace, however, was cut short and hostility broke out again when the Manchu officials refused to honor 
their promise of allowing the British to set up their embassy in Beijing. The joint army o f Britain and 
France entered Beijing, burning the emperor’s Summer Palace to the ground. The Manchu government 
finally ratified the Treaty of Tianjin, now called the Treaty of Beijing, in 1860, agreeing to open more 
treaty ports, cede the Kowloon Peninsula, pay a huge indemnity, allow foreign governments to set up 
embassies in Beijing, and give foreigners permission to sail freely on the Yangtze River. Following the 
Treaty of Beijing, other foreign powers also pressured China to sign treaties so that they could expand their 
interests and activities in China.
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was to tighten the closed-door policy by renewed suppression of Catholicism, which had 
by then gained as many as 18,000 native converts within two decades.23
In early 1866, Korea faced a national crisis. A Russian gunboat appeared at 
Wonsan, demanding the right to trade and threatening that troops were ready to cross the 
northern border if Korea refused. While the Korean court deferred the issue to the 
Manchu government by citing their tributary status with China, there was grave alarm. 
Taewon’gun was desperate for an effective way to resist Russian demands.
Hoping to avoid another persecution, the Catholics tried to use the crisis to their 
advantage. It was suggested to Taewon’gun by John Nam, a Catholic official in the 
court, and by Thomas Kim, an influential Catholic layman, that there were French 
missionaries in Korea who could help in securing an alliance with England and France.24 
Rumors said that Taewon’gun was interested at first, but due to the fear of offending 
China and the voluntary withdrawal of the Russian gunboat, the plan was dropped.25 
French Gunboats’ Attempt to Take Kanghwa Island 
The Catholic revelation that there were foreign priests inside of Korea turned out 
to be a terrible miscalculation. Upon their return from Beijing, Taewon’gun’s special 
envoys incorrectly reported that the Manchu government planned to put all Europeans to 
death.26 Now knowing that priests were hiding somewhere in the country, Taewon’gun 
began to hunt them down. Within a month, ten French priests and about forty converts 
were arrested and executed. Others were either hiding or mnning for their lives. News of
23 Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1946), 115.
24 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 46.
25 Ibid.; see also Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century 
Korea,” 417.
26 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 46.
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the purge reached the commander of the French Asiatic Squadron, Admiral Pierre- 
Gustave Roze, in Tianjin, China, through one of only three foreign survivors, Father 
Felix Clair Ridel.27
In response, Admiral Roze took a survey trip on September 18, 1866 to plan for a 
formal campaign against Korea. Before the French charge, Henri de Bellonet, could even 
inform the Manchu government of the plan, seven French warships containing about 600 
troops and guided by three Korean Catholics arrived at Kanghwa Island on October 16.28 
Situated at the mouth of the Han River, Kanghwa was an important island for the defense 
of Seoul, and had historically served as a refuge for the Koryo king during the time of the 
Mongol invasion. The security of Seoul was in jeopardy when two gunboats, la 
Deroulede and Tardif, sailed up to the Han River.29
The Korean government was shocked by the development and in response sent a 
strong letter to the Manchu court stating its decision to resist the French. Chinese 
officials expected Korea to be easily defeated, but the war took a surprising turn. 
Although Admiral Roze captured Kanghwa, he did not have the manpower to hold the 
island because the French government refused to commit more troops to fight in Korea. 
Admiral Roze had no choice but to withdraw.
To express their discontent, French troops took out their anger on Kanghwa 
Island. Many innocent civilians perished and national treasures were plundered by the
27 After consulting with the French charge, Henri de Bellonet, in Beijing, the French sent an angry note to 
the Zongli Yamen, which was the office of foreign affair of the Manchu court, threatening to attack Korea 
and dispose the Korean king, if  necessary. When the Chinese refused to press Korea to open their country 
and issue passports to foreign missionaries, the French decided to go to war. See Hara, “Korea, China, and 
Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 418.
28 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, 117. See also Soo Bock Choi, “Korea’s response to 
America and France in the decade of the Taewongun, 1864-1873,” in Korea’s Response to the West, 110.
29 Choi, “Korea’s response to America and France in the decade of the Taewongun, 1864-1873,” 110-111.
30 Lawrence H. Battistini, ‘The Korean Problem in the Nineteenth Century,” Monumenta Nipponica 8 
(1952): 48.
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retreating soldiers. The departure of the French fleet, sadly, gave Taewon’gun a false 
sense of security and led him to think that his isolationist and militant approach was the 
proper way to deter foreign encroachment. The incident also stirred up hatred against all 
Westerners and their Korean Catholic converts. Over the next four years, about eight 
thousands native converts were beheaded.31
The Tragedy of the ‘General Sherman ’
Prior to Korea’s clash with the French, an American merchant ship General 
Sherman, which was headed by an English captain with a crew of mostly Malays and 
Chinese, appeared along the Taedong River, heading toward P’yongyang.32 A Scottish 
missionary Robert J. Thomas was also on board as an interpreter. The ship was loaded 
with merchandise for trade. Because the sailors were unfamiliar with Korean weather 
and waters, the ship became stranded in the sand near P’yongyang, after the flood waters 
of the Taedong River receded. Running out of food and getting no local assistance 
because of the strict edict against contact with foreigners, the sailors chose to raid nearby 
villages in order to survive. Their action brought down the wrath of the villagers, who 
mistook them for a pirate ship. An angry mob set the ship on fire and killed all of the
33crew.
This unfortunate incident could have given America a good excuse to join forces 
with the French in attacking Korea, but Secretary of State William H. Seward decided to 
resolve the crisis through peaceful means. Anson Burlingame, the American Minister to
31 Ibid., 46.
32 Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Anne Walthall, and James B. Palais, East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political 
History (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), 437.
33 When Kim Il-sung took power in North Korea a hundred years later, he claimed that his great­
grandfather had led the mob to attack the ship. Kim Il-sung described this incident in his autobiography, 
With the Century, V ol.l (North Korea: Korean Friendship Association, 2003), 10, http://www.korea- 
dpr.com/library/202.pdf. See also Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care o f  the Fatherly Leader:
North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004), 13.
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China, brought the case before the Chinese court, but got no answer because the Chinese 
claimed that it would not interfere with the internal affairs of Korea.34 The United States, 
therefore, dispatched two gunboats to Korea, the U.S.S. Wachusett, under the command 
of Robert W. Shufeldt, and later, the Shenandoah, under the command of John C. 
Febiger. They were sent to inquire about the General Sherman incident, and to chart the 
rivers leading to Seoul to prepare for further necessary military actions.
In 1871, the United States government sent a special expedition to Korea, in the 
hopes of obtaining a treaty for the protection of shipwrecked sailors. The mission was 
headed by Frederick F. Low, the new American Minister to China, with the support of 
Admiral John Rogers, the American squadron commander. The expedition consisted of 
the flagship Colorado, the corvettes Alaska and Benicia, and the gunboats Monocacy and 
Palos, carrying 85 guns, and 1,230 men.35 Five Korean Catholic converts served as 
guides.
Minister Low demanded the Korean government to send high ranking officials to 
conduct negotiations with him. When the Korean officials brought back the message that 
Taewon’gun wanted peace but had no desire for any treaty, the Americans tried to exert 
pressure by sending two gunboats sailing towards Seoul. The Korean troops on Kanghwa 
Island opened fire at the American boats.
Minister Low decided to increase the pressure by destroying all of the fortresses 
on Kanghwa Island. He thought to improve his position by instilling fear and respect 
through a show of force. But instead, Taewon’gun proclaimed a new anti-foreign edict 
with the support of the whole country. Another anti-Christian squall swept across the
34 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, 120.
35 Choi, “Korea’s response to America and France in the decade of the Taewongun, 1864-1873,” 118.
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peninsula and more Catholic converts were beheaded. Seeing that negotiations were over 
and that his expedition was too small to storm Seoul, Minister Low decided to 
withdraw. Taewon’gun’s policy of seclusion once again triumphed and the door of 
Korea reminded tightly shut, at least for another five years.
THE OPENING OF KOREA BY JAPAN
While Western gunboats failed to intimidate Korea in opening up for trade and 
evangelism, Japan made its own attempt at securing a treaty of friendship and commerce. 
Like Korea, Japan had initially refused to open its door for Western traders, except the 
Dutch. However, after witnessing Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s demonstration of 
Western gunpower during the 1853 America Expedition to Edo, Japan gave up its 
seclusion policy and signed Japan’s first treaty with the United States, the Treaty of 
Kanagawa (1854), and later the first commercial treaty with the United States in 1858.
Meiji Reform and Territorial Expansion 
The opening of Japan hastened the downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate (1600- 
1887) and brought rapid political, economic, and social changes in Japan. The Meiji 
Restoration (1868) and the ensuing progressive reform movement gradually transformed 
Japanese government and society. The new Japanese government devised effective 
means to expand its central power. By both persuasion and threat, the government was 
able to take the feudal lands back from the daimyo peacefully and to establish a new and 
effective taxation system that enabled the central government to finance radical reform 
programs modeled after the West. Meiji reforms included zealous efforts to appropriate 
and adapt Western industrial technology, judicial institutions, and constitutional theory.
36 Ibid., 119-127.
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Despite Japan’s own history as a closed society, its interaction with and 
admiration of the West led them to champion imperialism and territorial expansion. The 
Darwinist idea of the “survival of the fittest” radically altered Japan’s foreign policy 
outlook. Since the Western imperialists had imposed an unequal treaty system on Japan 
using powerful gunboats, the Japanese were eager to shake off this yoke by building their 
own powerful gunboats and establishing a strong army. Then they could not only hold 
their enemies at bay, but also conquer their weaker neighbors.
In the decades following the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government 
gradually took steps to secure its borders and to build up its military strength for 
territorial expansion. Because Russia had acquired China’s maritime provinces of eastern 
Manchuria down to Vladivostok in 1860, it directly threatened Japan’s interests in the 
neighboring Sakhalin and Kuril Islands. In order to safeguard its northern frontier, Japan 
settled the issue with the Russians in the Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1875). Japan agreed 
to give up its claim to Sakhalin and, in return, Russia would not challenge Japan’s 
position in the Kuril Islands. Previously, in 1869, the Japanese government had smashed 
the remaining Tokugawa loyalists in Ezo (Hokkaido), and, by 1886, had assumed full 
control of Hokkaido by establishing three prefectures there. It then turned its attention to 
securing its southern frontier by annexing the Ryukyu Islands in 1879. Korea and 
Taiwan, located to Japan’s east and south, were the next potential areas for Japanese 
expansion.37
Japan’s Gunboat Diplomacy
The Korean government, under Taewon’gun, considered Japan’s compromises 
with the West as a sign of cowardice, and despised Japan’s ready acceptance of European
37 Ebrey, Walthall, and Palais, East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History, 416-426.
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ideas. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan had sent several envoys to Korea (in 1868, 
1867, and 1871), hoping to re-open relations. But the Korean court refused to receive the 
Japanese representatives and humiliated them.38 The aggressive faction within the 
Japanese government demanded an invasion of Korea in response. Yet, instead of 
retaliating immediately, the Japanese government decided to wait for an appropriate time.
Their opportunity came in 1875, when the Japanese gunboat Unyo Kwan was 
fired upon by Korean troops near Kanghwa Island, while surveying the coast. In 
response, Japan destroyed the attacking fort and stirred up a popular clamor for war 
against Korea. With Japan’s gunboats, led by General Kuroda Kiyotaka and Count Inoue 
Kaoru, holding Kanghwa Island and threatening the security of Seoul,39 Japan’s diplomat, 
Mori Yurei, negotiated with the Manchu government. He protested against Korea’s 
persistent rejection of Japanese representatives and its unreasonable attack on the Unyo 
Kwan. In his note to the Manchu government, Mori threatened that Korea would suffer 
“an incalculable calamity” if it refused to accept Japan’s demand for a treaty of 
friendship.40
In reality, Japan’s diplomacy was a ploy with two aims: to trick China into 
pressuring Korea into opening its borders and to test the waters of China’s commitment 
to defend Korea. Although China had never given up its suzerain claim over Korea, it 
was unwilling to dictate Korea’s internal affairs or to declare its commitment to defend 
Korea. China’s ambiguous position delighted the Japanese. Mori deceived the Chinese 
by paying lip-service to China’s special position over Korea, even while Japan’s true
38 Battistini, “The Korean Problem in the Nineteenth Century,” 49.
39 With a force of three warships and eight hundred troops, the Japanese expedition was able to capture 
Kanghwa Island in December 1875. See Carter J. Eckert et al, Korea Old and New: A History (Seoul: 
Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), 200.
40 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, 127-128.
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motive was to expand its own political and economic influence in Korea. Not suspecting 
Japan’s true agenda, Li Hongzhang, who was in charge of the Manchu government’s 
foreign affairs, instructed the Korean court to receive Japan’s mission.41
Japan’s public cry for another war of conquest against Korea, its new gunboats, 
and its skillful diplomatic maneuvering had left Korea with little choice but to comply 
with their demands. Vulnerable without China’s protection, and still remembering the 
destruction wrought by Hideyoshi’s invasion, Korea had every reason to be fearful. 
Korea’s traditional diplomacy of sadae ( ‘serving the great’) to China and kyorin 
(‘neighborly relations’) to Japan was in fact on the brink of collapse. Serving China 
alone was no longer useful in ensuring Korea’s independence.
When the Japanese representatives arrived in Seoul on February 6, 1876, they met 
a more receptive Korean court. King Kojong’s new wife, Queen Min, had ousted 
Taewon’gun to gain control over the court. Korea was now ready to conclude a treaty. 
Within a month, the Treaty of Kanghwa was signed. Korea agreed to establish 
diplomatic relations with Japan, open three ports for trade and foreign settlement, and 
give Japanese the right of extraterritoriality. The treaty also allowed Japanese boats to 
survey Korean coastal waters at will and granted special economic privileges to Japanese 
merchants in Korea. In 1880, Japan set up its legation in Seoul.
The most important element of this treaty, however, was that Japan recognized 
Korea as an independent state which enjoyed “the same sovereign rights” as Japan. It 
meant that Japan ceased to recognize Korea as a tributary state of China. The treaty 
paved the way for Japan to detach Korea from the suzerainty of China and to bring Korea 
under its own influence instead.
41 Ibid., 129-130.
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China’s Response to the Treaty o f Kanghwa
The 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa alarmed many Manchu officials. Li Hongzhang 
worried about Japan’s real intentions in Korea. These fears mounted when, in 1879, 
Japan annexed the Liu-ch’iu (Ryukyu or Okinawa) kingdom. Liu-ch’iu had been a 
tributary state of both China and Japan; if Japan could swallow one Chinese vassal state, 
then why not another? A look at any map would show what a tempting prize Korea 
would be to an expansionist Japan. Korea had psychological as well as political value to 
China because it was by then the last tributary state of the Middle Kingdom, Annam 
having already fallen into the hands of the French in 1863. Losing Korea would be the 
final blow to the declining prestige of the Manchu government.42
China began to look for ways to neutralize Japan’s rapidly growing influence over 
Korea, and to prevent its annexation. Li’s solution was to pit “barbarian against 
barbarian.” If two great powers could be played against each other, each might keep the 
other in check. A Western power had to be invited into Korea to counteract the Japanese. 
But which nation should it be? Li chose the United States, because it had shown little 
interest in territorial expansion in East Asia.
Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt and his Treaty
The expedition of 1871, despite its failure, had demonstrated the United States’ 
interest in a treaty with Korea. Japan’s success with the Treaty of Kanghwa had aroused 
some US officials to contemplate making another attempt of their own. Commodore 
Robert W. Shufeldt was sent by Secretary of State William Maxwell Evarts to investigate 
the possibility of a new attempt. He first approached the Japanese government, seeking 
their “good offices” for aid in securing a treaty with Korea. The Japanese refused, of
42 Ibid., 135.
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course, because, except for Chinese-Korean relations, they enjoyed a monopoly in Korea 
and did not want to share their influence with other Western powers. By the same logic, 
the Chinese were eager to assist the US. Hearing of the Americans’ rebuff by Japan, Li 
Hongzhang at once invited Shufeldt to visit him in Tianjin. He promised Shufeldt that he 
would persuade the Choson government to negotiate a treaty with the United States.43
In early 1882, Li Hongzhang convinced the Korean court to sign a treaty with 
America. Through the treaty, Li hoped to lure the United States into formally 
acknowledging Korea as a vassal of China. Shufeldt refused to include this language in 
the treaty,44 but he did promise to write a letter stating that he had requested China’s 
assistance in concluding the treaty because Korea was its dependency. Shufeldt also 
agreed to dispatch a letter from the Korean king to the President of the United States, 
stating that the treaty was concluded with the consent of China.45 Fearing foreign 
religious and cultural expansion into Korea, Li also requested that the treaty include the 
provision that “the [Christian] church shall not be established,” but the American 
representatives refused his proposal.46 Therefore, when the Korea-U.S. Treaty of Amity 
and Commerce was finally signed in the city of Tianjin, the anti-religious provision was 
omitted.47
The treaty was historically and politically significant, not only because it was the 
first treaty made by Korea with a Western nation, but also because it was the first attempt 
to seek American assistance in preserving Korean independence. Article I of the treaty
43 Ibid., 138.
44 Shufeldt refused because both he and the new American minister to China, John Russell Young, feared 
that it might drag the United States into defending interests in Korea. See ibid., 144.
45 Battistini, “The Korean Problem in the Nineteenth Century,” 52.
46 Kyong-man Hong, “Formation of Korean Protestantism and Its Political Nature,” Korean Journal 23 
(1983): 19.
47 Allen D. Clark, A History o f  the Church in Korea (Seoul: The Christian Literature Society of Korea, 
1971), 71-72.
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stated clearly that “there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of 
the United States and the King of Choson [Korea] and the citizens and subjects of their 
respective Governments. If others deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, 
the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an 
amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.”48
Interpreted broadly, this provision could imply that the United States recognized 
Korea as an independent country rather than a dependency of China. A letter from King 
Kojong to President Arthur stated that, even though Korea was a tributary state of China, 
the king had always retained full sovereignty over internal and external matters, and thus, 
the Korean government would carry out the provisions of the treaty completely in 
accordance with international law.49
Official relations between Korea and the United States improved markedly when 
the king sent an eight-man diplomatic mission to the United States under Chief Envoy 
Min Yong-ik and Deputy Envoy Hong Yong-sik. In addition to cementing official ties 
between the two countries, the mission’s goal was to obtain American advisers, teachers, 
and loans. One official, Yu Kil-chun, stayed in the United States to attend the Governor 
Dummer Academy in Massaschusetts. Upon their return to Korea, some members of the 
delegation became champions of radical reform based on Western models.50
The Korea-US Treaty, according to historian Walter B. Jung, was “typical of the 
time; two countries agreed to exchange diplomats, to establish consulates at trading ports,
48 U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Conventions Concluded Between the USA and Other Powers 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1889), 216.
49 Battistini, “The Korean Problem in the Nineteenth Century,” 53.
50 Eckert et al, Korea Old and New: A History, 204.
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and to treat each other based on equality.”51 It also became, in the words of Jung, “a 
good precedent for other Western powers interested in establishing similar treaty 
relationships with Korea.”52 Treaties with similar characteristics were signed by Korea 
and other Western powers: Britain and Germany in 1883, Italy and Russia in 1884, 
France in 1886, and Austro-Hungary in 1889. All of these powers agreed to recognize 
Korea as an independent country.
Despite its amicability and lenient terms, the first Korea-US treaty was, 
nevertheless, still an “unequal” treaty between a Western imperialist state and a weaker 
nation. Foreigners enjoyed the protection of extraterritoriality and expected economic 
concessions from the Korean court. It required no gift of prophesy to foresee that foreign 
encroachment would eventually hurt Korean sovereignty and worsen the existing 
political, economic, and social problems, unless the nation undertook substantial reform.
The Korean court was deeply divided over these changes. Most leaders argued 
that unless Korea reformed itself and began modernization programs, it could not survive. 
The question was, however: which model of reform should Korea follow? Some Koreans 
looked to the Japanese model.53 Some looked to China. Others looked to the United 
States.
As Korea begrudgingly opened its doors to the West, many of the destabilizations 
that they had feared were bound to occur. Radical political, economic, and social 
transformations were on their way. The old Korea was passing away and the shape of the
51 Jung, Nation Building: The Geopolitical History o f Korea, 150.
52 Ibid.
531 used the word “saw” because many Progressives had visited Japan and were impressed by what they 
saw in Meiji Japan. The first political coup d’etat initiated by pro-Japanese progressive reformers (mostly 
young students from the high yangban class) in 1884 was the direct result of what they learned after 
spending two years in Japan. See Se Eung Oh, Dr. Philip Jaisohn’s Reform Movement 1896-1898: A 
Critical Appraisal o f  the Independence Club (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1995), 5.
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new Korea was not yet known. It was a tumultuous period of intense rivalries within the 
Korean court and of frequent diplomatic disputes and of major military confrontations 
between Choson’s neighbors. Foreigners, both diplomats and missionaries alike, did not 
merely witness this fall, but contributed, directly or indirectly, to the changes that were 
sweeping the nation.
PROTESTANT MISSIONARIES AND THEIR INITIAL WORK IN KOREA
The conclusion of a Korea-US treaty opened the door for foreigners to reside in 
Korea, but it did not mean that missionary activities were legal according to Korean law. 
Anti-foreignism, including distrust of foreign religions, remained strong across the 
peninsula. Public evangelism was still prohibited, so American churches chose to begin 
with medical and educational work instead of direct evangelism. Before sending 
missionaries, the Americans first obtained the Korean king’s approval to build schools 
and to practice medicine.
The Arrival o f American Protestant Missionaries 
In 1884, the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions (USA) redirected their first 
missionary, Dr. Horace N. Allen, a medical worker serving in China, to Seoul. He 
arrived at In’chon on September 20. Although he was a missionary supported by the 
Presbyterian Board, he also came with an official title (though no official salary) -  The 
Physician of the American Legation in Seoul. His diplomatic status and connections 
shielded him from religious persecution and gave him legitimacy and influence in Seoul. 
Being the only Western doctor available at the time, he was warmly welcomed by most 
of the foreign residents, who were haunted by frequent outbreaks of strange diseases in
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this ancient city.54 Dr. Allen thereby made many friends within the diplomatic and 
business circles.
A year after his arrival, various American boards of foreign missions started 
sending ordained ministers and medical workers to Seoul. From the Presbyterian Church 
(North) came Rev. Horace G. Underwood and Dr. Horace Herod, and from the Methodist 
Episcopal (North) came Rev. and Mrs. Henry G. Appenzeller, Dr. and Mrs. W. B. 
Scranton, and Mrs. Mary F. Scranton. Step by step, they began to open hospitals, build 
schools, and establish churches. These two denominations cooperated closely in their 
Korean evangelical work. Over the next decade, in addition to the above-mentioned two 
groups, missionaries would arrive in Korea from many denominations, including 
Australian Presbyterian in 1889, Canadian Baptists in 1889, Church of England in 1890, 
Presbyterian (South) in 1892, Canadian Presbyterian in 1893, and Methodist Episcopal 
(South) in 1896.
Missionaries and the Korean Royal Family 
There is little dispute that medical service was the key to the success of American 
missionary work in Seoul. Dr. Allen’s “magic” healing (from the Korean viewpoint) of 
the Queen’s nephew, Prince Min Yong-ik, set the medical missionaries above all other 
foreigners in the Hermit Kingdom. The prince, who had visited Washington in 1882 as a 
Korean representative, was seriously injured during an attempted coup by pro-Japanese 
progressive reformers.55 When Dr. Allen saved his life, he earned a high reputation for 
both himself and Western medicine among the most powerful Korean officials in Seoul.
54 In Soo Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modern Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920 (New York:
Peter Lang, 1996), 18.
55 Horace N. Allen, Things Korea: A Collection o f Sketches and Anecdotes, Missionary and Diplomatic 
(New York: Fleming and H. Revell, 1890), 70.
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Afterward, Dr. Allen and his missionary colleagues became the trusted friends of 
the imperial family, thereby benefiting the position of all American missionaries in Seoul. 
The doctor was hired as the physician to the Royal Court and was given the status of a 
Korean nobleman so that he could enter the palace and see the king or his family 
whenever needed. When Dr. Allen asked for a Western hospital, the king provided all 
that was needed and named the hospital as Chai Chung Won (House of Civilized 
Virtue).56 The king later granted permission to the Methodists as well, for a second 
hospital, named Sibyongwon (Universal Relief Hospital). Dr. Lillias Horton, a 
Presbyterian medical missionary, became the Queen’s personal physician.
As the number of missionaries increased, their relationship with the royal family 
also deepened. Dr. Allen, in particular, soon became one of the most influential 
foreigners in Seoul.57 Although his political views were quite different from most of the 
other missionaries -  and also from the American officials in Washington -  his personal 
influence upon the court promoted the advancement of U.S.-Korean diplomatic and
c o
economic relations.
Educational Contributions o f Missionaries 
In addition to offering medical services, missionaries also set up schools so that 
they might teach and indirectly minister to Korean people. With the endorsement of the
56 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modem Korean Nationalism, 19-20
57 In the next two decades of his service in Korea, Dr. Allen emerged from being a medical missionary to 
become the king’s informal adviser; and then he served Korean interests as the Foreign Secretary o f the 
Korean Legation in Washington. When he returned to Seoul in 1889, he was then hired by the American 
legation as its secretary and from there he was finally promoted to be the Minister of the American 
Legation in the summer of 1897. Jongsuk Chay described him as the most involved and the most important 
individual in American-Korean relations from the 1890s to 1905. See Chay, Diplomacy o f  Asymmetry,
119.
58 Dr. Allen believed that America was the nation that could save Korea and a formal Korean-American 
alliance would serve the interests of both sides. He had advised the Korean king to give several important 
mining grants and construction works to American business corporations. See Fred Harvey Harrington, 
God, Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905 
(Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1944).
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king, the first school, Paejae haktang (Hall for Rearing Useful Men), was established in 
1886 by Rev. Henry Appenzeller. Soon afterward, a school for young girls was founded 
by Mrs. Mary F. Scranton; this school later became the famous Ewha University for 
Women.59 The Presbyterians and other mission organizations in Seoul soon followed the 
Methodists’ example and set up their own schools, seminaries, and eventually 
universities. Presbyterian and Methodist became the two most influential Protestant 
denominations in Korea.60 In 1886, there were two mission schools. But by 1910, 
American missionaries were running 1,623 schools of all categories, enrolling more than 
130,000 students. These American schools accounted for about 93 percent of all foreign 
mission schools.61 In fact, American missionaries established schools faster than they
59 Several famous women nationalist activists among Americans were graduates from Ewha Women’s 
University, including Helen Kim and Louise Yim. Both of them were Methodist women and Syngman 
Rhee’s supporters.
60 The Anglican Church sent its first evangelist, a Japanese convert, to Korea in 1880. But it would be ten 
more years before the church sent its first British missionary, Bishop John Charles Corfe. He focused his 
efforts on medical work, instead of education, with the assistance of some Catholic priests and nuns. After 
seven years, Bishop Corfe found his first Korean convert. Although Bishop Corfe arrived in Korea only a 
few years later than the Presbyterian missionaries, the Anglican Church in Korea ultimately failed to 
produce a native ministry. Unable to master the language or endure the harsh living conditions, Bishop 
Corfe and his Anglican coworkers gradually retired from Korea. During the Japanese colonial period, the 
church experienced some growth and built a beautiful cathedral in Seoul. But Anglicanism only had 
marginal influence upon the Korean Christian community. When the English priests were withdrawn at the 
outbreak of World War II, the church suffered from a lack of native leadership and funding. After World 
War II, only a few Anglican missionaries returned, but funding from war-torn Britain remained scarce 
throughout the Korean War and reconstruction period. A change occurred in 1956 when the new Bishop, 
John Daly, adopted full self-supporting and self-governing policies for the native Church. Since that time, 
the Anglican Church has begun to expand its influence in Korea. See John B. Whelan, ‘The Anglican 
Church in Korea,” International Review o f Missions 49 (April 1960): 157-163.
61 See Chay, Diplomacy o f  Asymmetry: Korean-American Relations to 1910, 6. Some other sources 
suggested the amount as 755 (see Table 7) or 778. (See Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modern 
Korean Nationalism, 65.) Chay’s data is from a Korean source which I cannot verify, but it should still be 
reliable because the new research by the Korean educationists indicates that some non-mission run private 
schools were actually owned by individual Christians who had connected with the churches or missions.
See Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 122.
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built churches.62
Gradually, Christian education developed into an effective means of transplanting 
American ideals into young Korean minds. Mission schools not only taught Christian 
doctrine, but also provided students with a Western liberal education, including the 
sciences, mathematics, the English language, and the humanities. In 1910, at least a third 
of the schools in Korea were run by foreign missionaries. Even as late as 1929, after 
more than twenty years of Japanese colonial control, Christian schools still graduated a 
third of the high school students in Korea.64 “These schools,” historian Jongsuk Chay 
pointed out, “which ranged from primary schools to colleges, not only introduced 
Western culture to the Koreans, but also produced young patriots who later played an 
important role in every field of Korean society.”65
These mission schools, moreover, became a direct challenge to the traditional 
Confucian education, which was controlled by the yangban (the name for the highest 
class of scholar-gentry in Korean society) class. Since the beginning of the Choson 
Dynasty, Neo-Confucianism66 was Korea’s official ideology and Koreans generally
62 There were about 687 Presbyterian churches and 359 Methodist churches and chapels (very primitive 
churches) in Korea. Data of the Presbyterian churches is taken from Park, Protestantism and Politics in 
Korea, 33; and data of the Methodist churches is from “Korea Conference 1910,” Annual Report o f the 
Board o f Foreign Missions o f  the Methodist Episcopal Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The 
Institute for Korean Church History, 2001): 380-381.
63 Daniel M. Davis, ‘The Impact of Christianity upon Korea, 1884-1910: Six Key American and Korean 
Figures,” Journal o f  Church and State 36 (1994): 795-820. Davis’ research is mainly on Henry G. 
Appenzeller and the influence of Christian education on Korea.
64 Reported by C. A. Sauer, “Korea Conference,” (1929) Annual Report o f  the Board o f Foreign Missions 
o f the Methodist Episcopal Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church 
History, 2001): 823.
65 Chay, Diplomacy o f Asymmetry: Korean-American Relations to 1910, 3.
66 Neo-Confucianism was a Zhu-xi style Confucianism.
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adhered to its teachings more strongly than the Chinese did.67 Most of the Korean 
yangban scholars had been educated in Confucian schools in the hopes of passing the 
government examination and receiving lucrative jobs in public service.
Therefore, before the 1890s, the only school available for Korean children was the 
male-bastion sodang (Book Hall) in their own village. There, boys learned old Chinese 
writing and Confucian classics under the guidance of their sodang master. Students were 
obliged to memorize the Sohak (Elementary Learning) textbook, in order to be promoted 
to a higher level and eventually acquire the status of a Confucian scholar.68 “These texts 
were nothing,” said Hong Ul-su, a Korean from South Kyongsang Province who was 
bom in 1905, “but Chinese history, poetry, stories about warriors and artists, you name 
it.”69 Both the educational content and the teaching method served to draw the Korean 
elites closer to China and to resist changes that might subvert the political, economic, and 
social base. Since Japan did not begin its own educational work in Korea until after the 
turn of the century, it was the Western mission schools that presented the first major 
threat to the existing educational system. Later, when Japan attempted to achieve 
complete control over the colonial school system in Korea and impose the Japanese 
language, these existing mission schools were a constant obstacle.
These three educational systems can be compared. The traditional Confucian 
schools emphasized the Chinese language and culture; after 1910, Japanese schools
67 Zhu Xi-style Confucianism was a form of Confucianism that was developed by Zhu Xi (1130-1200) in 
Song Dynasty in China. Zhu Xi-style Confucianism was later completely distorted by the Mongol rulers 
during the Yun Dynasty in order to suppress the nationalistic or anti-foreign elements of Confucianism. 
Instead, it emphasized the familialistic elements and ritual formalism of Confucians so that the Chinese 
would be kept under the Mongols’ control. See Thomas Hosuck Kang, “Changes in the North Korean 
Personality From Confucian to Communist,” in The Politics o f North Korea, ed. Jae Kyu Park and Jung 
Gun Kim (Seoul: ^  Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 1979), 68.
68 Ibid., 91.
69 Hildi Kang, Under the Black Umbrella: Voices from Colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 37.
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emphasized the Japanese language and culture; the American mission schools, however, 
did not focus on the language and culture of America. Although these subjects were 
taught, the students learned just as much about the Korean language and culture. Only 
the mission schools taught Korean history and used han ’gul™ Han ’gul was the Korean 
alphabetic script invented by King Sejong and a group of Korean scholars in 1450 A.D. It 
was one of the most perfect phonetic alphabets in the world and was very easy to learn.71
Despite its good quality and potential benefits, han’gul was never popular among 
the educated yangban class, because they valued their superior position as Chinese 
scholars.72 Anyone could learn han’gul, and then what would make the yangban special? 
Therefore, the Confucian masters at the sodang discouraged the use of han’gul. As a 
result, illiteracy was quite high during the Choson period.
Seeing the potential effectiveness of the native alphabet for teaching and 
evangelism, missionaries used han ’gul widely in their mission schools and publications. 
The process began when Rev. Horace G. Underwood learned han’gul through a native 
Korean teacher, Song Sun-yong. He then systemized his learning methods, and 
published two important books in English on the Korean language in 1890: An 
Introduction to the Korean Spoken Language and A Concise Dictionary o f the Korean 
Language™ These two books helped Koreans to unify and standardize their language, 
by providing a standard grammar and terminology. They became important learning 
tools for both natives and foreigners. With this system, Korean students only needed
70 Han’gul was also known as Onmun. For the sake of the yangban, the mission schools taught Chinese so 
that the mission school graduates would not be looked down upon by the educated Confucian scholars, and 
there was also a general need to know enough Chinese characters in order to master the materials written 
by traditional and famous Korean scholars at that time.
71 See Clark, A History o f  the Church in Korea, 13-14.
72 The use of Chinese characters for official documents and for other higher level written materials was far 
more popular than was the native alphabet. Han’gul was reserved only for low-grade novels. Ibid., 14-15.
73 Lillias H. Underwood, Underwood o f Korea (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1983), 94-95.
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about two weeks to master han’gul. Some children brought their materials home and 
taught their parents and siblings how to read and write han’gul. In this way, the literacy 
level of the common people gradually improved. This was the most unique feature of the 
contribution of missionary work to Korean society, setting the Korea experience apart 
from that of other Asian countries.
The classes offered by the mission schools prepared students for the changing 
national and international conditions. Mission school students were required to learn at 
least three written languages: han’gul, Chinese, and English. They were also encouraged 
to study their own history and acquire a basic knowledge of their historical and cultural 
roots.74 Initially, these classes were criticized by the yangban as lacking scholarly value. 
But slowly, the study of Korea’s own history began to arouse a Korean national 
consciousness. Just as the sodang had encouraged students to admire China and thus 
drew students closer to the Chinese way of thinking, the mission schools taught Western 
culture and drew students closer to America. Nevertheless, by emphasizing Korean 
language and history, students at the mission schools were also encouraged to keep their 
Korean heritage even while they were being exposed to a wider body of knowledge.75
The Influence of Missionary Publications 
As han’gul gradually became more popular among both the Korean youth and 
churchgoers, the demand for reading materials in han ’gul steadily increased. At first, the 
use of han’gul was only common among Christians, because the Korean Bible, religious
74 Later when the Japanese took over Korea, the students were forced to give up han’gul and use the 
Japanese language. The colonial government did not allow any Korean history and cultural classes in order 
to uproot the Korean national identity and make the Korean people loyal Japanese nationals.
75 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f M odem Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 68-69.
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books, and mission schools’ textbooks were mostly published in the Korean script.76 The
situation began to change when the first Korean newspaper, The Independent
(.Doklipsinmun), was published in han’gul in 1896 by Philip Jaison (SS Chae-pil), a
Korean Christian reformer returned from the United States.77
Missionaries took the lead in setting up their own religious and academic
publication businesses to propagate their religious beliefs and Western ideals. Rev.
Henry Appenzeller, for instance, founded the Trilingual Press, allowing Paejae’s students
to work there to earn money for room, board, and tuition.78 Later, in 1895, Appenzeller
also took over Korean Repository, which was originally founded and edited by Franklin
Ohlinger, an American publisher. Appenzeller published his own editorials in this
magazine in three languages (English, han’gul, and Chinese). The Methodists even ran
their own bookstore, The Methodist Book Comer.
Likewise, Rev. Horace G. Underwood from the Presbyterian Missions also started
his own newspaper, Yesugyo hoebo (also known as Christian News in English),
publishing articles purely in han’gul. In describing her husband’s motives for editing
Christian News, Lillias Underwood wrote that it was:
to carry counsel and comfort to the Christian church, [and] to present to laborer and 
landlord, to Koreans of country and city, a practical Christianity which interested itself in 
their fields and finances, and ... brought them word of doings in distant lands... [it] 
brought to far away provincial officials ... news of foreign countries and articles on 
subjects of interest and help; the farmer found accounts of cotton and tobacco-raising in 
other countries, improved methods of fertilization and descriptions of better, though 
simple, farm implements; the merchant found news and articles on commerce in its 
columns.79
76 Clark, A History o f  the Church in Korea, 15.
77 Ibid. See also Oh, Dr. Philip Jaisohn’s Reform Movement 1896-1898,19-20.
78 Daniel M. Davis, “Henry Gerhard Appenzeller: His Contribution to Korean Independence, Democracy, 
and Modernization,” Tongbang hakchi 57 (1988): 211.
79 Underwood, Underwood o f Korea, 168.
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Translated Western materials could reach the minds and souls of the Korean people 
through these religious publications. Because the materials were quite popular even 
among non-Christians, the demand was so large that one copy of such a publication 
might possibly pass through hundreds of Korean hands.80
As these papers grew into important channels for Christian education, they 
gradually shaped the Korean people’s interests and opinions regarding both national and 
international issues. Meanwhile, missionaries also wrote numerous books and articles on 
Korea for their English speaking audiences.81 These materials became important sources 
of information on Korea for further economic, religious, and cultural interactions 
between Korea and the West.
DOMESTIC DISCONTENT AND FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS
While missionaries were actively bringing changes to traditional Korean society, 
foreign governments were also increasing their level of involvement in Korean political 
affairs. The problems started in 1876, as soon as the Treaty of Kanghwa was signed. In 
facing Japan’s challenge to its rights of suzerainty, the Manchu government decided to 
assert greater control over the Korean court. This move eventually brought China into 
direct conflict with Japan.
80 Kim, Prostestants and the Formation o f M odem Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 73-74.
81 For examples, Rev. James Scarth Gale, an independent British missionary financially supported by the 
American Presbyterian Mission in Korea, wrote a variety of books on Korean language, history, and 
culture. His most famous works were Korea in Transition (1909) and History o f  the Korean People (1927). 
They were scholarly studies o f Korean history and culture. Other well-known books on Korea by Dr. 
Horace N. Allen are Korean Tales (1889), A Chronological Index o f  the Foreign Relations o f  Korea from  
the Beginning o f the Christian Era to the Twentieth Century (1900), and Things Korean: A Collection of 
Sketches and Anecdotes, Missionary and Diplomatic (1890). Dr. Homer B. Hulbert, a Christian educator 
and a close advisor to King Kojong, wrote The Passing o f  Korea (1906) to lament the loss of Korean 
independence to the Japanese imperialists.
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Power Struggle in the Korean Court
Taewon’gun, who had been out of power since 1873, planned a political 
comeback in 1881. The anti-foreign faction of the Korean government, who looked to 
Taewon’gun for leadership, were upset at the king’s accommodative approach to foreign 
encroachment. Taewon’gun took advantage of their discontent to gain political support 
from some high officials. He plotted a coup to depose his son, King Kojong, who was 
under the heavy influence of his wife, Queen Min, and to replace him with another of his 
sons. This plan was exposed, however, and all of his allies were purged. Only because 
he was the king’s father did Taewon’gun escape punishment.82
Shortly afterwards, in mid-1882, Taewon’gun saw another opportunity. 
Discontented Korean troops began rioting against the government. They had not been 
paid for a year, due to corrupt officials from the queen’s family, the Min clan. 
Taewon’gun secretly gave his support to these rebels and sent his trusted aides to direct 
them. The soldiers seized weapons from the government armory and then attacked the 
prison, where other rebels were being held. Afterwards, they turned to destroy the 
Japanese legation in Seoul and tried to kill Queen Min. Once the rebels stormed the 
palace, Taewon’gun was back in power and sought to undo all of his son’s reforms. His 
victory was short-lived, however, because the Japanese returned with more gunboats and 
troops, demanding reparations for all the damages caused by the riot.
Chinese Intervention 
This Japanese response led the Manchu government to fear that a takeover of 
Korea was imminent. With the approval of King Kojong’s emissaries in Tianjin, the 
Manchu dispatched a force of 4,500 troops under the command of General Wu
82 Eckert et al, Korea Old and New: A History, 205.
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Changqing (Wu Ch’ang-ch’ing). It was the first Chinese military intervention into 
Korean affairs since 1636. General Wu seized Taewon’gun and exiled him to Tianjin. 
Queen Min, who was in hiding, quickly regained power. At that time, Japan was not 
ready to confront China, due to its own domestic financial difficulties, so the Japanese 
gunboats held their fire. They did, however, demand a new treaty and reparations for 
damages to the legation. To avoid war, the Korean court agreed. The Treaty of 
Chemulp’o (1882) was signed, giving Japan the right to guard its legation in Seoul.
Once they entered Korea, the Chinese forces showed no interest in leaving again. 
Allied with Queen Min and her supporters in the court, Commander Yuan Shikai, who 
was General Wu’s chief of the military secretariat and concurrently the associate director 
of Korean military affairs, grew to be the most powerful man in Seoul. He pressured the 
Korean court to grant new trading rights to Chinese merchants, allowing them to travel 
and conduct business freely in all Korea. With political support from the Chinese, 
conservative officials succeeded in blocking many pro-Japanese progressive reform 
programs. For nearly a decade, Yuan was in control of Seoul, using his power to 
minimize Japan’s monopolistic trading position in Korea.
While the Japanese residents in Korea watched the rise of Chinese political 
influence and economic competition in Korea, the Japanese government was waiting for 
the right time to challenge China and assert its own domination over Northeastern Asia. 
Manipulating the progressive Koreans’ anti-Chinese sentiment, Japan positioned itself as 
the true defender of Korean independence and the model for the Korean reform 
movement. In 1885, taking advantage of China’s conflict with France over Annam, 
Japanese officials pushed through a treaty with China in Tianjin, agreeing that both
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nations would withdraw their troops from Korea and that each should notify the other 
party in advance if troops were again needed to put down disturbances in Korea.83
The Tonghak Rebellion and the Sino- Japanese War (1894-1895)
After ten years of difficult struggle to overcome domestic opposition and another 
ten years to stabilize its economy and secure its borders, the Japanese government was 
finally ready to confront China. The opportunity came when the Tonghak Rebellion, the 
biggest rebellion in Korean history, broke out in 1894. Tonghak was originally a 
religious movement with a strong anti-Catholic sentiment. Its founder, Ch’oe Che-u, 
claimed to have received a revelation in 1860 and to have been miraculously cured of a 
mysterious disease. When he began to preach his religion, which he called Ch’ondogyo 
(Doctrine of the Way of Heaven), people confused it with Catholicism. In order to 
differentiate his religion from Catholicism, Ch’oe renamed his sect Tonghak (Eastern 
Learning), in contrast to Suhak (Western Learning). He attacked Christianity furiously 
whenever he preached. Ironically, Ch’oe was executed on the charge of being a Christian 
in 1864, during the period of Taewon’gun’s nationwide anti-Catholic purge.84
Ch’oe’s teaching was carried on, however, by his young relative, Ch’oe Si-hyong. 
Over the next decade, Tonghak became popular. Its idea that “all men are equal” 
attracted a number of followers among the oppressed who were tired of government 
corruption and social inequality. Periodic uprisings were instigated by Tonghak 
followers in the 1870s. In 1892, the sect had become so powerful that it openly 
engineered large non-violent demonstrations at Changye and Poun, petitioning the
83 Ibid., 172.
84 R. Pierce Beaver, “Chondogyo and Korea,” Journal o f Bible and Religion 30 (April 1962): 116.
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government to remove the guilty verdict of their founder, Ch’oe Che-u, and to permit 
freedom of worship, end corruption, and eliminate foreign influences.
As the rebellion spread from Kyongsang Province to the north, Seoul was 
threatened.85 Doubting the strength of his own troops and fearing the loss of his throne, 
King Kojong called on China for aid. The crisis quickly subsided, however, when the 
government reached an agreement with the Tonghak leaders by promising toleration of 
their faith and allowing them to set up administrative offices in the Cholla provinces.
The uprising was over, but the fallout of King Kojong’s premature appeal for aid 
was just beginning. As soon as the request for assistance reached Li Hongzhang, he sent 
1,500 Chinese soldiers to Korea without notifying the Japanese government. His action 
gave Japan an excuse to stir up a war against the Chinese. Ignoring Korean requests for 
both China and Japan to withdraw their troops, the Japanese army surrounded the Korean 
palace in Seoul, ostensibly to protect it from the rebellion. The Japanese army then 
attacked Chinese troops in the north, while their gunboats engaged the Chinese navy.
The political turmoil in Seoul and fear of Japanese domination over Korea caused 
the Tonghak worshipers to take up arms again. Its specific purpose was to drive out 
Japanese invaders from Korea and to remove pro-Japanese officials from the government. 
With the help of Japanese troops, the Korean army successfully suppressed the rebellion. 
According to the remnants of Tonghak followers, about 400,000 Koreans were killed in 
the uprising, including key Tonghak leaders.86
The turmoil of war and rebellion lasted for a year. Japan won and thereby 
imposed a harsh treaty, the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), on the Manchu government.
85 Ibid., 117.
86 Ibid. See also Eckert et al, Korea Old and New: A History, 221.
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The Chinese were forced to acknowledge Korea’s full independence and to repudiate all 
tributary ties with Korea. In addition to a substantial indemnity, Japan also demanded 
that China cede the Liaodong Peninsula and Taiwan. Through the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, Japan joined the unequal treaty system that the Western powers had 
imposed on China in the mid-nineteenth century. Their victory hastened the downfall of 
the Manchu government.
While Japanese troops were battling the Chinese and the Tonghak, Japan also 
took control of the Korean court, pressuring King Kojong to implement a series of 
progressive reforms without regard for Korean popular wishes. Pro-Chinese officials, 
mostly from the Min clan, tried to resist these demands. In response, the Japanese 
executed Queen Min and reinstated Taewon’gun in 1895. King Kojong became a 
prisoner in his own palace, his life hanging on the will of his father and the mercy of the 
Japanese minister. The queen’s loyalists made repeated attempts to save the king, as 
Korea entered a stage of deep domestic turmoil and political uncertainty.
The Growing Russian Influence in the Midst o f Turmoil 
Russia was carefully watching Japan’s moves in Northeast Asia, because it had its 
own designs on this region. In 1891, the Russians began constructing the Trans-Siberian 
Railway to link Moscow and Vladivostok. Russian and Japanese interests in Korea 
clashed when, in 1895, Crown Prince Nicholas expressed a desire for an ice-free port to 
the southeast of Korea or on the Liaodong Peninsula.87 Russia refused to sit idly by 
while Japan claimed the area due to the gains under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Joining
87 Harrington, God Mammon and the Japanese, 283.
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with the French and Germans, they advised Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula to the 
Chinese.88
Unwilling to confront Russia militarily, Japanese leaders swallowed their anger 
and gave up their claim to the peninsula. Fearing a Russian challenge to their control of 
Korea, Japan proposed dividing the Korean peninsula into two protectorates along the 
38th Parallel.89 Russia refused this offer, however, because they had eyes on the entire 
Korean peninsula. They had cut a secret deal with the Manchu government in 1896 for a 
twenty-five-year lease of the area around Lushun (Port Arthur), an important ice-free 
port-city located at the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula. The Trans-Siberian 
Railway was to be linked with the Manchurian Railway, connecting Vladivostok to 
Lushun. This arrangement strengthened Russia’s position in Northeast Asia. Russian 
officials calculated that, once they controlled Manchuria, they could easily hold sway 
over all of Korea.
Russia’s first direct challenge to Japanese control of Korea came in late 1896. 
Japan’s domination of the Korean court and its murder of the queen had produced strong 
anti-Japanese sentiment among the Korean population. King Kojong felt that he could 
regain control of the country, if he could only escape his gilded cage. He was a prisoner 
in his own palace and a puppet of his own father. His supporters could not reach him. 
But there was one exception, one group who had direct access to him: the medical 
missionaries. Their special status allowed them free access to the palace.
These missionaries had previously demonstrated their concern for the king’s 
safety during the time of the coup against Queen Min. At that time, three American
88 Charles A. Fisher, ‘The Role of Korea in the Far East,” The Geographical Journal 120 (September 
1954): 286.
89 Ibid., 287.
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missionaries had rushed to the palace to guard the lives of the king and the crown prince, 
while the king’s second son sought refuge in the house of Rev. Horace G. Underwood.90 
Now, with King Kojong fearing that his father might poison him, he would not eat any 
food other than that prepared by the missionaries or ladies from the European legations.91
Then, in February 1896, under arrangement by Dr. Horace Allen, the secretary of 
the American Legation at that time, King Kojong and the crown prince found their way 
out of the palace, by disguising themselves as a coolie and a palace woman, and fled to 
the Russian Legation. For about a year, the king ran the country from the Russian 
Legation. Dr. Allen was a top advisor. Westerners, especially Americans, received many 
economic benefits during this critical period of time. Because of his efforts to expand 
American economic interests in Korea, Allen’s diplomatic career also received a boost 
when, in 1897, the newly-elected President William McKinley appointed Dr. Allen as the 
United States Minister to Korea.
The Independence Club Movement (1896-1898)
Meanwhile, two American-educated Korean officials, Yun Ch’i-ho and Philip 
Jaisohn (So Chae-pil), who had both converted to Christianity, returned from the United 
States. They received the king’s approval to conduct reforms, which came to be known
90 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modern Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 55-56.
91 Ibid. See also Harrington, God Mammon and the Japanese, 275-276.
92 Harrington, God Mammon and the Japanese, 288-289.
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as the Independence Club Movement (1896-1898).93 The club organized symbolic 
projects for promoting Korean independence, such as the building of a great meeting hall, 
Independence Hall, on the site of the old Chinese embassy, and setting up the 
Independence Arch at the gate where the Chinese envoys used to be greeted.
The life of this movement was cut short, however, by Philip Jaisohn’s lack of 
political skills. Since the court was still filled with many conservatives, resistance to any 
radical change remained strong. Jaisohn did not foster friendships or seek understanding 
among the conservatives. Although his reform programs targeted many of the ills 
plaguing the nation -  an anti-corruption campaign, education reform, transportation 
improvements, economic development, and the formation of a constitutional monarchy -  
they also threatened the interests of those in power. Even King Kojong was afraid that 
Jaisohn’s programs would incite a revolution and destroy his imperial reign. Finally, in 
1898, King Kojong ordered the club to disband and its members to be arrested.
Although the movement came to an abrupt end and its members were dispersed, 
the spirit of independence continued both inside and outside of Korea over the next four 
decades. The club had also played a significant role in arousing anti-Russian sentiment 
in Seoul. The Russian government at that time did not have a strong urge to annex 
Korea, in spite of the pressure from expansionists led by Alexis Speyer, the new Russian
93 Yun Ch’i-ho (1865-1946) and Philip Jaisohn (1878-1938) were classic examples of Christian officials, 
who sought to enact reform. Before their conversions, both of them were born into high-ranking yangban 
families and received traditional Confucian training from a young age. Both became pro-Japanese 
reformers when they were selected and sent to study in Japan by the Korean government in 1882. When the 
1885 coup against the Min clan failed, they fled overseas. Both later received an education in the United 
States with the help of American churches. Both were very successful academically and both became 
devout Christians. For the case of Philip Jaisohn, see Oh, Dr. Philip Jaisohn’s Reform Movement 1896- 
1898, 5-12. For the case of Yun Chi-ho, see Chi-ho Yun, Yun Chi-ho’s letters (Seoul: Yonsei University 
Press, date of publication unknown).
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Minister to Korea in 1897. As soon as the Russians got their ice-free port at Lushun, they 
were willing to settle with Japan and recognize Japan’s special position in Korea.
In 1898, as anti-Russian sentiment ran high among Koreans due to the 
Independence Club Movement, Russia voluntarily withdrew from Korea, shut down all 
their economic activities in Korea and replaced Speyer.94 Because of Russia’s change of 
policy and the death of Taewon’gun, King Kojong finally moved back to his palace and 
declared himself the Emperor of Choson, a title symbolizing Korean independence.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5)
Russia’s retreat did not, however, prevent an imminent confrontation with Japan. 
The Japanese-Russian rivalry over Korea intensified after the outbreak of the Boxer 
Rebellion in 1900. The Russians took the opportunity to send a huge army to Manchuria. 
When the Russians refused to withdraw after the crisis ended, the British were alarmed. 
Japan used this dispute to its advantage, obtaining a secret military alliance with Great 
Britain in 1902.95
Bolstered by this alliance, the Japanese took a tough stance against Russia. They 
insisted that the Russians leave Manchuria. When Russia refused and instead showed 
interest in re-entering Korea, Japan resorted to war. In February 1904, Japan launched a 
surprise attack on Russia’s stronghold at Port Arthur. Despite Korea’s declaration of 
neutrality, Japan sent its troops to Korea and imposed an agreement to allow Japan to 
occupy strategic locations throughout the peninsula during its war against Russia.
94 Harrington, God, Mammon and the Japanese, 300-301.
95 While Japan recognized Britain’s rights and interests in China, the British acknowledged Japan’s special 
interests in Korea. They agreed to assist each other if  either side got involved in war against a third power. 
See Eckert et al, Korea Old and New: A History, 237.
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After a year of fighting, Japan had the upper hand against Russia. Westerners, 
especially President Theodore Roosevelt, were impressed by Japan’s power. Roosevelt 
made a secret deal with the Japanese, known as the Taft-Katsura Agreement in July 1905, 
acquiescing to Japanese control of Korea in exchange for Japanese acceptance of 
American control of the Philippines. Roosevelt then stepped into the Russo-Japanese 
War to mediate a peace settlement, upon the request of Japan. The Treaty of Portsmouth 
was signed in September, with Russia agreeing to withdraw from Manchuria, to hand 
over the lease on Port Arthur, and to cede the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan.
Nevertheless, Japan’s biggest windfall of the war was not the land taken from 
Russia, but its now-unchallenged supremacy in Korea. With troops all over the country, 
Japan set up the office of Residency-General in Seoul, taking a crucial step toward the 
colonization of Korea. In accordance with the Taft-Katsura Agreement, the American 
government did nothing, even though Emperor Kojong sent several secret emissaries to 
seek American aid. It was a great disappointment to Minister Allen and some of the 
American missionaries. Because of his strong protest against America’s inaction and 
pro-Japanese attitude, Dr. Allen was dismissed from his position by President Roosevelt.
The Colonization of Korea
Without any international objections, Japan declared Korea as a protectorate in 
1905, after they forced Korea to sign the Protectorate Treaty. In 1907, the Japanese 
demanded another treaty surrendering all prerogatives on internal affairs to the Japanese 
Resident-General and disbanding the Korean defense forces. This treaty allowed the 
Japanese to reorganize the Korean central administration and judicial system. Japanese 
advisers who had been in the Korean government earlier became assistant ministers in
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their respective departments and gradually took over all crucial sectors of the 
government. There were, for example, more Japanese officials than Koreans in the 
Departments of Finance, Justice, and Agriculture, Commerce and Industry.96 Finally, in 
1910, Japan formally annexed Korea through the Treaty of Annexation. After 518 years, 
the Choson Dynasty came to an end. Korea was now a Japanese colony. Japan 
appointed Terauchi Masatake as the first Governor-General. He ruled Korea with an iron 
fist from 1910 to 1916.
Annexation and the Growth o f Korean Nationalism 
Since 1905, Japan’s aggression had provoked a strong nationalistic response 
among Korean nationals. While Japanese troops suppressed all peaceful protests, 
radicals organized the Uibyong (the Righteous Army) in the countryside. For a time, the 
demobilization of the Korean army in 1907 added strength to the Korean resistance 
forces.97 But the nation had not yet experienced the full extent of Japanese brutality. 
These unorganized uprisings of the early period were quickly curbed by the better- 
equipped Japanese police forces. The colonial government was able to pacify some of 
the unemployed soldiers by incorporating them into the Japanese-controlled police force 
and gendarmerie.98 As a result, the number of riots decreased from 1450 in 1908 to 147 
in 1910."
Japanese rule revoked many freedoms and rights of the Korean people. Land was 
systematically extorted from the peasants and handed over to Japanese overlords, who 
began to stream across the strait, seeking land and jobs. The colonial government banned
96 C. I. Eugene Kim, “Japanese Rule in Korea 1905-1910: A Case Study,” Proceedings o f  the American 
Philosophical Society 106 (15 February 1962): 54.
97 Ibid., 57-58.
98 Ibid., 58.
99 David Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” Monumenta Nipponica 25 (1970): 160.
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political organizations and the right of assembly, and closed down most Korean 
newspapers. Yet, it was against the backdrop of such oppressive Japanese rule that 
Christianity would not only experience astounding growth, but also emerge as a beacon 
of nationalistic hope.
CHRISTIANITY AND KOREA’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
While some of the American missionaries were deeply troubled by Japan’s 
growing influence in Korea between 1885 and the 1910 annexation, these developments 
had, in the short term, unforeseen positive repercussions upon the Korean church. 
Opposition to Japan diverted traditional anti-foreign sentiment away from Christianity. 
In fact, for many Koreans, Christianity lost its associations with imperialism, and began 
to be identified with Korean nationalism. This process had begun through the 
missionaries’ educational work. It was reinforced by the missionaries’ actions in 
protecting King Kojong and his crown prince after the death of Queen Min, which earned 
them the trust of anti-Japanese Koreans and marked them as champions of Korean 
independence.
As Chong-sik Lee, a leading historian of Korean nationalism, observed, “Japan, 
through her conquest and rule of Korea, awakened and sustained Korean nationalism. 
Japan provided the negative and yet most powerful symbol for Korean nationalism, a 
national enemy.”100 Lee also recognized the influence of Christianity in this process. “A 
significant number of older-generation leaders,” Lee pointed out, “were transformed in 
their thought pattern and behavior through close contacts with the missionaries. Along
100 Chong-sik Lee, The Politics o f  Korean Nationalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1963), 275.
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with Christian ideas the missionaries brought liberal Western thought upon which much 
of the Korean nationalism was nurtured. The churches produced not only spiritual 
leaders, but also reformers and educators.”101 By the time Japan formally annexed Korea, 
Christianity had emerged as a dynamic ideological, political, social, and religious force 
that directly challenged Japan’s colonial control of Korea.
American Missionaries and Korean Nationalists 
Christian education through mission schools not only improved the literacy level 
of the young Korean people, but also produced a generation of Korean nationalists who 
were willing to embrace Western principles and Christian beliefs. Missionaries from 
America, in particular, were key players in the development of Korean Protestantism. By 
the time of the Japanese annexation in 1910 there were a total of 207 Protestant 
missionaries in Korea; 157 of them were Americans. There were also, by that time, more 
than 1,700 Korean Protestant churches with about 160,000 members, and more than 
1,600 mission schools with about 130,000 students.102
Those missionaries who were involved in education envisioned their students 
becoming new leaders to modernize Korea according to Western models.103 Mission 
schools became practical training grounds for students to participate in Westem-style 
democracy, through various extra-curricular activities. Students were encouraged to 
conduct elections in their own organizations and to express themselves freely through
101 Ibid., 277.
102 There were 47 Catholic missionaries in Korea, but only one was American. Catholics had about 150 
churches with 38,000 members. They also operated 73 schools with 778 students. See Takayoshi Matsuo 
and S. Takiguchi, ‘The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary Activity of the Japan 
Congregational Church in Korea,” Modem Asian Studies 13 (1979): 419.
103 Davis, “Henry Gerhard Appenzeller: His Contribution to Korean Independence, Democracy, and 
Modernization,” 225.
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group discussions and debates.104 In this way, teachers in the mission schools led their 
students to learn about independence, democracy, and modernization, as they advocated 
American principles, the Christian faith, and the Western way of life.
Rev. Henry Appenzeller, for example, had strong aspirations to transform Korea 
into an independent Protestant nation under American democratic influence and 
protection so that it might serve as an outstanding example for other Asian countries to 
follow.105 Since Appenzeller was a bold champion of American ideology, according to 
historian Daniel Davis, who has done extensive research on the life and work of 
Appenzeller, he “worked to reform Korean society in the image of United States society 
... not exactly according to [the] reality of nineteenth century America, but rather, 
according to the Evangelical Protestant vision for America.”106 Ella Appenzeller, Henry 
Appenzeller’s wife, also confirmed that her husband intended to train Korean Christian 
leaders to have the American Protestant vision of the Korean nation and the idea of
107Korean independence. His school, Paejae haktang, became an important meeting 
place for Christian reformers, and served as a prolific breeding ground for future Korean 
political leaders.
Syngman Rhee (1875-1965), the future President of South Korea, for instance, 
was particularly affected by his interactions with Appenzeller during his years as a 
student in Paejae. Appenzeller’s ideals found fertile ground in the mind of Rhee. While 
taking classes in Paejae and at the same time working to pay his tuition and living
104 Ibid., 221.
105 Daniel M. Davis, “Building a City on a Hill in Korea: The Work of Henry G. Appenzeller,” Church 
History 61 (1992): 422.
106 Davis, “Henry Gerhard Appenzeller: His Contribution to Korean Independence, Democracy, and 
Modernization,” 198-199.
107 Ibid., 211.
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expenses, Rhee also actively participated in the school’s Mutual Friendship Society, a
debating club for students to express their views on Korean independence. One of his
most famous speeches was ‘The Independence of Korea,” which he presented as the
valedictorian of his graduating class. Rhee delivered this speech in English before his
teachers and his fellow students during the commencement ceremony in June 1897.108
Rhee was arrested and imprisoned by the Korean government shortly after his
graduation, however, because he demanded the release of political prisoners.109 While in
prison, Rhee converted to Christianity with the help of Rev. James S. Gale, an
independent missionary from England. Shortly after his conversion, Rhee began his own
prison ministry, leading to the conversion of at least forty other inmates.110 He also used
his time to write editorials for his own daily newspaper, the Maiyil Sinmun, which was
widely circulated among students, intellectuals, and even the royal family,111 and later a
book, The Spirit o f Independence, which outlined his programs for Korean independence.
There were five major aspects of his political thought at this time.
First, in spite of his yangban background, Rhee attacked the corruption of the
Korean court and the ignorance of the yangban class who enslaved and exploited the
commoners for their own political, economic, and social gains. He disliked the pro-
Chinese and pro-Russian Korean officials who had frustrated the progressive reformers’
112various efforts to modernize Korea since 1884.
108 Ibid., 218.
109 Robert T. Oliver, A History o f the Korean People in Modern Times: 1800 to the Present (Newark, DE: 
University o f Delaware Press, 1993), 86.
110 Ibid., 60.
111 Lady Um, consort of the king and mother of Prince Lee, the second heir to the Korean thrown, was 
Rhee’s faithful reader. See Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd 
Mead and Company, 1954), 54, 59-60.
112 Syngman Rhee, The Spirit o f  Independence: A Primer o f Korean Modernization and Reform translated 
by Han-kyo Kim (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
Second, Korean people needed to reform themselves, Rhee argued, and unite 
together to save the nation, which he portrayed as a sinking boat in the midst of a 
hurricane.113 Education, Rhee believed, was the key means to transform the nation. His 
exaggerated descriptions of the political merits and economic prosperity of the United 
States revealed his deep admiration of the country as a virtual paradise on earth.114 It is 
not surprising that he was unequivocal in his desire to learn from America and hoped to 
adopt American values and principles, though not unselectively, into the new Korean 
nation.115
Third, Rhee understood that Korean independence did not mean isolation.116 
Korea needed friends, but not all its Asian neighbors were trustworthy. His deep distrust 
of Russian intentions was revealed through his descriptions of the aggressive behavior of 
czarist Russia since the days of Peter the Great. His book’s portrayal of the barbaric 
misbehavior of Russian soldiers in Manchuria and northern Korea highlighted his view
117concerning Russia's presence in Korea. Concerning Japan, another neighbor of Korea, 
Rhee admired Japan's successful modernization efforts and the hardworking spirit of the
1 1 o
Japanese people, but voiced his worries about the intentions of its leaders. Among all 
the Western powers, the British model of constitutional monarchy, Rhee suggested, 
would be best suited to Korea.119 Nonetheless, it was American principles and values 
that would benefit the Korean people in the long run. A close friendship with the 
American people, in Rhee's mind, was deeply desirable. Somehow this pro-American
113 Ibid., 32-33.
114 Ibid., 20.
115 Ibid., 9.
116 Ibid., 54-58, 253-255.
117 Ibid., 10.
118 Ibid., 10-11.
119 Ibid., 9.
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attitude was shaped by what he personally witnessed and experienced — the benevolent
work of foreign missionaries in Korea.120
Fourth, Rhee strongly believed in the usefulness of diplomacy. “Because a
solitary nation is vulnerable to a sudden assault by a strong power,” he explained, “many
nations unite to form a community and maintain mutual relations so that no one may
exploit another’s weakness and commit an unlawful act.”121 In particular, Rhee thought
that obtaining political support from the United States would greatly facilitate the cause
of Korean independence.122 Therefore, it was not surprising to later find Rhee working
tirelessly for three decades in Washington, despite the fruitlessness of his efforts,
lobbying American leaders to support the cause of Korean independence.
Fifth and finally, Rhee unabashedly declared his Christian faith, and expressed his
deep conviction that a Christian foundation for a new Korea was necessary in order to
bring forth any successful political, economic, and social reform. His final words for his
people in the book were:
As our nation struggles to rise up from its fall and new buds try to sprout from decayed 
morass, unless we base ourselves on this religion, we may not reap true benefits even 
from our contacts with the [outside] world. Even hard work in the new learning may not 
be effective. Even with an emphasis on diplomacy, deep friendship may not develop.
Even an emphasis on [preserving] the nation’s sovereignty may not help in attaining a 
status of equality. Even a respect for moral obligations may not lead to constancy [in 
behavior]. Even a desire to uphold the right of freedom may suffer from ignorance of its 
bounds. We must adopt this religion as the basis fo r everything. Everyone must forget 
about themselves and work for the benefit o f others. We must do our best in supporting 
the nation to achieve the same level of civilization as that of Great Britain and the United 
States. Let us then meet again in the Kingdom of Heaven.123 (Italics added)
Such a deep religious testimony from his own words should not be ignored in analyzing 
Rhee’s political position, domestic policies, and diplomatic tactics in the post-liberation
120 Ibid., 257-258.
121 Ibid., 264.
122 Ibid., 265.
123 Ibid., 282-283.
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era, especially when Rhee rose to become the top political figure in Korea, having the
i • • 124means to act upon his convictions.
In 1904, Rhee was pardoned by the king and released from prison. Then, on the 
eve of becoming a protectorate of Japan, King Kojong sent Rhee on a secret mission to 
the United States to plead for American aid to support Korea’s independence by invoking 
the “good offices” clause in the Amity Treaty between the United States and Korea.125 
At the age of 29, with no official status and no money, Rhee sailed to the United States 
with the hope of saving his country from Japan. His journey was mainly funded by 
individual American missionaries, church ministers, Korean Christians, and American 
Christians, whom he met along his route to Washington.126
With the help of Senator Hugh A. Dinsmore from Arkansas, who had served a 
term as American minister in Seoul, Rhee was able to meet with the Secretary of State, 
John Hay. After hearing Rhee’s appeal, Hay promised to do everything he could to fulfill 
US treaty obligations, but the effort was to prove fruitless because Hay died shortly 
afterwards.127 Rhee was later betrayed by Kim Yun-jong (Kim Yun Jung), who was a 
Japanese spy in the Korean Legation in Washington. Eventually, Rhee’s efforts failed
124 Syngman Rhee (1875-1965) is the most controversial figure in Korean modem history. Even when he 
was alive, there were individuals, both Koreans and Americans alike, who loved him and were willing to 
assist him whole-heartedly, and at the same time, there were people who hated him and wanted him out of 
the political scene. He was such a stubborn and divisive figure that he caused much debate even years after 
his death. Research works from both sides were biased by several factors. People who worked with him 
and wrote for him, such as Henry Chung, Robert Oliver, and Louise Yim, might be affected by the factors 
of human loyalty and personal passions. Westerners and foreign researchers who observed him from a 
distance were crippled by certain degrees of blindness due to religious differences, cultural 
misunderstandings, or even language and generation gaps. To cite his book The Spirit o f Independence as 
an example, it was written in such an old form of the Korean language that even contemporary Korean 
native readers have difficulties in understanding his writing, not to mention those foreign researchers who 
possessed limited linguistic skills. Very few had actually read his book, but yet they passed judgment on 
Rhee as “experts.” Korean writers might be burdened by their ideological differences, political grievances, 
and personal memories so that their analyses were also not free from bias.
125 Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 75.
126 Ibid., 76-80.
127 Ibid., 81-83.
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when the Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, who had met with Rhee cordially prior 
to his mission to Japan, concluded a secret agreement with Japan that sealed Korea’s fate. 
When Japan finally annexed Korea, Rhee became a political exile in Washington. 
Without a country of his own, Rhee went on to get Master’s and Ph.D. degrees in 
International Relations, with the help of the American and Korean churches.
An Ch’ang-ho (1878-1938), like Rhee, was another student who was influenced 
by Appenzeller’s teaching while studying in Paejae and then went on to become a famous 
nationalist leader at home and abroad during the colonial period. In 1899, after the end of 
the Independence Club Movement, he returned to his hometown of P’yongyang and 
established the first Korean-owned modem co-educational private school, Cheomjin 
School (Gradual Progress School). An Ch’ang-ho believed that the new generation of 
Koreans needed to be ready for leadership before Korea could obtain complete 
independence. The name of the school reflected his political philosophy of 
evolutionary social change through effective education.
In 1902, An Ch’ang-ho immigrated to the United States with his wife Lee Hae- 
ryon (Helen An) and became an influential nationalist leader among Korean immigrants 
in California. While working as a farm worker in a California orchard, he initiated a 
social reform movement in San Francisco to guide Koreans to form a respectable 
community within the United States. When he returned to Korea in 1907, he established 
a nationalist organization, Sinminhoe (the New People’s Association), whose members 
were mostly Protestant Christians from northwest Korea. Their goal was to bring forth a 
new generation of Korean patriots through effective education.
128 Oliver, A History o f  the Korean People in Modern Times, 127.
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The main rationale behind An Ch’ang-ho’s eagerness in building up Korea 
through education was, in fact, rooted in his religious faith. Like Rhee, An had also 
converted to Christianity and he became a Presbyterian.129 He believed that personal 
regeneration was the foundation of national renewal. “Christ told the Jews,” An Changho 
explained in his newspaper, Kongnip Sinmun (Independence News), in 1907, “that it was 
because they were full of evil deeds and devoid of all goodness that God took their rights 
from them and handed them over to others, and this surely applies to Korea today.”130 
From his Christian viewpoint, since the Korean people were not good enough, they 
needed to be changed. An Ch’ang-ho envisioned that the best method was through 
nationwide Christian education to achieve individual transformation. His ideal of 
national revival through personal improvement and reform was a combination of 
utilitarianism and Protestant piety that was popular among Western thinkers in the late 
nineteenth century.131
An Ch’ang-ho was both a writer and an eloquent speaker who attracted many 
listeners and enthusiastic supporters.132 Throughout his sixty years of life he gave 
countless speeches and his travels took him all over Manchuria, Japan, China, and 
America. He established many organizations to propagate his political philosophy and
129 The P’yOngyang Presbyterian Church was very influential throughout the imperial and colonial period. 
The rapid growth of the Protestant church in Korea was closely related to the successful evangelical work 
in P’ybngyang. See Roy E. Shearer, “The Evangelical Missionary's Role in Church Growth in Korea,” 
International Review o f Missions 54 (1965): 465.
130 Quote in Kenneth M. Wells, New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in 
Korea 1896-1937 (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 41.
131 Ibid., 41.
132 In Kim Il-sung’s memoir, Kim described how excited he and his friends were when they heard that An 
Ch’ang-ho was in town to give a speech. Kim was a middle school student in Manchuria at that time. See 
Kim Il-sung, With the Century, V ol.l, 112. The first two volumes of With the Century were published by 
Pyongyang’s Foreign Languages Publishing House in 1992. Volumes 3 and 4 came out in 1993, volume 5 
in 1994 and volume 6 in 1995. Altogether, these six volumes of Kim’s autobiography gave details 
information from his birth in 1912 to the late 1930s, when Kim became a guerrilla fighter in Manchuria. 
Lee Wha Rang made the English version available on the web.
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acquire followers. In addition to Sinminhoe, he also established He Ungsadan (Society 
for Fostering Activists), which was an influential Christian political group that built its 
base in P’yongyang and enjoyed a wide following in the U.S., China, Manchuria, and 
Korea.133 His associates, such as Yi Tong-hwi, Yi Kap, and Yang Ki-tak, were mostly 
Christians and/or educators. His political ideas even influenced non-Christian 
intellectuals, such as Yi Kwang-su, a famous nationalist writer, and Kim Song-su, a well- 
known educator, both of whom patiently advocated and defended the ideas of cultural 
nationalism.
The beliefs of Syngman Rhee and An Ch’ang-ho had a deep influence on Korean 
nationalism. These two friends and political-rivals-to-be led two major forms of 
resistance that colored the cause of Korean independence. Both Rhee and An believed in 
the importance of education, but the main difference between them was that Rhee 
focused his effort on obtaining diplomatic recognition in Washington, while An did not 
think that anyone could “grant” independence to Korea unless Korea was herself ready 
for it. Since Korea was not ready for self government in the eyes of many Westerners at 
that time, he thought it would be more beneficial to encourage gradual change through 
education and industrial advancements.134 According to reports by Japanese spies in 
Korea, An Ch’ang-ho had told his audience, “If we believe in Christianity then we have 
no real enemy under Heaven.... The nation’s independence is up to you citizens, not the 
protection of foreign peoples. God alone can be called our Protector.”135 His teaching 
was open to two interpretations. Either the Koreans must equip themselves and become
133 See Wells, New God, New Nation, 129 and Oliver, A History o f the Korean People in Modem Times, 
127.
134 Ibid., 132.
135 Quoted in ibid., 66.
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better than the Japanese (which did not exclude the idea of positive and beneficial 
collaboration), or they might have faith in the Christian God and through self- 
improvement achieve national salvation and eventual independence. Later when Korea 
was liberated, An’s followers, some of them labeled as collaborators, would continue to 
be important players in the ideological competition between the various factions of 
Korean politics.
The experiences of Syngman Rhee and An Ch’ang-ho, together with other famous 
nationalists and Christian educator, including Kim Kyu-sik, Cho Man-sik, Kil Son-ju, 
Yun Ch’i-ho, Yim Yong-sin (Louise Im), and Kim Hwal-lan (Helen Kim), reveal the 
crucial role of Christianity in confronting the rapid political, social, and cultural 
transformation of Korea. Japan’s intensified aggression in Korea gave rise to a new 
sense of Korean identity and a new urgency for both personal and national salvation.
Because Korea was not colonized by a Western country, Korean nationalism 
never took on the anti-Western flavor found in other Asian countries. And just as 
mission schools provided a temporary safe haven for the growth of nationalism among 
young Koreans, Christian churches served as a convenient arena for preaching the 
message of national deliverance and as a secret meeting place for anti-Japanese 
nationalists. The growth of Korean Christian churches was tied closely to discontent with 
the process of colonization, and it paved the way for Christians to lead the way in 
planning and implementing the historic March First Independence Movement of 1919.
The Rapid Growth of Korean Protestant Churches
Compared to other Asian countries which enjoyed higher numbers of American 
missionaries and more funding (see Table 1.1 for the case of the Methodist Church),
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missionary work in Korea was generally regarded as a great success in spite of its lack of
1 'Xf tresources. For example, in 1898 there were only about five thousand overall Korean 
Protestant converts on the peninsula, a mere fraction of the forty-one thousand in Japan. 
Ten years later in 1907, however, the number of Christians in Korea had reached forty- 
one thousand, while Japan had increased by less than ten thousand. The Korean Church 
had experienced a 720 percent growth rate, while Japan (with far more missionaries and 
American church funding) experienced only a 22 percent increase (see Table 1.2).
Data provided by Rev. Horace G. Underwood concerning the conditions of all the 
Christian churches in the critical years of 1905 and 1907, highlights the correlation 
between political distress and church growth. Japan began colonizing Korea in 1905. In 
just the next two years, the number of Korean Christian churches doubled to about 642. 
More Koreans showed their interest in Christianity than ever, especially during the time 
when the survival of their nation was threatened by the Japanese (see Table 1.3). The 
Methodist Mission was also growing at a rapid rate, despite the fact that Korea had fewer 
foreign missionaries and resources than in Japan (see Table 1.4).
It is important to note that the 41,000 Korean Christians in 1907 were not spread 
thinly across the country, but were highly concentrated within certain key cities 
(particularly P’yongyang) and within certain key demographics (young, educated 
leaders). The proportion of Christian population against the overall population in certain 
provinces was much higher than one might expect. For instance, considering the 
distribution of Korean Presbyterian churches in 1910 alone, the two northern provinces, 
P’yongan Province and Hwanghae Province, where the population density was lower
136 According to the data in the Missionary Review o f the World, Korea had only 0.9 percent of the total 
number of American missionaries in 1900. See Chay, Diplomacy o f Asymmetry, 5.
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than the southern provinces (see Map 3), had the highest concentration of Christian 
churches. This area contained roughly 53 percent of all the Presbyterian churches in 
Korea. Whereas the southern part of the peninsula, Kyongsang Province where the city 
of Taegu was located, had the second largest number of churches, double the number 
found in Kyonggi province, where Seoul was located (See Table 1.5).
By considering the city of P’yongyang as a case for further elaboration, the 
concentration of church influence becomes more apparent. P’yongyang was the ancient 
capital of the Koguryo Kingdom. For geographical reasons, it was economically and 
politically connected to Manchuria. The people used to be very hostile to foreigners 
before 1895.137 Due to the destruction caused by the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5, 
however, the survivors became more receptive to foreign missionaries.138 As a result, the 
church grew from about 80 Christian converts in 1896 to about 14,000 church attendants 
in 1906. Given that the P’yongyang population in that year was around 42,000, it means 
that a third of the total population in P’yongyang city attended worship services on 
Sunday.139
In another case, church workers in Chongju, a city with a population of about 
20,000 in North P’yongan province, boasted that they had as many church attendants as 
P’yongyang.140 Although the actual data presented by the Korean churches might be hard 
to verify, the point was clear: Christian influence on the local level, especially in the
137 In 1893, the Presbyterian missionaries “succeeded in buying a house, but when they attempted to occupy 
it, the authorities [sic] drove them out and threw some o f the native Christians into prison.” For details see 
“Soldier of the Cross in Korea,” Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group 360, Folder: Samuel A. 
Moffett -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
138 Alan Carter Covell, “Korean Conversion to Christianity,” Asian & Pacific Quarterly o f Cultural and 
Social Affairs 19 (1987): 32-33.
139 See Wanne J. Joe, A Cultural History o f  Modern Korea: A History o f Korean Civilization (Elizabeth, NJ 
& Seoul: Hollym, 2000), 538.
140 Ibid.
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northern provinces, was much higher than one might expect. Thus, it was reasonable for 
the Presbyterian Foreign Mission Board Secretary Robert Speer to describe the situation 
by saying, “In the north, the church has spread and penetrated as we saw nothing to 
surpass anywhere else in the world. The churches are crowded: the opportunities are 
unlimited.”141
Even though the Japanese colonial government tried to curb the growth of the 
Korean churches after Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, Christian churches in the 
northern provinces continued to grow. In general, the further away from Seoul, the 
political center, the stronger was the influence of the Christian church. While Seoul 
served as the political capital of Korea, P’yongyang was growing as the Christian capital 
of Korea.142 By 1934, there were twenty-five Presbyterian churches and eight Methodist 
churches in the city of P’yongyang and its suburbs, and 1,000 Presbyterian churches, with 
over 100,000 Christians, in the northwestern district alone.143 According to church 
statistics, the estimated total membership of Korean churches was about 420,000 
communicants just prior to the outbreak of World War II.144 The Japanese government’s 
own figures closely match these numbers (see Table 1.6).145 Three northwestern 
provinces, South P’yongan, North P’yongan, and Hwanghae (see Map 2) contained about 
a quarter of the overall Christian population.
141 Quoted by Martha Huntley, Caring, Growing, Changing (New York: Friendship Press, 1984), 121.
142 A Japanese scholar in 1907 said that P’yfingyang was the “hotbed” of Christianity and estimated that at 
least half o f its population was Christian (somehow exaggerated). See Wells, New God, New Nation, 65.
143 The Methodist data is not available. For the Presbyterian data, see William N. Blair, “Samuel A. 
Moffett: On His Seventieth Birthday,” The Presbyterian (1934): 6, cutting found in Presbyterian Church 
Archives, Record Group 360, Folder: Samuel A. Moffett -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
144 “Samuel Austin Moffett, D.D.” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 360, Folder: Samuel A. 
Moffett -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
145 The Japanese figure should be more accurate because it was a comprehensive census done by the 
colonial government.
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It is important to note that the listed membership in the church only included 
those who were baptized and had their names recorded as full members of the church. It 
usually did not include probationers and seekers, even if they attended church regularly. 
Such people were also influenced by the church or they might use the church as a 
convenient place for their own political or social purposes. It would certainly be hard for 
any fast growing church to discipline their members when the church workers already 
had their hands full. In addition, the data for church membership only listed adults, 
whereas the census data for the Korean population listed children as well. Therefore, if 
the children being raised under Christian parents were properly included, the proportion 
of Christians in the population would become much higher. If the students of the mission 
schools were also included, the number of people who were connected to the Christian 
church, would be higher still, especially in certain areas where mission schools and 
private schools run by Christian leaders were particularly popular (see Table 1.7).
Reasons for the Rapid Growth
Why did the Korean church grow at such a fast rate? The above data suggest two 
possible reasons, aside from spiritual explanations. For one, the growth might, 
paradoxically, be the result of a lack of missionary personnel and a shortage of mission 
funds. When the Presbyterian missionaries saw that their home boards were slow to 
respond to their requests for more workers and funding, they began to adopt a new 
method of encouraging the Korean Christians to be self-supporting, self-propagating, and 
self-governing.146 Native Christians were given more responsibilities and opportunities
146 It was known as the Nevius Method, designed by Dr. John L. Nevius (1829-1893) of Shandong, China. 
This method was popular neither in China nor in Japan, but flourished in Korea after Dr. Nevius visited 
Seoul in 1890. It was a practical means for the struggling Korean church to grow by depending on native 
methods.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
86
to lead and partake in the evangelical work. The positive effect, however, was quite 
unexpected. As Rev. Archibald Campbell, a Presbyterian missionary who labored in 
Korea during the Japanese colonial period and later during the Korean War, observed:
The million that have come to the Saviour [sic] and received Him into the hearts have not 
been won by foreign missionaries. Only a few of them [sic]. Nearly all have heard the 
good news from the lips o f their own countrymen. The story goes from mouth to ear and 
from heart to heart.147
In this way, there was little direct social or cultural conflict between the foreign 
missionaries and the unconverted populace. It might be noted that the Methodists 
initially sent a comparable number of missionaries to Korea as the Presbyterians did, but 
they did not adopt the self-propagating model, and they did not experience the same 
degree of growth.
Moreover, the self-propagating method also preserved the self-determination of 
church leadership, allowing individual leaders to be active in the independence 
movement against Japanese colonization. In analyzing Protestant work in Korea, Rev. 
Allen D. Clark, the assistant commission representative for the United Presbyterian 
Mission, wrote in 1962:
The idea that these Korean churches are controlled or financed from abroad is quite 
incorrect. No foreign missionary has been moderator of the Korean Presbyterian Church 
for almost 50 years, and the same is true of other Christian bodies. This is a Korean 
church at work in its own communities.148
Rev. Clark’s idea was also strongly supported by Professor David Chung, President of 
Kon’guk (Keun-kuk) University. Professor Chung argued that “the Korean Christian, not 
foreign missionary and institute, played a leading role in founding the Christian Church 
in the modem history of Korea.”149
147 Archibald Campbell, The Christ o f  the Korean Heart (Columbus, OH: Falco Publishers, 1954), 12.
148 Allen D. Clark, “Protestant Work in Korea,” Korea Journal 2 (1962): 9.
149 David Chung, “Christianity in Modern Korea,” Koreana Quarterly 5 (1963): 138.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
A second reason for the success of mission work was probably political. The 
most exceptional growth happened during the years of 1905 to 1907, when Korea was 
losing its national independence as a Japanese protectorate. In the case of China and 
India, the loss of independence had driven native people to be more anti-foreign and 
violently opposed to missionaries; but this was not the case in Korea. Not only was mass 
violence against foreigners rare, but the people were also rather tolerant of the presence 
of Westerners.150 This was because Koreans perceived Japan as their chief enemy, not 
the United States or other Western countries.
According to diplomatic historian Jongsuk Chay, ever since the first 
establishment of relations, Koreans generally held a favorable view of Americans.151 
Together with American diplomats and businessmen, missionaries contributed to the 
building of this good image.152 In 1898, there were a total of 118 Westerners residing in 
Seoul, about thirty-five of whom were missionaries (see Table 1.8). 153 These 
missionaries were active in the Korean community. They traveled from the cities to the 
countryside, appearing in villages to preach, teach, hand out leaflets, or sell books. Some 
women from the yangban class were invited to the homes of the missionaries and 
socialized with them.154 These informal, but personal, contacts were very important to 
maintaining the influence of the growing church.
150 There were individual attacks against certain missionaries, but the people in general were quite 
respectful to foreign missionaries. No missionary, except Ethel Underwood in 1949, lost his or her life in 
Korea due to any violent attack. Underwood was killed by two gunmen. They were not actually looking 
for her, but for one of her female guests.
151 Chay, Diplomacy o f  Asymmetry, 14.
152 Ibid.
153 Samuel H. Moffett, “The Westerner,” in First Encounters: Korea 1880-1910 ed. Peter A. Underwood 
(Seoul: Dragon’s Eye Graphics, 1982), 36.
154 Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT: 
EastBridge, 2003), 20-26. See also Martha Huntley, “Presbyterian Women’s Work and Rights in the 
Korean Mission,” Journal o f  Presbyterian History 65 (Spring 1987): 37-48.
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When the United States refused to come to the aid of Korea after Japan declared it 
a protectorate in 1905, the image of America among Koreans was likely tarnished. 
Nevertheless, instead of losing members, church attendance actually grew steadily. 
There were four basic reasons why.
First, turning to embrace the Christian faith was itself a revolutionary act against 
the traditional imperial corruption and a rejection of Japanese colonial rule. Progressive 
reformers, both in China and in Korea, generally agreed that Confucianism was a source 
of weakness and decay. In both countries, alienated, young, educated elites, and 
commoners alike began to rise up against the old Confucian system and the corrupt 
imperial courts. In the case of Korea, since the Christian churches insisted that each new 
member make a clear break with the past, including activities such as ancestor worship, 
concubinage, drinking, smoking, and gambling,155 the church provided a sense of 
spiritual renewal and moral strengthening for some frustrated young Korean elites. What 
made the church even more attractive was the strong anti-Japanese sentiment within the 
church and among church members. For instance, as colonial exploitation intensified in 
1905 and Japan prepared the formal signing of the humiliating treaty for the protectorate, 
native leaders in the Presbyterian Church demanded that each church in the country 
protest against the treaty by holding meetings for seven days after Thanksgiving Day. 
When the treaty was signed in 1906, prayer services for the nation spread all across the 
country.156
Second, while the Protectorate Treaty of 1905 did cause grievance, 
dissatisfaction, and mistrust between the Korean converts and foreign missionaries,
155 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 120.
156 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f M odem Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 36-37.
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things began to change when the missionaries from different denominations decided to 
unite with the churches in prayer. Their efforts sparked a wave of revival meetings that 
gave birth to the Great Revival of 1907. This revival began in an annual Bible-study 
meeting at a Presbyterian church in P’yongyang. It soon spread to other cities and 
provinces and from one denomination to another. Since the revival was an 
unprecedented nationwide experience without any human planning or control, church 
leaders regarded it as an act of the Holy Spirit to make the Korean church bom again.157 
One practical result of the Great Revival was that individual Christians who had 
experienced the revival turned to focus on spiritual growth and repented of their angry 
feelings towards the missionaries.158 In this way, the Korean churches maintained 
peaceful co-operation with foreign missionaries and preserved unity.
Third, the churches also served as a source of comfort, inspiration, unity, and 
even a secret meeting place for the struggle of independence. Ch’oe Myong-sik, a reform 
activist in the late Choson period, explained the importance of the Christian church in 
Korean social life:
There was in the Anak district only one primary school managed by the Anak Church if 
one is to name an organization representing the new cultural movement.... Christian 
churches were in fact the only places where Koreans would come into contact with new 
Western culture, and thus where people could readily assemble for meetings.159
Shortly after Korea became a Japanese protectorate, Korean Christians organized a 
nationalist movement called either the “Movement for the Return of National 
Sovereignty” or the “Movement for Encouraging Patriotism.” It aimed at awakening 
Korean people’s political consciousness because they believed that a successful
157 See Clark, A History o f  the Church in Korea, 154-168.
158 See Huntley, Caring, Growing, Changing, 130-150.
159 Quoted in Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 122.
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independence movement needed the support of the masses.160 Taking advantage of the 
churches, Korean nationalists began to gather in churches to plot anti-Japanese activities.
Even Kim Il-sung, the Communist-leader-to-be in post-liberation North Korea, 
recognized the importance of church life in the cause of Korean independence during the 
colonial era. His biography asserted the importance of church activities in his early life. 
His maternal grandfather, Kang Ton-uk, was an elder in a P’yongyang Presbyterian 
church in Taedong County161 and a principal of Ch’angduk Elementary School.162 Kim’s 
father, Kim Hyong-jik, was a student from Soongsil (Sungsil) College in P’yongyang.163 
When his parents moved to Manchuria to escape Japanese persecution, they all went to 
church faithfully each Sunday. For Kim’s father, Popyong Church was his favorite place 
to meet his nationalist comrades.164 For his mother, it was a place to rest from her toils at 
home.165 For Kim Il-sung himself, even though he was not a believer, it was a place he 
found inspiration, friendship, and support from Rev. Son Chong-do (Son Jung Doh or 
Sohn Jong-do), the pastor of a Korean church in Jirin, where Kim attended middle school 
from 1925 to 1927.166
Regardless of whether Kim’s ideas concerning his parents’ faith were right or not, 
his account revealed the importance of the Christian church for the underground anti- 
Japanese activities and for the cause of Korean independence. Local churches turned out
160 Takayoshi Matsuo and S. Takiguchi, “The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary 
Activity of the Japan Congregational Church in Korea,” Modem Asian Studies 13 (1979): 420.
161 Yong-ho Choe, “Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-song,” Asian Survey 26 (October 
1986): 1087.
162 Kim Il-sung, With the Century, V ol.l, 52-53. Kim wrote that the school was a relatively famous private 
school. The size of the school was about 200 students, which was not a small school at all in those days.
163 Soongsil College was a famous Christian technical college in P’ydngyang. It followed the ideal of 
Protestant self-reconstruction nationalism. Many political activists were graduates from Soongsil. The 
admission was strictly limited to Christians and all students were required to attend Bible study lessons. See 
Choe, “Christian Background of the Early Life of Kim Il-sung,” 1086.
164 Kim Il-sung, With the Century, V ol.l, 45.
165 Ibid., 65.
166 Ibid., 190-191.
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to be convenient places for disillusioned Koreans to gather and to find a sense of mission 
and direction during the darkest hours of their nation’s history.167 It was an ideal location 
and network for anti-Japanese underground activities. Wherever Koreans lived, from 
Japanese controlled Korea, to Manchuria, to mainland China, to Russia, or to the United 
States, the Christian population became a major group in supporting and sustaining a long 
and painful struggle for regaining Korean independence.168
Before the coming of any mass movement, individual Christians had already risen 
up as anti-Japanese fighters. For example, Chon Myong-un and Chang In-hwan, who 
were members of the Methodist Church, assassinated the pro-Japanese Durham White 
Stevens, a foreign advisor to Marquis Ito Hirobumi, in Los Angeles in 1908, and a year 
later in Harbin, An Chung-gun (a Catholic) and Uh Yon-joon (a Protestant) assassinated 
Prince Ito, the architect of Meiji modernization and the Japanese colonization of 
Korea.169 Although such violent acts were praised by the general public and brought 
excitement to the cause of independence, Christian nationalist leaders understood that it 
was not an effective way to fight colonialism in the long run and it was also not 
consistent with Christianity. Instead, they hoped to achieve independence through 
peaceful means.
The most famous pastor to advocate non-violence was Rev. Kil Son-ju (Sun Chu 
Kil) from the P’yongyang Presbyterian church, who later became one of the thirty-three
I  nr\
signers of the Korean Declaration of Independence in March 1919. His theology was a 
kind of messianic nationalism, believing that the church and individual Christians were
167 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 121.
168 For more information see Wi Jo Kang, Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History o f  Christianity 
and Politics (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), 37.
169 Ibid., 38-42.
170 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modem Korean Nationalism, 109.
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an “extraordinary group” that came to save the nation from its misery and sufferings. 
The only way for the Korean people to recover their independence, Kil argued, was for
171the entire country to be evangelized. He often used the old stories of the Exodus and 
the history of the Israelite nation, also surrounded as it was by stronger neighbors, as 
examples to show the Korean people that God would also deliver them. Because he 
believed in God’s will and the importance of spiritual reconstruction instead of the 
violent restoration of Korean rights, he laid out the important blueprints of the Christian 
principle of non-violent resistance in the struggle for regaining Korean independence.
In this way, Kil skillfully impressed upon his Korean audience that the Christian 
faith belonged to their race and nation. Christianity, therefore, could no longer be
179described only as a Western religion. His preaching was so popular among Korean 
Christians during the colonial period that it was widely known as the “Chosen 
theology.”173 As a result, people were naturally attracted to Christian teachings because 
they found the gospel message directly connected to their national experiences as well as 
their desires for national deliverance and freedom.174 Beginning in 1907, many of the 
disillusioned — those who had taken part in the Tonghak Movement (1894), members of 
the Independence Club, failed reformists, and former soldiers — all joined the church with
17c
the hope of doing something for the country. The churches, as a result, became 
“centers for the nationalist movement and [the] salvation of the nation.”
171 Ibid., 112-113.
172 Wells, New God, New Nation, 37.
173 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modern Korean Nationalism, 123.
174 Kyong Bae Min, “On the Question of Understanding Korean Churches,” The Northeast Asia Journal of 
Theology 24-25 (1980): 123.
175 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f M odem Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 129.
176 Min, “On the Question of Understanding Korean Churches,” 126.
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Fourth, Japan’s harsh policies against Christian churches in Korea also helped 
identify Christianity with the Korean cause and contributed in large measure to the 
Korean independence movement. Since Korean leaders had taken up leadership roles in 
most local churches, the nationalistic tone of their preaching irritated the Japanese 
government.177 In addition, the church’s foreign connections through the missionaries, 
especially with the United States, worried Japanese officials. On top of all of this, the 
organizational structure of the Korean church, for example its national conferences,178 
and its history of effective interdenominational cooperation,179 was also regarded as a 
potential threat to the colonial authoritarian control because it could harbor anti-Japanese 
individuals and serve as an underground network for anti-Japanese activities. The 
Japanese Governor-General Terauchi Masatake, who had escaped a Korean assassination 
attempt in 1911, told his Japanese audience in Tokyo on December 1913, “The Christian 
Church is the most powerful force in Chosen. Therefore [we] must keep special watch on 
the Christians there.”180
177 Missionaries generally recognized the negative implication of this trend and tried to cope with it by 
directing the church to be less politicized. Their effort was successful in keeping the church in line, but less 
effective in controlling individual Christians and their personal convictions. See Yang, Reformed Social 
Ethics and the Korean Church, 112-115.
178 Both Methodists and Presbyterians had their own national conferences. Missionaries and Korean 
Pastors met together annually (some even more often) to discuss church business. In the case of the 
Presbyterian Church which controlled more than 80% of the Korean Christian churches, it had several 
major local presbyteries that allowed individual churches to gather on a regional level. It was hard for any 
authoritarian government to tolerate organizations that were not under its direct control. The colonial 
government’s fear of the potential threat of the Christian church was also the same fear that the 
Communists had in 1945.
179 Since the beginning of missionary work in Korea, foreign missionaries, regardless o f denominations, 
had succeeded in working together. Different Presbyterian missions (North USA, South USA, Canadian, 
and Australian) agreed to unify their effort to build one Korean Presbyterian Church. The Methodist 
missions did the same. In addition, both Presbyterians and Methodists agreed to divide among them 
provinces and areas so that there would be no overlapping of work and thereby avoid unhealthy 
competition. (See Map 1).
180 Sinhan Minbo, 26 February 1914. Quoted by Wells, New God, New Nation, 77.
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Consequently, the Japanese government devised many ways to weaken the 
effectiveness of the Korean church. It imposed new laws to limit the curriculums of the 
mission schools, and forbidding religious classes to be taught. It also required the 
presence of police at all formal church meetings. When the Christian community 
continued to expand, the Japanese government used the attempted assassination of 
Governor-General Terauchi as an excuse to arrest many Christian leaders, including Yun 
Ch’i-ho, a founding member of the Seoul YMCA, and Kim Ku (also known as Kim 
Chang-am), an educator and an active member in Sinman-hoe.m  It was the beginning of 
what later became known as the Conspiracy Case of 1911-1913.182 Even American 
missionaries were dragged into the trial. In the end, 157 individuals stood trial; among 
them only 22 were not Christians. A total of 105 were convicted, including Yun Ch’i-ho, 
who was accused of masterminding the conspiracy.183 Missionaries, Korean Christians, 
Japanese lawyers, and even Japanese residents and police agreed that it was not a fair 
trial, but rather a Japanese effort to threaten the Christian population and to destroy the 
life of the church.184 Nevertheless, this effort failed to weaken the church. Instead, it 
advanced the Christian cause by bolstering the common belief that, “To the Japanese, the 
most worrisome element is the Christians. To the Koreans, the most hopeful thing is the
1 R5expansion of the Christian Church.”
181 Oliver, A History o f  the Korean People in Modern Times, 127-128.
182 In Sonchon, a provincial center in North P’ybngan province, where over half o f its 8000 residents were 
Christians, more than eighty people, including five pastors and students and teachers of the Christian B oy’s 
Academy were arrested. More Christians were arrested in P’ySngyang, Seoul, and other cities where 
Christians were influential.
183 Yun Ch’i-ho was singled out not because he was guilty, but because he refused to serve in the colonial 
government. See, Wells, New God, New Nation, 76-76, 78.
Ibid., 76.
185 It was from an article written by Cho Tungnin, “Han’guk hyonshi chonghwang,” Sinhan Minbo 16 
September 1915. Quoted by Wells, New God, New Nation, 77.
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Japanese Colonial Rule and Korean Discontent 
From 1910 to 1919, Japan’s harsh rule incited deep discontent among Koreans. 
Nationalistic, anti-Japanese sentiment spread from the educated elite to the general public 
who all shared in the bitter experience of Japanese repressive control and the growing 
scale of systematic economic and social exploitations. The Japanese residents in Korea 
enjoyed more rights and privileges than the native Koreans, received higher pay in their 
salaries, enrolled in better schools, lived in bigger houses, and owned larger pieces of 
land. By 1914, 76 percent of the Korean farm population had become tenant farmers.186 
When the Korean people realized that they had become “second-class” citizens in their 
own land and that their long history and culture were being systematically destroyed by 
the colonial government, their hatred for the colonial government and their desire for
187national independence intensified. Nevertheless, because of the tight control by the 
police, most of the anti-Japanese activities went underground. Korean nationalists were 
waiting for the right opportunity to mobilize the whole nation to throw off the colonial 
yoke.
In January 1919, King Kojong died suddenly. Rumors spread across the country 
that he was forced to commit suicide by the Japanese. Although he was never a popular 
figure among the people and very few people mourned personally for the fall of the 
imperial family, his death brought forth a new tide of anti-Japanese sentiment. 
Nationalist leaders used this opportunity to arouse public interest in support of a 
nationwide uprising against the Japanese rule. The movement was planned by the 
collaboration of several nationalist groups: the Chungang School group (non-Christian)
186 Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” 168.
187 Ibid.
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under the leadership of Kim Song-su, Song Chin-u, and Hyon Sang-yun, and the 
Ch’ondogyo group under the leadership of Son Pyong-hui, Kwon Tong-jin, O Se-ch’ang, 
and Ch’oe Rin.188 The date of the uprising was set for March 4, the day of the funeral 
service for the king. Since the Japanese police exerted tight control on travel, the funeral 
would allow people to move around and gather for meetings without causing too much 
suspicion.189 Later, the organizers of the uprising changed the date to March 1 because 
word had leaked out to the police that a disturbance was coming.
In order to maximize public support and to acquire foreign sympathy and 
recognition, the nationalists strongly urged all religious groups, particularly Christians, to 
participate.190 Their goal was to stimulate international interest in the Korean cause with 
the hope that the United States as well as other Western countries would honor their 
pledge of national self-determination that President Woodrow Wilson had recently put 
forth in his Fourteen Points prior to the Paris Peace Conference.
Christians’ Participation in the March First Movement (1919)
Initially, Christian nationalists had their own plans and were reluctant to partake 
in a secular uprising that was beyond their control. Secular leaders, however, were eager 
to form alliances with all religious groups because through them the movement would 
have a stronger spiritual tone and enjoy a higher moral ground to attract international 
recognition. They particularly valued Christians’ participation because of the benefit of 
the church network and its foreign connections so that the movement would gain 
legitimacy both inside and outside of Korea. Therefore, in order to gain Christian
188 Choong Soon Kim, A Korean Nationalist Entrepreneur: A Life History o f  Kim Songsu, 1891-1955 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998), 50-53.
189 Carlton Waldo Kendall, The Truth About Korea (San Francisco, CA: The Korean National Association, 
1919), 26.
190 Ibid. See also Hong, “Formation of Korean Protestantism and Its Political Nature,” 25.
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confidence and support, non-Christian nationalist leaders agreed to establish the 
movement on the principle of non-violence.
When the secular leaders’ approved of the non-violence principle, Christian 
groups began to join the movement individually even without the official consent of the 
churches or the missionaries. The first Christian clergyman who answered the call was 
Yi Sung-hun, the founder of Osan School in Chongju and one of the most respected and 
influential Christian leaders of the time.191 Other Christian leaders such as Ham T’ae- 
yong, who later became a vice-president under Syngman Rhee, Pak Hui-do, secretary of 
the Korean YMCA, and Kim Won-byok and Yi Kap-song, student leaders at Choson 
Christian College (today’s Yonsei University), joined the movement. As a result, the 
movement became a united effort of all anti-Japanese nationalists.
From its preparation to the day of the uprising, the role of churches was vital and 
the participation of Christians was remarkable. Secret preparation meetings were 
organized throughout the churches in Korea. Christians were informed of the upcoming 
uprising and were instructed to follow non-violent principles. From there, the word 
spread quickly through the church network.
On March 1, Koreans throughout the land read a Declaration of Independence 
signed by thirty-three leaders of various religious and underground patriotic groups on 
the previous night. Of these thirty-three signers, sixteen were famous Christian ministers 
including Kil Son-ju, Kim Pyong-jo, Yu Yo-dae, and Chong Ch’un-su (see Table 1.9).192 
Seven of them were Presbyterians, six Methodist-North, and three Methodist-South.
191 Kim, A Korean Nationalist Entrepreneur, 53.
192 Hong, “Formation of Korean Protestantism and Its Political Nature,” 26.
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There were no Catholic signers because the Pope had, for unknown reasons, ordered the 
Korean Catholic Church not to participate in the movement.193
Home-made Korean flags were waved on the streets, and slogans, such as 
“manse” (“ten thousand years”) and “Taehan tongnip manse” (“Long Live Korean 
Independence!”), were shouted by hundreds and thousands of demonstrators in every 
major city and town. On that day, Korea showed to the world that the desire for national 
independence was not the wish of a few people, but the general sentiment across the 
peninsula.
Churches became the most effective channels for the distribution of copies of the 
Declaration and national flags, and for mobilizing people.194 In Seoul, Sung-Dong 
Church and Jung-Dong Church were used as meeting places by the student 
representatives. Church-supported schools became “sources of demonstrations.” 195 
Across the country, mission schools and church buildings were used as arenas to hold 
declaration ceremonies. One American missionary who was not sympathetic to the 
involvement of Korean Christians in politics described the role of the church saying:
At P’ySngyang, the so-called Christian capital, where the writer happened to be on 
March 1 last year, permission was secured from the police to hold memorial services for 
the ex-emperor in the chief churches. At the close of these services the declaration of 
independence was read in the churches and the first ‘mansei’ were shouted. At 
Chinnampo, where I went on March 2, the mobs each time collected at the churches and 
started from there... to the streets for the demonstration.196
Despite his negative view, his comment showed that churches were the centers of this 
mass movement.
193 Matsuo and Takiguchi, “The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary Activity of the 
Japan Congregational Church in Korea,” 586.
19 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modern Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 135.
195 Matsuo and Takiguchi, ‘The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary Activity of the 
Japan Congregational Church in Korea,” 583-584.
D. Frank Herron Smith, The Other Side o f the Korean Question (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1920), 6.
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Japan’s Brutal Suppression
The police were shocked by the scale and the scope of this event. Some Korean 
policemen were so moved by the crowd that they took off their uniforms and joined the 
protest. Intent on bringing the situation under immediate control, the Japanese police 
forces, supported by hundreds of gendarmes, armed with swords and rifles, were sent to 
disperse the demonstrators and arrest trouble-makers. When this method failed to stop 
the gatherings of people, the military stepped in and opened fire on the peaceful 
demonstrators. Old men, women, and children were knocked down with the butts of 
rifles. In some remote cities where foreigners were not around, the gendarmes fired at 
the people until their ammunition was exhausted. Countless people died either on that 
day or the days afterwards due to police retributions. Foreigners estimated that over fifty 
thousand Koreans had either been killed or wounded in the first three months after the
• • 197uprising.
In one particular case, Japanese authorities demonstrated their distaste for 
Christianity. In Cheam-ni, which was about forty-five miles from Seoul, Japanese 
soldiers ordered all Christian men of the town to gather at the local church. As soon as 
they assembled, the soldiers fired at them and thirty-five men died at the spot. This event 
was confirmed by the investigations of both British and American consular agents and 
was admitted by Governor-General Hasegawa.198 A similar event also happened in 
Suwon, where Japanese soldiers locked all the villagers of one town in a church, set it on 
fire, and shot those who tried to escape.199 Widespread violence against Christians was
197 Kendall, The Truth About Korea, 33. This estimation is also supported by Korean historians’ figures.
See also Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” 170.
198 Kendall, The Truth About Korea, 31-32.
199 Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” 171.
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reported everywhere across the peninsula. In some areas, Christians were crucified in 
public. Extremely gruesome methods were witnessed, recorded, and reported by the 
missionaries and other foreigners.200
Four months after the movement, the Korean Presbyterian Church alone had lost 
2,486 of their members. Among them, forty-one church leaders were killed during the 
uprising and six more were tortured to death while in prison. A total of 12 churches were 
completely destroyed.201 In the end, 134 Presbyterian pastors and elders lost their lives. 
The Methodist missionaries described their loss this way:
When it came time for District Conference one of the Korean pastors said, ‘I think the 
best place to hold our District Conference this year would be the prison.’ This remark 
was brought out by the fact that 160 of our pastors, local preachers, exhorters, stewards, 
class leaders, day school teachers, Sunday school workers, and others were in prison on 
the account of the independence movement.... Of the eleven ordained Conference men 
eight were cast into prison and one was forced to rest on account of poor health. We 
close the year with two Conference members only. In the city of P’ydngyang the five 
churches were supporting six ordained pastors. These were all sent to prison.. ..202
Among all the 19,525 arrested demonstrators, there were 3,428 Christians (the total of all 
denominations), which was about 18 percent of those arrested (see Table 1.10). Another 
source suggested the number imprisoned was 9,458 and among them 2,987 were 
Christians, which was about 22 percent of the total.203 These figures are startling when 
one considers that Christians comprised only 1.3 percent of the population in 1919 
(roughly 200,000 out of 16 million people).
200 Ibid. See also Moffett, “Missionaries Contributed to Korea,” In D.R.P.: The Official Bulletin o f the 
Democratic Republican Party 10-11 (November 1975): 19-20.
201 The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches o f Christ in 
America. The Korean Situation: Authentic Accounts o f  Recent Events by Eye Witnesses (New York: The 
Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 
1919), 8-9.
202 Korea Conference: P’yfingyang District (1919) Annual Report o f  the Board o f Foreign Missions o f the 
Methodist Episcopal Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 
2001), 602.
203 Man-yol Yi, Han’guk kidokkyo minjok uishik (Christianity in Korea and National Consciousness) 
(Seoul: Chishik Sanopsa, 1991), 349.
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Although Christians did not participate in the movement as an organized religious 
body, the prominent role of churches in the movement was further evidenced when the 
nation witnessed forty-seven churches burned down, hundreds of Christians killed in the 
demonstration, and thousands more, including women, subjected to imprisonment and 
torture.204 Christian religious beliefs were a strong ideological force behind the 
movement. Many believed that they had planned the independence movement with 
God’s help and they could not stop even if they had to die. Patriotism backed by religion 
and the desire for religious freedom were two major motives for Christian participation in 
the demonstration.205
The blow to the churches caused by the loss of personnel and property was so 
great that evangelical work had to be largely halted for a time. Nevertheless, church 
membership began to increase again the following year, once the turmoil had died down. 
It had returned to its pre-1919 strength by 1921 (see Table 1.11). Because a great number 
of students of the mission schools had participated in the uprising, many were arrested or 
dropped out of school soon afterwards due to intense police pressure and surveillance. In 
contrast, the Korean Catholic Church did not suffer as much police harassment as other 
denominations and enjoyed an undisrupted growth of membership.
Another important aspect of the March First Movement was the role of Christian 
women in the cause for independence. Of the 471 women who were arrested, 309 were 
Christians, which was roughly 66 percent of the total (see Table 1.10). Yim Yong-sin, 
(whom was commonly known as Louise Yim by foreigners), a Methodist woman who
204 Kyong-bae Min, Han’guk kidokkyohoesa (A History of the Christianity in Korea) (Seoul: Taehan 
Kidokkyo Ch’ulp’ansa, 1982), 311-313.
205 Matsuo and Takiguchi, ‘The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary Activity of the 
Japan Congregational Church in Korea,” 585.
206 Ibid., 420.
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later became a loyal supporter of Syngman Rhee, was one of the major organizers of the 
local demonstrations. She was imprisoned for months and later sentenced to 42 months 
of house arrest.207 In a time when the majority of Korean women were still confined to 
their homes, Christianity brought the first major challenge to the traditional role of 
women in Korean society. It soon became fashionable for women to participate in 
underground anti-Japanese activities. The most famous of these women’s groups was 
Songmae-hoe (the Pine and Plum Society), in which Christian women led an 
underground network of nationalists.208
In spite of their high cost of thousands of lives, the peaceful demonstrations went 
practically unnoticed by a disinterested American public. Although individual reports 
were sent to the American churches by missionaries concerning the violent suppression 
of the peaceful demonstrations, American churches refused to throw their support behind 
Korean independence due to a strong pro-Japanese sentiment among church leaders in the 
United States. The US government made only a half-hearted effort to pressure the 
Japanese government to stop the oppression.
Meanwhile, although missionaries witnessed this unprecedented nationalistic 
political movement and were very sympathetic to it, they were not free to express their 
thoughts. They feared that their association with the movement would anger the Japanese 
government and thereby jeopardize their missionary activities in Korea. Their hesitation 
to openly side with the Korean nationalists and the failure of the American church 
community to respond to the movement or to pressure the US government to take bolder
207 Louis Yim, My Forty Year Fight for Korea (Seoul: International Culture Research Center Chungang 
University, 1951), 107-117.
208 Famous women leaders included the teachers and students from Sungsil Girl School in P’yongyang. 
Hwang Ae Tok, Kim Yong Hui, Yi Hyo Tok, An Chong Sok, Pak Hyon Suk, Yi Ma Tae, Ch’ae Kwang 
Tok, Song Pok Um, Hwang Sin Tok.
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steps to stop the Japanese persecution were examples of inaction that would be long 
remembered, though few Americans recognized their importance at the time. When the 
next opportunity came (this time in the struggle against Communism), American church 
leaders and missionaries were quite determined to prevent the United States government 
as well as themselves from making the same “mistakes” again.209
The effect of American missionaries in Korea during the colonial era was mixed. 
Some people accused them of helping the Japanese colonial government by keeping 
Korean Christians submissive to the Japanese government.210 Nevertheless, the same 
point can also be reversed by considering that the presence of missionaries helped the 
Korean churches by keeping the Japanese restrained. They prevented further unnecessary 
loss of lives and properties as the church suffered under a heavily oppressive policy put 
in place since March 1919.211 In fact, because American missionaries did not initiate or 
participate in the March First Independence Movement directly, the Japanese had no 
excuse to charge them. Behind the scenes, therefore, missionaries negotiated with the 
Japanese government so that they could continue their missionary activities in Korea. As 
a result, American missionaries succeeded in enabling Korean Christianity to survive and 
continue to grow steadily throughout the 1920s. Although it was not the missionaries’ 
intention, the continuing existence of the Christian churches did pose a constant threat 
and challenge to the Japanese colonial authoritarian government.
209 The word “mistakes” was used in the resolution adopted by the Foreign Mission Conference of North 
America in January 1947. The resolution was reported by The Voice o f Korea 6 (15 February 1947): 1. 
This publication was found in the Vertical File: Truman Subject File -  Religion, Truman Library.
210 Joe, A Cultural History o f  Modern Korea, 555-563.
211 Here I pass no judgment on the moral issue o f the stand of the missionaries, but present the background 
of their views during the colonial era so that it might shed light on their potential influence in post-war 
Korea-American relations as well as Korean domestic politics.
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Christianity and Cultural Nationalists 
In the post-March-First independence straggle, the temporary union among 
various nationalist factions began to fall apart. The cultural nationalists, by-and-large 
Christian laymen, began to dominate the independence straggle inside Korea, while the 
radicals were either heavily suppressed by the Japanese police or fled overseas for 
survival or recruitment. These groups marked the two competing versions of Korean 
nationalism that split the resistance into opposing camps. For the rest of the colonial 
period, these two groups straggled to survive under Japan’s surveillance and competed 
for supporters from among both domestic and oversea Korean patriots.
Inside Korea, because of the bad publicity of their brutal suppression of the 
independence movement, the Japanese government adopted a new policy known as 
Bunka seiji (cultural rule), allowing more freedom for the Korean people in order to 
appease the Korean nationalists and to satisfy the international community. The new 
Governor-General, Admiral Baron Saito Makoto, sought reconciliation with Korean 
political and social leaders. The colonial government allowed Koreans to publish their 
own newspapers, but with strict government censorship, and to hold meetings, but with 
careful police scrutiny. It also provided loans for Korean investors and industrialists, but 
only to develop small-scale industries using local raw materials.212 Governor Saito also 
agreed to establish more schools for Korean children, end discrimination of salaries in 
government services, and abolish flogging. Nevertheless, these were empty words 
because flogging and discrimination against Koreans continued throughout the colonial
212 Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” 176.
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period, and the schools for Korean children were not comparable to the schools for 
Japanese children.213
While the government agreed to lessen its social and political control, it tightened 
its control over the Christian churches. On the surface, the colonial government made 
some concessions to the missionaries in order to pacify them, by allowing religious 
teachings in mission schools and lessening the requirements for the construction of new 
churches, but deep down, the Japanese held the Christian community in great contempt. 
Although there was no more persecution and brutality against Christians under Governor 
Saito’s rule, the Japanese police watched everything. One missionary reported:
They [the policemen] often insist on attending the services of the churches and schools 
and in regulating what is said and done. They frequent the halls of the schools and arrest 
the students on all sorts of suspicion. They censor all publications and often object to 
articles in the weekly church’s paper.214
Their policy was aimed at preventing the Christian churches from ever again becoming a 
hot-bed for anti-Japanese sentiment. The policy would become tougher when Japan 
began to prepare to wage a war of conquest in East Asia in the 1930s.
In order to keep the church weak, the colonial government discriminated against 
Christians economically. When Japanese landlords took over Korean farmlands, 
Christian tenants were often thrown out and the right to farm the land was given to non- 
Christian tenants. In this way, the Japanese government was successful in disabling the 
long-term growth of the Christian church by indirectly denying the economic support it 
needed. According to Samuel H. Moffett, the son of an early missionary pioneer in 
P’yongyang, “A 1927 study of church giving in Korea concluded that the church was
213 Ibid., 175-176.
214 Harry A. Rhodes, History o f  the Korean Mission Presbyterian Church, 1884-1934 (Seoul: Chosen 
Mission Presbyterian Church U.S.A., 1934), 503.
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paying only half enough toward an adequate income for its church workers.”215 Because 
the church did not have enough resources to train and retain qualified leadership, the 
growth of most local churches in the later period of the colonial reign was stunted (see 
Table 1.12).
The fruitless result and the cost of human suffering also brought important 
changes to the minds of the church leaders and Christian intellectuals. They were willing 
to take a more conservative role in the independence movement. Japanese brutality 
caused American missionaries and Korean pastors to redirect the focus of their flocks to a 
peaceful path of resistance to avoid any further direct conflict with the colonial 
authorities. They advocated the importance of education and industrial development. As 
a result, the gradualist, cultural-nationalistic approach was commonly adopted by most 
Korean churches. While pastors focused their responsibility on preaching, individual 
Christian elders took up the responsibility of social improvements.
Cultural nationalism, as a result, gained a wider domestic following during the 
colonial period from 1919 to 1945. Christian schools and small businesses sprang up 
throughout Korea within the boundaries that were set by Japanese colonial authorities. 
Whoever chose to remain in Korea would be forced to make hard decisions whether to 
comply or face imprisonment. Dr. Kim Hwal-lan (Helen Kim), the President of Ewha 
Women’s University from 1939-1961, related that it was hard to define who was a 
collaborator and who was not, because in order to survive and carry on their educational 
work, Korean leaders all had to collaborate in one way or another. The same situation 
also applied to Kim Song-su, who sought to build up the Korean economy through both
215 Samuel H. Moffett, “Missionaries Contributed to Korea,” 72.
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0 1 ( \educational and economic means. He later became the most famous and influential 
cultural nationalist in postwar Korea.
CONCLUSION
Korea fell to Japan because of the weakness of the late Choson court, which was 
infected with corruption and power struggles. Lacking good political leadership and 
determination, most reform efforts failed as soon as they started. The decline of the 
Middle Kingdom due to foreign encroachments left Korea at the mercy of its neighbors. 
Korea’s hostile actions against foreign priests and native Christians, in turn, aroused the 
attention of Western powers that in the end brought many gunboats to the Korean coast. 
Nevertheless, it was eventually the growing power of Japan and its desire for territorial 
expansion that fundamentally disrupted the stability of the region and brought wars to the 
Korean soil. "When Western powers, particularly the United States, not only refused to 
restrain Japan, but also gave their consent to Japanese control of Korea, there was little 
hope for Korea’s survival as a nation.
While the US government had very little interest in defending Korea, and while 
most American businesses in Korea gradually yielded their operations to the Japanese in 
the midst of Japan’s encroachment on Korea, there were small groups of Americans who 
were determined to stay. Instead of giving up their fruitful field, missionaries continued 
their religious activities despite the constant hostile interference of the Japanese colonial 
government. Throughout these difficult decades, missionaries stood behind the Korean 
Christian churches, although they did not support anti-Japanese activities by individual 
Christians. Missionaries fought for greater religious freedom and liberty, and their
216 Kim, A Korean Nationalist Entrepreneur, 117-120.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
influence was felt all over the peninsula, from the biggest cities to even remotest villages 
of the north.
Although there were no formal diplomatic relations between Korea and America 
in the three decades of Japanese rule, informal relations between the Korean people and 
the American people continued to flourish. Under missionary sponsorship, Korean 
students came to the United States and Canada to pursue higher education, and then 
returned to serve their country. In this way, the religious connection opened a channel of 
communication between the colonized peninsula and the Western world, planting hope 
for an alternative vision for the future development of the country based on the Western 
democratic model.
Missionary activities not only influenced the Korean image of America and the 
American people, but also affected the Koreans’ image of themselves and their nation as 
well. Some students magnified what they learned from the missionaries and then turned 
the religious messages of personal salvation into political sermons to inspire their own 
people. Christian nationalists, who lived and grew under the shadow of the American 
missionaries, became dominant political figures in modem Korea.
Therefore, it was at least some missionaries, if not all, who impressed the Koreans 
with the promises of national and personal salvation that partially boosted the Koreans’ 
grand expectations from the United States and motivated them to seek American aid 
persistently.217 It was also their evangelical teachings, education work, and medical
217 This point has been clearly presented and elaborated by Harrington, God, Mammon and the Japanese, 
when Harrington analyzed how Dr. Horace Allen gave assurances to the Korean king about potential 
American aid, and by Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modem Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 
when Kim presented Horace Underwood’s positive assurances the American support behind the cause of 
Korean Independence. Both Allen and Underwood spoke their own convictions rather than the board’s 
position.
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services as a whole that induced crucial elements of change in the struggling Korean 
nation. Western education, undoubtedly, gave new understanding and new hope to the 
Korean people during the dark colonial era.
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CHAPTER 2 
Religious Factors in North Korea
INTRODUCTION
While nationalism helped to stir up many Koreans to resist Japanese colonial rule, 
the failure of the March First Movement and Japan’s new “cultural rule” polices caused 
serious disagreement among Korean nationalists. The split between the radicals and the 
gradualists affected the future development of Korean politics. While the gradualists had 
more influence and power inside Korea, the radicals earned their fame through political 
assassinations and armed struggles against the Japanese forces in China and Manchuria. 
In the post-colonial era, these divergent views of how the country should be liberated and 
developed became a constant source of tension among Korean nationalists, affecting the 
development of Korean politics and its foreign policy outlook.
The competition between leftists and rightists did not begin in 1945, but had 
instead been developing throughout the colonial period, as cultural nationalists were 
challenged by radical Communist nationalists. The dispute went beyond fractional 
differences and power struggles between ambitious politicians; at its core, it was clash 
between two incompatible philosophies. It was a battle over the vision that would guide 
Korea’s future: a radical revolution to achieve a Communist dictatorship or a gradual
110
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transition into a Christian-influenced democracy.1 The division of the country by two 
ideologically-competitive powers in August 1945 watered those seeds and caused them to 
flourish. While the Communists sought support from the Soviet Union, the Christian 
nationalists desired an alliance with the United States.
In the northern part of Korea, where Christianity had taken a strong hold in the 
hearts of the people, the clash between the gradualists and the radicals was intense even 
within the first three months of the liberation in 1945. To analyze the postwar political 
struggle in the north, it is important to first understand the final decade of Japanese 
colonial rule in Korea, in particular Japanese policy toward Christian churches. Christian 
nationalists, who had survived Japanese persecution, were the main political obstacle to 
Communist dominance in the north. Thus, when the Communist government sought to 
control the native religions in the north, it singled out Christian groups for more severe 
treatment.2 Their political rivalry and open confrontation had a significant impact on the 
polarization of Korea politics during the inter-war years.
THE DARKEST HOURS OF THE COLONIAL ERA (1931-1945)
Japan’s policy of bunka seiji (cultural rule) drew to a close as Tokyo began to 
mobilize for war in the 1930s. Ever since the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War,
1 According to John K Fairbank, there were many kinds of nationalism. He simplified them into two major 
categories: the conservative and the reformist-revolutionary. See John K. Fairbank, ‘The Problem of 
Revolutionary Asia,” Foreign Affairs 29 (October 1950): 107. Fairbank was speaking of East Asia in 
general; a more careful analysis of the specific case of Korea, however, reveals a political landscape that 
was too complex to be adequately described by these two simple categories. The Korean rightists consisted 
of more than conservatives who wanted to preserve their power at the expense of change, but also of 
Christians and other reformers who embraced some elements of the leftist agenda for positive political, 
social and economic changes. A temporary alliance between these groups was possible only because their 
interests, though different, were all equally threatened by Communism.
2 U.S. State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Take Over (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 96.
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Japanese troops, known as the Kwantung Army (Guandong Army), had been stationed in 
Manchuria to protect Japan’s newly-acquired railroad interests. The Kwantung Army 
was controlled by a militant faction of Japanese expansionists, eager to start a war of 
conquest against China. In September 18, 1931, two Japanese junior officers, Colonel 
Itagaki Seishiro and Lt. Colonel Kanji Ishiwara, both militant extremists, blew up a 
section of Japan’s South Manchuria Railway near Mukden.3 This event stirred up 
conflict between China’s troops under Zhang Xueliang and the Kwantung Army. The 
Japanese seized upon the crisis to send 10,000 troops to Mukden, ostensibly for the 
“protection” of the railroad system. Without facing any strong resistance from the 
Chinese army, Japan occupied Manchuria and established a puppet state, Manchukuo.
After the Manchurian Incident, political pressure mounted for Korea to assume a 
bigger role in Japan’s expansion. As a result, totalitarian measures were taken to tighten 
the control of the Korean peninsula, suppressing all potential domestic opposition and 
foreign influences that might jeopardize the war effort. In 1931, General Ugaki 
Kazushige replaced Admiral Saito Makoto as Governor-General of Chosen. The new 
government remilitarized the nation, ruthlessly suppressing opposition. Later, in 1936, 
General Minami Jiro, a pro-war militarist, replaced Ugaki and ruled with an even heavier 
hand. Japan was preparing for war against China.
A Full Scale “Japanization” of Korea
Korea, as the gateway that connected Japan to Manchuria, was an indispensable 
base for Japan’s invasion of the Asian continent. A full scale war between China and 
Japan started in July 1937, after Japanese and Chinese forces clashed at Marco Polo 
Bridge. As Japan ramped up its production for war, Korean factories were quickly
3 Japan seized Manchuria from China and established a puppet regime called Manchukuo.
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converted into a vital element of its war machine, and Korean natural resources were 
seized upon to fuel the Japanese Army. War factories were established in P’ydngyang, 
Hamhung, and Wonsan. In order to supply enough energy to keep the factories running 
for long hours, the colonial government developed hydro-electric power in northern 
Korea that supplied electricity not only to the whole peninsula but also to Manchuria as 
well. In the south, the Japanese took over Korea’s most fertile farmland and exported 
the rice to feed Japan and Japan’s army, while they imported barley and wheat from 
Manchuria to feed the Koreans. The Japanese also conscripted young Korean men into 
the Japanese army and forced young Korean women to become “comfort women” for the 
Japanese soldiers.4 The railroad network was used to transport troops and war materials 
from Pusan to Manchuria.
Economic and military mobilization, however, was not seen as enough to 
transform Korea into an essential partner in the war. The Japanese government 
demanded all Koreans to be fully assimilated into the empire. A complete program for 
the “Japanization” of the Korean people began. The colonial authorities ordered Koreans 
to adopt Japanese names and forbade them from using their own native language in 
public. Only Japanese history was to be taught, and only the Japanese language was 
allowed in schools.
Shintoism, the Japanese national religion of emperor worship, was enforced 
throughout Korea in the 1930s. Students were required to participate in Shinto worship 
on a regular basis. Shinto temples were built in each city, town, and village. At first, the 
Japanese authorities planned their propaganda campaign carefully, hoping to confuse
4 “Comfort women,” also known as wianbu in Korean, were young women forced by the Japanese to serve 
as prostitutes for Japanese soldiers on the front. While the majority o f them were Japanese and Koreans, 
there were also Chinese, Taiwanese, and some other women under Japanese occupation.
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church opinion by making a distinction between “State” and “Sect” Shinto. They argued 
that State Shinto was a mere patriotic ceremony and they promised noninterference with 
church activities. But the Japanese later intensified their demands and sought to enforce 
Shintoism by any means necessary. Shrines were put in all Christian churches and 
Buddhist temples. The police also ordered a kamidana, which was an individual 
household shrine, to be placed in each Korean home. Churches were only allowed to 
hold Christian services before or after working hours.
The Influence o f American Missionaries in the Korean Christian Community 
While most religious groups in Korea did not have a serious problem accepting 
Shinto worship, Korean Christians adamantly refused because of the main Biblical 
invectives against idol worship. Foreign missionaries were caught in the middle of this 
controversy. During the earlier period of bunka seiji, the Shinto issue was seldom raised 
because the Japanese government guaranteed some level of religious freedom. But when 
the Shinto rites became a test of loyalty to the emperor, they carried a deep political 
meaning. Japanese militarists feared that foreign religious influences would weaken 
support for the war, so they pressured all Christian institutions to perform Shinto rites in 
order to show their loyalty and patriotism.
Japan’s fear of foreign influence among Korean Christians was not unfounded. 
By 1931, foreign missionaries had established successful and influential mission 
enterprises in the Korean peninsula. The French Catholics’ strongholds were in Seoul 
and Taegu. The German Benedictines, though they came to Korea in 1909, began to 
focus their activities in the northeast region in 1921, from Wosan through the Hamgyong 
Provinces into Jiandao and all the way to Khabarovs. American Catholic missionaries
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(the Maryknoll Fathers) did not arrive until 1923 and their works were mainly in the 
northwest region.5 By 1941, their most successful mission area was in Yongyu, a city 
near Uiju on the Yalu River.6 The Irish Columbans came in the early 1930s. All together, 
the four Catholic missions had more than 140,000 converts by 1939 (see Table 2.10).
Although the Catholics had started 100 years earlier than the Protestants, the 
Protestants had already outgrown the Catholics in term of numbers of missionaries, 
converts, and mission institutions as early as 1910. At that time, more than 80 percent of 
foreign missionaries were Protestants and they controlled about 90 percent of all 
missionary premises, 91 percent of all mission hospitals, and 95 percent of all mission 
schools (see Table 2.9). When the first American Maryknoll missionary, Father Patrick 
Byrne, arrived in P’yongyang, he was shocked by the success of the Protestant churches 
in northern Korea and exclaimed, “Pyeng Yang [sic] is the most Protestant city I was ever 
in, in America or elsewhere.”7
American missionaries, in fact, were the most influential within the Korean 
Protestant community. In 1910, over 75 percent of all Protestant missionaries were from 
the United States and they controlled the majority of mission schools and hospitals (see 
Table 2.9). More than two decades later, in 1939, Americans still represented more than 
76 percent of all Protestant missionaries and had influence over 72 percent of all of the 
Korean Protestants that were under the care of foreign mission stations (see Table 2.10).
Among them, the Presbyterian missionaries were the most successful. There were 
six main Protestant missions working in Korea. Four were Presbyterian: Northern
5 Donald N. Clark, Christianity in Modern Korea (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 11.
6 Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT: 
EastBridge, 2003), 140.
7 Quoted by Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 137-138.
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(U.S.A), Southern (U.S.), Canadian, and Australian. While the Northern Mission had ten 
stations across the peninsula, the Southern Mission had four stations in two Cholla 
provinces.8 Altogether, the American Presbyterian missionaries had influence over 70 
percent of the Presbyterian churches with more than 200,000 members. In addition, the 
American Methodist missionaries had more than 800 churches with 50,000 members. 
Other American sects, such as the Seventh Day Adventist Mission and the Holiness 
Church had a total of 390 churches with about 12,000 members (see Table 1.6).
Missionaries from other countries, except the Catholics from France, were only 
marginal in their overall influence among Korean Christians. While working closely 
with their American counterparts, the Canadian Presbyterian Mission focused its work in 
two Hamgyong Provinces in the north and the Australian Presbyterian Mission had its 
main center in Pusan, South Kyongsang Province. In 1939, the Canadians had 38 
missionaries, taking care of about 17,000 converts in the north, and the Australians had 
29 missionaries, ministering to about 19,000 converts in the south. The English Church 
Mission had 136 churches with about seven thousand members in 1910, but by 1939, its 
four missionaries ministered to only about six thousand converts. The Salvation Army 
had 140 centers with 4,876 members in 1910, and its membership grew to be 18,000 in 
1939 (see Table 2.9 & 2.10). The Greek Orthodox had only six churches with 115 
members, mostly White Russians (see Table 1.6) in 1941. All of these, even added 
together, formed a relatively small fraction of the American mission enterprises.
8 In 1929, the Southern Missions had 10,809 baptized membership in its area. See George Thompson 
Brown, Mission to Korea (USA: Board of World Mission, Presbyterian Church U.S., 1962), 134.
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Controversy over the Shinto Issue
In Japan, foreign missionaries did not challenge the idea of “State Shinto,” 
because it was part of the expression of Japan’s nationalistic sentiment. For practical 
reasons, they accepted it as they did the Confucian notions of loyalty and filial piety. But, 
the case in Korea was completely different. The Christian community, including 
missionaries, church leaders, and native converts, were deeply divided over Shinto 
worship. The Korean Catholic Church took its official position from the example of the 
Japanese Catholic Church and interpreted the ceremony as a patriotic ritual, but 
individual priests, such as Monsignor John Morris, refused to accept it.9 In response, 
Morris was fired from his position. Likewise, after intensive debate, the Methodist 
missionaries and the Korean Methodist Church yielded under intense political pressure 
from the colonial government. The Seventh Day Adventists and Congregationalists also 
followed a non-resistant approach under pressure from the Japanese authorities.
Concerning the Presbyterians, who represented more than 78 percent of all 
Protestants (see Table 2.5), the scale of controversy was much bigger and the resistance 
was much stronger. Since the American Presbyterian missionaries controlled the 
majority of the mission schools and had influence over many churches, their opinions on 
this matter had a great impact on many people, including non-Christians. Some (mostly 
from the Presbyterian P’yongyang Mission Station and Southern Presbyterian Mission), 
such as Rev. Samuel A. Moffett, Rev. Otto DeCamp, Dr. DeWitt Lowe, and Dr. George 
McCune, objected to Christians’ participation in Shinto worship.10 Dr. McCune’s 
argument was based on one of the Ten Commandments: “Thou shalt have no other gods
9 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 213.
10 Brown, Mission to Korea, 149-152.
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before me.”11 His opinion persuaded the Presbyterian Mission in the north to vote to 
close its schools rather than have its students participate in Shinto shrine worship. As a 
result, the famous Sungsil College in P’yongyang (also known as Union Christian 
College) was, under Dr. McCune’s leadership, closed in 1938. The Southern 
Presbyterian Mission also decided to close down all of their mission schools if Japanese 
authorities forced their students to perform Shinto rituals.12
Nevertheless, other missionaries, especially those in Seoul, took a more practical 
view of Shinto worship, hoping to preserve their institutions. Dr. Horace H. Underwood, 
for example, advanced an argument based on the idea, “Render unto Caesar the things 
that are Caesar’s.” 13 He regarded the Shinto ceremony more as a citizen’s political 
obligation, and therefore, one that should be honored. His position was supported by 
many in the southern Christian community, who valued education and wanted to preserve 
the mission schools. Underwood’s position influenced the Presbyterian Board of 
Foreign Mission in New York to decide to continue supporting Christian institutions in 
Korea, overruling the Presbyterian Mission’s decision to close down all mission schools 
and ordering the missionaries to transfer ownership of individual schools to the hands of 
the Koreans if necessary. In the end, the mission schools that stayed open until 1945 
were those who were transferred to non-mission management.14
The final decision on how the individual churches should respond fell on the 
shoulders of the Korean church leaders of the different denominations. After a long
11 Horace G. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections o f Horace G.
Underwood, ed. Michael J. Devine (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 64.
12 Brown, Mission to Korea, 156.
13 The debate between the two groups of missionaries was reported in “A Debate,” The Presbyterian 
Tribune, 20 January 1938. See also ibid., 64.
14 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 63-65.
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period of discussion and facing strong government pressure, the Presbyterian Church 
followed Underwood’s reasoning and adopted a conciliatory approach. The General 
Assembly declared that attendance at a Shinto ceremony was merely a patriotic rather 
than a religious act.15
The decision of the General Assembly did not, of course, represent the beliefs of 
all Presbyterian ministers or their congregations. Many pastors who had graduated from 
P’yongyang Presbyterian Seminary disagreed with the decision of the assembly, and 
many Christians left their churches in protest.16 The Japanese colonial police arrested 
most anti-Shinto church leaders. In the north, 40 percent of Protestant pastors were 
imprisoned. The most famous anti-Shinto pastors were Rev. Chu Ki-ch’ol, the pastor of 
Sanjonghyon Church in P’yongyang, and Rev. Son Yang-won, the pastor of the Leper 
Colony in Sunch’on. Neither were the anti-Shinto missionaries immune to punishment. 
When Rev. DeCamp and Dr. Lowe removed shrines from churches and Christian homes, 
they were also arrested, tried, and sentenced to prison. They were expelled from Korea 
shortly afterwards.
In the end, 1,200 churches were closed, and about 3,000 church leaders, mostly 
from the north, were thrown into prison due to their opposition to Shinto worship. All of 
them were subjected to brutal torture at the hands of the Japanese police.17 About fifty of 
them, including Rev. Chu, died as martyrs before the day of liberation.18 The religious 
fervor of these inmates led to nationalistic fanaticism as well. Rejecting Shintoism, they
15 Chung-Shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 
2003), 155.
16 Edward Adams, “Report on Korea,” 15 January 1946, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, 
Box 16, Folder 29 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
17 Ibid., see also Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 156.
18 Chu, Kwang-jo, More Than Conquerors (Seoul: Daesung.com, 2006), 121-127.
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reasoned, was rejecting the emperor. Enduring years of abuse in prison had refined the 
resolve of these Christians. When these church leaders and laymen were later released 
from prison following liberation, they were intensely anti-Japanese and anti-Communist, 
with no interest in compromise. They had also earned the respect of the Korean people 
and were recognized as courageous, principled, uncompromising nationalists. They 
would enjoy enormous public support from both Christians and non-Christians, and many 
became national leaders.
The confrontational stance of some American missionaries encouraged the 
Japanese government to impose tough restrictions upon the Korean churches. First, it 
ordered the Japanese churches to take control of all Korean churches and Christian 
organizations. 19 For instance, the Korean Y.M.C.A. (Young Men’s Christian 
Association) was forced to merge with the Japanese Y.M.C.A., prompting the 
International Y.M.C.A. to deny Korean representatives permission to participate in 
Y.M.C.A. international conferences. Such restrictions gradually expanded to all 
Christian denominations, cutting off Korean religious affiliations from their outside 
organizations. In 1939 and 1940, the Presbyterian Church of Korea was bracketed with 
the Presbyterian Reformed Church in Japan, and the Korean Methodist Church with the 
Japanese Methodist Church.20
Second, Japan carefully regulated any personal interaction between Korean 
Christians and foreign missionaries. Missionaries were asked to withdraw from local 
church organizations. They were forbidden from conducting mass evangelism or
19 Seijiro Niwa, “The Federated Union of Japanese and Korean Churches in the Peninsula,” The Korean 
Mission Field, (August 1940). The source was used by Yoko Okuyama, “Helen Kim’s Life and Thought 
Under the Japanese Colonialism, 1918-1945” (MA Thesis: Yonsei University, 1989), 40-41.
20 “Korea Report, 1943,” Annual Report o f  the Board o f Foreign Missions o f the Methodist Episcopal 
Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The Institute of Korean Church History, 2001), 890.
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speaking in churches. As the pressure continued to tighten, Japanese police would stop 
any church meetings where missionaries were present. Even innkeepers were instructed
not to host missionaries. In this way, the colonial authorities succeeded in curtailing all
0 1missionary evangelical activities by June 1940.
The Deterioration o f  Japan-America Relations 
Meanwhile, Japan’s aggression in China aroused international concerns. When 
Nanjing, the capital of China, fell, reports of unconscionable brutality against civilians 
were told by missionaries and reporters around the world. Public opinion in the United 
States turned against Japan. In 1938, the United States government imposed an embargo 
on war materials to Japan. Tensions between the two countries intensified when Japan 
signed the Tripartite Mutual Defense Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940. In 
response, the United States declared an embargo on scrap iron and steel to Japan.
American missionaries began to discover that, even if they were willing to 
compromise with the Japanese government, it would not save them from eventual 
banishment from Korea. The colonial police forces began full scale surveillance of all 
foreigners. Korean Christians were ordered not to interact with missionaries because all 
foreigners were considered possible spies. With the worsening of US-Japan relations,
Gaylord Marsh, the American consul general in Korea, advised all American citizens to
00leave. The US government provided special transportation for the evacuation. Many 
missionaries chose to go because their mission services were no longer possible in such a 
hostile environment. On November 16, 1940, the S. S. Mariposa took 219 Americans,
21 Brown, Mission to Korea, 159-160.
22 Ibid., 161.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
mostly missionaries and their children, back to the United States.23 The British also 
followed the American lead and evacuated their nationals, including Canadians and 
Australians.24 The missionary community in Korea thus shrank to a dozen families in 
major cities.25
The attack on Pearl Harbor followed soon afterward on December 8, 1941 
(Korean time), and all remaining foreigners and missionaries in Korea were arrested. 
One of them, Dr. John Van Neste Talmage, was chief of the Southern Presbyterian 
Mission juridical body. He was jailed for 121 days on charges of possessing certain maps, 
even though they had been registered with the authorities. The real purpose of his 
imprisonment was to force him to sign over various mission properties. When Dr. 
Talmage refused regardless of threats of torture and further imprisonment, he was 
expelled from the country.
Meanwhile, the Japanese police also tried to prove that the Presbyterian Mission 
was a spy organization. They tortured Dr. Frederick S. Miller, Dr. Edwin W. Koons, and 
Mr. Ralph O. Reiner, who were key members of the Mission, in an attempt to force them 
to make false confessions.27 The missionaries refused to comply. On May 31, 1942, 
after five months of confinement, Japanese authorities transferred their foreign prisoners 
to Kobe, where the Japanese gathered all foreigners and repatriated them back to America 
and Europe in two separate ships.
23 Ibid.
24 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 252.
25 Seven Southern Presbyterian missionaries chose to stay behind. They were Dr. and Mrs. Wilson, Dr. and 
Mrs. Talmage, Dr. J. C. Crane, Miss Mary Dodson, and Miss Florence Root. See Brown, Mission to Korea, 
162.
26 Ibid., 162-164.
27 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution, and Peace, 81-82.
28 Ibid., 84-86.
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Christians who Collaborated with the Japanese
Meanwhile, Christian churches in Korea faced another challenge after the 
departure of foreign missionaries. As soon as war broke out between the United States 
and Japan, Japanese authorities automatically assumed that all Christians were against the 
colonial government and began to exert tighter control over the churches.29 Church 
services were largely reduced to once a week, usually in the evening because Christians 
were required to work on Sunday. Pastors were forced to perform manual labor on 
defense projects. Church services were censored, and Shinto elements were forcibly 
incorporated into them. Many Christian schools were closed or transferred to non- 
Christian ownership. No religious instruction was allowed to continue in any schools. 
The government also closed down the Christian Literature Society and the British and 
Foreign Bible Society so that no more Christian literature was published. Most
o n
seminaries and Bible schools were also closed down, with only a few exceptions.
In June 1945, the Japanese authorities issued a new order to require all Protestant 
denominations to join together and form a new amalgamation called Kyodan (“church 
federation”), also known as the United Church of Korea, which was completely under
0 1
colonial government control. Representatives were called and asked to vote for a 
“moderator” of the new church, but the result was never made public. Instead, the 
Japanese colonial government appointed Rev. Kim Kwan-sik to be the moderator. 
Clergymen and laymen who resisted the process were purged from their churches or 
institutions. About one third of Korean Christian churches closed their doors and church
29 Adams, “Report on Korea,” 2.
30 “Survey 1947: Korea Mission, Presbyterian Church, USA,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 140, Box 16, Folder 34 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
31 “Korea Report, 1942,” Annual Report o f  the Board o f Foreign Missions o f the Methodist Episcopal 
Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The Institute of Korean Church History, 2001), 878.
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buildings were taken over by the government and used for secular and military 
purposes.32
Japan’s policy against the Christian churches in Korea left serious divisions and 
scars within the Christian community. During those darkest hours of colonial history in 
Korea, some clergymen and laymen who were determined to keep their churches and 
schools open had no option but to collaborate with the Japanese.
Dr. Kim Hwal-lan (Helen Kim), for example, the President of Ewha Women 
University at that time who was one of the most influential women in Korea, had to work 
with Japanese government agents in the school and write pro-Japanese articles endorsing 
government policies. Some charged that she made pro-Japanese speeches in villages, and 
even assisted in the recruitment of prostitutes for soldiers on the war front.33 Regardless 
of her reasons for collaboration, Dr. Kim’s effort did not bear much positive results. 
Normal academic programs were eventually halted by the Japanese government and 
Ewha girls were sent to villages as war propagandists, telling the Korean people what 
they must do to help the Japanese win the war.34
The most egregious case was that of Dr. Song Ch’ang-gun, President of the 
Choson Seminary. In order to keep his seminary open, Dr. Song actively supported 
Japanese policy, making speeches on behalf of the government. He even acted as a priest
32 Adams, “Report on Korea,” 2.
33 Okuyama, “Helen Kim’s Life and Thought Under the Japanese Colonialism, 1918-1945,” 45-46. In her 
autobiography Dr. Helen Kim confessed that she had made pro-Japanese speeches in Ewha, but did not 
mention her pro-Japanese articles. See also Helen Kim, Grace Sufficient (Nashville: The Upper Room, 
1964), 101.
34 Okuyama, “Helen Kim’s Life and Thought Under the Japanese Colonialism, 1918-1945,” 48.
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at a Japanese shrine, going through its rites of cleansing like a Japanese priest. Many 
charged him with being the guiltiest collaborator in the Christian community.35
Despite the willingness of many Christian leaders to collaborate with the colonial 
government, Japan’s mistrust of Korean Christians remained unchanged. Japanese 
authorities feared that their hidden pro-American attitude would jeopardize the 
government’s effort to defend the Korean peninsula against an American invasion. The 
colonial government thus formed a list of Christian leaders whom they planned to 
execute on August 17, 1945. Fortunately, liberation came before the designated date. 
The lives of these Christian leaders were spared.
THE LIBERATION OF NORTH KOREA
The Pacific War came to a quick end in August 1945 after Truman ordered the 
use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, respectively. 
The Japanese government’s hope to avoid an unconditional surrender was dashed as soon 
as the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8.36 These two main factors led 
Japanese Emperor Hirohito to announce his decision to terminate the war on August 15, 
1945. It was supposed to be good news for Korea, which had been under Japan’s 
colonial rule for four decades. Nevertheless, what disappointed many Koreans was that 
shortly after the liberation, they found that their country was not only divided, but also 
forcibly occupied by two new foreign powers.
35 Letter from Fran Kinsler to John Smith, 19 March 1949, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
36 For a detailed analysis o f Japan’s serious effort to keep the Soviet Union neutral, see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, 
Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2005).
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Drawing a Demarcation Line 
The division of Korea along the line of the 38th Parallel was initially the result of 
a military agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union when Japan 
surrendered. On August 15, 1945, President Harry Truman cabled a draft message of 
General Order No.l to Generalissimo Joseph Stalin, which contained an order to the 
Japanese troops in Korea to surrender to the Red Army north of the 38th parallel and to 
the American army south of that line. Stalin accepted Truman’s proposal without dispute, 
and as a result, a demarcation line along the 38th Parallel was drawn. It was a strange and 
arbitrary arrangement that has troubled many Koreans to this day. Why did Truman 
propose this demarcation, and why did Stalin accept it?
Truman wrote about his decision years later, testifying that it was merely a 
“convenient allocation of responsibility for the acceptance of the Japanese surrender.”37 
However, historians have suspected that the real reason for Truman’s proposal was to 
prevent the Soviet Union from occupying the whole Korean peninsula.38 Keeping Seoul 
in American hands strengthened the U.S. position in steering Korea’s political 
development, since Seoul was the political, economic, and cultural center of Korea. In 
addition, by securing the lower half of the Korean peninsula, the United States prevented 
the Soviet Union from controlling the Tsugaru Strait, the water between Honshu and 
Hokkaido, which was an important sea route for the movement of submarines.
37 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs o f  Harry Truman, Vol.l: Years o f Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1955), 444-445.
38 See Erik van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford, New York & 
Munich: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989), 63. See also Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 252.
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Nevertheless, according to Dean Rusk, a colonel in the army at that time, who
wrote in 1990 about his experience, the demarcation line was selected in “great haste”
and “under great pressure”:
Working in great haste and under great pressure we had a formidable task: to pick a zone 
for the American occupation. Neither Tic [Charles H. Bonesteel III] nor I was a Korea 
expert, but it seemed that Seoul the capital, should be in the American sector. We also 
knew that the U.S. Army opposed an extensive area of occupation. Using a National 
Geographic map, we looked just north of Seoul for a convenient dividing line but could 
not find a natural geographical line. We saw instead the thirty-eighth parallel and 
decided to recommend that.. ,.39
Rusk’s testimony led historians to wonder just how serious the United States was about 
occupying South Korea. Clearly, Washington was distracted with many post-war 
concerns in both Europe and Asia, and the U.S. Army in the Pacific was quite unprepared 
to occupy a land of nearly 20 million people.
Soviet motives were even less clear. Historians have puzzled as to why Joseph 
Stalin would promptly agree to limit the advance of the Red Army when it seemed that it 
could have easily outrun the United States and captured Seoul first. One possible reason 
was that Stalin might have expected the United States to allow the Soviet Army to 
occupy the northern part of Hokkaido as a Soviet occupation zone in Japan if he 
complied with the American request on Korea.40 Although the Americans had never 
made such a promise, it was a plausible hypothesis explaining Russian motives in August 
1945.
Nevertheless, the readiness of Russia to keep its promise over the 38th Parallel did 
not necessarily mean that it was willing to cooperate fully with the United States 
concerning Korea. Korea had far more vital strategic value to the Soviet Union than to 
the United States. For one thing, Korea was on Russia’s back doorstep. Moreover, if the
39 See Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: Penguin Book, 1990), 124 and 167.
40 For details of the Russians’ motives, see Van Ree, Socialism, in One Zone, 63.
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Soviet Union could extend its sphere of influence over the whole peninsula, then the 
U.S.S.R. would be in a stronger position to influence the post-war political and military 
development of China. It would also be in a far better position to challenge American 
dominance of Japan.
Soviet Occupation above the 38th Parallel 
When the United States received the news of Japan’s unconditional surrender, 
President Truman ordered American commanders in the Pacific to suspend their 
offensive operations against Japanese forces. The Soviet Union, however, continued 
their offensive operations against the Japanese forces on all fronts. Russian troops were 
battling to push their position deeper into Manchuria, Korea, and the Kurils, hoping to 
seize all the territories promised at Yalta.41 On August 16, 1945, the Soviet Army had 
not yet occupied any territory on the Korean peninsula because the Japanese were still 
resisting the advancing Red Army from various strategic positions.42 The cease-fire 
order from Tokyo was not issued to the Kwantung Army until August 18. The Soviet 
Union and Japan eventually reached their cease-fire agreement on August 19.
As soon as the Soviet Army entered Korea, the majority of its troops were sent to 
stand guard along the 38th Parallel. Southbound routes were generally open, but 
northbound movement was closely watched. The natural flow of information and 
transportation between the north and the south gradually came to a halt. The northern 
section became entirely cut off from Seoul once the Soviet Army sealed the border. 
Hence, crossing the 38th Parallel became more and more difficult and dangerous.
41 Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 253.
42 The Japanese did not stop fighting on August 16, 1945, because they claimed that they had not yet 
received the formal order from the emperor. See Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 62-64.
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The immediate impact of the demarcation line was to create a deep sense of 
uncertainty among Koreans on both sides. Koreans were a homogenous people with a 
unified language, culture, and set of customs. The northern and southern half mutually 
depended on each other economically. The north needed southern food, particularly rice; 
the southern factories needed northern electricity, and the southern peasants needed 
northern fertilizers. The overnight appearance of an artificial line dividing the country 
caused immense logistical problems and frustrations. The electricity supply for Seoul 
and the rest of the south was now in Russian hands in the north. Meanwhile, with the 
influx of 100,000 Russian soldiers, who normally lived off their occupied lands, the north 
faced an immediate food shortage.
In addition, Seoul had long been the center of Korea’s political activities. 
Historically, whoever controlled Seoul usually controlled the nation. Most of the nation’s 
top political activists such as Yo Un-hyong, Song Chin-u, and Pak Hon-yong resided in 
Seoul. For this same reason, even the leftists’ stronghold was in the south. By isolating 
the north from Seoul, the Red Army created a sudden power vacuum in the north, which 
none of the leaders in Seoul were able to fill.
Christian Domination of Local Committees for the Preparation o f Korean 
Independence (CPKI) in North Korea
While the Russians were fighting their way to P’yongyang from August 11 to 
August 24, the Japanese were searching for some means of safeguarding the lives of 
Japanese civilians and of preserving peace and order during the transition period. 
Knowing that their country was about to surrender to the Allies, Japanese officials in the 
north contacted Cho Man-sik, a prominent Christian nationalist in P’yongyang, to 
manage security in the northern part of the peninsula. Cho Man-sik’s high reputation
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among anti-Japanese nationalists was indisputable. He had founded Sin’ganhoe (New 
Korea Society), a united nationalist organization that enjoyed the strongest political 
following in the north prior to liberation and had a membership of thirty thousand.43
In the south, the Japanese approached Song Chin-u, a famous educator and 
cultural nationalist. Cho accepted the offer, but Song declined. Yo Un-hyong became 
Song’s substitute. Yo Un-hy5ng had studied in the Paejae School (the first mission 
school established by American Methodist missionaries). He dropped out of school when 
he was punished for not attending religious services. In 1908, he was baptized by Rev. 
Charles A. Clark, an American Presbyterian missionary, and became an assistant minister 
in Seoul for two years in the Sungdong Church. From 1911 to 1912, he studied theology 
at the P’yongyang Presbyterian Seminary. Like An Ch’ang-ho, Yo advocated both 
education and military preparation. He was a major figure in the Korean Provisional 
Government in Exile (KPG) in Shanghai44 He was a moderate, leaning to the left, an 
ideal figure for a leftist-nationalist coalition.45 On September 6, 1945, a “Korean 
People’s Republic,” under Yo’s leadership, was proclaimed in Seoul.
While Yo mobilized all the underground rightists and leftists to form a temporary 
alliance under the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) in the 
south, Cho was simultaneously doing the same thing in the north. On August 17, 1945, 
Cho Man-sik organized a local committee in P’yongyang, which he affiliated with the 
CPKI in Seoul. Both the northern and southern CPKIs were therefore headed by
43 The US government document translated Sin’ganhoe as the “National Foundation Association.” See 
State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f  Takeover, 13.
44 The Korean Provisional Government (KPG) was established in Shanghai by around 1,000 Korean 
nationalists in April 1919. Syngman Rhee was chosen as its Premier, while Kim Kyu-sik was its foreign 
minister. Among its best known leaders were also Yi Tonghwi, An Ch’angho, Y8 Unhy5ng, and Kim Ku. 
Finally, under Kim Ku’s leadership, KGP earned its fame through terrorist activities against Japanese 
leaders.
45 See Lee Wha Rang, “Who Was Y8 Un-hy5ng?” http://www.kimsoft.com/2002/mongyang.htm.
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prominent Christian laymen. Also, Christians were heavily represented in both the north 
and the south CPKIs, outnumbering the Communists in almost every local council.
Nonetheless, relatively speaking, the strength of the Communists and their leftist 
allies was concentrated in the south, and the Christian nationalists were most powerful in 
the north.46 According to Korean historian Kim Nam-sik, “the People’s Committees 
were not created from the center but organized from the bottom up.”47 In other words, 
the leadership of the People’s Committees (PCs) and CPKIs revealed the relative political 
strength of the leftists and rightists in local settings. In South P’yongan Province, where 
Cho Man-sik received the most support, Communists had a difficult time in controlling 
the local PCs.
For instance, among the twenty members of Cho’s committee, there were only 
two Communists. Likewise, all CPKIs in the north were under the control of Christians, 
except the North and South Hamgyong Provinces, who were either influential local 
pastors, such as Rev. Yun Ha-yong and Rev. Han Kyong-jik, or prominent Christian 
nationalist leaders who had been imprisoned by the Japanese following the March First 
Independence Movement. Even though there were Communists and other leftists present 
in all local PCs in northern Korea, they tended to be a minority and less influential. 
Therefore, in order to boost the political standing of the Communists, whenever the Red 
Army entered a town, they would force the local CPKI to reorganize by enlisting more 
Communists as committee members, and would change their name to a People’s Political
AC,
Committee, a term which was not used in southern Korea.
46 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2003), 50-51.
47 Quote in ibid., 49.
48 Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 93-95.
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The influence of Christians in the local CPKIs was so powerful that the 
Communists could not use the CPKIs to push their agenda. The Soviet army had two 
options: to allow the CPKI to continue to function, or to impose its own political system 
immediately. The Soviet leaders chose the first option. With very few Communist 
national figures available to them, they were willing to work with Cho Man-sik, since this 
would buy time for the Communists to build up their own network and to tighten their 
grip on the power system.49 It was not a surprise that Cho led the South P’yongan 
Provincial People’s Political Committee (SPPPC) immediately after liberation50 and later 
headed the Five-Provinces Administration Bureau (FPAB) under the sponsorship of the 
Soviet Union.
POLITICAL COMPETITION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND 
COMMUNISTS IN POST-LIBERATION NORTH KOREA
According to Charles K. Armstrong, the author of The North Korean Revolution, 
1945-1950 (2003), religious groups, such as Christians and Ch’ondogyo followers (from 
the Tonghak Movement), had a strong influence in North Korea and thus competed with 
the Communists for political domination.51 Although the population of these two groups
49 Most of the famous Communist leaders were in the South. The headquarters of the Korean Communist 
Party was located in Seoul. Kim Il-sung did not return until September 1945.
50 Actually the Soviet leaders forced Cho to include more Communists in his committee. According to a 
CIC document, “On 27 August 1945, Soviet troops entered P’yQngyang, largest city in Korea north of the 
38th Parallel. They found there already established a Nation Reconstructing Preparatory People’s 
Committee composed primarily of Christians, businessmen, and educators. Head of the Committee was 
Cho Man Sik, a Presbyterian minister. On that same day Soviet authorities informed the Committee that 
they were turning over the government to the Koreans, and that they desired this Committee to be 
composed of 15 members from the Preparatory Committee and of 15 members from the Communist Party, 
no members from which were on the original body. This request was acceded to and Cho Man Sik was 
elected Chairman o f the new group.” See “Weekly Information Bulletin#20,” 4 September 1947,
CIC M JZ*j 1945 .9  -  1949.1  (Seoul: Hallym University, Institute of
Asian Culture Studies, 1995) 2: 381.
51 Tonghak meant Eastern Learning. See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 14-15.
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was less than four percent of the overall Korean population, their political influence 
remained strong among the Korean nationalists.
It was true that the most common religious practice in Korea was ancestor 
worship, but since it was organized according to each clan on a local level, it did not 
generate a nationwide political force to support Korean independence. Like the case of 
China, Korean ancestor worship was a direct result of the cultural influence of 
Confucianism and Buddhism, but these two religious faiths did not have strong organized 
structures and overseas connections.52 Their political influence in Korea was declining 
while Christianity and other messianic types of religious sects, such as Ch’ondogyo, were 
gaining popular support during the colonial period.
While Ch’ondogyo’s power base was among poor peasants in the countryside, 
particularly in the Hamgyong region, Christians’ influence lay more in urban areas and 
among intellectuals, especially in the P’yongan region. After liberation, both groups 
resisted the Soviet-inspirited Communist revolution, using peaceful as well as violent 
means.53 This section describes the political competition between the religious groups 
and Communists prior to the Communist take-over in February 1946.
Ch’dndogyo’s Strong Influence in Rural Areas 
Ch’ondogyo was a religion with roots in the Tonghak peasant uprising in the late 
Choson dynasty. Nationalist Kim Ku, the President of the Provisional Korean 
Government in Chungking, China, was once a member of this movement before he was 
converted to Catholicism.54 With the help of the Chinese government, the Choson
52 State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Take Over, 96.
53 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 115 and 119.
54 Kim Ku, Packpom Ilchi: The Autobiography o f Kim Ku, translated, annotated and introduced by Jongsoo 
Lee (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000).
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government crushed the Tonghak rebellion in 1895, and many Tonghak believers moved 
north. Son Pyong-hui, the third head of Tonghak escaped to Japan and when he returned 
in 1905, he renamed the religion Ch’ondogyo, the original name applied to the doctrine 
by the founder in his own Scriptures.55
Under the leadership of Son, Ch’ondogyo expanded quickly and set up places of 
worship in every province and county. Priority was also given to the establishment of 
schools. Ch’ondogyo’s strongest base was in the P’yongan area.56 In 1919, since 
Ch’ondogyo’s followers were active participants in the March First Independence 
Movement and Son was the first signer of the 1919 Declaration of Independence, the 
Japanese authorities arrested Son. According to Japanese statistics, there were about
111,000 Ch’ondogyo followers in 1920 (see Table 2.1). The actual number, however, 
was actually about 3 million, much higher than the official figure because of the secret 
nature of the group. By the 1920s, it had founded more than thirty schools in the north, 
and was active in organizing peasants, merchants, women, young students, and even 
children.58 After Son’s imprisonment, the work was carried on by a new leader, Yi Ton- 
hwa.59
From its beginning, the religious teaching of Ch’ondogyo always contained a 
strong political element. It advocated the idea of in nae chon (“man and heaven are one”), 
which generated the belief of social egalitarianism, quite a radical idea for Korea’s 
traditional class-conscious and hierarchical society. The religion stressed kaebyok, which
55 R. Pierce Beaver, “Chondogyo and Korea,” Journal o f  Bible and Religion 30 (April 1962): 117.
56 Songbo Kim, ‘The Decision and Development Process of North Korean Land Reform” (unpublished 
manuscript), 11. See also Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 15.
57 Wi Jo Kang, Religion and Politics in Korea under the Japanese Rule (Lewiston, N Y : Edwin Mellen 
Press, 1987), 70-73.
58 Ibid., 73. See also Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 126.
59 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 127.
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meant “awakening.”60 Individuals needed religious enlightenment, the nation needed 
independence, and Korean society needed a new social order so that all people could 
reach their full potential.61 Their version of “new democracy” was the elimination of 
feudal relationships, the end of colonialism, the removal of “reactionary fascism,” and the 
promotion of the leadership of the unified working masses.62
Since Ch’ondogyo members were mostly stem nationalists, they formed a 
“Young Friends’ Party” (YFP) (Ch’ongudang) as the political wing of the religious group 
in 1923 to carry out their work of education, reform, and religious teaching. Although 
the YFP had branches all over Korea, the party recruited most of its supporters from the 
northern provinces (see Table 2.2). Its religious publication, Kaebyok, was a major 
literary journal in the early 1920s. The Japanese colonial government therefore regarded 
Ch’ondogyo as a “quasi-religion” that posed a great threat to the reign of the Japanese. 
The government forced all Ch’ondogyo-affiliated schools to shut down in retaliation for 
their involvement in the March First Movement.
In 1931, when the YFP attempted to organize a Second March First Movement, 
the colonial government launched a major campaign to arrest YFP members. Since the 
police effectively cracked down on Ch’ondogyo’s activities throughout the 1930s, the 
YFP was forced to go underground. The official membership of Ch’ondogyo gradually 
declined to about 72,000 in 1944 (see Table 2.1) after its central headquarters in Seoul
60 Ibid., 128.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Beaver, “Chondogyo and Korea,” 118.
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was converted by the government into a factory that manufactured Japanese army 
uniforms.64
Ch’ondogyo, nevertheless, remained popular in rural areas, especially in North 
P’yongan and South Hamgyong. Its followers in the P’yongan area organized the Korean 
Peasant Society (KPS) to lead peasant protests against the Japanese colonial authorities. 
They agreed to cooperate with the leftists (“the Red Peasant Unions”) against the 
Japanese when the colonial authorities tightened up control over all the underground 
political groups. The leftists, however, did not trust the KPS because they believed that 
the Ch’ondogyo followers were “reformists,” not revolutionaries. Since Ch’ondogyo had 
a strong base and deeper historical roots than the Communists in the countryside, the 
Young Friends Party became a major competitor for political power in the post-liberation 
period.65
Underlying Conflicts between Christians and Communists 
While Ch’ondogyo was a sectional religious group with strong influence in rural 
areas, Christianity was more a national religious organization that enjoyed a prominent 
position in the cities and among educated elites. Although it was true that Christians in 
general often did not work effectively as an organized political group -  holding disparate 
political opinions, not standing behind one leader or supporting one political party -  
nonetheless, the Christian community was reasonably well organized in northern Korea. 
In particular, five unique features of the Christian community of northern Korea gave the 
Soviet occupiers many headaches.
64 Ibid., 127.
65 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 15.
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First of all, among the major organized religious groups (Buddhists, Christians, 
and Ch’ondogyo), the Christians had the largest official membership in Korea in 1944 
(see Table 2.1) and they were highly concentrated in the north. The population of 
northern Korea in 1941 was about 9.3 million, which was about 37.6 percent of the 
overall Korean population (see Table 2.4b). The majority of Koreans, therefore, lived in 
the south. The distribution of the Christian population, however, was the opposite of the 
national trend. There were more than 2,000 churches in the north with about 300,000 
registered members (compare Table 2.5).66 The three northern provinces alone (South 
P’yongan, North P’yongan, and Hwanghae) had about 1,000 churches, and around a
ft!quarter of the overall Christian population on the whole peninsula. According to a 
survey presented by Dr. H. A. Rhodes in 1944 on the proportion of Presbyterians to the 
overall population, northern stations, such as P’yongyang, Sonch’on (near Sinuiju and 
Uiju) and Chairyong (near Sariwon), had the highest ratios (see Table 2.6). This 
proportion of Christians to the overall population in these areas would be even higher if
/TO
other Protestant and Catholic populations were included.
In P’yongyang, for example, there were two seminaries, one Christian college, 
two technical colleges, and several hospitals. There were nearly 400 churches and 150
66 ‘The List of Worship & Religions in Korea” by the Training Dept., Education Bureau of the Governor 
General of ChosSn, December, 1941, pp.55-57 recorded in “Statistics -  Japan & Korea” /  General 
Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Box#5780, RG331 GHQ/SCAP records, CIE ©, 
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington National Records Center. Concerning the 
official members of the churches in North Korea, the five Presbyteries in the north reported 300,000 
members. See Allen D. Clark, History o f  the Korean Church (Unpublished manuscript), 14, Presbyterian 
Church Archive -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
67 William N. Blair, “Samuel A. Moffett: On His Seventieth Birthday,” The Presbyterian (1934): 6. The 
cutting was found in Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 360, Folder: Samuel A. Moffett -  
Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
68 Dr. H. A. Rhodes’ presentation “Survey of the Stations” during the Korea Consultative Conference 
(September 22-24, 1944), Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 30 -  
Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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ordained ministers responsible for the city and its vicinity.69 Time Magazine reported in 
November 1950 that about 50,000 Christians lived in the city, about 17 percent of the 
population.70 The P’yongyang Presbyterian Mission Station was the largest American 
Presbyterian station in the world in terms of the number of both missionaries and native 
Christians.71 These Christian institutions were influential in the city life. Throughout the 
colonial period, foreign missionaries, church pastors, elders, and Christian laymen 
operated many mission schools from the elementary level through high school level. 
Clearly, Christians had a dominant role in medicine and education, fields of particular 
honor in East Asian societies.72 Therefore, a high concentration of the Christian 
population in major northern cities posed a great challenge to the Communist revolution 
because the Christian community tended to give less support to Communist ideology or 
Communist leaders.
Second, the Christian community in Korea was historically pro-American, and 
indirectly served to foster pro-American sentiment among the general population. Most 
of the church members, mission school graduates, and hospital patients had some degree 
of interaction with American and Canadian missionaries. Many young people, believers 
and non-believers alike, had come to know the benefits of Christianity through the 
humanitarian work and social services provided by missionaries and perceived 
Americans as their teachers or doctors; a number hoped one day to study in North
69 Rhodes’ presentation, “Survey of the Stations.”
70 “Carrots and Radishes,” TIME, 13 November 1950.
71 Ibid. See also Roy E. Shearer, ‘The Evangelistic Missionary’s Role in Church Growth in Korea,” The 
International Review o f Missions 54 (1965): 465.
72 In the 1930s, Rev. Samuel A. Moffett received a reward from the Japanese colonial government on his 
contribution to the education work in Korea. See William N. Blair, “Samuel A. Moffett: On His Seventieth 
Birthday,” The Presbyterian (1934), newspaper cutting found in Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 360, Folder: Samuel A. Moffett -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Amenca. Such pro-American sentiment was stronger in P’yongyang than in Seoul or 
any other major city. Therefore, when this northern city fell into the hands of the Russian 
Army, a deep sense of fear and disappointment was felt among its dwellers. Earnest 
efforts were made by Christian nationalists and capitalists to join together in preserving 
self-autonomy and hopefully ultimate independence.
Third, the concentration of the Christian population into specific local 
communities would allow them to unite in resisting Soviet policies. Their high influence 
in the local CPKIs showed the reality of their political strength. The determination of 
church leaders in the north to stand against Shinto worship during the Japanese colonial 
period would also not bode well for the Communists’ own efforts at cracking down on 
the Christian community. Having learned from the years of persecution and 
imprisonment, Christian leaders would present a real obstacle to the ultimate threat of a 
Communist revolution. Foreseeing these potential problems, the Communist government 
decided on a gradual policy of containing Christian influence, while slowly carrying out 
its revolutionary reforms and consolidating its control.
Fourth, to compound Russia’s troubles, not only was Christianity strongest in the 
north, but Communist influence was also the weakest there. The center of the Korean 
Communist Party was in the south, because the majority of the population was landless 
farmers and Communism offered a better alternative promise for landless serfs. The 
tenancy issue was less of a problem in northern rural life than in the south, partially
73 Such desire was not limited to merely Christian believers, but affected non-Christians as well. In the 
memoirs of No Kum-sok, even though he was not a Christian, he and other fellow classmates still had a 
desire to study in the United States. See Kum-sok No, A MiG-15 to Freedom: Memoir o f  the Wartime 
North Korean Defector Who First Delivered the Secret Fighter Jet to the Americans in 1953 (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1996). See also the interviews in Hildi Kang, Under the Black 
Umbrella: Voices from  Colonial Korea 1910-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 15, and 77.
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because northern farmland was generally less desirable for commercial rice cultivation, 
so northerners had been less harassed by Japanese investors.
According to Dr. Edmund deSchweinitz Brunner’s 1925 survey,74 the percentage 
of Korean families that owned a farm was far higher in the north than in any other part of 
Korea. Christian families in the north, in particular, had enjoyed a higher rate of land 
ownership than their non-Christian neighbors (see Table 2.7b).75 It was hard to say that 
all these northern Christian farmers were landlords and therefore supported reactionary 
policies, but it was certainly possible, from the data of Table 2.7b, that Christian farmers 
were slightly better off than others in the region, and thus less receptive to the appeal of 
radical land reform. Facing the institution of Communist land reform, moreover, it was 
highly possible that Christians would become the victims of the Communist policy. Not 
only did churches themselves hold a large amount of land but, in addition, Christian 
landowners might be specifically targeted as a means of weakening the Christian 
community.
74 Although Dr. Edmund deSchweinitz Brunner’s survey only consisted of 35 villages in Korea, the villages 
selected were typical in each region. This study was presented in The Jerusalem Meeting o f  the 
International Missionary Council (24 March -  8 April 1928). The US State Department also received a 
copy of this research. The value of Brunner’s results was that it provided data on the Christian population 
so that the relative difference of rural experience between Christians and non-Christians was shown in the 
figures. The data closely resemble other studies conducted later by historians. See Gi-wook Shin, Peasant 
Protest and Social Change in Colonial Korea (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1996), 202. 
See also Kim Songbo, “Land Reform and Agricultural Collectivization in North Korea” (Ph.D. diss.,
Yonsei University, 1996), 35.
75 The survey in 1925 (Tables 2.7a and 2.7b) showed general rural conditions during the colonial era. 
Certainly, rural-urban migration did occur during the next two decades of Japanese rule and the rate of 
tenancy did increase due to the Japanese policy, especially among Christian villages in the south where the 
land was more fertile and more suitable for rice cultivation. Because the Japanese government targeted 
Christians and took their land by force or through false charges in order to weaken the influence o f the 
Church, more southern Christian farmers lost their land. As the figure showed in 1925 (five years after the 
March First Independence Movement), Christian families in the north still owned land (even higher than 
the regional overall percentage), whereas in the central region, where the capital Seoul was located, 
Christians shared a far lower percentage of landownership than the overall figure. Thus, the north still 
enjoyed a relatively higher percentage of families who tilled their own land by 1945.
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The Communists were more successful in the Hamgyong region, which ironically 
was the highest non-tenancy area in all Korea. More than fifty percent of the peasants in 
North Hamgyong Province were owner-cultivators and in South Hamgyong had the
7 f\second highest figure (32 percent). The main reasons for their popularity were, 
therefore, not the promise of land reform, but the result of its further distance from the 
colonial power centers (in P’yongyang and in Seoul), its closer proximity to the Russian 
and Manchuria borders, and the smallest numerical presence of Christian and 
Ch’ondogyo population. In the P’yongan region, where the Christian and Ch’ondogyo 
populations were concentrated, the Communists faced strong resistance. If the 
Communists wanted to control the political center in P’yongyang, they would need to 
nullify the religious influence in the P’yongan region before they could secure firm 
control over the cities and the countryside.
Fifth, the prominent position of individual Christian leaders within the cultural 
nationalist circle also produced a natural union between Christians and other non­
religious rightists, especially landowners, educators and capitalists. Since mission 
schools had graduated about one third of all Korean high school students, and since 
Christians were famous for their zeal for evangelism through their churches and their 
schools, Christian education competed directly with Communism in capturing the hearts, 
minds and souls of the youth.
The Rise o f Cho Man-sik
The Soviet Army was willing to work with Cho Man-sik because of his 
undeniable popularity in North Korea. Cho was a renowned Christian conservative in
76 Kim, “Land Reform and Agricultural Collectivization in North Korea,” 35. See also Armstrong, The 
North Korean Revolution, 14.
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P’yongyang and his reputation among Christians was high throughout the colonial period. 
In 1916, he became the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the P’yongyang YMCA. 
Cho was also an elder of the famous Sanjonghyon Church, where Rev. Chu Ki-ch’ol was 
a pastor before he was arrested by the police due to the Shinto controversy. During Rev. 
Chu’s imprisonment, Cho continued to provide for Chu’s family, defying the order of the 
colonial government.
Cho’s influence as a Christian educator was also well-known in Korea. After his 
graduation from Meiji University in Japan, he took up a position as a teacher and later 
became principal of the famous Osan School in 1913.77 The Japanese imprisoned him for 
about a year because of his participation in the March First Independence Movement in 
1919. After his release, he continued to advocate resistance through “non-violence,” and 
earned a nickname as the “Gandhi of Korea.”
Since then, Cho worked with other cultural nationalists to promote education and 
native economic production. However, under Japanese pressure, Cho, like other 
conservative nationalists, had to make public statements to encourage students to 
volunteer for the Japanese war effort in late 1943. It did some damage to Cho’s 
reputation as a nationalist.78 Even so, Cho remained the most respected non-Communist 
leader in the north when the country was liberated by the Allies.79 His fame in Korea was 
as strong as other nationalists in the south, such as Syngman Rhee, Yo Un-hyong, Kim 
Ku, and Kim Kyu-sik. From August to December 1945, Cho was the leader of a
77 Osan School was a famous institution established by An Ch’ang-ho.
78 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 55.
79 Bruce Cumings, The Origins o f  the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence o f Separate Regimes 
1945-1947 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 402.
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Nationalist-Communist Coalition. His popularity among both Christians and non- 
Christians made him an ideal leader for north Korea.
A Nationalist-Communist Coalition 
Without any prominent nationalist figure to compete with Cho Man-sik, the 
Soviet Union adopted a gradual and conciliatory approach in gaining political control in 
north Korea, and prevented open confrontation between the Communists and the 
conservatives. At that time, the domestic faction of the Korean Communists led by Hyon 
Chun-hyok and O Ki-sop supported Cho Man-sik, hoping to establish him as a national 
symbol and supreme leader.80 Restraining orders were sent to all Soviet commanders to 
forbid the Russian soldiers from following the demands of the local Communist radicals 
so as to limit the chance of local unrest or armed uprisings.81
Meanwhile, the Russian occupation forces gradually reorganized all the CPKIs 
and made sure that Communists comprised at least half of the membership of these local 
organizations. The Soviet army went from city to city, taking over all enterprises, 
railroads, radio stations, banks, and other important economic installations; there was 
little opposition, since all of these facilities had been formerly owned by the Japanese. 
After securing the food supply, they next worked to take control of local security forces. 
The Russians placed Communist “red guards” in charge of all provincial police stations 
because they feared that pro-Americans and anti-Communists might have taken root in 
these vital units.82
80 Chong-sik Lee, “Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage,” The China Quarterly 4  (April-June 
1963): 6.
81 The Red Army was generally receptive to the local radicals’ demands to redistribute land. It caused a lot 
of grievances and social unrest among the rightists. See van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 100-101.
82 Ibid., 94-96.
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Outwardly, the Russian leaders proclaimed that “the stage of the Korean 
revolution is the stage of bourgeois democratic revolution”83 and sought to form a broad- 
based coalition. But secretly, they were working hard to weaken the power of the 
rightists and to gradually boost their own strength, all the while waiting for the right 
moment to strike. This time-honored Communist political ploy was very effective; the 
Soviets managed to tighten their military grip while successfully concealing their long 
range intentions under the guise of liberation.
There were four different factions among Korean Communists. In addition to the 
domestic faction, there were three more groups: the “Kapsan faction” led by Kim Il-sung, 
the Yan’an faction led by Kim Tu-bong, and the Soviet faction led by Soviet-born Ho Kai. 
The Russians had not quite decided whom they would support as rulers in Korea. Kim Il- 
sung and his group of sixty partisans returned in September 1945, while the “Yan’an 
faction” led by Kim Tu-bong, Mu Chong, and Ch’oe Ch’ang-ik, arrived a month later. 
Since the Soviet faction would probably receive the least direct support from the Korean 
people, the major political competition was therefore mostly among the domestic, Kapsan, 
and Yan’an factions. However, whoever could gain the support of the Soviet faction 
would substantially enhance their political position.
The most promising group seemed to be the Kapsan faction. Kim Il-sung’s 
guerrilla experience in Manchuria, his informal connection with both the Soviet Union 
and the Chinese Communist Party, and his Christian family background in P’yongyang 
gave him invaluable political assets, making him an ideal person to be a Communist
83 Quote in Ibid., 99.
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representative to prepare for a nationalist-Communist front, and the future replacement of 
Cho Man-sik.84
The first sign of Soviet intention to build up Kim Il-sung’s reputation was the 
huge welcoming ceremony staged by the Russians. On October 3, General Terentii 
Shtykov brought Kim Il-sung to Cho Man-sik, asking Cho to introduce the young 
nationalist to the Korean people. On October 14, 1945, in a ceremony to welcome 
“General Kim II Sung” back to Korea, Cho Man-sik introduced Kim Il-sung as a 
legendary anti-Japanese hero to a crowd of 70,000 people.85 On that day, many people in 
the crowd had doubted Kim’s true identity due to his youthful looks and his mysterious 
name as Kim Song-ju. Rumors about him as an imposter were spread throughout the 
north and the south. Kim still needed time to build up his support base in the north, while 
he competed with other Communist factions in gaining control of the Korean Labor Party.
A coalition between the leftists and rightists seemed to be possible at that time 
when the Russians still allowed a certain degree of political autonomy, letting the 
rightists organize their own parties and allowing religious activities to continue. During 
September and early October, members of the Soviet high command in P’yongang and 
various Communists leaders, including Kim Il-sung, urged the non-Communist members 
of the People’s Committee to establish a political party to mobilize his supporters.86
Main Political Ideas o f Cho Man-sik 
When Cho Man-sik started his work to organize a rightist political party, he 
attracted a wide range of followers. He received solid support not only from Christians,
84 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 121.
85 Cumings, The Origins o f  the Korean War, 401.
86 “Weekly Information Bulletin#20,” 4 September 1947, CIC
1 9 4 5 .9 -1 9 4 9 .1 ,  2:381.
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but from non-Christians as well, especially among the well-educated elites and the 
propertied classes. Communists from the left and collaborators from the right were all 
willing to work with him in the South P’yongan Provincial People’s Political Committee 
(SPPPC) and the Five-Provinces Administration Bureau (FPAB). Cho attracted a wide 
following and received Soviet support because of his national fame and his moderate 
political platform.
Since Cho considered that it was important to improve the welfare of the whole 
nation and maintain unity with the social elites, he did not want an immediate resignation 
of all Japanese collaborators, even though he personally believed that “national traitors” 
should be stripped of suffrage and other political, economic, and social privileges. He 
was more of a figure of reconciliation who attracted many ex-pro-Japanese followers. 
Here, Cho’s idea did not differ greatly from Syngman Rhee’s concern over the question 
of collaboration; Rhee also advocated a peaceful transition period.
Cho’s idea of land reform was also rather moderate. He supported the 
improvement of the tenancy system, but not its outright abolition. He did not support a 
radical land reform that confiscated land without compensation to the land holders. He 
advocated social justice, but he did not neglect the needs and the rights of landlords. For 
example, the Communists proposed a “3-7” tax system, which meant that the tenants 
were allowed to keep up to 70 percent of their products and gave 30 percent to the land 
owners. Cho fought bitterly against this “3-7” system because he believed that it was too 
harsh to the landowners. He thus proposed a moderate “4-6” distribution instead, in 
which land owners could receive 40 percent of the output. In spite of Cho’s position, the
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South P’yongan People’s Committee adopted the “3-7” system on September 27, 1945.87 
Since Cho frequently stood up to defend the interests of capitalists and landowners, it 
made him a very popular man among the rightists and the moderates.
Even so, the Soviet Union favored Cho Man-sik as the leader for a coalition 
because he was a less controversial figure. Thus, under Cho’s leadership, a coalition 
government (similar to those in Eastern Europe) perhaps could solve the problem of the 
38th Parallel division, and achieve the ultimate independence of Korea. After a “push” by 
Soviet officials, Cho Man-sik and Rev. Yi Yun-yong formed the Choson Democratic 
Party (CDP) on November 4, 1945. The strength of CDP grew quickly to 300,000 and 
demonstrated its power in local People’s Committee elections in November 1945.88 By 
early 1946, its membership grew to 500,000. Kim Il-sung sent three agents, one of whom
QQ
was Kim Ch’aek, to be installed as Demcratic Party officials.
The CDP was a party of cultural nationalists. It adopted their ideas of national 
unity, patriotism, and independence. It published three newspapers in the north: 
P ’ydngbuk minbo (People’s News in North P’yong’an Province), Hwanghae minbo 
(People’s News in Hwanghae Province), and Kwangwon minbo (People’s News in 
Kangwon Province).90 The party stood for the improvement of the welfare of the whole 
nation, not merely of the interests of the underprivileged. It paid special attention to the 
unity of all social elites and supported the idea of freedom of speech and universal 
suffrage for all except “national traitors.” Like Cho, the party advocated an improvement 
of the tenancy system and labor reform. Education, the CDP believed, was the key to the
87 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 121.
88 Ibid., 122.
89 State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Take Over, 14.
90 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 163.
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enhancement of national culture. The political platform of the CDP was generally 
tolerated by the Communists, the socialists, and the Russians because they all believed 
that it was appropriate for the current stage of Korean development.91
Although Cho Man-sik seemed to be the leader of the north, he actually had very 
little real power; he was merely a figurehead. The Russians controlled not only the local 
People’s Political Committees, but also the police forces as well. However, what the 
Russians had miscalculated in the formation of such a coalition was that Cho Man-sik 
was more loyal to the interests of the Korean people and the idea of independence than 
his own political fortune. The conflict between the CDP and the Russian occupation 
forces began to intensify a few weeks later, when Cho opposed the Red Army’s policy of 
taking grain away from the Korean farmers in the name of food procurement.92 The 
underlying tensions between the Christian community and the Communist authorities 
also fueled the breakup of the coalition.
A Major Clash between Christians and Communists
The first major clash between Christians and the Red Army occurred in mid- 
November 1945, in the North P’yongan Province, a Christian-dominated area. In Sinuiju, 
where Christians dominated the CPKI, two Presbyterian pastors, Rev. Yun Ha-Yong and 
Rev. Han Kyong-jik, organized the Christian Social Democratic Party in September 
1945.93 It was probably the first political party to be organized in the whole Korean 
peninsula after liberation, preceding the CDP by two months. The party platform was to
91 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 122.
92 “Weekly Information Bulletin#20,” 4 September 1947, ■’ CIC (  tfl)
1945.9 ~ 1949. 1, 2:381. See also Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 117. There was a serious food shortage 
during the first eighteen months of Soviet occupation. The economy was disrupted by the division of the 
country and the slaughter of livestock by the Soviet occupation forces in the fall o f 1945.
93 At that time, Syngman Rhee was still in Washington waiting for a passport to enter Korea. Kim Il-sung 
arrived at W6nsan on September 19, but he did not appear in public until October 14,1945, when Cho 
Man-sik, under the arrangement of the Russian General Chistiakov, introduced him to the public.
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promote democracy and reform the country in line with Christian ideals. Later, it was 
renamed the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in order to attract a wider following. This 
party was mainly organized through church channels. According to Korean church 
historian Allen Clark, “in each district, with the Church as a center, a district branch was 
organized and became so strong that the Soviets became much concerned.”94 The SDP 
was similar to Cho’s CDP, but had stronger religious connotations. Rather than being a 
competitor, the SDP endorsed Cho Man-sik and worked closely with the CDP, whose 
political base was in South P’yongan Province.
The conflict between the SDP members and the Soviet occupation forces began as 
soon as the party was established in September because Soviet leaders were afraid of the 
growing influence of SDP. Since the Communists did not have enough loyalists in this 
province, the Red Army needed to bring in additional Communists from the remote 
Hamgyong Province to organize the local non-Christian residents, mostly uneducated 
farmers and laborers.95
When the SDP District Executive Committee in Yongamp’o Po, under Deacon 
Chang Won-bong’s leadership, met on November 16, 1945, student representatives spoke 
up against the violent control of the Red Army.96 The workers in a local factory, stirred 
up by the Communists, attacked the meeting. One church elder was beaten to death and 
many others injured. The mob destroyed the church building where the meeting was 
taking place and damaged the homes of most of the SDP executive committee
94 Allen D. Clark, A History o f  the Church in Korea (Seoul: The Christian Literature Society of Korea, 
1971), 240.
95 Ibid.
96 Most o f the local grievances in the north against the Soviet Army were over widespread rapes, 
requisitioning excessive amounts of the local food reserves, and looting the factories and banks. See van 
Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 118.
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Q7members. Students from local high schools, mostly Christians, rose up to defend the 
executive members of the SDP when they saw the Communists’ violent methods. As 
soon as they arrived at the scene, a fight broke out between the students and the 
Communists. Many were injured; yet it was just the beginning of a wider student 
uprising.
A few days later, on November 23, 1945, about five thousand Christian high 
school students in Sinuiju, organized by student leaders in three local, church-connected 
high schools, gathered to confront the Communist authorities through a mass 
demonstration, in the spirit of the March First Independence Movement. They divided 
themselves into three groups and marched peacefully toward three different locations: 
Communist headquarters in Sinuiju, the North P’yongan People’s Committee office, and 
Sinuiju Police office.98 Alarmed by the potential spread of wider social unrest, the 
Russian Army immediately suppressed the demonstration, using machine guns. In the 
end, twenty-three students were killed, about seven hundred were wounded, and more 
than one thousand were arrested.99 Among them, about two hundred students were sent 
as exiles to forced labor camps in Siberia.100
The Russian Army issued a warning against any student demonstration, and began 
to arrest all SDP Executive Committee members. Rev. Yun and Rev. Han, the organizers 
of SDP, escaped the purge because they had left for the south already. The confrontation
97 Clark, A History o f  the Church in Korea, 240. See also Clark, History o f the Korean Church, 12-13.
98 Seong-Jae Lee, “Mmm Haebangihu 
buk’hankidokkyohoe gongsanjeonggwongwaui gwangyee tehanyeongu Study on the Relation Between 
North Korea Government and North Korean Church since Liberation,” (M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 
1992), 39-40.
99 Ibid., 40. See also Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 117.
100 The Siniiiju Student Uprising was the second most famous uprising in the 1940s. It demonstrated the 
influence o f Christianity in the north and the political and social conflicts between Christianity and 
Communism in northern Korea. Ibid., 40.
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and the crackdown on the SDP marked the beginning of a Christian “exodus” to the south. 
The Russians then began tightening their control over churches, planting spies in each 
congregation to spot any potential anti-Communist activities, just as the Japanese had 
done during the colonial period. Christian family background was declared to be a 
condition of political “unreliability.”101 Many more clashes between Communist forces 
and nationalist rebels occurred during that winter and spring.102
Cho Man-sik’s Objection to the Moscow Agreement 
A major breakthrough that could possibly have resolved the division of Korea was 
the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Moscow in December 1945. It was a genuine effort 
by the great powers to save their wartime alliance and preserve the possibility of 
cooperation in post-war international affairs. The foreign ministers of the United States, 
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met together in Moscow on December 16 to discuss 
various key issues of unresolved wartime programs. Korea was one of their main 
concerns.
During the conference, the United States proposed a plan calling for a four-power 
trusteeship of Korea, while the Soviet Union declared that it wanted quick Korean 
independence. Yet, what the Russians really desired was an “independent friendly” 
Korea, a Korean government that was controlled by pro-Soviet leaders. The United 
States, however, insisted on a trusteeship, hoping that by doing so, it could have a 
stronger influence over political development of Korea. In the end, both sides agreed to 
form a US-Soviet Joint Commission to assist the establishment of a provisional Korean 
government. The new government would then consult the Joint Commission and decide
101 State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f  Take Over, 97.
102 See Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 117.
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on detailed arrangements for a four-power trusteeship of Korea for up to five years. The 
final version of the Moscow Agreement opened the possibility that a trusteeship might 
not be necessary if both the Joint Commission and the new provisional government
i magreed to drop the plan. It also implied that the United States and the Soviet Union 
would cooperate to put an end to zonal occupation.104
The Koreans’ response to the Moscow Agreement, however, was generally 
negative in both the north and the south. Most people, including the Communists, 
naturally resented the whole arrangement because the word “trusteeship” was often 
mistranslated as “protectorate” in the Korean language. It reminded them of the old 
memories of how Korea became a Japanese protectorate between 1905 and 1910 and 
eventually lost its independence. Therefore, in order to soften the resistance of the people 
in their occupation zone, the Russians carried out an extensive campaign to explain the 
idea of “trusteeship” to the Korean people. The word “trusteeship” was translated into 
Korean as “guardianship” to distance its connection with the unpalatable past. The 
Soviet officials also emphasized that the new Korean government would come first -  
before the trusteeship -  and the Korean people should support the plan in order to secure 
their quick independence.
Cho Man-sik and the CDP stood firmly against any arrangement of trusteeship. 
On December 28, 1945, the trusteeship plan for Korea was officially announced in the 
two occupation zones. Cho Man-sik immediately voiced his opposition to the plan. 
Dining a meeting of the People’s Committee (SPPPC), representatives were asked to cast 
their votes on the plan. While Communist members supported the plan, Cho and his
103 Cumings, The Origins o f  the Korean War, 217.
104 Ibid.
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supporters voted against it because they believed that any compromise on the idea of 
trusteeship, regardless of how the term was translated, would delay the possibility of 
immediate independence. In other words, their stem opposition to trusteeship had 
nothing to do with the plan itself, but with the idea of foreign intervention in Korean 
affairs. Cho and his supporters, who were mostly cultural nationalists, found it an insult 
for the foreign powers even to consider a trusteeship because they believed in their 
capacity for self-government, and they did not need the consent of any foreign powers. 
Therefore, in protest against trusteeship, Cho Man-sik and several other CDP members 
resigned their position in the SPPPC.
Cho Man-sik’s protest against the Moscow Agreement caught the Russians by 
surprise. After Cho’s resignation, Soviet officials tried to persuade Cho to change his 
mind, but Cho refused.105 On January 5, 1946, exhausting all possible means to sway 
Cho from his anti-trusteeship position, the Soviet authorities finally decided to take him 
into “protective custody,” which meant house arrest in the Koryo Hotel, a luxury hotel in 
P’yongyang.106 There were many testimonies saying that the Soviet generals as well as 
other Communists and leftists, including Kim Il-sung and later Yo Un-hyong, gathered 
around Cho to persuade him to support the Moscow Agreement and promised to make 
him the head of state in northern Korea. Had Cho accepted the offer, the course of 
history might have been different.
The point here was not whether or not Cho Man-sik accepted the Soviet offer, but 
the offer itself. It showed the lack of confidence of the Soviet generals and Kim Il-sung 
in assuming full control of the northern zone without the collaboration of Cho. It was
105 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 123.
106 Cumings, The Origins o f  the Korean War, 217.
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true that in the end the Communists did manage to control the whole zone, but it was not 
without loss. Open confrontation was the last thing the Soviet Union desired, especially 
when United States’ public opinion might be sensitive towards the oppression of the 
Christian church in the north. They did not want to provoke a big uprising like that of 
March 1st 1919. Therefore, they wanted to push forward the plan of coalition as long as 
possible so that they could conduct their house cleaning quietly.
The way in which the Russians handled Cho’s opposition supported this point. 
The Russian had shipped to Siberia almost everyone who stood up against the trusteeship, 
but not Cho Man-sik. He was only put under house arrest in the best hotel in P’yongyang. 
Clearly, because of Cho’s strong influence in the north, it was too much of a risk to 
execute him. Perhaps the Russians might have believed that Cho would possibly change 
his mind later, and could therefore be useful to pacify the north as well as to gain support 
in the south. In fact, Cho Man-sik’s reputation in the south increased rather than declined 
when he openly opposed trusteeship. Thus, Cho still had future political bargaining value.
Also, Cho Man-sik was different from other rightists because he was a true 
national figure. Similar to Syngman Rhee and Yo Un-hyong in the south, his name had 
symbolic influence among the people of the whole nation. Killing Cho or sending him to 
Siberia was too much of a political risk to take because the anti-Communist rightists 
might use this opportunity to incite a nationwide, anti-Soviet uprising that could 
jeopardize the Communist position while its hold on power in the north was still weak. It 
was better to keep Cho under “house arrest” so that the rightists had no excuse to 
mobilize a mass movement.
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From 1946 to 1950, many people tried try to persuade Cho Man-sik to give up his 
anti-trusteeship stand and support the Moscow Agreement. Nevertheless, Cho was not 
swayed because he was more a nationalist than a politician. His anti-trusteeship position 
was also in line with public opinion, so his resolve only increased his popularity, causing
107many people to come forward and plead for his life. Beyond his personal appeal, 
Cho’s story also suggested the overall strength of the Christians and their rightist allies in 
the north, as well as the fears that the Soviets and the Korean Communists had 
concerning them.
RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION
Cho Man-sik’s downfall marked the end of any Soviet attempts at forging a 
coalition with the rightists. The Five Provinces Administrative Bureau (FPAB) was 
dissolved and replaced by a new political organization, the North Korean Provisional 
People’s Committee (NKPPC), under Kim Il-sung’s chairmanship.108 It became the 
central government in P’yongyang that controlled the five provinces in northern Korea.
A  Communist Revolution in North Korea 
A  systematic purge of rightists started first against the Choson Democratic Party 
(CDP), and then against other groups. In February 1946, a General Meeting of delegates 
of the Choson Democratic Party was called in P’ydngyang.109 The party was forced to
107 Syngman Rhee’s government attempted to exchange Cho for two convicted Communist spies, but the 
effort was cut short due to the outbreak of the Korean War. According to Pak Kiryong, a North Korean 
Communist official who fled to the Soviet Union in 1959, when UN troops were marching toward 
P’ydngyang in October 1950, Cho and all his family were executed before the Communists fled north. See 
Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 123.
108 The North Korean Provisional People’s Committee (NKPPC) was later renamed the North Korean 
People’s Committee (NKPC) in February 1947.
109 “Weekly Information Bulletin#20,” 4 September 1947, CIC ALJZ'tf
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elect a new party chairman, Ch’o Yong-gon, who had been in Soviet Russia and was a 
close associate of Kim Il-sung. When the purge began, many Christians and rightists in 
the CDP joined the “exodus” of refugees fleeing south, including one of Cho’s sons and 
the vice-chairman, Yi Yun-yong.110
The NKPPC began a series of reform programs including land reform, new 
regulations on labor, legalized equality between the sexes, and the nationalization of 
major industries. The Communist authorities also passed legislation to improve working 
conditions, provide social insurance, and expand educational, cultural, and health 
facilities.111 To expand the influence of the Communist Party, the NKPPC mobilized the 
poor peasants, workers, women, and youth, who were the traditionally underprivileged 
elements of Korean society.
The land reform program in March 1946 was the main effort to buy the support of 
landless farmers. The NKPPC issued an order that land was to be confiscated from 
former Japanese holdings, known collaborators, landlords with over 5 chdngbo (about 
2.45 acres), absentee landlords, and religious organizations, and then distributed to 
agricultural laborers, landless tenants, and peasants with less than 5 chdngbo. In the end, 
about 1 million chdngbo were confiscated and re-distributed to 700,000 families.112 
About seventy percent of the farming population benefited from the reform. A state- 
operated Farmers’ Bank offered loans for farmers to buy seed, fertilizer, and equipment.
110 Rev. Yi Yoon-yong remained politically active in the south. At the request of Syngman Rhee, Rev. Yi 
gave a representative prayer at the opening session of the first National Assembly on May 31,1948. See 
Nak Heong Yang, Reformed Social Ethics and the Korean Church (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 
1997), 136.
111 State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Take Over, 16.
112 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 76.
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The Land Reform was, in fact, not as bloodless as the Communists claimed. The
rightists in South P’yongan region resisted the land redistribution. Riots broke out in
many places. Russian soldiers were called in by the NKPPC to suppress these local 
1 1 - 2
rebellions. The majority of landlords left the north for the south even though their 
decisions would leave them permanently landless.114 When the land redistribution was 
completed on March 31, 1946, the popularity of Communism among the landless 
peasants and urban workers began to rise, and the political and social power of the 
rightists continued to decline.
In many leftists’ eyes, the northern revolution was a successful model because it 
met relatively little resistance and enjoyed strong public appeal. The success, however, 
was not truly realistic because the Communists’ popularity was the simple consequence 
of arresting the most disgruntled, or pushing them south. The Communists were 
untroubled by the loss of about two million people who migrated south; removing this 
surplus population lessened northern food demands and increased the political, economic, 
and social turmoil below the 38th Parallel (See Table 2.8). It was a wise political strategy 
that allowed the Communists to kill two birds with one stone.
In reality, the land reform actually gave more economic power to the state than to 
individual farmers because the Communist authorities actually taxed about 50 percent of 
the farmers’ crops.115 Later, on some occasions when farmers failed to meet their 
predicted goals, they had to surrender 75 percent of their crops to the state. The land 
reform neither solved the food shortage problem, nor improved the livelihood of the
113 See Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 153.
114 Mun Woong Lee, Rural North Korea under Communism: A Study of Sociocultural Change (Houston, 
TX: Rice University, 1976), 20.
115 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 143.
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northern farmers. Communist authorities adopted food rationing to solve the shortage 
problem. Without a free market, food distribution enabled the Communist authority to 
exert greater political control over city dwellers, because the government could withhold 
food from their political opponents and supply good quality food to their loyal 
supporters.116
Christian Opposition To Communist Political Control
The arrest of Cho Man-sik and the loss of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
upset many church leaders in the north who knew that the Soviet Union had no desire to 
grant them political freedom. As the March First celebration was approaching in a few 
weeks, church leaders seized the opportunity to mobilize their congregations to voice 
their discontent. Before the fall of Cho, the Soviet authorities had shown no objection to 
the churches’ participation in the celebration of March First. In February, however, the 
North Korean Provisional People’s Committee suddenly issued an order prohibiting any 
church from celebrating the independence movement and commanded all people to
117attend the People’s Assembly organized by the Communists.
Such an order did not, however, deter clergymen from organizing their own 
religious memorial services for the loss of their members during the March First uprising. 
The P’yongyang Pastor’s Association met on February 21, at the Somun (West Gate) 
Church,118 and they decided to hold their own March First memorial service. Communist 
authorities immediately demanded that the clergymen change their minds. When the 
pastors refused, police arrested about sixty P’yongyang city church leaders. A few who
116 Ibid., 144.
117 Lee, “Study on the Relation Between North Korea Government and North Korean Church Since 
Liberation,” 43-44.
118 The West Gate Church was the oldest Presbyterian Church established by an American missionary, Rev. 
Samuel A. Moffett around 1895.
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managed to escape arrest went on with the original plans for the memorial service in 
various locations.119 On March 1, 1946, at ten o’clock in the morning, about ten 
thousand people gathered at the Changdaehyon Presbyterian Church, the original site of 
the March First Movement in P’yongyang city, to attend the memorial service. The 
Communist authorities surrounded the church with armed men, but because of the 
presence of several thousand Christian young people, they did not disturb the service and 
waited until Rev. Hwang Un-gyun finished his sermon. As soon as he was done and the 
people bowed their heads in prayer for the independence of Korea, the police came in and 
took the pastor away in front of the whole congregation.120
Rev. Hwang’s arrest did not prevent Christians from continuing with their 
planned programs. About five thousand Christians rushed out, waving Christian and 
Korean flags and shouting the famous slogan, “Tongnip Mansei/” (which means “Hurrah 
for Independence”), then singing the hymn, “Onward Christian Soldiers,” as they 
marched towards the Soviet Army headquarters. When they saw the Communist police 
and Red guards, they waved their Christian flags and shouted, “Freedom of religion. 
Government control of religion [is] absolutely opposed.”121
The parade attracted the attention of many sympathetic P’yongyang citizens who 
voluntarily joined the demonstration. When they finally reached the P’yongyang 
Railway Station, where Kim Il-sung held the Communist March First celebration, the two 
groups confronted each other, and Kim’s celebration came to an abrupt end. Similar 
clashes between Christians and Communists occurred everywhere in the northern cities. 
For example, in Yongch’on and Uiju in North P’yongan Province near the Korea-
119 Clark, History o f  the Korean Church, 12-13.
120 Ibid., 13.
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Manchurian border, not far from Sinuiju, where there was a huge concentration of 
Protestants and Catholics (see Table 2.6), the confrontation between the Communist 
authorities and the Christian community was particularly intense, resulting in the 
destruction of many churches and mass arrests.122
What disturbed Kim Il-sung even more was that several assassins had tried to kill 
him with hand grenades while he was giving his speech during the March First Memorial 
celebration.123 Kim Il-sung put the two events together and concluded that Christian 
churches were conspiring with the southern rightists in order to eliminate him and destroy 
the Communist revolution in the north. As a result, Kim became even more determined 
to take full control of the churches and exterminate all anti-Communist and reactionary 
elements from northern society.
Shortly after the March First event, the Uiju Presbytery moderator, Rev. Kim 
Kwon-jo, called a meeting of Christians on March 17, 1946. He suggested that 
Christians in the north send a joint statement to the south, informing southerners of the 
Communist atrocities in the Russian occupation zone. As soon as Kim Il-sung 
discovered the plan, the police immediately arrested Rev. Kim and his associates.124
Communist Control over Christian Churches 
This chain of events triggered Kim D-sung’s wrath against the churches. As a 
result, Communist authorities organized a systematic dissolution of the influence of the 
Christian churches. First of all, they intentionally scheduled all important affairs on
123 This event is also written by one of the assassins. See In-ho Kim, Across the Line o f  Death (Seoul: 
Thinking People Press, 1999). See also Lee, 4
cfl Study on the Relation between North Korea Government and North Korean Church since
Liberation,” 45-46.
124 Clark, History o f  the Korean Church, 13.
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Sunday, conducted political lectures in church buildings, and demanded that all 
Christians attend. The most serious dispute was the election on Sunday, November 3, 
1946. The authorities demanded that all people come out and vote. Christians, who did 
not want to vote, perceived this as a direct threat to their religious freedom. Church 
leaders finally became disgusted with the Communists’ unreasonable demands, and 
united together to voice their discontent. The North Korean Joint Presbytery declared:
Our 2,000 churches and 300,000 Christians, for the preservation of the faith and the 
progress of the Church, having approved the following five principles for the government 
of the Church and as rulers for Christian living, wish to inform the People’s Committee 
of these Principles, hoping for their kind cooperation: 1) Keeping the Sabbath holy is of 
the life of the Church, so there should be no attendance at things other than worship on 
the Lord’s Day. 2) Government and religion should be kept separate. 3) Respect for the 
Deity in the church building is the proper duty of the church, so that the use o f this 
church building for other purpose than worship is forbidden. 4) In the event that an acting 
church worker enters the field of politics, he must resign his office in the church. 5) The 
Church stands for freedom of religion and assembly.125
Their opposition to the Sunday election and their refusal to comply with Communist 
orders revealed their desire to distance themselves from the new Communist regime.
In order to weaken the unity of the Christian community, Communists applied a 
divide-and-conquer strategy. Under the direction of Kim H-sung, a separate pro-regime 
Christian organization, known as the Christian League (Kidokkyo Kyodoyonmaeng), was 
formed and headed by Kim’s relative, Kang Yang-uk, a former pastor in P’yongyang. It 
was designed to take members away from the influential Presbyterian Church and other 
denominations. Initially, their effort was not successful, but when a famous Korean 
missionary to China, Pak Sang-sun, and a retired minister-evangelist, Kim Ik-du, joined 
the league, some Christians followed in fear of Communist persecution.
125 Ibid., 14.
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Probably the last major organized resistance by the Christian community against
Communist control was on election day, November 3, 1946.126 Most churches in both
North and South P’yongan Provinces refused to participate in the election despite Kim II- 
10 1sung’s order. Christians crowded their churches and did not leave for the entire day. 
In other provinces, Communists went to Christians’ home, asking them to vote in the 
morning. When they did not listen, the police waited for the end of the worship services, 
and forced the church members to vote. In some areas, the election was extended to 
Monday morning so that Christians had no excuse not to vote.128
The election was an effective means of creating the illusion of mass support, 
while at the same time rooting out opposition members. The people could either vote for 
the communist candidate, or they could vote against him by placing their ballots in an 
ominously colored “black box.” There was no way to conceal an anti-Communist vote 
because all of the ballots were serially numbered and the Communist guards were 
watching carefully.129 Despite these dangers, of the 4,516,120 legitimate voters, around
25,000 refused to vote, and 131,757 chose to vote against the Communists (see Table 
2.8).130 The number of anti-Communist voters was actually as high as 156,692, or about
126 Following the consolidation of Communist power in the north, little is known for certain about the fate 
of those Christians who remained. According to the reports of the refugees and the testimonies of 
individual northern Christians during the Korean War, most of the remaining clergymen were either 
arrested or converted by the Communists.
127 Clark, History o f the Korean Church, 14.
128 Lee, ^  Study on the Relation between
North Korea Government and North Korean Church since Liberation,”,49.
129 Buk Lee, “Report on North Korea,” (F. E. G i l l e t t e )
i f  $  eft 1946-1948  (Seoul: Hallym University, Institute of Asian Culture Studies, 1996), 1:23-
24. See also Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 158. Two ex-north Koreans, Chung Hwak-sil and Jeong 
Chun-seop, whom the author interviewed in June 2004, also testified to a similar situation.
130 The Communist authorities used the “two-box system” for the election. Each voter received a card with 
the name of a candidate and threw it either into the white box ( ‘yes’) or into the black box ( ‘no’). This 
election was hardly democratic because there were basically no options. The names of the candidates were 
mostly Communists or pro-Communists. Those who rejected the Communist candidates had to put their 
ballots into the “Black Box” before the eyes of the Communist guards, a very daring move.
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3.5 percent of the total legitimate voters (see Table 2.7). To cast a ballot into the black 
box or to refuse to show up at the election center was to put one’s life at risk. A report by 
an anti-Communist publisher in the south, Yi Puk, claimed that prior to the re-election the 
following year in March 1947, “members of the Democratic Young Men’s Alliance and 
Laborer’s Union carried out a widespread massacre of the black box voters.”131
In addition, since the November election, any attempt to organize a rival political 
party would immediately attract the police. The most well known case was the Christian 
Liberal Party (CLP) under the direction of Rev. Kim Hwa-sik. Like the SDP, the CLP 
began its organization around September 1945, but the formation of the Choson 
Democratic Party under Cho Man-sik’s leadership attracted most of the attention. Rev. 
Kim and his supporters gave up their effort. Nevertheless, new international 
developments motivated Rev. Kim to mobilize again. In September 1947, after the 
collapse of the US-Soviet Joint Commission to resolve the division of Korea, the United 
States referred the Korean situation to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The 
US plan was to call for separate elections in two zones in Korea. After two months of 
debate and discussion, the General Assembly adopted the US-sponsored plan to establish 
the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to investigate the 
situation in Korea and oversee the upcoming election in the American zone.132
Fearing that the nation was going to be divided permanently, the remnants of the 
northern Christian nationalists tried to rise up again to reverse this trend. When news of 
the UN resolution reached the ears of Rev. Kim and his supporters in November, they
131 Lee, “Report on North Korea,” (F. E. G i l l e t t e )  -& & 4I
z Q & r m  1946-1948, 1:24.
132 Jon Halliday, “The United Nations and Korea,” in Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship 
Since 1945, ed. Frank Baldwin (Toronto: Random House, Inc., 1973,1974), 112-117.
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hoped that the situation might turn to their favor, and thus hurried to form a new political 
party to support a general election throughout the country. Nevertheless, the day before 
the formal ceremony of the CLP’s establishment, the Communist police arrested Rev. 
Kim and some forty leaders of the party. Most of these men either died in prison or 
permanently disappeared.133
The resistance of the northern Christian leaders against Communist domination 
cost the Christian community heavily. Kim Il-sung intensified his pressure on the 
clergymen and laymen through the Christian League. From 1948 onwards, all Christian 
workers were “required” to join the league. Most of the well-known pastors and elders 
who refused to join the league either were arrested one-by-one or went missing or 
escaped to the south before the police found them.134 In the end, a total of 212 pastors, 
not including elders and laymen, lost their lives before the outbreak of the Korean War.135 
By forcing two Protestant seminaries to combine and limit their enrollment to only 120 
students, the Communist authorities sought to starve the Christian community of any 
potential leadership so that it would never be able to rise again to resist the 
government.136
Because of the Communists’ harsh policies against the Christian community, a 
large number of Christians became uprooted refugees in the south. Although the actual 
number of Christians that fled south is unknown, the figure likely exceeded one hundred 
thousand. The majority of these refugees were pastors, laymen, church workers,
133 Lee, “Study on the Relation Between North Korea Government and North Korean Church Since 
Liberation,” 41.
134 Clark, A History o f the Church in Korea, 243-244.
135 There were about 109 pastors in the five presbyteries of the south in 1940. By 1947, there were about 
179. About seventy Presbyterian pastors had left the north. With a total of 212 northern pastors’ deaths by 
1950, we can guess the majority of the clergymen in the north were either exterminated or fled.
136 Lee, “M M lik'ik  j b f t f i l f  t f c #  study on the Relation between
North Korea Government and North Korean Church since Liberation,” 58-60.
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educators, landowners, students, or businessmen. Their presence in the south would 
provide new political, social, and religious force to the anti-Communist cause.
The Last Stand o f Ch’dndogyo 
The Young Friends’ Party (YFP) organized by Ch’ondogyo’s followers was a 
serious rival opposing Communist domination in the countryside. When the Christians 
clashed with the Communists in the cities during the first eighteen months of Russian 
occupation, the YFP remained quiet in the countryside since the YFP’s approach to social 
issues such as land reform was quite similar to the Communists. Their differences began 
to emerge later in 1947 when the Communists tried to weaken the influence of the YFP, 
and also when the failure of a real rural transformation and Communist control became 
obvious to some Ch’ondogyo followers.
When Ch’ondogyo continued to grow and attract followers among peasants, the 
Communist authorities were alarmed. In mid-1947, Ch’ondogyo claimed 1,690,000 
adherents in north Korea.137 In March 1948, the YFP conducted a “Second March First 
movement” to advocate national unity and independence, supporting the idea of a 
nationwide election. Since the YFP believed that the peasants’ rights should be above the 
state, and that the public should be free from the extractive hand of the state and 
government control, the movement aroused the suspicions of the Communist authorities. 
Many Ch’ondogyo believers were arrested by the police. Kim H-sung denounced 
“reactionaries” among the peasants in the YFP in his speech before the Korean Workers 
Party Congress in March 1948.138 The YFP leaders became fearful of their political 
future, and would never again make any statement or take any action that would provoke
137 Armstrong, The Korean Revolution, 128.
138 Ibid., 133.
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the Communists. Under Kim Tal-hyon’s leadership, the YFP reversed its position, 
denounced the UNTCOK, and accused the United States and “reactionaries” in the south 
of perpetuating the division of Korea. After that, the YFP submitted fully to the political 
leadership of the Communist government in North Korea.139
CONCLUSION
Religion was an important political factor in post-liberation North Korea. Both 
Ch’ondogyo and Christianity were popular. While Ch’ondogyo received its support 
mainly from farmers, Christianity was popular in the cities and among educated elites. 
An immediate Communist dictatorship was not possible right after liberation because of 
the influence of these religious groups. A nationalist-Communist coalition was, therefore, 
desirable, yet not necessarily attainable. The rise and fall of Cho Man-sik signified both 
the attempt and the failure of such a coalition in north Korea. The division of the Korean 
peninsula, the clash between Christians and Communist authorities, and the exodus of 
refugees from the north would have equally significant impacts on the south. The 
refugee problem was an added burden on an already troubled and inflamed southern 
society, further complicating the political, economic, social, ideological, and religious 
conditions in the south.
Koreans, in general, had a very limited understanding of American democracy. 
Nevertheless, through either the church or its public outreach services, many Koreans had 
formed a favorable view of America, through a “special relationship” dating back sixty 
years. And among all Koreans, Korean Christians had the strongest ties to America, and 
were the most ardent admirers of America’s freedoms and way of life. Preserving their
139 Ibid.
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religious freedom became part of their struggle to achieve an American style of 
democracy. Among the two million refugees, there might not be many common traits -  
they came south from all socioeconomic backgrounds, and left the north for a variety of 
reasons, not all of them religious. However, they shared one common idea -  a hatred, if 
not a fear, of Communism.
The influx of two million refugees into the southern Korean zone (enough to 
swell the overall southern population by about 10 percent) would, of course, come to 
have a dramatic effect on the polarization of the south. These northern refugees, 
including prominent Christian clergymen, elders, and educated laymen, would emerge as 
a significant political, religious, and social force in the southern zone. As a result, 
whichever southern leader could capture the refugees’ support would likely gain enough 
political strength to rise above his political rivals.
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CHAPTER 3 
Religious Factors in South Korea
INTRODUCTION
When the northern refugees arrived in the south, they discovered a very different 
world. Lacking the troop numbers,1 the political savvy,2 and the ruthlessness of the
-5
Soviet Army, the U.S. occupation zone was rocked by other kinds of problems such as 
terrorist activities, political assassinations, strikes, guerrilla attacks, political uprisings, 
and anti-government demonstrations. In addition, an influx of migrants from Manchuria, 
China, Japan, and North Korea caused serious shortages. Refugees suffered from squalid 
living conditions as a massive relief effort was needed just to provide basic necessities.
Nevertheless, for many refugees from the north, the southern wind was a breath of 
fresh air. The southern clime was especially welcome to the Christians, educators, land 
owners, and the pro-Japanese collaborators, who had generally been the most persecuted 
in the north. Under the U.S. occupation, Christians and collaborators were two of the 
major groups dominating the American Military Government (AMG). Christians were 
free to preach, foreign missionaries were coming back and working for the AMG, and
1 According to General John Hodge’s report to General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo on September 13, 
1945, the strength of US Army stationed in south Korea was very limited, far less than the number the 
Soviet Union had sent to north Korea. See “Conditions in Korea,” 13 September 1945
(John R. Hodge) 1945 .6 -1948 .8  (Seoul: Hallym University,
Institute of Asian Culture Studies, 1995), 3:6.
2 It is generally agreed by most historians that United States forces were unprepared and uninformed for 
their occupation task in south Korea.
3 The ruthlessness o f the Soviet Army during the initial stage of the occupation is presented by Erik van 
Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989).
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Christian leaders could be found all along the political spectrum from the right to the left 
(though not the extreme left). Why did the AMG favor Christians and hire collaborators?
To cover every aspect of the American occupation is far beyond the scope of this 
chapter, and has already been the subject of various books.4 Instead, this chapter will 
focus only on finding the missing pieces in the puzzle of how Christians rose to power 
under the AMG and of how Christianity became an important factor in the rise of radical 
anti-Communism in southern Korea.5
THE ROLE OF GEORGE Z WILLIAMS IN THE FORMATION OF THE AMG
As soon as the demarcation line was drawn on August 16, 1945, Washington 
informed General Douglas MacArthur about the American occupation of Korea. But, 
who should General MacArthur send to be in charge of Korea? There were several 
logical choices. The most suitable one was General Joseph W. Stilwell, the Commander 
of the Tenth Army, because he had wide experience in the Far East. He had worked with 
both the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists during World War II, but Chiang Kai- 
shek disliked him intensely because of Stilwell’s harsh criticism of Chiang’s government 
while working with Chiang in the China-India-Bumia theater in 1942-1944. General
4 The most comprehensive work is Bruce Cumings’ two volumes on the origins of the Korean War. Bonnie 
B.C. Oh’s collection of articles, Korea Under the American Military Government 1945-1948, provides 
interesting analyses of specific aspects of the American Military Government (AMG). Jongsuk Chay’s 
Unequal Partners in Peace and War gives a solid overview of the bilateral relations between Korea and 
America before and during the Korean War. Robert T. Oliver’s Syngman Rhee and American Involvement 
in Korea 1942-1960 is an in-depth pro-Rhee study of the relationship between Rhee and the American 
government.
Chung-shin Park’s study, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, is an important overview, but he does not 
study the connection between Korean Christians, American missionaries, and the AMG in depth. Donald 
N. Clark’s account of missionaries in Korea, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900- 
1950, gives some important details, but still, he provides no elaboration on the connections between these 
three major groups.
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MacArthur did not send Stilwell due to Chiang’s strong opposition.6 Another possible 
choice was Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who was in command of all 
American forces in China at that time. Since he had trained the Korean “Restoration 
Army” in Xi’an, China, he was well-known among Korean nationalists.7 Had he been in 
charge of the occupation, he would have wide support from Korean nationalists in China, 
in particular, the Korean Provincial Government (KPG) in Chongqing (Chungking). 
Nevertheless, perhaps Wedemeyer was too involved in China affairs, and too far away to 
come. The assignment fell on the shoulders of General John R. Hodge for one simple 
reason: he was geographically the closest to Korea at the time.
General Hodge and Commander Williams 
General Hodge was in Okinawa when General MacArthur’s order arrived. He 
needed to move his troops from there to Inch’on Harbor as quickly as possible. Although 
Hodge was a good soldier and a courageous commander, he had very limited knowledge 
of Asia. Neither Washington nor General MacArthur offered him much help. He 
received little guidance on how to set up a military government in the southern zone, and 
had few troops and no interpreters. Hodge’s first political adviser was H. Merrell 
Benninghoff, a low ranking State Department officer who could not speak with authority
6 Bruce Cumings, The Origins o f  the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence o f Separate Regimes 
1945-1947 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 123.
7 Henry Chung, Korea and the United States Through War and Peace: 1943-1960 (Seoul: Yonsei 
University Press, 2000), 99-100.
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and had very little knowledge of Korea.8 Hodge’s ignorance of Korean affairs paved the 
way for Commander George Z. Williams, the son of Rev. Frank Williams, who was a 
Methodist missionary to Korea, to become Hodge’s trusted personal adviser during the 
first three months of US occupation in Korea.
George Z. Williams was bom in Inch’on and had spent the first fifteen years of 
his life in Korea, but he was not originally assigned to the Korean occupation force on the 
eve of General Hodge’s landing. During World War n, Williams had served as the head 
of the Department of Laboratories at a large hospital on the U.S. naval base in Brisbane, 
Australia. In 1945, he took up a new assignment as an Assistant Fleet Surgeon, where he 
was in charge of the medical landing operations for US forces. He applied for a transfer 
as soon as he heard of the plan of American forces to occupy southern Korea. His 
application, however, was rejected twice because Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, the 
Commander of the 7th Fleet, wanted to keep him on his ship.
Nevertheless, through a mere coincidence that would have far-reaching effects on 
the AMG, Williams’ ship came in on September 8, 1945 because the 7th Fleet was 
assigned to the convoy escorting General Hodge and his troops to Inch’on. Speaking 
fluent Korean, Williams was the only American at that time able to communicate with 
the three Korean representatives who were waiting for General Hodge at Inch’on
8 Neither did Washington have any bright ideas about domestic politics in Korea. Most o f the reports the 
State Department officials received were basically unreliable or tainted by political leanings. Cumings, The 
Origins o f  the Korean War, 129. See also James I. Matray, “Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in 
Korea, 1945-1948,” Korean Studies 19 (1995): 20. To make it worse, Benninghoff was a low ranking State 
Department officer who could not speak with authority. Thus, General Hodge requested to have 
“Washington officials empowered to speak of the future be added to [his] staff.” See “Conditions in 
Korea” 13 September 1945, (John R. Hodge) ^ 1$  1945.6-1948.8,
3:8.
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Harbor.9 Williams seized this opportunity to plead his case directly to General Hodge. 
Hodge immediately took him to be his personal political adviser. It was initially a 
temporary assignment, but Williams would ultimately serve in this capacity for about 
three months. Since Hodge had already been given Benninghoff as his political adviser 
from the State Department, why did he choose to put Williams in the same role? It was 
not just because Williams could communicate freely in Korean, but also because he could 
mingle with the Korean people due to his religious connections.10
Commander Williams’ Responsibilities 
General Hodge asked Williams to advise him on the political conditions in Korea, 
to hire Koreans for the American Military Government (AMG), and to speak on behalf of 
the AMG to Korean leaders.11 Each of these assignments would prove critical to the 
initial formation of AMG. By combining three crucial responsibilities into one position, 
and then entrusting that position to a hastily chosen individual, Hodge unintentionally
9 These three Koreans were delegates of the Committee for Preparation o f Korean Independence. See 
Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners In Peace and War: The Republic o f  Korea and the United States, 1948- 
1953 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher, 2002), 40.
10 On September 8, 1945, right after Williams had met with the three representatives and brought the 
General’s words back to them, they took Williams around town and fed him dinner. When he returned to 
the ship, he reported his “investigation” back to the General. That night, the Admiral sent word to 
Williams, asking him to work for General Hodge. “Notes on address by Commander George Tsur 
Williams to Korea secretaries and missionaries in the Methodist Chapel, 30 January 1946,” Presbyterian 
Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 29: 1, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. (This document is the most interesting document I found in the church archives. Although it 
was a message to the Methodist leaders, I found the document instead in the Presbyterian archives. At the 
top of the document, it was marked as “very confidential -  not to be quoted.” It was a private statement by 
Commander George Z. Williams to the church groups and secretly circulated among church leaders who 
had a deep interest in the missionary work in Korea. Since this document was buried in the church archives 
and not generally available to diplomatic historians, I think it is important to take a deeper look at it 
because of the influential role Williams played during the early months of US occupation. The document 
reveals Williams’ inner thoughts, frustrations, and even his “prophesy” on the future development of a 
divided Korea.)
11 Ibid.
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made Williams the most powerful and influential person in the AMG -  at least for the all- 
important first month, if not longer.12
Williams, however, was a medical specialist, not a trained interpreter, and not a 
well-informed political advisor. Thus, his views were not necessarily in accordance with 
the position of Washington, and he was vulnerable to the manipulations of skillful 
Korean politicians. Also, his religious background and church connections tended to 
make him more receptive to the opinions and the needs of Christian groups, educated 
elites, and missionary communities. His extensive contact with the Korean elites and his 
free access to General Hodge were probably the keys to understanding how the rightists, 
especially the Christian elites, came to dominate the AMG.13
Williams’ first mission was to learn as much as he could about Korean public 
opinion and political leanings, and then to report it to General Hodge. What kind of 
information did he submit to Hodge? First of all, he showed particular favoritism 
towards conservatives and Christian elites, such as Song Chin-u, Kim Ku, and Syngman 
Rhee. His favorite Korean leader was Song Chin-u, who was a famous cultural 
nationalist during the colonial period, and was also the leader of the Korean Democratic 
Party (KDP). Williams saw Song as a stem anti-Communist and pro-democracy 
conservative. He regarded the people in the KDP as prominent and trustworthy Korean
12 It is important to note that Washington did not send any specific or detailed guidelines for the occupation. 
It made Williams’ role in the first three months of occupation more critical. A lack of preparation and an 
absence o f qualified personnel haunted the initial stage of Hodge’s military occupation in Korea. See 
Matray, “Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945-1948,” 21.
13 It is hard to evaluate George Z. Williams’ work because there is not much information available. Since 
he was a last minute kind of adviser of whom the State Department had no foreknowledge and over whom 
it exercised no direct control, State Department files contain only a few written materials concerning him. 
Neither did he have a formal responsibility to report on his duties to the Army Headquarters in Tokyo. Nor 
is much available in the military file. Nevertheless, from September 1945 to January 1946, Williams was 
very close to Hodge, receiving full attention from the General. He was everywhere in the field and very 
active in the AMG, but unfortunately remained basically invisible if we only seek information on him in 
the government archives.
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leaders. This probably explained why the AMG appointed many KDP members to its 
administration. Since the arrival of the US occupation forces, the KDP had advocated the 
return of Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku to Korea, and lobbied for the recognition of the 
exiled Korean Provisional Government (KPG), then based in Chongqing (Chungking), 
China. Song and his associates worked hard to convince Williams that Rhee and Kim 
would receive “ninety percent support” from the Korean people if the United Nations 
were willing to recognize them.14 Soon afterward, General Hodge, probably acting on 
Williams’ advice, urged General Douglas MacArthur to bring Rhee back from the United 
States and to recognize the KPG “as a provisional government under Allied sponsorship 
to act as figure-heads during the occupation,” if possible.15
The problem, however, was that Williams actually knew very little about any of 
these individuals. The names of Song, Rhee and Kim were indeed famous among 
Koreans,16 but this did not necessarily mean that they would be the best choices for the 
benefit of an American occupation. History would show that Rhee and Kim caused more 
problems and headaches for the AMG than anyone else. The anti-trusteeship campaign 
devised by Rhee and Kim was a great burden on the AMG.17 Kim’s attempt to overthrow 
the AMG in early 1946 also weakened the legitimacy of the AMG. These rightists
14 “Notes on address by Commander George Tsur Williams to Korea secretaries and missionaries in the 
Methodist Chapel, January 30, 1946,” 2-5. According to Cumings, the KDP constantly demanded the 
return of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) to offset the influence of the People’s Republic.
These two self-proclaimed governments thus competed vigorously for public support as well as political 
legitimacy in the first year of American occupation.
15 Hodge himself knew that not all Koreans favored the KPG due to “a wide diversity of opinion.” Thus, he 
allowed the KPG members to return only as private individuals and did not recognize the KPG without the 
approval of Washington. See “Conditions in Korea” 13 September 1945, M M UkffllW fBX'M M •' &}x l  
(John R. Hodge) 1945.6-1948.8, 3:6-8.
16 All their names appeared on the list of the cabinet members of the People’s Republic even without their 
consents. Cumings, The Origins o f  the Korean War, 87.
17 For details o f the trusteeship debate, see Choi Sang-Yong, “Trusteeship Debate and the Korean Cold 
War,” in Korea Under the American Military Government 1945-1948, ed. Bonnie B.C. Oh (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 2002), 13-39.
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probably caused as much trouble as the leftists, making the American occupation even 
more difficult. In fact, the State Department trusted neither of them and even blocked 
Rhee’s return by denying him a passport. Nevertheless, because of the insistence of 
Hodge and MacArthur, the War Department bypassed the State Department and brought 
Rhee back to Korea on its own airplanes. This action sparked the beginning of an on­
going conflict between Hodge and the State Department throughout the occupation 
period.
Second, Williams did not trust the leftists, particularly the Communists. Despite 
Yo Un-hyong’s general popularity among the Korean people, Williams feared that his 
People’s Party was actually controlled by the Communists.18 According to Williams’ 
own political surveys, probably conducted during the first two months of the American 
occupation, the Korean Communist Party (KCP) only had 300 members when the 
Americans landed, and the overall support for the Communists was a meager five percent 
of the southern population. He also asserted that the Communist leader, Pak Hon-yong, 
was politically insignificant because no one in Korea knew who he was. But, since Pak 
was the only Korean delegate that Williams could identify as ever visiting Moscow, 
Williams suspected that Pak was a puppet, and that the Russians had real control over the 
People’s Party.19 Williams’ major concern was that Pak actually ran the People’s Party20 
instead of Yo. Thus, since Williams believed that the leftists were politically marginal, 
and at the same time wide open to Soviet subrogation, he was unwilling to depend on
18 “Notes on address by Commander George Tsur Williams to Korea secretaries and missionaries in the 
Methodist Chapel, January 30,1946,” 4-6.
19 Ibid., 5. Actually, Y6 Un-hy6ng had also visited Moscow in his early life. Y6 became a devoted Socialist 
after his tour to Russia. See Lee Wha Rang, “Who Was Yo Un-hyung?” 
http://www.kimsoft.com/2002/mongyang.htm.
20 Because of General Hodge’s command, the People’s Republic was forced to change its name to 
“People’s Party,” in order to avoid suppression by the AMG.
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them for advice or public services. His survey probably explains why the General 
initially refused to work closely with the People’s Party.21
Since Williams was responsible for hiring Korean elites to fill high positions in 
the AMG, he naturally loaded the government with more conservatives, in addition to the 
already empowered pro-Japanese collaborators. According to historian Bruce Cumings, 
the AMG hired or retained about 75,000 Koreans from September to December 1945,
O ')and most of these men were affiliated with the KDP. Seeing that the United States had 
made a great mistake by hiring pro-Japanese “traitors,” Yim Yong-sin,23 a well-known 
female nationalist, hurried to confront the AMG officials about the problem. However, 
an official told her that since there was only one person who spoke Korean in the whole 
US occupation force, there was no way for the Americans to distinguish who were 
collaborators and who were not.24
Williams was actually quite sympathetic to those Koreans who had worked and 
lived under the Japanese reign of terror. When some accused collaborators showed him 
how they had tricked the Japanese and “sabotaged the Japanese war effort,” Williams was
r y e
very impressed and hoped that someone might write a book about it. His positive view 
of these collaborators perhaps had encouraged him to keep them in the military 
government. According to his primary investigation, he discovered that “the Koreans had
21 General Hodge agreed to cooperate with the leftists and worked with YC Un-hyOng when Washington 
pressured him in 1947 to bring forth a coalition between the leftists and the rightists, but the effort came too 
late.
22 Cumings, The Origins o f  the Korean War, 156.
23 Louise Yim was a graduate from Ewha Women University and received her Master Degree at the 
University of Southern California, with her thesis, “Korean Buddhists Are Turning to the Christian Faith.” 
She turned to Korea in 1932 and began to build a new Women University in Seoul. She was well-known 
among the anti-Japanese underground circle, and a loyal supporter of Dr. Syngman Rhee.
24 Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight fo r  Korea (Seoul: Chungang University Press, 1951), 242.
25 “Notes on address by Commander George Tsur Williams to Korea secretaries and missionaries in the 
Methodist Chapel, January 30, 1946,” 3.
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been forced to cooperate in all the war efforts,” and believed that it would be unfair to 
exclude them simply because they had worked for the Japanese.26 If so, no one would be 
qualified to serve in the AMG.
Most American missionaries agreed with him. For example, Horace G. 
Underwood, who had lived in Korea during the colonial era, knew the difficulty of the 
issue and explained the situation well. According to his experience in the education field, 
most of the collaborators in Korean schools were actually “good people,” but they had no 
choice if they wanted to survive the thirty-five years of Japanese occupation. From top to 
bottom, collaborating with the Japanese was basically unavoidable.27
Growing Christian Influence in the South 
Liberation of South Korea by US troops offered Korean Christians an opportunity 
to gain power. Since Americans were looking for educated and English-speaking 
workers, it was relatively easy for Christians, who were educated in mission schools and 
had worked closely with missionaries, to enter the AMG. Thirty-five out of fifty Koreans 
in high positions were Choson Christian College (Yonsei) professors, graduates, 
clergymen, and church laymen.28 In addition, six Korean doctors, who were all 
personally trained by American medical missionaries during the Japanese colonial period, 
were appointed by AMG as vice-governors. Compared to these two sets of figures with 
the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (KILA) and the directly-elected Korean
26 Ibid.
27 Horace G. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections o f  Horace G.
Underwood (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 106.
28 Edward Adams, “Report on Korea,” 15 January 1946, p.3, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 16, Folder 29 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia. See also Arthur J. Moore, The 
Church Cradled in Conflict: A Report o f  an Episcopal Visit to Korea in 1946 (New York: The Methodist 
Church, 1946), 8.
29 R. Manton Wilson, “Dear Friends” letter, 23 January 1946, Presbyterian Church (U.S.), Department of 
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
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Legislative Assembly (KLA), the proportion of Christians was high in all three, but by far 
the highest in the AMG administration appointments (see Table 3.1).
In fact, when General Hodge ordered Williams to set up a National Advisory 
Council for the military government, he also showed his favoritism toward Christians. 
The general wanted the council to consist of “two non-pro-Japanese lawyers, two bankers, 
some agricultural men, two highly successful business men, a doctor, and two 
representatives of the Protestant Churches, one of the Catholics, one of Confucianism, 
one of Buddhism, and one from each of the main political parties -  the People’s Republic 
and the Democratic Party.” 30 Given that Christians were less than three percent of the 
overall Korean population, a request for three out of five religious representatives taken 
from the Christian circle was exceptionally high. Following Hodge’s direction, Williams 
was able to find people to fill the council except for the two representatives from the 
Protestant churches because he could not immediately locate any non-pro-Japanese 
pastors. For the rest of the group, the majority of them were Christian laymen. Williams 
called it a “Christian National Advisory Council.”31
In another case, General Hodge asked Williams to find a head for the Korean 
National Police, one of the most crucial positions in the AMG. Williams turned to Song 
Chin-u for help and instructed him to find someone to run the police who would be anti- 
Communist and have the courage to put anti-Communism into practice.32 When Song 
came back to Williams the next day, he brought with him Cho Pyong-ok, a well-known
30 “Notes on address by Commander George Tsur Williams to Korea secretaries and missionaries in the 
Methodist Chapel, January 30, 1946,” 6.
31 Ibid. Eventually, Kim Song-su, Kim Yong-mu, Song Chin-u, Yi Yong-sol, Kim Yong-sun, O Yong-su, 
Kang Pyong-sun, and Yun Ki-ik participated in the council, but Y5 Un-hy6ng quit and Cho Man-sik was 
not able to attend because he was in the north. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 147.
32 Cumings, The Origins o f  the Korean War, 158.
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Christian nationalist and an active KDP member.33 Cho’s anti-Japanese record and his 
American-educated background satisfied the criteria, and so Williams persuaded the 
General to immediately appoint Cho as the head of the national police in October 1945.34 
Since whoever controlled the police force would eventually control the future political 
and social development of the American zone, the rightists and Christians were gaining 
more power and obtaining a stronger position in the south with a Christian KDP man in 
charge.
Because more Christian clergymen and laymen were entering into positions of 
influence, there was an immediate impact, boosting the political and social standing of 
the Christian community. Rather than being persecuted, as they were during the colonial 
period, Christians became a new ruling class in the liberated southern zone. This was not 
accidental, but was a natural result of a synergistic match between a successful American 
mission field for the previous four decades and the rise of an American hegemony.
AMERICAN MISSIONARIES AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE AMG
The establishment of a military government in the south hastened the return of 
American missionaries and provided an unprecedented opportunity to re-establish their 
influence in Korea. Although the American Military Government (AMG) and the 
missionaries had completely different goals, each side needed the other to achieve them. 
The AMG was desperate for trained workers and the missionaries were desperate for 
visas. Though having no direct power in politics or policy-making, the missionaries
33 Cho Pyong-ok was a student in Paejae School. He graduated from Columbia University and claimed to 
have received a Ph.D. there also. He later returned to Korea and became a YMCA Activist. Cho was 
arrested during the colonial period because of his anti-Japanese activities. See ibid., 501.
34 Ibid., 158.
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would come to wield a remarkably strong influence upon both American military 
generals on one side and Korean leaders on the other.
Preparation for their Return to Korea
After being forced out of Korea by the Japanese in 1942, missionaries looked 
forward to their return to the peninsula as ambassadors of peace. At the inter­
denominational Korea Area Conference held in 1943 in New York, the attendants 
expressed their desire for Korean independence.35 At first, they were optimistic about the 
growing power and influence of Russia and China in Asia, hoping that “the eclipse of 
Japan” would produce greater freedom for evangelization in China and other Asian 
countries. With such hope, they supported religious freedom so that missionaries might 
advance the Christian cause without hindrance.36
Around this same time, some religious political action committees, such as the 
Christian Friends of Korea, began to advocate that missionaries become involved in 
Korean politics. Their representatives urged churches in the United States and Canada to 
“unite in an effort to prevail on the Allied Nations, especially America, to immediately 
recognize the independence of Korea, deal with the [Korean] Provisional Government in 
Chungking China, through its accredited representative in Washington just as they 
continue to recognize the provisional governments of several European countries and 
deal with them through their accredited representatives.”37
35 “Letter by the Board to members of the Sub-Committee on Korea,” 26 April 1943, Presbyterian Church 
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 19 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
36 J. L. Hooper, “Basic Issues Confronting Postwar Missions,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 140, Box 16, Folder 30: Korean Consultative Conference, 1944-Presbyterian Historical Society, 
Philadelphia.
37 O. R. Allison, “Note on objections some missionaries and some Board Secretaries make to joining in a 
movement to urge the United States of America to declare the immediate independence o f Korea,” 18 
November 1943, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 29 -  Presbyterian 
Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Planning the future of a not-yet-liberated Korea, some church activists envisioned 
a land of confusion and many competing ideologies -  democracy and communism being 
just two. Having a history of monarchy but now without a king, and having had no self- 
government for forty years, post-war Korea would be a power vacuum. Since Korea had 
a large number of well-trained Christian leaders, missionaries expected the Christian 
elites to be the ones to maneuver this new nation toward America and toward the 
American ideals of democracy and the free practice of religion. The missionaries’ role 
would therefore center on assisting native-Christian leaders and on extending the 
Church’s influence.38 To be sure, not all missionaries thought in such political terms or 
would become involved in politics; yet, no missionary (or church member for that matter) 
could remain entirely aloof from the religious implications of a Communist Korea. Such 
political planning reveals that the seeds of future alliances between individual 
missionaries and the Korean rightists had already been planted before the war’s end.
The Return of Missionaries 
When World War II finally came to a close, the US occupation of southern Korea 
encouraged American missionaries, who expected that their government would be 
favorable to their cause, opening the way for their prompt return, and working with them 
to develop Korea. Korean Christians had similar expectations. As soon as the war ended, 
Korean Churches sent a deluge of requests for missionaries to the Foreign Missions desks 
of their parent denominations in America. For example, representing the general opinion
38 Ibid.
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of the Korean Christians, Rev. Yun Ha-yong39 and Rev. Han Kyong-jik also wrote to the 
Presbyterian Board in early 1946 that they were “waiting for the missionaries” and 
wanted to establish new Korea “on the sure foundation of Christ.” 40
Similar requests from individual Korean clergymen and laymen arrived frequently. 
American church leaders were excited and moved to act quickly. As early as November 
1945, the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions (USA) had already expressed the hope 
that the United States would enter into a short-term trusteeship with Korea so that the 
United States could offer political support and economic assistance to Korea through both 
government and private channels 41 The board adopted a strategy of inter-denominational 
collaboration to lobby the U.S. government to help Korea attain political and economic 
stability and independence and the full religious liberty of the Korean people.42 To 
maximize the religious influence, the Presbyterian Church (USA) encouraged 
missionaries to enlist in “the Red Cross, OFRRO, or other government agencies” 
involved in relief work.43
In spite of pressure from religious groups, the State Department hesitated to send 
back missionaries due to security concerns. The missionaries turned their efforts to the 
U.S. Army. Here, they met with greater success, because the army recognized that, to
39 Rev. Yun Ha-y6ng, a formerly pastor of the First Presbyterian Church in Sinuiju, was the co-founder of 
the (Christian) Social Democratic Party in North Korea. After he escaped to South Korea, the American 
Military government appointed him to be the governor of North Ch’ungch’bng Province. Harry A. Rhodes 
and Archibald Campbell, History o f  the Korean Mission Presbyterian Church in the USA Vol.2 1935-1959 
(New York: Commission on Ecumencal Mission and Relations, The United Presbyterian Church in the 
U.S.A., 1964), 88.
40 Edward Adams, “Report on Korea,” 15 January 1946, p.5, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 16, Folder 29 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
41 J.L.H. “Reports From Korea,” 6 November 1945, Presbyterian Church Archives, RG 140, Box 16, Folder 
29 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
42 Ibid.
43 Charles W. Iglehart, “Some Notes on Post-war Relief and Reconstruction,” 28 September 1943, 
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 19 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, 
Philadelphia.
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effectively occupy Korea, it would need as many people as possible with expertise in 
Korean society. The War Department expressed a willingness to sponsor missionaries “if 
they would cooperate during the first period of their arrival with the relief program of the 
army.”44 Even though the missionaries were connected to the army, “they would be free 
to give time outside the regular hours to making contacts with the Christian groups.”45 
General Hodge also gave his personal assurance to Bishop Arthur J. Moore of the 
Methodist Episcopal Church, who visited Korea in early 1946, that he welcomed 
missionaries to come and work for the AMG.46 Blocked by the State Department, the 
missionaries therefore saw the AMG as the only way to get their feet back on Korean soil. 
In the final analysis, the stonewalling of the State Department surely increased the 
political impact of the missionaries, because they became entrenched in many 
government posts as a result.
The first missionaries to return were those already enlisted in the military. Like 
Williams, they requested transfers to Korea. Among this first wave of returnees were Dr. 
Horace H. Underwood, Lieut. Horace G. Underwood, Lieut. Richard Underwood, 
Gordon Avison, Jr., Park L. Gerdine, and Charles K. Bemheisel.47 These men were all
44 John Hooper, “Letter from the Board to the Korea Mission,” 22 October 1945, Presbyterian Church 
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 2, Folder 28 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
45 Ibid.
46 The following is a quotation from a radiogram sent by General Hodge to the Department of State.
‘Policy on missionaries this headquarters revised as follows. Each religious denomination formerly 
represented in Korea may send former missionaries not to exceed number formerly maintained in Korea by 
each organization. Government transportation to Korea is desired until commercial transportation becomes 
available. Local transportation and living accommodations exceedingly limited. Military Government can 
assist in making food available and in finding limited housing. But it must be understood by individuals 
that living conditions will be rugged and for that reason selection should be limited to male missionaries. 
No facilities for families at present time. This headquarters desires opportunity to approve individual cases 
prior to departure from United States.’ See Moore, The Church Cradled in Conflict, 20-21.
47 The author o f this dissertation cannot find the rank of the rest of them.
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Korean-born children of missionaries.48 Their army status, their local connections, and 
their language skills made them very useful to the occupation forces.
Lieut. Richard Underwood, for example, was an 18 year-old army officer who 
was receiving training for future intelligence work in Korea by the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) shortly before the war ended. Outrunning his oldest brother and his 
father, Richard Underwood was the first member of the prestigious Underwood family to 
return to Seoul49 Upon landing in Seoul, he was immediately put to work in the Property 
Custody Section because he spoke fluent Korean. Then in the spring of 1946, he was 
sent to the American Liaison team in P’yongyang. Purportedly assigned as the chauffer 
for the Head of the Liaison Office, his real mission was collecting intelligence 
information. But where could he find a network of pro-American informants? Naturally, 
he used his church connections. Making contact with a local Presbyterian Church in 
P’yongyang, he earned their trust through his missionary credentials as a third-generation 
Underwood in Korea. Church members provided him with valuable intelligence 
information about Russian soldiers and the communist government in the north.50
Richard Underwood’s father, Dr. Horace H. Underwood, the only son of Rev. 
Horace G. Underwood, the first ordained Presbyterian missionary to Korea, returned to 
Seoul as a 54-year-old civilian officer under the AMG. He also had conducted
48 Edward Adams, “Report on Korea,” 15 January 1946, p.3, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 16, Folder 29 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
49 According to his Memoirs, Dr. Syngman Rhee allowed Richard Underwood to fly with him from Guam 
to Tokyo in the private plane that was prepared by General MacArthur. Richard F. Underwood, “Memories 
and Thoughts,” (unpublished manuscript, 2002), 42.
50 Ibid., 56-58. It is hard to verify exactly what information the church members provided for Richard 
Underwood, but judging by the time of his residence in P’ySngyang, it was the period shortly after the 
implementation of land reform. Anti-Communist sentiment among the rightists, especially among church 
leaders, certainly ran high because all the church farmland was confiscated by the Communists and 
redistributed to landless peasants.
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intelligence work during the war for the US government in Asia and had been reassigned 
to similar murky duties in Seoul, arriving soon after his son Richard, in October 1945.51
Meanwhile, Lt. Horace G. Underwood was serving in the US Navy and 
participating in the occupation of Japan because he was fluent in both Japanese and 
Korean. Later, in early 1946, he was transferred to Seoul and placed in charge of
59reorganizing Seoul National University. He “was the only bilingual person working 
between the university’s newly appointed president, Dr. Harry B. Ansted, and the 
Military Government on the one hand, and the Korean faculty and students on the 
other.”53 Lt. Underwood remained in the AMG through August 1947.
In addition to these missionary “kids,” other civilian missionaries also found their 
way to Korea through the AMG. Since General MacArthur thought that there was a link 
between Christianity and democracy, he gave permission for another twenty American 
male missionaries (10 Protestants and 10 Catholics) to return and serve in AMG’s 
Department of Public Health and Welfare.54 In addition, Mr. Dexter N. Lutz and Rev. 
Frank Williams (George Williams’ father) became agricultural advisers of the AMG; Dr. 
John D. Bigger and Dr. Roy K. Smith worked as medical advisors; Dr. R. Manton Wilson 
was put in charge of medical services for lepers, and Miss Ella Sharrocks and Miss Edith 
Myers served as nurses. The AMG depended heavily on these “Old Korea hands” to 
understand Korean affairs. For instance, every Friday morning at ten o’clock, General 
Archer Lerch, the Military Governor, would meet with these missionaries and listen to
511 cannot locate the details of their return. Since Richard Underwood mentioned his father’s position, we 
know that Dr. Horace H. Underwood was attached to the U.S. Army: “Even my 54 year old father was 
signed up to go to China as a Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) to be involved in Korea-American 
affairs in some unspoken manner.” See Underwood, “Memories and Thoughts,” 37.
52 The exact date of his transfer is not available. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 103.
53 Ibid., 103.
54 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 294.
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their advice.55 Seeing the potential benefit of missionary-AMG cooperation, Mr. Lutz 
urged the Presbyterian Foreign Mission Board to send more missionaries to work for the 
military government because they could obtain more power and resources to carry out 
their Christian reform programs in Korea.56
By joining forces with the military government, American missionaries wielded a 
stronger influence over the modernization and development of Korea in terms of 
education, social work, agriculture, and of course, religious freedom and the promotion of 
Christianity than other foreign missionaries, who returned later than the Americans.57 
American Catholic missionaries, for instance, replaced the French in leading the Korean 
Catholic Church. For example, Bishop Patrick Byrne, one of the early American 
Maryknoll missionaries who had begun work in P’yongyang in the 1920s, was appointed 
by the Vatican as its apostolic delegate to Korea in 1948.58
American missionary works had always included aspects of modernization and 
democratization, as well as spreading the gospel. For the missionaries who had struggled 
in vain to advance their reform programs through the long years of tight Japanese 
colonial control, US occupation of Korea was the breaking of a logjam. Their positions 
in the AMG and the support they received from the army were like a dream come true. 
They were excited and hopeful about working to build a Korean government for the 
future based on American and Christian ideals.
55 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f  the Korean Mission, 379-380.
56 Dexter N. Lutz, letter written from Seoul to Dr. Hooper, 7 May 1946, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 29 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
57 The earliest group of civilian missionaries (non-American) returned in June 1946, about six months to a 
year later than the Americans. See Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 295.
58 Ibid., 349.
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Missionaries and the Influx o f Northern Refugees
By early 1946, a massive influx of refugees was causing serious problems for the 
military government in the south. More than a million Koreans had been repatriated from 
Japan and 401,685 more were recorded as migrants from above the 38th Parallel. But 
there were about 1,450,000 more who arrived without any records (see Table 3.2). 
Christians and clergymen from North Korea were among them.59 Most of these refugees 
settled in the big cities; the majority of those from the north stayed in Seoul, unless they 
had relatives in other parts of Korea (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Caring for these refugees 
became a major headache for the AMG. Food, housing, clothing, and job opportunities 
were all in short supply, and the potential for epidemics was high.
Out of compassion for the needs of these destitute people, and recognizing an 
opportunity for mass evangelism, missionaries and Christian churches took up the 
daunting burden of caring for these millions. Missionary homes, especially the big house 
belonging to the Underwood family, served as informal relief centers and storage areas. 
Mission schools and local churches were also focal points of private relief work. Ethel 
Underwood (the wife of Dr. Horace H. Underwood), for example, recruited volunteer 
women from various churches for assistance. The Underwood family alone supplied
60,000 people with clothes in a year.60 These extensive religious relief networks also 
presented a significant opportunity for increasing the visibility and public image of 
Christianity among the new refugees. The church network and Christian connections
59 William A. Linton, “Dear Friends” letter, 4 October 1947, Presbyterian Church (U.S.), Department of 
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
60 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 110-111.
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also gave some Christian refugees a better chance of survival and higher upward mobility 
by securing jobs in the AMG.61
According to a survey conducted by the Presbyterian Korea Mission in 1947, 
church attendance in the south increased markedly from 1946 to 1947. People seemed 
very eager to hear the Christian message.62 The numbers of pastors reported living in the 
south grew rapidly because of the south-bound migration of many northerners. The 
Presbyterians had 109 pastors living in the south in 1941. However, in 1947, there were 
179, a sixty-four percent increase, a direct result of an influx of Christian clergymen from 
the north.63 New refugee churches began springing up in many southern cities. Formerly 
Japanese churches in the once Japanese settlements were now occupied by Koreans. In 
some cases, even Shinto temples were turned into churches.
The Rise o f Radical Anti-Communism among Christians 
The north had always been the heart of Korean Christianity, both in terms of the 
proportion of the overall population and evangelical zeal. Since Christians had been 
persecuted by Communist authorities in the north, they longed for the religious freedoms 
of the south. When these refugees began to concentrate in the south, it infused the 
southern church with new radical anti-Communist vigor.
Maie B. Knox, an American missionary in Kwangju, wrote to her friends across 
the Pacific about the rise of anti-Communist sentiment among Korean Christians:
61 Since American missionaries constantly hosted and befriended American officials, it was easier for 
Christians, with references both from Church leaders and missionaries, to secure clearance to work for the 
AMG. See Anna McQueen, “Dear Friends” letter, 26 November 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.), 
Department of History, Montreat, North Carolina.
62 “Survey 1947, Korea Mission, Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.,” p.4, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 140, Box 16, Folder 34 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
63 “Survey 1947, Korea Mission, Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.,” pp.2-3, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 34 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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The refugees continue to pour into South Korea from the Communist North, and of 
course are destitute, having to leave everything to the Communists and begin again from 
scratch. Leaving is a very precarious business and babies and old people sometimes die 
on the way. But they say they cannot exist under Communist rule. So many fine 
Presbyterians have flocked to Seoul, and sixty new churches have been organized 
recently, and now Seoul has eighty three Presbyterian churches.64
Churches with a strong anti-communist message gained members at the fastest pace, 
particularly among the refugees. The most famous example was the still-widely 
renowned Yongnak Church in Seoul, led by Rev. Han Kyong-jik, the former leader of the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) of the north. By 1949, the membership of this church 
exceeded three thousand -  most of them refugees from Sinuiju, in North P’yongan 
Province.65
Working in close contact with refugees, missionaries were well informed on 
conditions in the north. For instance, Knox reveals how the story of one such refugee 
influenced her own attitudes. Her friend Rev. Kim Hyun-jung, whom she had supported 
in his education, told her that he was imprisoned and tortured by the Russian occupation 
forces simply “because he [was] a minister of the Gospel.” He described the Russians as 
pigs, and was convinced that they spread lies in order to “win the Koreans to 
Communism.”66 Repeatedly hearing the same types of horror stories from the victims' 
own mouths alarmed the relief workers. Anti-Russian and anti-Communist sentiments 
were strong among Christians and missionaries. Many regarded the Soviet Union and the 
Communist regime above the 38th Parallel as the “two most anti-Christian powers” in
64 Maie Borden Knox, “Dear Friends across the Pacific” letter, 7 March 1949, Presbyterian Church (U.S.), 
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
65 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 303.
66 Maie Borden Knox, “Dear Friends” letter, 14 January 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.), Department of 
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
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their time. They did not want Korea to fall into the control of Communists because in 
their eyes, the salvation of Korea was the symbol of the salvation of the whole Orient.68
Interactions with refugees had a critical impact on the Christian opinion of 
Communism, causing many missionaries and church leaders to shift to the right and 
become more politically conscious. It was true that they supported Korean independence 
and wanted Korea to be united, but they desired more to see the establishment of a free 
and democratic government based on the American model.69 By 1947, the competition 
between the leftists and rightists in the south had escalated into a vicious power struggle 
in which both missionaries and the Christian community would become entangled and 
play significant roles in the establishment of a separate regime in the south.
THE CONDITIONS OF THE SOUTHERN CHURCHES
By the end of World War II, the Korean Church was disorganized. Partly due to 
the more liberal view of missionaries in Seoul that encouraged cooperation with Japanese 
demands, and partly due to the tighter control of the Japanese police over the citizens in 
Seoul, anyone who remained in leadership positions in the church community in the
7flcapital had had to yield to the colonial government’s pressure. When liberation came, 
collaborating clergymen were all in disgrace. Clergymen who had suffered imprisonment 
and survived stood up against the current leaders in the church community. They refused 
to participate in the existing general assemblies, and instead, set up their own
67 Marion E. Hartness, letter to Dr. J. L. Hooper, 2 February 1946, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 140, Box 16, Folder 29 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
68 Ibid.
69 “Churches Demand Immediate Freedom for Korea: Separate Government Idea Oppose,” The Voice o f  
Korea 6 (15 February 1947): 1. This publication was found in the Vertical File: Truman Subject File -  
Religion in the Truman Library.
70 Helen Kim, Grace Sufficient: The Story o f Helen Kim by Herself, ed. J. Manning Potts (Nashville, TN: 
The Upper Room, 1964):103-105.
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organizations. Because of the collaboration controversy, the Christian community was 
deeply divided during the early months of liberation. Four major factions emerged 
among Korean Christians.
Non-compromisers
The first and the most influential group was led by those anti-Japanese clergymen 
and their followers who had refused to yield to Japanese demands and as a result, 
suffered persecution, exile, or imprisonment. These survivors instantly became popular 
in the post-liberation period. They were respected by both Christians and non-Christians 
because of their courage and patriotism. The most famous clergymen in this group were 
Rev. Han Kyong-jik, the SDP leader who had fled from the north, and Rev. Son Yang- 
won from the “leper colony” in Sunch’on, near Kwangju. In the years of the AMG, these 
non-compromisers were more outspoken critics of pro-Japanese collaborators, both 
within the church and across the nation. They demanded open repentance and the 
spiritual regeneration of the ex-compromisers.
The ranks of non-compromisers would swell drastically from 1945 to 1950, 
forever altering the composition and ideology of the southern church. Their numbers 
increased mostly because of the influx of northern refugees. Not only had non­
compromisers been more numerous in the north, but they were also more likely to be
71persecuted and flee south. Because they had already refused to bend under forty years 
of Japanese pressure, non-compromisers were in no mood to suddenly kowtow to Soviet
71 Those pro-Japanese compromisers (clergymen) in the north were less likely to flee south because the 
charge of their crime was purely religious and the Communists did not go after them. Instead, they were 
encouraged to participate in the government sponsored church and enjoyed new religious authority under 
the Communist reign. Actually, many ex-compromisers did join the official church in the north and fade 
away in the religious scene.
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demands. As a result, all of Korea's conservative church elements became concentrated 
in just the bottom half of the country.
Once in the south, these clergymen became hardcore anti-Communist activists. 
By 1948, they grew to be a powerful political, social, and religious force commanding 
about a hundred thousand Christian refugees living in the south, with about seventy
79thousand of them concentrated in Seoul and its vicinity. Seoul had long been the most 
crucial city in Korea. Whoever controlled Seoul could command the political direction of 
the rest of the country. The influx of northern Christians, together with other rightist 
elements, rapidly transformed the political, social, and religious landscape of Seoul, 
favoring the cause of the rightists. The Christians’ platform of religious freedom, strong 
nationalist integrity, and charismatic leadership boosted the popularity of the rightist 
camp and gave it a more humane and appealing face.
According to data gathered by the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), northern 
refugees, including many Christians, were the main supporters of rightist youth groups, 
such as Sobuk ch’dngnydndan (Northwest Young Men’s Association or Northwest Youth 
Corps).73 Having just fled from the north in search of religious freedom, these Christians, 
though eager for unification and the chance to return home, dreaded the prospect of 
unification under communism. These northerners would not support politicians who 
sought compromise with either the Communists to the north or leftists in the south. Nor 
would they tolerate such views within their churches.
72 Petition from the Association of Christians from North Korea, 14 September 1948, Presbyterian Church 
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 29 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
CIC (  Cl)  M J l^ j 1945 .9  -  1949.1, 1 (Seoul: Hallym University, Institute
of Asian Culture Studies, 1995), 1:469-494.
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As their numbers and power grew (not only through Christians fleeing south, but 
also through revival meetings and evangelical work among the non-Christian refugees), 
they criticized and even physically attacked leftist elements within the Church. Their 
fervor and their harrowing tales of persecution swayed many southern Christians to join 
their crusade, so that even native southern Christians became decidedly anti-Communist. 
Moreover, those few church leaders who did not repudiate their liberal stances would be 
gradually purged from power within each denomination. Political and religious pressures 
from these northerners had a profound effect on the southern church, causing it to take a 
tremendous lurch to the right from 1945 to 1950, even while the global church outside 
Korea remained captivated by the social gospel.74
Compromisers and Collaborationists
The second major group of clergymen consisted of compromisers and 
collaborationists. Compromisers and collaborationists were similar, but not exactly alike. 
Some clergymen compromised with the Japanese demands because of the fear of death 
and/or because of a personal desire to save the established church. They pointed to the 
Biblical principle of “submission to authority” as their justification and personal 
defense.75 Compromisers might have not gained any personal power or wealth during the 
colonial period. Their livelihood could have been as hard as others. They felt that they 
were being misunderstood and hoped to reconcile with the non-compromisers and be 
accepted. This group probably represented the majority of Christian clergymen.
74 See Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 
2003), 169-170.
75 The missionary community was also divided by the Shinto issue. Not all missionaries agreed to bow 
down to the Shinto Shrine. In fact, most of them, such as Dr. George McCune, Rev. Otto DeCamp and Dr. 
DeWitt Lowe, did not and were arrested by the Japanese immediately, but Dr. Horace H. Underwood 
thought that to comply was the right course when the church faced a harsh ruler. Underwood, Korea in 
War, Revolution and Peace, 65.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
194
Nevertheless, there were a few Christian clergymen who not only compromised, 
but also actively collaborated with the Japanese and even propagated the Japanese Shinto 
religion in order to gain personal wealth and power. Both kinds were charged by their 
contemporaries as “collaborators,” but since the nature of their crimes or sins were very 
different, their ends were also very different.
After Japan was defeated, both groups were called to account. Famous 
collaborators, such as Rev. Chong In-gwa (Chung In-kwa),76 Dr. Song Ch’ang-gun,77 and 
Rev. Pak Hyung-chul78 were stripped of their religious positions after they were 
convicted of crimes by a Korean court.79 Church conservatives were particularly 
troubled by the compromisers' willingness to sacrifice the gospel message by allowing 
Shinto shrines to be put in their churches. Facing severe criticisms, these compromisers,
ROsuch as Rev. Kim Kwan-sik and Rev. Chong In-gwa, who had not betrayed their 
country but simply had organized and supported the United Christian Church under 
Japanese direction, struggled to survive and keep their positions of influence in the 
Christian community.
Due to constant debates and power struggles between the northern non­
compromisers and the southern compromisers, the Christian community was initially
76 Rev. Ch6ng In-gwa was pastor of the Korean Church in Yunchi Dong. He was a key leader of the 
Korean Presbyterian Church during World War II. See Rhodes and Campbell, History o f  the Korea 
Mission, 259.
77 Dr. S6ng Ch’ang-gGn was the President of the ChosSn Seminary. See Chapter 2.
78 Pastor Pak Hyung-chul was connected to the Sung Duk Hostel. They were all strongly pro-Japanese 
ministers who constantly gave their loyal support for the Japanese militarist policy. See Francis Kinsler, 
“Dear John,” 19 March 1949, Presbyterian Church Archives, RG 140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian 
Historical Society, Philadelphia.
79 Letter from Fran to John Smith, 19 March 1949, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 
18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
80 See Chapter 2.
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rather unstable. For all of its new-found conservatism, however, the non-compromisers 
were far more ready to forgive their collaborationist brethren than were nationalists 
outside of the church -  forgiveness being, after all, a core teaching of Christianity. The 
missionaries, in particular, labored to bring reconciliation among church leaders, hoping 
that the Koreans could put their past behind them and focus on the future. The situation 
began to improve when sincere repentance and spiritual revival meetings swept through 
the south like wildfire. Ex-compromisers were allowed to keep their positions, and ex­
collaborationists were generally accepted back into the church unless they had been 
convicted of their crimes.
There is an old diplomatic notion that says, “The enemy of my enemy is my 
friend.” As the south faced the threat of being overrun by Communist subversion, anti- 
Communism grew to be a crucial element in hastening reconciliation and bringing the 
northerners and the southern ex-compromisers to form a temporary alliance with other 
rightists. Christian collaborators, like others tainted by Japanese ties, tended to be solid 
supporters of the Korean Democratic Party (KDP), which labored to protect collaborators, 
landowners, and capitalists. Thus, the KDP was strongly anti-communist for economic 
reasons, and this second category of Christians would be as anti-Communist as the first 
group, although perhaps from a different motivation. This alliance of Christians and non- 
Christians within the KDP would also lead to the formation of several rightist youth 
organizations, such as Taehan yonmin doklip ch’dngnyondan (the Great Korean
81 Missionaries constantly reported the miserable situation of the church during the first two years of 
occupation.
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Independence Young Men’s Corps), a group that would not support any candidate who 
proposed compromise with the leftists for the sake of their ultimate survival.82
Educated Elites and Church Laymen 
Like the clergymen, educated elites and church laymen had to make hard choices 
during the colonial period. Many, though anti-Japanese at heart, were forced to cooperate, 
at least passively, in order to maintain their schools, hospitals, churches or other 
institutions. Most southern church laymen belonged to this category. These elites and 
intellectuals held positions as principals, university presidents, lawyers, and judges.83 
Many were gradualists who felt that they had worked toward eventual Korean 
independence, although compromise had been necessary if they were to work within the 
Japanese system. Therefore, these elites protested the label of “collaborator,” arguing for 
a clear definition of the term, and even seeking approval of their work from the Christian 
community as well as the general public. For example, at the farewell party for General 
Hodge in August 1948, Dr. Kim Hwal-lan “asked the Assembly to be considerate of the 
[pro-Japanese], because [they] all had had to cooperate.” 84
Many of these intellectuals worked for the AMG as advisors or administrators, 
maintaining close relationships with missionaries inside and outside the government. 
Their political and social ideals traced back to the cultural nationalists of the early 1900s, 
who believed in the gradual transformation of the country and rejected radical reforms. 
Under the support of the AMG, these Christian reformers devised reform programs on
82 See CIC (  $ )  M JZ^j 1945 .9  -  1949. U 1:469-494.
83 The most famous examples were Dr. Helen Kim, President of Ewha University; Louise Yim, President of 
Central Women’s College; and Dr. George Paik, President of Chosen Christian University (which is 
today’s Yonsei University). They did not believe that they had done anything wrong. Instead, they 
believed that they had made significant contributions to the educational and economic development of 
Korea during the colonial era.
84 Quote in Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960: A Personal 
Narrative (Seoul: Panmun Book Company Ltd., 1978), 192.
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improving education, implementing voluntary land reform programs, and re-establishing 
international trade. In his letter to the American Board, Dr. George L. Paik (Paek Nak- 
chun) expressed the Korean Christian elites’ political leaning:
The Japanese enslavement of the Korean people has gone forever. The Korean minds are 
receptive o f things American. The religious revival is bound to come as the general 
order o f  things is established. The liberated Korea needs her strong physical body of the 
Statehood, but making the soul o f the nation is the paramount task. [A] wide door of 
opportunity is open for all sorts of constructive work in making a Christian nation in the
heart o f  the Orient. Christianization of Korea will be the best investment for the
evangelization of the whole Orient.85 (Italics added)
The new Korea that they envisioned would be Christian, pro-American, and democratic -  
a vision almost identical to the one Syngman Rhee had put forth in his book, The Spirit o f 
Independence .86
Communism, the antithesis of everything these Christian gradualists had worked 
for, sought to establish an atheistic and undemocratic state through radical reform. For
the Christian gradualists, it was a huge dilemma. On the one hand, they feared
Communism, but on the other hand, they desired peace instead of war. Therefore, they 
favored unification through peaceful and democratic means, or barring that possibility, at 
least maintaining of the status quo. Nevertheless, if the Communists threatened the 
country with violence and war, the gradualists would stand up against the disruption of 
peace. Having political astuteness and influential positions, the elites would be an 
important ally for the politicians who could gamer their support.
General Churchgoers 
The majority of the Christian population was general churchgoers. This catch-all 
grouping included people of diverse political leanings, yet certain generalizations about
85 Edward Adams, “Report on Korea,” 15 January 1946, Presbyterian Church Archives, RG 140, Box 16, 
Folder 29 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
86 See Chapter 1: Christianity and Korean Nationalism.
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them are possible. In 1945, the southern church members tended to be politically 
moderate or even somewhat to the left of center. They supported peaceful unification, 
democracy, religious freedom, and land reform. However, within a few short years, they 
would move farther and farther to the right. One major reason was the influence of 
northern refugees and their reports of persecutions in the north.
There was also another equally significant cause for the southern churchgoers’ 
change of opinion: the events that they, themselves, experienced while living in the south. 
As violence against the rightists began to intensify in early 1948, Christian believers and 
villages were specifically targeted by terrorist attacks and Communist guerilla uprisings, 
because of their religious faith. Such unprovoked assaults pushed these unorganized 
individual Christian families more and more firmly into the hawkishly anti-Communist 
camp.
For example, during the first week of May 1948 (the election month), a total of 
162 people were killed in civil conflicts (see Table 3.4). In this wave of violence, two 
churches were destroyed in Kaesong and in Kanggyong, and one Catholic missionary’s 
home was burned in Ch’unch’on. A few months later, during the Yosu Rebellion of 
October 1948, rebels burned at least twenty-five Christian homes in one community.87 
Another widely publicized case was the murder of Pastor Son Yang-won’s two teenage 
sons, who were well-known Christian leaders in a local high school in Sunch’on, during 
the rebellion.88 When the rebellion was finally put down by the South Korean 
government, more than one thousand civilians had lost their lives including both the
87 Florence E. Root, “Dear Friends” letter, 14 October - 26 November 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.), 
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
88 Ibid.
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leftists and rightists. Christians had suffered greatly too. In the cities of Sunch’on and 
Yosu alone, more than 82 Christian families were left destitute and homeless from a 
single devastating fire that was set by rebels as they retreated.90
Shortly after the Yosu Rebellion, Maie and Robert Knox, a missionary couple in 
Kwangju, reported to their American friends that:
Kwangju is the capital o f the Province and has been heavily guarded. Korean troops are 
constantly on the alert, and many volunteers are being trained for guard duty. We have 
no trouble so far. But the Communists are active in the country, living in the mountains 
and darting out fo r  quick raids on the villages. They shot a Korean Christian the other 
day, a valued assistant in one of Rob’s churches, because he was a Christian. They 
threaten to kill all Christians and missionaries, but so far they have been restrained and 
have killed only a few Christians and no missionaries... Our new governor is a 
Presbyterian minister and he seems to be trying to do all in his power to put down the 
menace o f  Communism. He has organized the men o f the city into volunteer bands fo r  
protection. Meanwhile, the seven of us missionaries in Kwangju go on about our work 
almost as though nothing were going on, except that we are keeping out of the 
Communist infested mountain regions at night... .9I (Italics added)
The Knoxs’ observation showed that what was happening in Yosu was also flaring up all 
across the country. Regardless of their class background, Christians in the countryside 
were undeniably singled-out by the rebels. The main reason was that, compared to other 
country folk, Christian peasants were less willing to support the guerrillas, so the 
Communists considered them to be traitors to the Korean nation and enemies of 
revolution. Although unrest within the cities received more attention, it was in the 
countryside that the Communists had their bases and left their deepest mark.
As the power of the guerillas grew in late 1948 in South Cholla Province, the 
death rate and material deprivation became higher in the countryside than in the big cities. 
These losses were caused not only by rebel attacks but also by police countermeasures.
89 The actual number of civilian casualties was hard to determine. Richard Underwood claimed that there 
were about 1000. Bruce Cumings says that at least 500 civilians died in Sunchon alone. See Cumings, The 
Origins o f  the Korean War Vol.2 (Seoul: Yuksabipyungsa, 2002), 266.
90 Louise B. Miller, “Dear Friends” letters, 5 December 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.) Department of 
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
91 Maie and Robert Knox, “Dear Friends of Ours” letter, 26 November 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.) 
Department of History, Montreat, North Carolina.
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Many people had to move into fortified villages or cities and leave most of their 
possessions behind. In Tongbok County near Kwangju, Miss Florence E. Root, a 
Southern Presbyterian missionary, reported that twelve of fifteen villages were ordered to 
be destroyed, allowing nothing to fall into the hands of the raiders.92
Kwangju, the capital of the South Cholla Province, was overcrowded with 
refugees from the countryside. These people had experienced the same suffering at 
Communist hands as the northern refugees had. They were also just as destitute and 
angry. Crowded together in the cities, these two groups would become a strong anti- 
Communist force, supporting the government’s hard-line measures to wipe out 
Communist bases hidden in the hills.93
Common Ground Among Christian Refugees 
Not all Christians were of one background or opinion; there were refugees, ex­
collaborators, elites, and general churchgoers. Nevertheless, almost all Korean Christians 
shared three common characteristics. First, they were generally pro-American. They had 
had favorable experiences with American missionaries and recognized that without the 
work of these missionaries, Christianity would not have grown in Korea. Second, they 
were politically active, despite the fact that they might not always act in unity. Third, 
they wanted to keep Communism out of the south, for the sake of their own survival -  a 
very compelling motivation.
92 Florence E. Root, “Dear Friends” letter, 13 October 1949, Presbyterian Church (U.S.), Department of 
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
93 The new effort to wipe out Communist guerrillas was led by the new Governor, Rev. Lee Nam-gyu, at 
Kwangju, o f South Chulla Province, which was heavy infested with guerrilla activities. See Anna 
McQueen, “Dear Friends” letter, 26 November 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.) Department of History, 
Montreat, North Carolina.
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Like all Koreans, Christians wanted unification, and especially so that they could 
reclaim the northern church. But for many, unification took a backseat to preserving the 
religious freedoms that they enjoyed in the south. On the whole, one point was clear: 
despite their various denominational differences and internal divisions, they shared a 
common enemy to the north, which served as a unifying force, and thus brought the 
Christian community together under the banner of anti-Communism.
Therefore, it was hardly surprising that the Christian community as a whole 
would actually welcome a leader with a heavy hand, given their fears of Communism and 
their desire to restore peace and order. According to Rev. William A. Linton, a senior 
missionary in Chunju of the North Cholla Province, the Christian churches in Korea were 
“willing to take a stand against Communism and face whatever hardships the future may 
bring.”94 By 1947, the Christian community firmly backed several well-known Christian 
politicians: Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo, and Kim Kyu-sik and they wanted the south to 
form a separate government under the sponsorship of the United Nations.95 From late 
1947 to May 1948, Christians were looking for a leader who would reverse the 
Communist tide. Nonetheless, their moral principles would prevent them supporting an 
outright dictator. The leader who wished to win over the Christian votes, would have to 
be a man shrewd enough to tacitly make use of the militant right-wing groups, who were 
carrying out violent attacks, while he himself remained aloof from charges of thuggery.
94 William A. Linton, “Dear Friends” letter, 4 October 1947, Presbyterian Church (U.S.) Department of 
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
95 Ibid.
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SYNGM AN RHEE AND THE FORMATION OF A SEPARATE GOVERNMENT
The religious factor soon emerged as a crucial element in southern politics. Not 
only did Christianity become an important anti-Communist ideological force, but the 
Christian community, as a whole, became the backbone of the rightists. By the end of 
1945, four high-profile Christian leaders competing for political domination had emerged 
in the southern zone: Yo Un-hyong, Kim Kyu-sik, Kim Ku, and Syngman Rhee. 
However, only Rhee emerged as the victor. Why?
The Weakening of Yd Un-hyong’s Popularity
Yo Un-hyong was the most popular leader in Korea when the peninsula was 
liberated by the Allied Powers. Having been a Christian evangelist earlier in his career 
and enjoying nationwide fame as an underground nationalist, he was an influential 
Christian socialist during the 1930s, who sacrificially gave away all his land inheritance 
to his poor tenants.96 Therefore, he was very popular among Korean leftists. Yo 
originally received solid support from the southern clergymen when they crowded into 
their local CPKIs in September 1945. When the Korea People’s Republic was formed on 
September 6, moderate and leftist church leaders, such as Rev. Kim Ch’ang-je, Rev. Pak 
Song-sa, Rev. Kal Hong-gi, and Rev. Sin Hung-u stood firmly behind Yo.
Yo Un-hyong’s political position was weakening in 1946, however, under attacks 
from both the right and the left. When General Hodge refused to recognize the People’s 
Republic and forced Yo to change its name, Yo’s popularity began to shrink. The 
extreme rightists attacked Yo’s Christian supporters when they gathered to organize 
Kidokkyo minju ydnmaeng (the Democratic League of Christians) in 1946. Three 
hundred men from the Northwest Young Men’s Association stormed the YMCA building
96 See Lee, “Who Was Yo Un-hyung?”
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in Seoul and disrupted their ceremony. No one died, but most of the leaders were
Q7seriously beaten. Christians from the north, in particular, disliked Yo’s willingness of 
compromise with the Communists. When more tales of Communist persecution against 
Christians reached the south, the Christian community was less willing to compromise. 
Therefore, the influence of leftist clergymen weakened as more rightists flooded the 
southern cities.
Yo Un-hyong’s moderate attitude toward the Communists in the end cost him 
dearly. In late 1946, the Communists, under Pak Hon-yong’s leadership, succeeded in 
infiltrating all levels of the People’s Party and eventually tore the party apart. Yo’s party 
ceased to exist. His earnest attempt to work with the Communists bore no fruit. By 1947, 
Yo told the AMG officials that his life was in danger because both extreme leftists and 
extreme rightists wanted to kill him. Nevertheless, General Hodge did not give him any 
protection. On July 19, 1947, Yo was gunned down in his car by right-wing extremists: 
Yu Yong-ho, Kim Hong-sung, Kim Hun, Kim Yong-sung, and Han Ji-gun. Most of them 
were refugees from the north. Yu Yong-ho said that he wanted to kill Yo because he was 
the main instigator of a left-right coalition that would split the nation. Kim Hong-sung 
said that he wanted to kill Yo because Yo had made many trips to north Korea. There 
was no proof who actually gave the order, but the closest guess was Chang T’aek-sang. 
General Hodge pointed his finger at Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, but there was no hard 
evidence for such a charge.98
97 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 169.
98 Lee, “Who Killed Yo Wun Hyung?” http://www.kimsoft.com/2002/mongyang.htm.
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A Christian Moderate Kim Kyu-sik 
Compared to Yo Un-hyong, Kim Kyu-sik seemed to be in a better position to 
secure the support of the Christian community in 1947. Kim was an orphan raised by 
Rev. Horace G. Underwood. He received a degree from Roanoke College in Virginia. 
As an American-educated Christian intellectual who enjoyed the complete confidence 
and support of General Hodge, Kim was a rising political star in the south under the 
sponsorship of the AMG. American leaders found comfort in Kim’s willingness to 
cooperate and his status as a selfless statesman. Hodge appointed Kim as the chairman 
of the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (SKILA) in October 1946. The 
SKILA was a half-elected and half-appointed legislative body with a total of ninety 
representatives. The election of the SKILA, however, was not open to every citizen. 
Only the taxpayers and landlords were allowed to vote to “assure a conservative 
delegation.”99 As a result, most of the forty elected representatives were rightists from 
the KDP. To balance the SKILA, Hodge appointed 45 moderates and leftists, such as 
Yo Un-hyong and Kim Kyu-sik, to the body.
So, why did Kim fail to become the new president of South Korea? As historian 
Bonnie B. C. Oh points out, Kim Kyu-sik was not a self-serving politician and was 
faithful to the cause of forming a coalition for peaceful reunification.100 But his naive 
stand towards the Communists,101 and his lack of political skills made him unfit to lead a 
deeply divided country.102 Since he strongly opposed the establishment of a separate
99 Cumings, The Origins o f  the Korean War, 260-261.
100 Bonnie B. C. Oh, “Kim Kyu-sik and the Coalition Effort,” in Korea Under the American Military 
Government 1945-1948, ed. Bonnie B. C. Oh (Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher, 2002), 106-109.
101 Kim Kyu-sik was actually sympathetic toward socialism. He represented the liberal wing o f the 
Christian intellectuals.
102 Ibid., 120.
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government, he failed to understand the mentality of most southern Christians, who, 
though desiring unification, wanted absolutely nothing to do with the Communists. His 
political fate was sealed in May 1948, when Kim chose to attend a conference in the 
north, where he met with Kim H-sung instead of preparing for the May election. The 
political backlash from this meeting led him to completely withdraw from politics shortly 
thereafter.
The Master o f Korean Assassins was Assassinated 
Kim Ku, another well-known Korean nationalist, was also tainted by this very 
same conference in the north when he attended it together with Kim Kyu-sik. Prior to 
that, Kim Ku had earned his fame through political assassinations and terrorist plots 
during the colonial era. His leadership position in the Korean Provisional Government 
(KPG) came after his several attempts to assassinate the Japanese Emperor in Tokyo and 
Japanese officials in China. Because of his fame, Kim Ku was the only nationalist leader 
who could challenge Syngman Rhee’s leadership among the rightists. Although he was a 
Methodist, Kim was not as influential as Kim Kyu-sik and Rhee among the Protestant 
elites. Nevertheless, Kim Ku enjoyed the support of a group of loyal followers in the 
KPG, and benefited from his reputation for political assassinations.
Being the Chairman of the KPG, Kim initially gained the full backing of the 
KDP.103 He was also in command of most of the extreme rightist terrorist groups. 
Nevertheless, Kim’s relations with the KDP leaders began to turn sour due to his critical 
view of the pro-Japanese collaborators.104 He was less a skillful politician and more a
103 Individual wealthy KDP members supported both Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee and helped meet their 
financial needs after their return from exile.
104 Patrick D. Gardner, “Prerequisites of Power in Liberated Korea: The Political Relationship between 
Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku,” (M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 2000): 36-37.
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fervent nationalist. There was an allegation that he had ordered the assassination of Song 
Chin-u, when Song expressed his support for the Moscow Agreement. His action 
haunted his relationship with the KDP and lost him some support from the rightists. 
Since there was a rumor that he had also directed a failed attempt to assassinate Kim II- 
sung, the Communists had no love for him as well.
Neither was Kim Ku active in cultivating Christian support. These policies 
weakened Kim’s position in the ideological battle against Syngman Rhee. Kim lacked 
the political skills and the mind to understand the game of politics in post-war Korea and 
grasp the picture of international relations during the initial stages of the Cold War.105 
His anti-American views and activities over the trusteeship issue forestalled his chances 
for growth under the AMG. His inability to master English or to cultivate friendships 
with foreign residents limited his international reputation. Kim’s narrow-mindedness 
blocked his political ascent.
Even though Kim Ku had great potential to lead the fight against the Communists, 
he did not fully commit to the anti-Communist cause. Being an idealist longing above all 
else for Korean independence, Kim Ku sincerely wanted to unite the country even though 
it might require collaborating with leftists.106 Since Kim Ku’s opposition to the 
formation of a separate southern government was shared by Kim Kyu-sik, both these men 
refused to participate in the 1948 election, instead meeting with Kim Il-sung in the 
northern zone.
Nevertheless, an American political observer in the State Department, Joseph 
Jacob, saw a different political motivation for their boycott:
105 Ibid., 106-107
106 Ibid.
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While on the surface, hue and cry of both Kims is ‘unification of Korea,’ in reality basic 
cause o f their proposal for north-south conference and acceptance of P’ydngyang 
invitation is realization that they had no real following (insufficient at least to ensure their 
election or appointment to high office) and they ‘don’t want to play ball.’ They prefer to 
seek better prospects elsewhere.107
Jacob’s comment showed that both Kims were actually losing their influence in Korean 
politics even prior to the 1948 election. Neither of them had succeeded in consolidating 
their power in spite of each having a number of political advantages at the beginning, 
such as the rightists’ support of Kim Ku, and General Hodge’s support of Kim Kyu-sik. 
The two Kims had been deceived by the Communists who used their visit to the north for 
propaganda purposes. Their visit and their similar decisions not to support the election 
disappointed many Christian leaders and even non-Christian voters.108 While Kim Kyu- 
sik eventually retired from Korean politics, Kim Ku’s influence in the south shrank 
tremendously when the Republic of Korea was established in Seoul under Syngman 
Rhee’s leadership.
Syngman Rhee’s Experience in the United States 
In contrast to these men, Syngman Rhee was less an idealist and more a 
pragmatist in his political outlook. His biographers, his supporters in both Korea and the 
United States, and historians all had very different opinions on Rhee, but most of them 
agreed that he understood politics and diplomacy due to his long years of experience in 
the Western world. His views on Christianity and his relationship with Christians were 
the backbone of his political career. Apart from his education in Paejae and his close 
relationship with missionaries in his early life, Rhee’s academic and political lives in the 
United States and in Korea were built through the Christian network. In the 1920s, he
107 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relation o f  the United States (1948) Vol 6, The Far East and 
Australasia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974): 1177-1178.
108 See Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960, 155.
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had worked for religious organizations, such as the YMCA in Korea and the American 
Methodist Church in Hawaii. He had even organized his own church and school in 
Hawaii when his views on the education of women clashed with conservatives in the 
Methodist Board. Although Rhee faced opposition from various Korean radical 
independence groups in the United States, his most loyal supporters and followers were 
among Korean Christians and their children in the United States. They included Im 
Pyong-jik (also known as Ben C. Limb), who later became the first minister of foreign 
affairs in Rhee’s administration, Chong Han-gyong (Henry Chung), and Yi Won-sun 
(Won-soon Lee). Their loyalty did not fade even after Rhee’s political demise in I960.109
Rhee bore not only the image of a cultural nationalist, who advocated the 
importance of education and gradual transformation, but also the image of a pro-Western 
Korean diplomat, who persisted in seeking a political, economic, and military alliance 
with the United States. Prior to World War II, Rhee acted as a political prophet, who 
constantly warned against Japanese aggression in Asia, but his warnings went unheeded 
in Washington. During the war, under Rhee’s leadership, the Korea Commission, which 
was a diplomatic agency representing the KPG in Washington, lobbied for the immediate 
recognition of the Korean Provisional Government in Exile. He argued that recognizing 
the KPG, it would help to stabilize postwar Korea and prevent the Korean peninsula from 
falling into the hands of the Communists.110 His effort, nevertheless, had very limited 
success because the United States refused to recognize the KPG due to the lack of
109 Rhee’s Christian supporters in Hawaii housed, clothed, and fed him when he was almost penniless in the 
last few years of his exile life in the United States.
110 Jungmin Kuk, “Helping Syngman Rhee and the Republic of Korea: Robert T. Oliver’s Publicity and 
Lobbying Efforts in the United States, 1942-1960,” (M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 2000), 24.
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political representation of the KPG among Korean natives and the division within the 
KPG leadership.
During these decades in the United States, Rhee’s anti-Japanese and later anti- 
Communist positions alienated him from most Asian experts and liberals, such as Alger 
Hiss, in the State Department. The State Department advised Rhee and the KPG to form 
a coalition with other Korean leaders such as Han Kil-su (Kilsoo Han), whom Rhee 
condemned as a Japanese spy and a Communist. Rhee rejected the idea because he 
believed that a coalition with the Communists would invite the Russians into the Korean 
peninsula and eventually jeopardize the ultimate goal of Korean independence.111 Rhee’s 
refusal to cooperate with Korean leftists further distanced him from the officials in 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration.112 In 1945, during a United Nations conference 
in San Francisco, the Russian journalist, Emile Gourvereau, misinformed Rhee that the 
United States had handed Korea over to the Soviet Union at the Yalta conference. 
Angered by what he was told, he distributed a leaflet condemning the policy of the 
United States without further investigation. His action seriously jeopardized his 
relationship with the State Department, leaving him with very few friends inside the US
113government.
Nonetheless, Rhee’s bitter experiences in Washington and his deep 
understanding of international diplomacy molded him to be the most successful 
statesman in Korean politics. His relationship with Washington began to improve when 
the US-Soviet relationship began to get worse and the power of anti-Communism took 
root in the US government. Despite his lack of progress in getting diplomatic
111 Ibid., 31.
112 Ibid., 25.
113 Ibid., 29.
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recognition, his effort in Washington made him a legendary hero in the struggle for 
Korean independence. His name was so well-known in Korea that both the leftists and 
the rightists wanted to acquire his support and endorsement, but Rhee had his own plan 
for political domination by building up a political network in the United States as well as 
in Korea.
Rhee’s Publicity Work in Washington 
Knowing that unlike China and Japan, Korea attracted very little attention among 
American officials and that he was not popular in the State Department, Rhee needed 
every single drop of support he could possibly acquire if he wanted to achieve political 
victory over his opponents and competitors and establish a new modem Korea of his own 
dream. The very first step that Rhee took prior to and after his return to Korea was to 
maintain a close correspondence with church leaders in the United States, such as Rev. 
Edward Junkin, a former missionary to Korea,114 and Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, the 
Chaplain to the U.S. Senate. Rhee attended Rev. Frederick Brown Harris’ church in 
Washington when he was doing his lobbying work on behalf of the KPG.115 Later, Rev. 
Harris, who subsequently became the Chaplain of the Senate, emerged as one of the 
major defenders of Rhee throughout Rhee’s presidency in South Korea. Rhee also 
maintained close contact with Bishop Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York. Prior to
114 See David Brickey Bloomer, “Syngman Rhee’s Spokesman in the United States: Dr. Robert T. Oliver’s 
Korean Lobby and Public Relations Efforts 1942-1948,” (M.A. thesis, Yonsei University, 1996), 43.
115 Historian Bruce Cumings thought that Rhee did so because Rev. Harris was the chaplain of the Senate, 
but the fact was that Rev. Harris was chosen to be the chaplain in 1949, three years after Rhee had moved 
back to Korea. See Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, 62, 64. See Joungwon Kim, Divided Korea. 
The Politics o f  Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 36. See also 
Ibid., 89.
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Rhee’s return to Korea, Bishop Spellman praised Rhee as the American Catholic 
Church’s choice for leadership in Korea against the forces of godless communism.116
Since Rhee understood the importance of public opinion on American policy 
makers, he recruited as many sympathizers in the United States as possible to expand his 
publicity work in the United States in order to arouse American interest in Korea and 
improve his image in Washington. Through Rev. Junkin’s introduction, Rhee met Dr. 
Robert T. Oliver in 1942, a full-time professor of communications at Bucknell University 
in Pennsylvania, and invited him to assist in his publicity work in Washington. Dr. 
Oliver was not only a good writer, but he also had very strong experience in publicity. 
During the war, he took a wartime leave of absence to work as an Assistant Chief of the 
Office of Civilian Defense in Washington. His job was to write speeches to direct 
American citizens’ attention to support war efforts.117 Oliver frequently submitted 
articles to the Washington Post and other well-known newspapers and journals. Rhee 
was fortunate to have Dr. Oliver as his adviser and publicity director because from 1942 
on Oliver became the most effective and loyal lobbyist for the Korean cause. In addition 
to Oliver, Rhee also acquired help from Jay Jerome Williams, who served as Rhee’s 
advisor and fundraiser, and Preston M. Goodfellow, a US colonel in the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), who later assisted Rhee in getting military aid and equipment.
At first, Dr. Oliver only helped Rhee on a part-time basis, but after Rhee left for 
Korea, Oliver began fulltime publicity work on behalf of Korea. Rhee regarded Oliver’s 
publicity work as “the only thing that will help get the Russians out of Korea.”118 The
116 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 349.
117 Jungmin Kuk, “Helping Syngman Rhee and the Republic of Korea: Robert T. Oliver’s Publicity and 
Lobbying Efforts in the United States, 1942-1960,” (M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 2000), 15.
118 Quote in Ibid., 34.
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goal of Oliver’s work was to reverse the negative image the American people had of 
Korea. In Oliver’s first book on Korea, Korea: Forgotten Nation, published in 1944, he 
argued that Korean fighters could have contributed greatly to the war effort in the Pacific 
greatly if the United States had trained and allowed them to participate in the war 
earlier.119 In order to arouse public sympathy, Oliver devoted one-third of the book to 
describing Japanese persecution of Korean Christians and Western missionaries during 
the colonial period. His book was well-received in the United States. As soon as it was 
published, both the hardcover and paperback editions were sold out within a very short 
period of time.120 In addition, since Oliver’s articles on Korea were well-written and 
carefully researched, his works surpassed most of the Korean and American writers of 
those days.121 Oliver reported to Rhee that his publicity works were enthusiastically 
received, particularly by church people.122 In late 1946, he worked closely with Rev. 
Harris to lobby the US government to understand the needs of Korea.
Rhee’s Political Support in Korea 
As soon as Rhee arrived in Korea in October 1945, both the Korean Democratic 
Party and the People’s Republic offered Rhee leadership positions in their organizations. 
Rhee wrote to Oliver, boasting that all parties were solidly behind him. Surprisingly, 
Rhee accepted neither of them. Nor did he join Kim Ku’s group in the formation of the 
Korean Independence Party in spite of his connection with the KPG. Rhee kept his 
distance from these existing political parties because he did not want to lend his
119 Robert T. Oliver, Korea: Forgotten Nation (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1944), 102.
120 Kuk, “Helping Syngman Rhee and the Republic of Korea: Robert T. Oliver’s Publicity and Lobbying 
Efforts in the United States, 1942-1960,” 23.
121 Ibid., 8.
122 See Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 101-102.
123 Rhee’s letter to Oliver, 21 October 1945. See Kuk, “Helping Syngman Rhee and the Republic of Korea: 
Robert T. Oliver’s Publicity and Lobbying Efforts in the United States, 1942-1960,” 36.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
213
prestigious name as a mere symbolic figure-head, lacking actual political power and loyal 
following.
Instead, Rhee started to organize his own political organization, the National 
Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (NSRRKI). He began 
building his political organization through the Korean church network, met with Korean 
Christians, and “preached” his idea of national independence, supporting his case with 
Biblical passages much like a zealous preacher. He cultivated friendships among Korean 
Christian elites, especially important educators like Dr. Kim Hwal-lan (Helen Kim), Dr. 
Paek Nak-chun (George L Paik), and Yim Yong-sin (Louise Yim).124 These leaders 
would become his most loyal supporters throughout his presidency. He also sought out 
Christians such as H6 Chong, Yim Yong-sin, Cho-Py6ng-ok, Yi Ki-bung, and Hwang 
Song-su to be his closest advisers.125 In the end, Rhee’s NSRRKI enjoyed some success 
in forming local groups all over the south as a counterforce to the Choson Minjujuui 
Minjok Chonson (Democratic People’s Front) organized by Yo Un-hyong.126
Rhee’s Popularity in South Korea 
The extent of Rhee’s popularity in Korea has always been a matter of serious 
dispute. American officials in the State Department thought that Rhee did not have a 
strong base of support in Korea. Those on the ground in Korea, however, almost 
universally disagreed with the State Department’s assessment. During the early days of 
US occupation, Commander George Z. Williams believed that Rhee was popular, though 
he might not be as popular as Kim Ku among ordinary Koreans. Rhee was certainly
124 See Kim, Grace Sufficient and Yim, My Forty Year Fight fo r Korea.
125 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 170.
126 Allen R. Millett, The War fo r  Korea, 1945-1954: A House Burning (Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 2005), 82.
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popular among educated elites. But Rhee’s fame and his seniority over Kim Ku and Kim 
Kyu-sik gave him a relative advantage in their political competition. The general 
population tended to regard Rhee as their “grandfather,” someone to be treated with great 
respect. During his visit to Korea in mid-1946, Dr. Oliver talked with Major Wayne 
Geissinger and Colonel Anderson, the Military Governor of Kyonggi Province. They 
both told him that among all Korean politicians, only Rhee could draw a huge crowd 
whenever he appeared in public, and that Rhee was “the strong man of Korea” even if 
General Hodge believed that he could ignore Rhee.127
On July 8, Oliver met with a Colonel Green, chief public relations officer for the 
American Military Government in Seoul. The colonel told him that public opinion polls 
taken by the military showed that seventy percent of the Korean people below the 38th 
Parallel supported Rhee. Nevertheless, the AMG suppressed the finding. Instead, 
General Archer Lerch, the military governor of Korea, forced Colonel Green to falsify 
the findings to show less than a majority for Rhee because of Rhee’s strong stance 
against trusteeship. Dr. Oliver observed during his two-month stay in Korea that Rhee
198was the most respected and popular representative of the Korean people.
In addition to Oliver’s observation, reports both from the CIC and from various 
missionaries also showed that Rhee had widespread popularity. For instance, an 
American information officer responsible for gathering political information on Korea, 
though himself unimpressed by Syngman Rhee, reported that Rhee was “the most revered 
and respected name among the Korean villagers.” In the mind of the Korean people, the 
officer observed in 1947, Syngman Rhee “occupied a place somewhat akin to that of a
127 Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea 1942-1960, 35.
128 Ibid., 38. Oliver’s note was also quoted by Bloomer, “Syngman Rhee’s Spokesman in the United States: 
Dr. Robert T. Oliver’s Korean lobby and public relations efforts, 1942-1948,” 84-85.
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legendary hero.” 129 No one in the AMG doubted the power or stature of Rhee, and some 
even credited his shrewd leadership as being the reason why Communists were restrained 
from taking over the entire peninsula.130
Rhee Gains Loyal Followers from the Christian Community 
Rhee’s religious and political outlook made him particularly popular among 
Christians, for three reasons. First, he understood the importance of Christianity in the 
reconstruction of Korean society. As early as 1942, he wrote to his friend that Korea had 
“more than one million Christians” and that Korea was “Christianity’s greatest bastion in 
the Orient.” 131 He was exceptionally optimistic about the role of Korea “as the future 
aerial gateway to Asia” and “the crucible for the tenets of Confucius and teachings of 
Christ.”132 His desire to gain the support of Korean Christians was not merely shrewd 
politics, but a genuine personal conviction. He had never wavered in his belief that a 
modem Korea should be built upon the Christian model -  an idea he had articulated 
while imprisoned by the Choson government in his book, The Spirit of Independence.133 
In fact, he was determined to implement his ideas as soon as he gained political power.
Second, despite being classified by many political observers as an extreme rightist, 
Rhee’s policy outlook was rather moderate and even leaned toward the left. He 
understood the importance of seeking social justice, but favored a gradual approach
129 Richard D. Robinson, “Korea -  Betrayal of a Nation” Unpublished manuscript (1947), 121. See 
Joungwon Kim, Divided Korea, 37.
130 Bloomer, “Syngman Rhee’s Spokesmen in the United States: Dr. Robert T. Oliver’s Korean Lobby and 
Public Relations Efforts, 1942-1948,” 84.
131 “Letter from Syngman Rhee to Dr. Hoo,” 5 December 1942, Political Affairs: Korean Independence 
Movement, 1941-1944, RG 59, Records of the US Dept of State relating to internal affairs of Korea, 1940- 
1944, File 895, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
132 Ibid.
133 Syngman Rhee, The Spirit o f Independence: A Primer o f  Korean Modernization and Reform, translated 
by Han-kyo Kim (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 282-283. See also Chapter One: 
Christianity and Korean Nationalism.
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rather than a radical one. While serving as an elected member in the Korean Interim 
Assembly (KIA), he had advocated a fair and just review of all the collaboration cases 
following the establishment of the new Korean government because he believed that 
tolerating an irrational hatred for collaborators would bring more harm than good to 
Korean society.134 Rhee gained support from the rightists because he supported a gradual 
land reform policy rather than a radical one by first selling Japanese-owned areas to 
landless farmers, and then by encouraging landlords to sell their holdings through 
incentives and credits for conducting industrial investments.135 Therefore, KDP members 
supported Rhee even though they were never his trusted lieutenants.
Third, Rhee was being hailed as the “chief bulwark against the communization of 
Korea” and the man who could hold the reins of a free and independent Korea if it were 
so created.136 Rhee’s anti-Communist and anti-trusteeship political positions were clear 
and consistent. While the Christian non-compromisers took confidence from his clear 
stand, the ex-collaborators needed him to shield them from potential losses, both political 
and material, due to his moderate views on collaboration. Rhee received loyal support 
from both South Korean rightists and North Korean refugees among the militant youth 
groups such as the National Salvation Young Men’s Federation, the Northwest Young
1 ^ 7Men’s Association, and the Korean National Youth Corps.
134 Syngman Rhee was also seeking a middle-of-the-road method to settle the collaboration problem 
because he knew that American public opinion favored forgiveness rather than revenge, whereas the 
Korean public opinion favored justice and punishment. See Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American 
Involvement in Korea, 153.
135 Rhee tried to delay selling the ex-Japanese owned land by the AMG. He desired to have a new Korean 
government to implement the land reform programs. The land reform policy, however, was never 
successfully carried out due to the resistance of the KDP. It was the Korean War several years later that 
brought the final implementation of land reform. Nevertheless, Rhee’s moderate attitude in 1947 did earn 
him support from most o f the landlords. See Ibid., 153-154.
136 “Report on Korea,” The New York Times, 10 November 1946, editorial section.
m MWJBcMswmxnM: c ic  a t% rn) m jz ^i  1945.9-1949.1 ,1:469-494.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
217
In the end, Rhee’s pro-American attitude, his Christian faith, his emphasis on 
education, and his tough anti-Communist position made him the top candidate of 
Christian non-compromisers, elites, and ex-collaborators alike. In this way, Rhee was 
able to rally a strong Christian coalition behind him, as well as gain strong popular 
support among the public. In the end, most Christian groups came out to support Rhee 
and his organization, NSRRKI, in the 1948 election in the name of Christian unity and 
early independence.138
The May 10,1948 Election
When the Soviet-US Joint Commission came to a deadlock in mid-1947 due to 
dispute over the issue of proper representation of different political groups, the United 
States submitted the problem of Korean unification to the United Nations. The United 
Nations agreed to carry out a separate election in South Korea, and appointed a United 
Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). The responsibility of the 
UNTCOK was to oversee the election of a Korean National Assembly in May 1948. The 
responsibility of this assembly was to write a Korean constitution and establish an 
executive branch of government for South Korea.
In a country where less than four percent of population was Christian, the election 
of 1948 marked the beginning of strong Christian influence in South Korean politics for 
decades to come. The date of the election was itself an important indicator of things to 
come. Originally scheduled for a Sunday, May 9, 1948, both the Korean churches and
138 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 170.
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the missionaries petitioned to change the date.139 General Hodge granted their demand, 
and moved the election to Monday, May 10, 1948. The election was a general success. 
Ninety-four percent of all of South Korea’s eligible voters were registered and among 
them ninety-one percent came to the polls.140 A total of one hundred ninety 
representatives were elected to serve a two-year term in the National Assembly. 
Christian candidates, in particular, received votes from both believers and non-believers. 
Out of the one hundred and ninety elected representatives, thirty-eight were Christians -  
twenty percent of the total of elected representatives (see Table 3.1).
Syngman Rhee was elected by the National Assembly as first president of Korea, 
and the Republic of Korea was formed in August 1948. Rhee’s regime was known as the 
First Korean Republic. Under Rhee’s leadership, a Christian-style ceremony replaced the 
Confucius-Buddhist traditions and Shintoism in all government gatherings. In Rhee’s 
inauguration ceremony, the President took the oath of office with his hand on the Bible, 
an event unprecedented in Korean history. No one raised any objection when Rhee 
suggested that the opening ceremony of the National Assembly begin with a prayer of 
thanks by Assemblyman Yi Yun-yong, a Christian minister.141 Clearly, Christianity was 
widely respected or, at the least, tolerated by the majority of the non-Christian population. 
The First Korean Republic in South Korea marked the dawn of a new Christian influence 
in Korean history. Such an era began not because of the numeric strength of Christianity 
in Korea, but due to the political power of this foreign religion. Christianity became a
139 Bruce F. Hunt, a missionary o f the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, wrote to General William F. Dean on 
April 2 ,1948, asking the general to change the date of election because of the symbolic Christian meaning 
of keeping the Sabbath Day holy. Letter from Bruce F. Hunt to General Wm F. Dean, 2 April 1948,
(F. E. G ille tte )  7 $ # 7 ] ^  1946-1948 (Seoul:
Hallym University, Institute of Asian Culture Studies, 1995), 2:189-191.
140 Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 165.
141 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 173-174.
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religion of the Korean elites, and Christians emerged to dominate the new ruling class in 
South Korea. This trend was further strengthened by the outbreak of the Korean War.
CONCLUSION
The return of American missionaries and their children as liberators to the 
southern half of Korea marked a new phase of Korean political, economic, social, and 
cultural development along a course completely different from the one in the north. 
Nevertheless, the seeds of division were also being sown at this point, because the 
political, economic, social, and religious well-being of the Christian community became 
so closely tied to American missionaries and the military government that it began to 
realize what it stood to lose if Korea were united under Communism.
In both the south and the north, the early days prior to the arrival of foreign forces 
had already witnessed the forming of a broad coalition between leftists and rightists, all 
sharing a common dream of an independent and unified Korea. Cho Man-sik in the north, 
and Y6 Un-hyong in the south, seemed to provide the best formula for transforming the 
former colony into a liberal democratic nation. But then the intervention of two 
superpowers changed everything. Cho Man-sik and Yo Un-hyong's moderate visions 
were replaced by the realities of Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee. Rhee’s victory and his 
unwillingness to compromise with the leftists made peaceful unification almost 
impossible. The establishment of two separate regimes on the Korean peninsula not only 
consolidated the division of the country but also set ticking the time-bomb of a bigger 
conflict to come.
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Religious Anti-Communism and American Foreign Policy 
INTRODUCTION
The previous three chapters have explored the influence of Christianity in Korean 
nationalism and post-war politics. The discussion in this chapter turns to the other side of 
the globe, and the influence of Christianity within the United States during the early post­
war years, examining how religious factors became a powerful force in American politics 
and a useful propaganda instrument, and how South Korea grew to be a symbol of the 
struggle for religious freedom and a focal point of America’s anti-Communist strategy in 
East Asia.
Religious influence on foreign policy had both individualistic and institutional 
elements that were difficult to quantify. From 1945 to 1950, the US government 
developed a close partnership with religious actors in the conduct of foreign affairs. It 
enlisted the support of religious leaders and religious institutions to propagate its political 
agenda. Meanwhile, church leaders also tried to lobby politicians to protect their 
interests and expand their influence in their mission fields.
To illustrate the complexity of religion in the conduct of US foreign affairs, the 
first two layers of discussion focus on President Harry S. Truman and his major foreign 
policies during the interwar years. While it is true that US foreign policy has never been 
a direct product of the will and actions of a single individual, it is also true that whoever 
occupied the White House -  his personality, religious beliefs, and political philosophy -
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substantially affected the decision-making process. Of course, the ultimate result is the 
product of complex interactions of the President’s close advisors and other institutional 
actors, but as the head of the US government, the President has the responsibility to sell 
his policies to the American people. Being both a leader and a man of his time, President 
Truman and his public speeches provide the important clues to understanding the 
mainstream religious sentiments of the United States in the early Cold War era. The 
purpose of this chapter is not to determine whether Truman was, in his heart, a true 
believer or merely a skilled politician who had used religious rhetoric to cultivate public 
support. Instead, this chapter investigates the essential role of religion in the early 
formation of the Cold War.1
The third layer of discussion relates to the impact of the discovery and the use of 
the atomic bomb. The atomic issue not only caused serious debates and a moral dilemma 
among American political and religious leaders, but also generated enormous fear over 
the ultimate annihilation of human civilization. The destructive nature of the atomic 
bomb brought significant impact to the development of American Christianity. The 
possibility of an atomic confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union 
was a key concern for many US policy makers. It affected Christians’ perception of 
themselves and the Soviet Union that hardened anti-Communist sentiment in the United 
States. It is essential to understand the origins of atomic fear in order to examine the later 
controversy over the idea of fighting a limited war in Korea.
1 If the President, as a skillful politician, needed to pretend to be religious in order to get elected and enjoy 
public support, this would clearly demonstrate the central role of religion in American politics. On the 
other hand, if  he was a sincere believer who was unabashed about expressing his thoughts, then religion 
could have had an even stronger role on his policy decisions. Yet he would still not have won the election 
if his religious rhetoric had not resonated with the sentiment of his time. Therefore, regardless of his 
personal beliefs, Truman’s comments reflect the public mood. Examining Truman’s religious justifications 
serves to shed light on the essence of these values in US domestic and foreign policy.
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The fourth layer of discussion focuses on the opinion of religious leaders and the 
official position of American churches on the US interests in Korea. The rise of religious 
anti-Communism, the expansion of missionary activities in Korea, and China’s closing 
the door on Christian missionary activities altogether generated a keen interest in 
supporting South Korea among American church leaders. Christian publications and 
inter-denominational conferences voiced their support for religious and political freedom 
in Korea. They were the leading force urging American economic assistance to the 
struggling Syngman Rhee regime in Seoul. Deepening religious connections between the 
two countries was the main underlying cause of the continuous American involvement in 
Korea.
AMERICA TRIUMPHANT 1945-1948
When President Franklin D. Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, Vice President 
Harry S. Truman became commander-in-chief of a nation at war. On that day Truman 
wrote in his diary, confessing his uncertainty about the future and about the many 
decisions he was about to make.2 As Truman took office, the United States faced major 
problems about not only how to end the world war, but also how to set the course of 
peace. Many people, including Truman himself, had thought that the job was too big for 
the man from Missouri. Unlike Roosevelt, who personally dominated the formation of 
US foreign policy, Truman depended more on the advisors around him due to his lack of 
knowledge and experience in foreign affairs. As a result, it gave room for such officials 
as Dean G. Acheson, W. Averell Harriman, Robert A. Lovett, John J. McCloy, George F.
2 Robert H. Ferrell, ed„ Off the Record: The Private Papers o f  Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1980), 16.
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Kennan, and Charles E. Bohlen to influence the President on the formation of the 
containment policy against Soviet political and military expansion. Throughout 
Truman’s years in the White House, his foreign policy was a product of a team effort in 
the administration.3 Even so, Truman was generally regarded by historians as a strong 
leader who not only led the Allies to military victory, but implemented practical plans to 
reconstruct a new world order. His courage and his style of leadership were connected 
with his religious background and beliefs.
The Religious Beliefs o f Harry Truman 
Truman was a devoutly religious man although he was not a faithful churchgoer 
while he was in the White House. Throughout his life, Truman was deeply committed to 
his personal faith and “lived by a strict Baptist morality.”4 Growing up under the strong 
religious influence of his devoutly Baptist mother, Martha Ellen Truman, he had read the 
Bible twice by the age of twelve, and was impressed by the moral codes set out in the 
Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount.5 He had even considered becoming 
a minister when he was young, but it did not work out.6 Instead, he found interests in 
politics and became a very successful senator. His fame in Congress eventually earned 
him a place on the Democratic ticket as President Roosevelt’s running-mate in the 1944 
presidential election. After he entered the White House, his busy schedule kept him from
3 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1986), 26-27.
4 Andrew J. Dunar, The Truman Scandals and the Politics o f  Morality (Columbia, MO: University of 
Missouri Press, 1984), 2.
5 Ibid.
6 Dianne Kirby, “Harry Truman’s Religious Legacy: The Holy Alliance, Containment and the Cold War,” 
in Religion and the Cold War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 86.
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going to church every Sunday, but he continued to read the Bible and interpret it for 
himself.7
Many people underestimated the importance of religion in Truman’s life and 
decision-making because he did not like to talk about his religious life, thinking that 
religion was “something to live by and not talk about.”8 While he was a senator living in 
Washington D.C., very few people were interested in his religious life and church 
attendance, but as soon as he became the President, he discovered that suddenly the 
whole world was watching him. When he attended church, Truman felt that his presence 
attracted too much gossip and national attention. He was particularly frustrated when he 
felt that some religious leaders were taking advantage of the publicity show.9 Because of 
this, he attended church irregularly, gave no advance notice and usually “slipped into a 
rear pew o f ’ a church quietly so that he could “beat the publicity boys.”10
Despite his Baptist background, Truman’s religious outlook leaned toward the 
ecumenical. His wife and daughter belonged to the Episcopalian denomination. As 
President in the White House, he supported all denominations and sought to have peace 
with other religions, showing no particular favoritism towards any religious affiliation in 
his political appointments.11
Since the President cherished the American tradition of religious tolerance, he 
emphasized the importance of religious life and the right of religious freedom for
7 Clark M. Clifford, ‘The Unique and Inspiring Leadership of President Truman,” in Harry S. Truman: The 
Man From Independence, ed. William F. Levantrosser (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 385.
8 Quote in Ibid.
9 Harry S. Truman, Mr. Citizen (New York: Popular Library, 1953), 97.
10 See Truman’s diary, 1 June 1945, Off the Record, 40-41.
11 Merlin Gustafson, “Church, State, and the Cold War, 1945-1952,” Journal o f  Church and State 8 (Winter 
1966): 50.
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American citizens.12 Ecumenical religious organizations, such as the Federal Council of
Churches of Christ (FCCC), enjoyed President Truman’s respect. The FCCC was first
organized in 1908 and expanded gradually. By 1949, it received the support of three
Eastern Orthodox denominations and twenty-four Protestant denominations, except the
Southern Baptists, in the United States. It claimed about twenty-eight million in
11associated memberships. The work of the FCCC was carried on by more than twenty 
committees and departments that covered all phases of church affairs. Since the FCCC 
was one of the influential church lobbies in the nation’s capital, the President took their 
views seriously and maintained a friendly relationship with them in order to mobilize 
their support for domestic and foreign affairs. He was the first President of the United 
States to speak at a FCCC conference in Columbus, Ohio, on March 6,1946.
Truman’s religious faith influenced his style of leadership and especially some 
crucial decisions that he made. Unlike his presidential predecessors who predominantly 
came from well-educated and privileged backgrounds, Truman was a self-made man of 
humble birth. Without even having a college degree, he had to mingle among Ivy League 
graduates and many highly decorated World War II generals, while at the same time 
asserting a leadership role in the top decision-making process in the highest office of the 
world. A prayer that Truman had recited frequently ever since his teenage years shed 
some light on his inner desire to please God by doing what was right:
Oh! Almighty and Everlasting God, Creator of Heaven, Earth, and the Universe: Help me 
to be, to think, to act what is right, because it is right; make me truthful, honest and 
honorable in all things; make me intellectually honest for the sake o f right and honor and 
without thought of reward to me. Give me the ability to be charitable, forgiving and
12 Truman, Mr. Citizen, 98.
13 Luke Eugene Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation’s Capital (New York: The MacMillan Company, 
1951), 43.
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patient with my fellowmen -  help me to understand their motives and their shortcomings 
-  even as Thou understandest mine! Amen, Amen, Amen.14
As Truman faced the daunting task of leading the nation, he may well have remembered 
this familiar prayer. It is at least known that when he spoke for the first time before 
Congress as the President of the United States, he quoted King Solomon’s prayer for 
wisdom and the ability to govern the people as they should be governed.
It is hard to evaluate how deeply his religious beliefs affected his political 
behavior and leadership style, but according to historian Merlin Gustafson, who 
specializes in the study of religious influence in the American Presidencies, Truman’s 
political philosophy was closely connected to his religious philosophy.15 Truman 
testified again and again that while he was in the White House, he desired to think and act 
more as the President of the United States than as the individual, Harry S. Truman. He 
thought that it was right for him to care more about the benefit of the whole country than 
for his own personal interests.16 However, sometimes to do right could jeopardize one’s 
political career and popularity. As a matter of fact, Truman was hardly very popular 
compared to Roosevelt while he was in the White House and his approval rating dropped
17every year of his presidency. Despite this, Truman was able to mobilize bi-partisan 
political support for some of his policies with his administration setting the course for the 
American response to the Soviets in the first decade of the Cold War.
Moral Fallout from the Use o f the Atomic Bomb 
As soon as he entered the White House, Truman was confronted with ending the 
prolonged war against Japan. In spite of facing their doom, the Japanese continued to
14 Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers o f  Harry S. Truman, 188.
15 Merlin Gustafson, ‘The Religion of a President,” Journal o f Church and State 5 (Autumn 1968): 379.
16 Truman, Mr. Citizen, 263.
17 See Sheldon Appleton, “Public Perceptions of Truman,” in Harry S. Truman: The Man From 
Independence, 169-184.
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refuse to surrender to Allied forces unconditionally because they hoped to prevent an 
Allied occupation of Japan and to preserve kokutai, “a symbolic expression of both the 
political and the spiritual essence of the emperor system,” which in the end boiled down 
to the status of the imperial house.18 From June to July, Truman’s administration was 
tom between whether or not to revise the Allies’ position of demanding an unconditional 
surrender. Truman’s advisers pointed out that an invasion of Kyushu and the Kanto Plain 
on Honshu, estimated to cost about 193,500 American casualties, would be needed to 
crush Japan’s fighting spirit and completely disarm the country.19 On June 17, 1945, 
Truman’s diary records his dilemma, “I have to decide a Japanese strategy -  shall we 
invade Japan proper or shall we bomb and blockade? That is my hardest decision to date. 
But I’ll make it when I have all the facts.”20 About a month later, the successful testing 
of the atomic bomb was reported to Tmman while he was meeting with Churchill and 
Stalin at Potsdam on July 16 ,1945.21
As the President of the United States, Truman held the ultimate responsibility of 
ordering the use of the atomic bombs against Japan. Tmman regarded the atomic bomb 
as “the most terrible bomb in the history of the world.” However, he did not hesitate to 
use it against Japan, because he believed that it was God’s favor for the United States to 
possess such a powerful weapon.22 His only concern was that he wanted to use it against 
a “military objective and soldiers and sailors, not women and children.”23 He wrote in
18 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender o f Japan (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 4.
19 Ibid., 103.
20 Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S. Truman, 47.
21 Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Year o f  Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1955), 415.
22 Harry S. Truman, Statement announcing the use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, U.S. 
President, Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: Harry S. Truman 1945 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 197-199.
23 Ibid.
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his diary, “Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader 
of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old capital or 
the new.”24 On July 26, the day on which the Allies sent their ultimatum in the Potsdam 
Proclamation, demanding that Japan surrender unconditionally through a public 
declaration, Truman told the American people, “If they do not now accept our terms, they 
may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this 
earth.”25 When Japan refused to comply, on August 6, 1945, the US dropped the first 
atomic bomb used in combat on the city of Hiroshima. Three days later, on August 9, it 
dropped another atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki. Finally, Japan agreed to surrender 
unconditionally on August 15.
Truman, however, had over-estimated the usefulness of the atomic bomb to end 
the Pacific War because the leaders in Tokyo seemed more shaken by the hostile action 
of the Soviet Union, which declared war on Japan on August 8, than the destructive
Of ipower of the atomic bombing at Hiroshima. Nor did the bomb scare the Russians into 
complying with U.S. demands in dealing with post-war settlements. Instead, its 
immediate result was to hasten Stalin’s steps toward joining the Pacific War and increase 
his distrust of the United States. Historians such as Martin J. Sherwin have questioned 
Truman’s inflexibility toward Japan and suggested that Truman’s hidden “atomic
9 7diplomacy” against the Soviet Union sowed the seeds of the Cold War.
24 Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers o f  Harry S. Truman, 55-56.
25 Statement announcing the use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima on August 6 ,1945, U.S. President, Public 
Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: Harry S. Truman 1 9 4 5 ,197-199.
26 The latest interpretation is presented by Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender 
o f Japan, 183-202.
27 Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins of the Arms Race (New York:
Vintage Books, 1987).
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Initially, the American people were happy to win and proud of their 
accomplishment of inventing the atomic bomb. President Truman officially declared 
Sunday, August 19, 1945, a day of prayer and “[called] upon the people of the United 
States, of all faiths, to unite in offering their thanks to God.” Most of the American 
people were firmly behind Truman’s decision to use the bomb, thinking that since God 
had denied the atomic bomb to America’s enemies, “we will use it in his name and for his 
purposes,” making possible a world in which “we will have war no more,” in the words 
of one elderly man from rural Florida.29 According to a cultural historian, John Fousek, 
the bomb and the victory over Germany and Japan signified, to many people, a “national 
greatness, which in turn entailed responsibility for ensuring peace and freedom 
throughout the world.” Borrowing the words of Henry R. Luce, the owner of Time, 
Life, and Fortune magazines, “the American Century” had arrived because of American 
leadership in the victory over the Axis Powers and the American monopoly of atomic 
weapons.31
Nevertheless, the fever of victory began to subside when more detailed reports of 
the horror of destruction and radiation effects caused by the atomic explosions reached 
the American public. These cases of human suffering were beyond the imagination of 
any scientists and political leaders prior to the use of the weapon. People began to 
question whether the ends justified the means, and how much guilt they should feel for 
using an immoral weapon upon women and children, even when the purported goal was,
28 “Proclamation 2660: Victory in the East -  Day of Prayer,” 16 August 1945, Public Papers o f the 
Presidents o f  the United States: Harry S. Truman 1945, 223.
29 John Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots o f  the Cold War 
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University o f North Carolina Press, 2000), 24.
30 Ibid., 62.
31 Michael H. Hunt, “East Asia in Henry Luce’s ‘American Century’,” Diplomatic History 23 (Spring 
1999): 322.
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ironically, “to defeat tyranny.” As the true extent of the devastation at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki became known, many American moralists and pacifists condemned the 
President’s decision, arguing that it had damaged the moral supremacy of the United 
States as a Christian nation. It stirred up intense controversy and deep concern over any 
future use of atomic weapons.
Liberal Protestant publications were particularly critical of the decision of the 
President. In late August 1945, Christian Century reported that “something like a moral 
earthquake has followed the dropping of atomic bombs on the two Japanese cities.” The 
editorial, titled “America Atomic Atrocity,” condemned the use of the atomic bomb, 
which had placed the United States in an indefensible moral position.32 It called on the 
churches of America “to dissociate themselves and their faith from this inhuman and
' j ' j
reckless act of the American government.” Those who were involved in the making 
and using of the bomb could also not escape a deep sense of guilt and responsibility. 
Albert Einstein, for example, stated that if he were to live his life over again, he should 
prefer to be a plumber or a peddler rather than a physicist.34 Many within the U.S. 
government were troubled as well -  although Truman himself never expressed any 
regrets about using the bomb on Japan.
American churches were divided on this issue. Some believers, such as Catholic 
clergymen and Protestant laymen, sided with the President, seeing God’s providence in 
giving America the bomb. Others, especially liberal theologians and intellectuals,
32 Leo Maley, III, “Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Memory (and Forgetting) in the Religious Press,” in The 
Writing on the Cloud: America Culture Confronts the Atomic Bomb, ed. Alison M. Scott and Christopher 
D. Geist (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1997), 183.
33 Ibid., 184.
34 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Einstein and the World Situation,” The Messenger 19 (December 14, 1954): 6. See 
also Robert E. Williams, “Christian Realism and ‘The Bomb’: Reinhold Niebuhr on the Dilemma of the 
Nuclear Age,” Journal o f  Church and State 28 (Spring 1986): 295.
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condemned its use. Between them, these views perhaps affected the President in the 
following way: they encouraged him in believing that he had made the right decision, 
while at the same time discouraging him from using the bomb again, since it had cost so 
many innocent lives and caused such unprecedented suffering.35
Christian intellectuals were also deeply troubled by the discovery and the use of 
the bomb. For example, Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the most famous Christian theologians 
of the 1940s who later became an adviser in the State Department’s Policy Planning  
Staff, initially tried to justify the use of the bomb against Japan as “the climax of the use 
of methods of warfare including obliteration and incendiary bombing.”36 However, just a 
few weeks later, he cautioned about the potential threat of the bomb against humanity 
because a scientific breakthrough might not necessarily bring good to mankind. Nor did 
the bomb, Niebuhr felt, mean a victory of good over evil.
The destructive power of the bomb, in fact, raised serious questions for those who 
looked to science for hope regarding the future. Man’s quest for the mastery of nature 
had climaxed in fear and trembling. Biblical predictions of a fiery Armageddon now 
seemed to be real and certain. One Life editorial suggested that all the major postwar 
problems were symbolically embedded in the atomic bomb: “Food, Russia, strikes, UN, 
colonies and everything else on the public conscience are inseparably threaded on this 
bomb, swinging like pendulums in unison between idealism and blue funk.”37
Fears of atomic annihilation were widely shared among American political and 
military leaders because many people could visualize that the next world war would
35 Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender o f  Japan, 202.
36 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Our Relations to Japan,” Christianity and Crisis 5 (September 17,1945): 5. See also 
Willliams, “Christian Realism and ‘The Bomb’: Reinhold Niebuhr on the Dilemma of the Nuclear Age,” 
294.
37 Quoted in Fousek, To Lead the Free World, 114.
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probably be an atomic war that destroyed the whole world. In response, American 
political, military, and religious leaders began to advocate a revitalization of spiritual 
values in American life as the only solution to the threat of eternal destruction. General 
Douglas MacArthur, who had a clearer view of the destructive power of the atomic bomb 
than most Americans because of his responsibility as Supreme Commander of Allied 
Powers (SCAP) in Japan, told his troops shortly after Japan surrendered, “We have had 
our last chance. If we do not devise some greater and more equitable system, 
Armageddon will be at our door.”38 The only solution to the problem, according to the 
general, was spiritual. Men must first be saved in spirit in order to confront this difficult 
reality of saving lives in a hostile world.39
General MacArthur’s idea was supported by John Foster Dulles, a religious 
layman active in the FCCC, who also called for a “spiritual revival” of the nation, urging 
the American people to rededicate their lives to the religious faith of their forefathers.40 
In June 1946, Life published a two-part series by Dulles on Soviet foreign policies and 
the steps needed to counter Communist encroachment. First, he called for a spiritual 
renewal, because traditional American “political and religious faith” could solve the 
nation’s domestic problems. He also urged the United States to maintain military 
strength and to promote, in American-occupied regions, the Four Freedoms and the 
concepts of justice found within the Atlantic Charter, a vision for a post-World War II 
world established by President Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill in 1941.41 The
38 Jerrold Lee Brooks, “In Search o f Peace: Presbyterians in the Early Cold War Period, 1945-1953,” 
American Presbyterians 70 (Winter 1992): 261.
39 Ibid., 262.
40 Mark G. Toulouse, ‘The Development of a Cold Warrior: John Foster Dulles and the Soviet Union, 
1945-1952,” Journal o f  Presbyterian History 63 (Fall 1985): 312.
41 Fousek, To Lead the Free World, 119.
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American people, Dulles warned, should be ready to accept the necessary sacrifices in 
order to “help keep freedom alive in the world.”42
Speaking the Language of Faith
One of the key roles of religion in American foreign policy was as a means of 
public persuasion. As the President of the United States, Truman, along with his cabinet 
members, was responsible for making US foreign policy known and acceptable to the 
American people. Religious rhetoric was generally an essential part of Truman’s public 
appeal for a new world order because it was an effective means of breaking down 
partisanship in politics by emphasizing the common beliefs and values that were 
generally shared by the American public.
At the same time, it was quite likely that the role of religion went far beyond that 
of a convenient toll of rhetoric. At least in the case of Truman, his appeals for morality in 
foreign policy probably derived from his own ideology and desire to “do what was right.” 
On some occasions, he went against the advice of his cabinet in making his own 
decisions.
Truman’s public speeches showed a consistent religious conviction -  speeches 
that he approved even if he did not write 43 Truman’s “references to Bible passages and 
the Christian mission of the United States in world affairs,” according to historian 
Gustafson, suited the spirit of the times.44 Three major events -  the establishment of the 
United Nations, the creation of the state of Israel, and the implementation of the Truman
42 Ibid.
43 Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., Harry’s Farewell: Interpreting and Teaching the Truman Presidency 
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2004), 9.
44 Gustafson, ‘The Religion of a President,” 380.
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Doctrine and the Marshall Plan -  demonstrated how Truman used religion to build public 
support for his foreign policy and how religious ideas influenced his decisions.
The Formation o f the United Nations 
The idea of establishing a United Nations (UN) had originated in three major 
successive political conferences (Moscow, Cairo, and Tehran) during the war in 1943. 
From August to October 1944, the details of such a world organization had been worked 
out by representatives from France, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union. As President of the United States, Truman’s role 
was to persuade the American public to support this new organization for international 
collective security and to accept the American responsibility in leading the postwar 
world.
In his speech before the United Nations Conference in San Francisco on April 25,
1945, Truman shared his belief that the United Nations was formed by “Divine guidance”
for a new world order:
None of us doubt that with Divine guidance, friendly cooperation, and hard work, we 
shall find an adequate answer to the problem history has put before us.... We must build 
a new world -  a far better world -  one in which the eternal dignity of man is respected.
As we are about to undertake our heavy duties, we beseech our Almighty God to guide us 
in the building of a permanent monument to those who gave their lives that this moment 
might come. May He lead our steps in His own righteous path of peace.45
Truman’s expression was a sincere statement that revealed not only what was on his 
mind, but also what he believed Americans in general had wished for. “Our sole 
objective,” the President explained, “at this decisive gathering, is to create the structure. 
We must provide the machinery, which will make future peace, not only possible, but
45 Address to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, 25 April 1945, Public Papers o f the 
Presidents o f  the United States: Harry S. Truman 1945, 21-23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
235
certain....”46 Instead of depending on the American military establishment, Truman 
envisioned the United Nations as God’s given machinery and structure for the 
preservation of world peace. When he pitched the UN to the American people, and 
particularly to religious groups, he stressed the religious principles within the UN 
Charter:
We have tried to write into the Charter o f the United Nations the essence of religion. The 
end of aggression, the maintenance of peace, the promotion o f social justice and 
individual rights and freedoms, the substitution o f reason and justice for tyranny and war, 
the protection o f the small and weak nations -  by these principles the United Nations has 
laid the framework of the Charter on the sound rock of religious principles.47
He wanted Americans not to see the UN as just another worldly organization, but as one 
that was built on religious principles which they commonly shared and endorsed. In 
other words, Truman hoped to convince people that the formation of the UN was not 
merely the political design of a few heads of states, but also a general answer to the
A n
public sentiment of the world.
The Recognition o f Israel 
President Truman’s conviction of doing what was right motivated him to make 
crucial decisions that sometimes went against the advice of his cabinet members or 
against general popular opinion of the time. The establishment of a Jewish state in 
Palestine was the best example. After the end of World War II, there was an intense 
effort by the Zionist leaders of the American Zionist Emergency Council to lobby for a 
homeland for the Jewish refugees in the Middle East49 It was a highly controversial and
46 Ibid.
47 Address in Columbus at a conference of the Federal Council of Churches on March 6, 1946. U.S. 
President, Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1946 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1962), 141-144.
48 Arthur H. Darken, ‘The National Council of Churches and Our Foreign Policy,” Religion in Life XXIV 
(Winter 1954-55): 121.
49 Memoirs By Harry S. Truman: Year o f  Decisions, 72.
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complicated issue. According to the Balfour Declaration (1917),50 the British had 
committed to give the Jews a homeland in Palestine.51 After the end of the war, the 
Allies established a protectorate, called Palestine, for Jewish refugees from Europe. The 
issue of recognition of the nation of Israel came up when the Jewish population proposed 
to announce their independence on May 14, 1948. It caused serious conflicts and 
controversy within the United States.
Under General George C. Marshall’s leadership, the State Department strongly 
opposed extending US recognition because it was practically impossible for Jews in the 
new Palestine protectorate to defend themselves against thirty million Arabs in the 
Middle East unless the United States fully backed it up. To do so, in Marshall’s view, 
would jeopardize American interests and its military position in the Arab world.52 
President Truman, however, wanted to recognize Israel, not for any political, economic, 
or military motive, but for religious reasons. He told Clark M. Clifford, his close adviser 
in the White House, that he was “determined to do all that was in his power” to help the 
formation of a Jewish nation because “there was a commitment in the Old Testament that 
the Jews would have a homeland.”53 Because of Truman’s efforts, the United States 
government recognized the State of Israel just before the Soviet Union did.54
When the Jewish representative came to thank him for his support, Clifford said 
that the President’s eyes were filled with tears because the President thought that he had 
done the right thing despite the opposition, and that God had been on his side to fulfill the
50 Letter from Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, 2 November 1917, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/balfour.htm.
51 Memoirs By Harry S. Truman: Years o f  Decision, 73.
52 Clark M. Clifford, Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford by Jerry N. Hess, 3 April 1971 in 
Washington, D.C., 97-98, Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaperAoreasub.htm.
53 Clifford, ‘The Unique and Inspiring Leadership of President Truman,” in Harry S. Truman: The Man 
From Independence, 385.
54 Clifford, Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford, 102.
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prophesy.55 Clifford had little doubt about Truman’s sincere effort in supporting Israel, 
but some people believed that Truman helped the Jews because it would probably help 
him to gain more Jewish votes in the 1948 Presidential election. This latter argument was 
supported by C. Girard Davidson who was Truman’s Assistant Secretary of Interior at 
that time.56 Nevertheless, Truman’s friendliness to the Jews perhaps also cost him many 
votes from anti-Semitic groups. In short, Truman’s decision was both a political gain and 
loss that was hard to measure, but the importance of the religious factor remained clear.
The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan 
The political and economic stability of Europe was another big concern for the 
United States. As soon as the war ended, the Soviet Union expanded its military control 
over Eastern Europe. Communists were gaining public support and political influence in 
Western Europe as well. In addition, the weakening British Empire could not maintain 
its position in Greece and Turkey when Communist insurrections disturbed the stability 
of the Balkans. The British urgently asked the Americans for help. President Truman 
feared that all of Europe might turn to Communism if the United States did not act 
immediately. The stability and economic recovery of Europe was crucial for America’s 
market economy because a Communist-controlled Europe would mean a closed door for 
US products and a threat to free trade. Truman’s advisors suggested that he take a clear 
stand against Communist expansion and implement crucial measures that would save the 
European economy.57 The President was convinced.
55 Clifford, ‘The Unique and Inspiring Leadership of President Truman,” 385.
56 C. Girard Davidson, Oral History Interview with C. Girard Davidson by Jerry N. Hess, 17 July 1972 in 
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57 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made, 17-19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
238
However, it would not be easy for the American public to accept the rebuilding of 
Berlin just after they had finished bombing it. After four years of sacrifice, the American 
people wanted demobilization, a smaller government budget, and reduced overseas 
involvement. A complex economic argument on preventing the spread of Communism 
might not have been fully understood, so Truman instead appealed to the religious golden 
rule. In a nationally broadcast speech to the FCCC, Truman called on the American 
people to “save the world which is beset by so many threats of new conflicts, new terror, 
and new destruction.” He wanted the people to make more sacrifices. “As your 
President,” Truman told his audiences, “I appeal to you again -  and to all Americans 
everywhere -  to prove your faith and your belief in the teachings of God by doing your 
share to save the starving millions in Europe, in Asia, in Africa. Share your food by 
eating less, and prevent millions from dying of starvation. Reduce your abundance so 
that others may have a crust of bread.”58 In his 1947 State of the Union address, he 
warned the United States about the difficulties of securing a peace settlement in Europe 
and Asia due to the obstruction of the Soviet Union and the need to maintain the strength 
and increase the security of the United States.
According to the Truman Doctrine presented two months later, the President 
openly defined the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union 
as the competition between two different ways of life.59 To support Greece and Turkey, 
and to give economic aid to the recovery of war tom Europe, Truman argued, was an
58 Address in Columbus at a Conference of the Federal Council of Churches, 6 March 1946. Public Papers 
of the Presidents o f  the United States: Harry S. Truman 1945-1953, Truman Library, 
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effective way to promote the American way of life because political freedom allowed 
independent countries to choose their own way of life, rather than letting Communists 
impose political tyranny upon free people.60 The foundation of the American way of life, 
however, was not merely built on its materialistic abundance and sound political system, 
but also on its spiritual strength. Truman argued that capitalism without the guidance of 
moral principles and religious freedom had very little value and thus was not much 
different from materialistic Communism.61
Truman’s administration devised a comprehensive economic recovery program to 
revive the European economy. The plan was known as the Marshall Plan, which was 
named after the Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall. Prior to the 
implementation of the plan, the United States had already spent $9 billion in the region, 
but the effort proved to be inadequate. General Marshall urged all European countries to 
join the integrated effort. West Germany, the defeated enemy, would also be included in 
the plan. The United States government would pump money into the reconstruction of 
Europe so that the Europeans would be fully integrated back into the American- 
dominated free market economy.
The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were invited, but neither the 
Russians nor the Eastern Europeans participated because they feared the capitalist 
influence. According to the Marshall Plan, Eastern Europe would provide raw materials 
to industrial Western Europe, making the region dependent on the Western world. The 
Russians believed that it was a capitalist trap to nullify their domination over Eastern
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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Europe. The Soviet Union therefore organized its own recovery program, known as the 
Molotov Plan, to counter the US effort.
To get the American people and Congress to support the Marshall Plan, the 
Truman administration carried out a huge advertising campaign. The government 
stressed the humanitarian purposes of the recovery program, the Communist threat, and 
the importance of Europe in a free market economy to generate public support. Church 
leaders were also mobilized to endorse the effort, pointing out that the plan was 
consistent with the Christian doctrine of loving your enemies. After months of discussion 
and debate, Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act in March 1948 to fund the 
project. In three years, the US government sent a total of 12.4 billion US dollars to 
Europe. The plan proved to be a mixed success. It caused inflation and did not solve the 
huge trade deficits between the United States and Europe, but it did generate industrial 
production and stimulate European economic growth. The United States also benefited 
economically and politically from the program when the Europeans were able to afford 
American exports and sided with the United States in its political competition against the 
Soviet Union.
President Truman’s Idea o f Building a Western Christian Alliance 
The threat of Communist expansion in Europe and Asia dominated the conduct of 
US foreign policy from 1947 to 1950. To find a way to nullify the threat and secure a 
victory over Communism became a major concern of US foreign policy makers. Apart 
from building economic strength and political alliances with non-Communist countries to 
contain the spread of Communism, President Truman wanted to expand the anti­
communist coalition through religious means. His outlook on foreign policy was colored
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by his religious convictions. Since he believed that a country with a strong Christian
presence and a democratic political system to ensure individual freedom would
fundamentally reject Communist philosophy,62 he was not particularly afraid of
Communist infiltration into the United States, so long as the American people held fast to
their religious beliefs and democratic institutions. To this end, the President thought that
he could use his position to encourage worship and to draw attention to the plight of
Christians in Communist countries. For instance, in his 1948 State of the Union address,
Truman defined the American objective in the pursuit of freedom:
Our first goal is to secure fully the essential human rights of our citizens. The United 
States has always had a deep concern for human rights. Religious freedom, free speech, 
and freedom of thought are cherished realities in our land. Any denial of human rights is 
a denial of the basic beliefs of democracy and of our regard for the worth of each 
individual.63
The President also wanted the American people to spend more time on religious activities 
and pay more attention to religion, putting their freedoms and rights into practice. Since 
the world was looking to the U.S. for leadership, Truman asserted that it was the 
responsibility of the United States to “rededicate ourselves to the faith in God that gives 
us confidence as we face the challenge of the years ahead.”64 In a radio address a year 
later, he urged the American people to go to worship and to give thanks to God because 
God had blessed America while in other parts of the world there were many people who 
could “only pray in secret, fearing persecution if they profess their beliefs openly.”65
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Truman’s idea of the pursuit of freedom, however, had its own blind spot. The 
United States’ own civil rights record did not look good. American blacks did not enjoy 
the same kind of freedom as white Americans in the 1940s due to deep-rooted ideas of 
racism and segregation. American racism was a glaring weakness that the Soviet anti- 
American propaganda machine attacked repeatedly. Nevertheless, it did not mean that 
the President had not made any effort on civil rights issues. Using his presidential 
authority, Truman first set up a committee on civil rights. Based on the report, To Secure 
These Rights, submitted by the committee, the President issued Executive Order #9980 to 
set up a Fair Employment Practices Commission in the federal government, putting an 
end to discrimination in the civil service system. After this, he also issued another 
executive order (#9981) to desegregate the US military forces. Had it not been for the 
presence of the Southern Bloc within Congress, who blocked any attempt to address civil 
rights problems through legislation, Truman might have implemented more laws to 
ensure the freedom of American blacks. Moving slightly ahead of his time, Truman was 
quite sincere in his objective to ensure freedom in both domestic and foreign affairs.
In terms of foreign affairs, Truman was especially sympathetic towards those who 
did not enjoy religious freedom. “Millions of people in our world,” the President wrote 
in October 1949, “are living in slavery.”66 He was referring to the political and religious 
persecution in the Communist countries in Europe. A month later, he explained the 
same issue on another occasion. “Men and women in the Communist world are being 
systematically persecuted for their religious beliefs and campaigns are being waged to
66 Harry Truman’s letter to John L. Sullivan Accepting the Honorary Chairmanship of National 
Brotherhood Week, 5 October 1949, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 
1949,499-500.
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turn religion into a tool of the state.”67 Truman argued that the American people should 
offer them not only economic aid, but also “the sense of brotherhood in a common 
cause.”68 Seeing that it would not be hard for him to find allies and helpers in religious 
circles, Truman believed that he might “organize the moral forces of the world to meet 
this situation.”69 He confided to his wife, Bess Truman, that if he could mobilize 
religious leaders to join hands “against the Bolshevik materialists,” then the United States 
could win the fight against Communism.70
Therefore, Truman sought to build an informal Western Christian alliance -  “a 
common religious and moral front” -  to counter the Communist ideological expansion in 
Europe and Asia.71 In 1948, he began an effort “to bring about the active cooperation of 
the leaders and the followers of the great religious faiths of the world,” hoping that he 
could generate “a vital force for the advancement of peace.”72 His first step was to set up 
informal diplomatic relations with the Pope by sending Myron C. Taylor as his personal 
representative to the Vatican. This drew criticism from Protestant groups, but Truman 
wanted to work with the staunchly anti-Communist Catholic Church. Using his own 
personal influence, the President then contacted Protestant leaders, such as Bishop G. 
Bromley Oxnam (Methodist) and Dr. Samuel McCrea Calvert (Baptist), to mobilize their 
support for the potential alliance across various denominations. In addition to these 
Christian leaders, he also reached out to Jewish leaders, spiritual authorities in the
67 Address at a Luncheon of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, 11 November 1949, ibid., 
561-563.
68 Ibid.
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Moslem world, and anti-Communist Buddhist leaders, such as the Dalai Lama of Tibet.73 
Such a diverse group of religious representatives would usually not work together. But 
Truman sought to convince these religious leaders “that a foe common to them all was 
trying to destroy them all.”74
Partnership with Religious Institutions in Spreading Pro-American Propaganda 
Propaganda was the primary benefit that Truman would reap from this religious 
alliance if he could mobilize religious forces behind him. Anti-American propaganda 
spread by the Soviet Union had long troubled the President. “Propaganda seems to be 
our greatest foreign relations enemy,” he wrote. “Russians distribute lies about us. Our 
papers lie about and misrepresent the motives of the Russians -  and the British out-lie 
and out-propagandize us both.” To his frustration, Truman felt that he was facing a 
three-front propaganda war and he needed help in order to offset its negative impact. It 
was nothing new that Truman had a rough relationship with the American press during 
his presidency. Because of their biased reports on his administration, he labeled the 
newspapers run by people such as William Randolph Hearst of the Los Angeles 
Examiner, Colonel Robert R. McCormick of the Chicago Tribune, Eleanor Patterson of 
the Washington Times-Herald, and Joseph Patterson of the New York Daily News, as the 
“sabotage press.”76 His dislike of Soviet propaganda was hardly surprising, but what 
upset Truman most was when he heard that the British put up a show for the French, 
claiming credit for furnishing the French with the lend-lease materials that the United
73 Ibid., 100.
74 Kirby, “Harry Truman’s Religious Legacy: The Holy Alliance, Containment and the Cold War,” 77.
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States had given them.77 Truman believed that it was his job to fix this problem because 
people in the world (not just Americans) needed to know the facts in order to fully 
appreciate the supremacy of the American political system and way of life. If the truth 
was not told, it would eventually hurt US foreign policy. Truman’s major goal in Cold 
War foreign policy was to therefore spread anti-Communist propaganda while countering 
anti-American messages.78
Addressing the members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, who 
were resisting governmental propaganda efforts, Truman asked for understanding and 
support. The Cold War, he explained, was a struggle for the minds of men. Since the 
forces of “imperialistic communism” were winning the propaganda war through a 
systematic program of deceit and distortion, it would be crucial for the United States to 
get the real story across to the people. Otherwise, the United States would “lose the 
battle for men’s minds by default.”79 Truman asserted that the United States must 
intensify its effort “to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery,” 
and to make American voices “heard around the world in a great campaign of truth.”80 In 
March 1949, the President approved an expanded propaganda and psychological warfare 
program to curb Communist activities in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, which was 
known collectively as the Campaign of Truth. The program divided the world into
77 Ibid.
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different regions and devised appropriate means for anti-Communist propaganda efforts 
in each region.
The Campaign of Truth centered on the theme of religious freedom. One way 
that a religious moral front aided America’s propaganda warfare was by emphasizing 
around the world that the difference between America and the Soviet Union was freedom 
of worship versus state-enforced atheism. Freedom of religion was of course a much 
more appealing argument for the American way of life than an economic argument for 
capitalism would have been. Truman explicitly stated that a world with freedom of 
worship was an important US foreign-policy objective. He told the graduating class of 
1950 at Gonzaga University:
It is the moral and religious beliefs of mankind which alone give our strength meaning 
and purpose. The struggle for peace is a struggle for moral and ethical principles. These 
principles unite us with religious people in every land, who are striving, as we are 
striving, for brotherhood among men. In everything we do, at home and abroad, we must 
demonstrate our clear purpose, and our firm will, to build a world order in which men 
everywhere can walk upright and unafraid, and do the work of God.81
The notion of religious freedom, in Truman’s eyes, was not only a powerful force to unite 
the world, but also an essential principle for mankind to fulfill its eternal destiny. This 
was a classic example of how a political leader might harness the power of religion in the 
fight to win the Cold War.82 It was an attempt to instill a moral conviction that the
O'}
Americans were on the side of religious righteousness, while the Communists were evil.
The radio broadcasts of the Voice o f America, an official propaganda machine for 
reaching the people behind the Iron Curtain, “repeatedly attacked Soviet tyranny as 
hostile to religion, denounced Stalin as a pseudo-God and claimed that the Russian
81 Address in Spokane at Gonzaga University, 11 May 1950, U.S. President, Public Papers o f  the 
Presidents o f  the United States: Harry S. Truman 1950, 375-377.
82 Kirby, “Harry Truman’s Religious Legacy: The Holy Alliance, Containment and the Cold War,” 77.
83 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
247
people still crowded into church despite all the persecution and peril.” 84 Religious 
freedom grew to be the main theme of anti-Communist broadcasting conducted by the 
Voice under the leadership of Edward Barrett, an assistant Secretary of State who headed 
the US Information Service (USIS) from 1950 to 1952.85 The objectives of these 
broadcasts were to destabilize the Communist regimes inside the Iron Curtain and to 
encourage and exploit defections for the sake of obtaining a psychological victory.86 
Interestingly, the separation of church and state did not stop the Voice o f America (VOA) 
from broadcasting explicitly religious programming, because it was clearly understood as 
one of the most effective destabilizing methods available. The US propaganda offensive 
in 1949 caused the Soviet Union to increase its efforts to jam Russian-language 
broadcasts by the VOA.
Another way that the religious moral front could help was to assist the US 
propaganda efforts by utilizing the church networks to spread a pro-American message 
around the world. The US government facilitated communication between religious 
groups and other private organizations because the President believed that these groups 
could “help the cause of the United States to bring peace to the world.”87 Truman 
regarded missionary activities, in particular, as the most effective way to spread pro- 
American information since these gospel workers could bring a positive message by 
telling the people in other countries that the United States had no aggressive agenda.88
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To ensure the success of this anti-Communist propaganda campaign, the United 
States also needed to enlist supporters inside the hardcore regions, where neither 
American private nor public institutions could function effectively, to distribute printed 
materials to remote areas outside the area of radio broadcasts. A common religious cause 
would offer the United States valuable allies and helpers within the Communist- 
controlled regions. For instance, the Catholic churches in Eastern Europe became the 
major channel for the flow of pro-American leaflets and other reading materials.89 
Therefore, it was hardly a surprise that many clergymen in Europe, China, and North 
Korea were charged as US spies by Communist authorities. Truman’s efforts further 
intensified the Communist distrust of the Christian churches, institutions, and population, 
seeing them as pro-American. The loyalty of Christians to their native lands and 
governments was constantly challenged by Communist authorities.
On the whole, Truman possessed what Reinhold Niebuhr had called the “deep 
layer of Messianic consciousness in the mind of America.”90 Such an ideal, according to 
historian Dianne Kirby, who has studied Truman’s presidency, “held a special appeal for 
him as the leader of a nation which considered itself a special moral force in the world, 
with a unique mission, bom of its righteousness.”91 Religion, in Truman’s hands, became 
not only a way for obtaining personal spiritual nourishment, but also a means to guide the 
Western world as it fought Communist encroachment. The nature of the Cold War was 
no longer solely the political, economic, and military competitions between two 
superpowers attempting to expand their spheres of influence. Religious beliefs not only
89 Ibid., 17.
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became important elements in American anti-Communist ideology, but also were used as 
an essential tool in the battle against Communist expansion.93
ATOMIC FEAR AND RELIGIOUS REVIVAL
The competition between the United States and Soviet Union was further 
intensified by several major political developments in Europe and Asia. The first one 
was the Berlin Blockade in June 1948. The crisis started because the Soviet Union 
wanted to force a renegotiation of the four-power control of Germany by blocking all 
supplies to Western-held sectors in Berlin. Although the United States succeeded in 
breaking the blockade through the continuous airlifting of essential supplies to its 
controlled areas and forced the Soviet Union to end the ineffective blockade, the event 
planted real fear of future Soviet aggression in the hearts of many Americans and 
Europeans, fears that caused the American people to accept greater US responsibility in 
defending Western Europe. Western European nations huddled around the United States 
for military protection. Even though the United States had a long tradition of not 
entering into permanent military alliances with European countries, the blockade 
hastened the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military 
alliance that guaranteed a collective response against an attack on any member state. 
Nevertheless, the confidence of the United States was soon challenged by two major 
events: the Soviet possession of atomic weapons and the victory of Chinese Communists 
over the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war.
93 Rasooli-Sa’eed, “The Iron Curtain is Not Soundproof,” 8-9.
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The Fear o f an Atomic War with the Soviet Union 
Most experts had predicted that the Soviets would not be able to make their own 
atomic bomb until around 1955, but instead the Soviets succeeded much earlier -  in 
September 1949.94 The United States had lost its nuclear monopoly. President Truman 
urged the American people to be prepared for any eventuality at any hour because 
America was vulnerable to an atomic attack from the Soviet Union. To maintain US 
military superiority, the President accepted the proposal to develop a hydrogen bomb. 
The possibility of an atomic war with the Soviet Union terrified many Americans as well 
as Europeans.95 People were shocked by how quickly the Russians closed the nuclear 
weapons gap. Soviet spies who transferred atomic secrets to the Russians were arrested 
in Canada and England. The on-going perjury trial of Alger Hiss, a State Department 
official who had earlier attended the Yalta Conference with President Roosevelt, fueled 
fears of severe Communist infiltration in the US government. A deep sense of betrayal 
was the mood of the time. The hearts of many Americans were further darkened by the 
defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops by Mao Zedong’s Communist forces in 
China and Chiang’s retreat to Taiwan. Following the reasoning of the domino theory, 
Americans worried which country would be next. An astute observer might well have 
put odds on South Korea.
In this unsettling time, religion offered an answer to the chain of unsettling events 
in world affairs, and, according to some scholars, it would grow to be “a potent political
94 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World they Made, 16.
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force.”96 Distraught people went to church and attended revival meetings; especially, 
they looked to religious leaders for guidance and advice. In fact, the 1940s and 1950s 
were decades when religious leaders, theologians, pastors, and missionaries enjoyed a 
particularly high social reputation in the United States. According to cultural historian 
Stephen Whitfield’s research on the culture of the Cold War, “when pollsters asked 
which group was ‘doing the most good for the country,’ the answers lifted religious 
leaders from third place in 1942 (after government and business leaders) to first in
1947.”97 The proportion of the public who regarded clergymen as “the most useful 
citizens” grew from 32.6 percent in 1947 to 46 percent by 1957.98 “Churches,” Whitfield 
observed, “were by far the most trusted institution in American life -  ahead of schools, 
radio, and newspapers, and the government itself.”99 From 1947 onwards, the American 
people were generally more receptive to a religious interpretation of world events than at 
any other time in history. As the church base within the United States widened due to an 
ongoing revival, the potential influence of American missionaries in Korea on American 
popular opinion was reaching its zenith.
From the secular circle to the religious realm, a general consensus was developing 
as the nation faced the challenges of post-war reconstruction and peace preservation. As 
Soviet-American rivalry in Eastern Europe intensified, many looked to the Bible for 
answers in their insecure world. Christian leaders saw connections between current 
affairs and Biblical prophecies. Most mainstream religious groups took an ecumenical
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approach to the crisis, and shared the general conviction that “the current threat to the 
United States must serve as an occasion for a deep religious and spiritual renewal.”100
To many preachers, the stories of persecution of Christians in Eastern Europe and 
in Asia fit the pre-millennialists’ view of the end tim es.101 The Biblical term 
Armageddon was frequently used to describe the possible confrontation between the two 
atomic powers. “The common religious response to this situation,” historian Raymond 
F. Bulman observed, “was the spread of a certain doomsday revivalist mentality among 
the various denominational communities.”102 Prophetic beliefs played a key role in the 
way many Americans understood current events. Books such as Wilbur Smith’s This 
Atomic Age and the Word o f God were popular among both religious and secular readers. 
The Soviet Union became the main focus of doomsday prophecy among dispensationalist 
writers. For example, Rev. Harold J. Ockenga preached at a Rose Bowl Rally that “God 
should judge us and use the two hundred fifty divisions of the Soviet people to whip us 
and scourge us and drive us to our knees before Him in repentance.”103
Billy Graham’s Religious Revival in 1949 
The most successful preacher in capturing the American anti-Communist 
sentiment of the times was Rev. Billy Graham. As early as the Charlotte Revival of 
November 1947, the thirty-two year-old evangelist alerted his audience that Communists 
were everywhere.104 About forty-two thousand people attended this revival meeting (see
100 Raymond F. Bulman, ‘“Myth of Origin’, Civil Religion and Presidential Politics,” Journal o f  Church 
and State 33 (Summer 1991): 532.
101 Dean C. Curry, “Where Have All the Niebuhrs Gone? Evangelicals and the Marginalization of 
Religious Influence in American Public Life,” Journal o f Church and State 36 (Winter 1994): 104.
102 Bulman, ‘“Myth of Origin’, Civil Religion and Presidential Politics,” 531.
103 ‘The Christian Answer to Communism,” in America’s Hour o f Decision: Featuring a Life Story o f Billy 
Graham, ed. Harold J. Ockenga (Wheaton, IL: VanKamper, 1951), 153.
104 Quoted in Andrew J. Rotter, “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and U.S.-South Asian 
Relations, 1947-1954,” Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 596.
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Table 4.1). Graham skillfully drew connections between God’s judgment and the rise of 
Communism. The nation was vulnerable because the American people were not aware of 
the infringement of its enemies. According to Graham, Communism, like alcoholism, 
sexual immorality, and idolatry, could destroy the Christian world.
Just two days after the news that Russia had detonated a nuclear device, Graham 
warned his audience at a Los Angeles crusade that if the American people refused to 
repent of their sinful lifestyle, the city would soon be destroyed by the atomic bomb 
because God would not spare a sinful and unrepentant city.105 In Graham’s mind, part of 
Los Angeles’ guilt was its strong pro-Communist atmosphere. “Do you know that Fifth 
Columnists, called Communists,” Graham explained, “are more rampant in Los Angeles 
than any other city in America?”106 Although Graham did not give any example in his 
sermon when he made this sweeping assertion, the American people responded to his call 
enthusiastically. The Los Angeles crusade marked the beginning of more than a half- 
century long religious crusade led by Billy Graham.107
105 Marshall Frady, Billy Graham: A Parable o f  American Righteousness (Boston, MA: Little Brown and 
Company, 1979), 198. See also Whitfield, The Culture o f  the Cold War, 77.
106 Ibid., 198.
107 Since, in the end, neither Los Angeles nor any other US city was destroyed in during the Cold War, one 
might characterize Billy Graham as a false prophet whose predictions did not come to pass. Yet, to be fair, 
Graham did not predict what would happen, but only what would happen if  people did not repent. As an 
evangelist, Graham saw a responsibility to warn about the coming judgment. There are Biblical precedents 
for the delaying or cancelling of an impending judgment when the people responded to the call to 
repentance. In Genesis 18:32, God promised Abraham that he would not destroy the cities of Sodom and 
Gomorrah if  he could find ten righteous people there. The city was destroyed because ten could not be 
found. Also, in the Book of Jonah, Jonah pronounced the destruction of to the Assyrian city of Nineveh. 
When the Ninevites heard Jonah’s message, however, they repented. “When God saw what they did and 
how they turned from their evil ways, he had compassion and did not bring upon them the destruction he 
had threatened.” (Jonah 3:10, New International Version) The city of Nineveh was destroyed fifty years 
later when, according to the Book of Nahum, the new generation went back to their wicked ways. In other 
words, a successful revival was measured by how many people responded to the call and made confessions, 
not by how accurate the prophecy turned out to be. This understanding helps to explain how Graham’s 
revival started and flourished during the Cold War.
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Graham defined the Cold War in completely religious and absolute terms as the
struggle between good and evil, between the godly and godless. He urged Los Angeles
residents to respond to God’s call immediately because:
God is giving us a desperate choice, a choice of either revival or judgment. There is no 
alternative! ... The world is divided into two camps! On the one side we see 
Communism. On the other, we see so-called Western culture, and its fruit had its 
foundation in the Bible, the Word of God, and in the revivals of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Communism, on the other hand, has declared war against God, 
against Christ, against the Bible, against all religion! ... Unless the Western world has an 
old-fashioned revival, we cannot last!’108
Listeners were being urged to view their feelings of insecurity as a call to repentance, by 
choosing to make a clear stand on God’s side, against Communism. Communism was, 
by nature, completely against Christianity. If the American people refused to turn back to 
Christ and repent, Graham warned, the American nation would not be spared.109 
Christianity was not only the antithesis of Communism, but also the means of salvation 
for the whole of the American nation and the world. Graham drew no clear line between 
religion and either ideology or American nationalism.
Billy Graham’s vigorous anti-Communist evangelical preaching appealed to an 
anti-Communist publisher, William Randolph Hearst, whom President Truman regarded 
as “the top mind prostitutor” and “the number one whoremonger.” 110 According to Don 
Goodenow, photo editor of the old Los Angeles Examiner in 1949, Hearst asked him to 
send teletype messages to his managing editors, urging them to “give attention to Billy 
Graham’s meetings.”111 Reporters and photographers from the Examiner and Hearst’s 
other papers came to cover the crusade. Goodenow arranged a full page of photographs
108 Frady, Billy Graham: A Parable o f  American Righteousness, 198.
109 Graham, “Will God Spare America?” in America’s Hour o f  Decision: Featuring a Life Story o f  Billy 
Graham, 116-126.
110 See Monte M. Poen, ‘“Rose, File It’: What Harry Truman’s Unmailed Letters Tell Us About the Thirty- 
Third President,” in Harry S. Truman: The Man From Independence, 372.
111 Quoted in Patricia Daniels Cornell, A Time For Remembering: The Story o f Ruth Bell Graham (San 
Francisco, CA: Harper & Row Publishers, 1983), 86.
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of Graham preaching each Friday night throughout the crusade in Los Angeles.
Favorable letters from readers poured into the Examiner's editorial department. Stories
about Graham’s crusades and success were reported all over the country. Newsmen
praised Graham’s “charisma,” saying that he was eloquent and powerful in his
preaching.112 Because of Hearst’s support, Graham’s Los Angeles crusade attracted
nationwide attention. By the end of the eight-week revival, about 350,000 had attended
the meetings and around 3,000 had come forward to make a decision to believe in Jesus
Christ or to rededicate their lives to having active Christian fellowship in local churches
(see Table 4.1). Indianapolis Star reported on November 2, 1949 that Billy Graham,
according to churchmen, started the greatest religious revival in the history of Southern 
1 1 - 3
California. Graham’s story of success in LA was not a one-time event as some people 
thought. Instead, it marked the beginning of a long-wave of national and international 
revivals.
About a month later, Graham’s success in Boston attracted the attention of many 
political leaders. When Graham held another month of revivals in South Carolina (this 
time, attended by one hundred and ninety thousand people -  see Table 4.1), Governor J. 
Strom Thurmond and former Secretary of State James M. Byrnes came to endorse the 
crusade. Henry Luce was also interested in this young preacher and flew out to meet 
Graham personally. After that meeting, Luce became a loyal supporter of Graham’s 
evangelical movement.114 From 1949 to 1955, Graham frequently made the front cover 
of Luce's Time and Life magazines. The media’s positive support and coverage of Billy 
Graham’s crusades made him into an influential religious figure throughout the 1950s.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War, 78.
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In about eight years, the Billy Graham Evangelical Association grew rapidly from 
one secretary in a one-room office in 1950 to being headquartered in a four-story office 
building in Minneapolis with two-hundred staff workers. Each week, the association 
received about ten thousand dollars from letters, and each year it collected and disbursed 
over two million dollars for national and international crusades. Moreover, from 1952 
onward, Graham had his own weekly television program on top of his already-very- 
popular “Hour of Decision” radio program. And his newspaper column was published by 
125 newspapers across the country.115
The Political Influence of Billy Graham 
Rev. Billy Graham was one of the most important religious figures in the 1950s 
because he emerged as the spokesperson of American Protestantism, receiving the 
endorsement of most mainline denominations. He was labeled as “the pope of protestant 
America.”116 His anti-Communist message found resonance across the entire religious
117spectrum. And because his theology so often merged religion with policy, he would 
also turn out to be one of the era’s key political figures. An out-spoken critic of President 
Truman’s foreign and domestic policies, he insisted on hardening the U.S. position 
against Communist infiltration and Soviet expansion in East Asia. His evangelical 
crusades and his anti-Communist preaching gave rise to a new nationalistic religious 
fervor and colored American public opinion toward the Soviet Union.
115 Ibid., 79.
116 Harold Bloom, ‘The Preacher Billy Graham,” TIME (6 July 1999), 
http://www.time.com/time/time 1 OO/heroes/profile/grahamO 1 .html.
117 James German, “Economy,” in Themes in Religion and American Culture, ed. Philip Goff and Paul 
Harvey (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004): 287.
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First, Graham’s negative view of Communism reinforced anti-Communist 
hysteria in the United States. In his sermon, “Satan’s Religion,” he explained how he 
saw Satan working through the Communists:
The Devil is their god; Marx, their prophet; Lenin, their saint; and Malenkov their high 
priest. Denying their faith in all ideologies except their religion of revolution, these 
diabolically inspired men seek in devious ways to convert a peaceful world to their 
doctrine of death and destruction. So fanatical and ruthless are these disciples of Lucifer 
that in thirty years they have slaughtered millions of innocent persons and stand prepared 
with poised weapons to kill millions more in an all-out effort to spread their doctrines to 
the ends of the earth. The mysterious pull o f this satanic religion is so strong that it has 
caused some citizens of America to become traitorous, betraying a benevolent land which 
had showered them with blessings innumerable.118
Communism, in Graham’s eyes, was master-minded by Satan. Seeing that Communism 
was gaining unprecedented popularity in Asia and in Europe, Graham was convinced that 
it was impossible for Communism to spread so quickly without the supernatural power of 
demons giving wisdom and intelligence to the Communists.119 Since he regarded 
Communist ideology as a new godless religion used by the devil to try to build a kingdom 
on earth without God, he encouraged American Christians to oppose Communism 
vigorously.120 Graham’s preaching boosted Senator Joseph McCarthy’s credibility as he 
leveled charges against the Truman administration.
Second, Graham preached against any attempt at reconciliation with the Soviet 
Union. Since Communism was the “Antichrist,” controlled by Satan, Graham argued 
that reconciliation and peaceful co-existence between Communism and Christianity were 
almost impossible. Communism, Graham believed, had political ambitions for world 
conquest and, blended with a godless ideology, it deeply threatened freedom
118 Quoted in David Lockard, The Unheard. Billy Graham (Waco, TX: Word Books Publisher, 1971), 128.
119 Whitfield, The Culture o f  the Cold War, 81.
120 Lockard, The Unheard Billy Graham, 143-144.
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191worldwide. He twice preached on his radio program against tolerance, viewing broad­
minded liberals as a danger to the nation’s survival in the Cold War. In every single 
sermon he preached throughout the 1950s, he always mentioned the evil of Communism, 
and several times he devoted a whole sermon to describing “the death-duel between
199Christian America and atheistic Russia.”
As historian Andrew Rotter has put it, for many Americans the Soviet Union was
1 '■ jo
not just an enemy but also the antichrist, the “devil we knew.” It is very important to 
understand the implications of such a view because it suggested a completely different 
spiritual approach to handling one's adversary. The Bible teaches Christians to love their 
enemies, but at the same time “to resist the devil” 124 and “not to give the devil a 
foothold.”125 The teachings of love supported the postwar rehabilitation of Germany and 
Japan. Nevertheless, such grace would not be extended to “the devil we knew,” because 
according to Graham, Communism was Satan's newest version of religion.126 Christian 
ideas helped to define the containment strategy against the Soviet Union, justifying the 
US attempt to roll back the communist expansion.
Graham’s revivals also encouraged the use of religion as a political weapon 
against Communism. The only way to save the nation from the onslaught of demon- 
possessed Communism, Graham declared, was to have “millions of Americans turn to 
Jesus Christ at this hour and accept him as Savior.”127 “This religious revival,” Billy
121 “Whither Bound?” in America’s Hour o f Decision: Featuring a Life Story o f  Billy Graham, 140. See 
also Lockard, The Unheard Billy Graham, 141.
122 Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War, 79-80.
123 Rotter, “Christian, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and US-South Asian Relations, 1947-1954,” 593- 
613. See also Kirby, “Religion and the Cold War — An Introduction,” in Religion and the Cold War, 4-5.
124 James 4:7 (New International Version).
125 Ephesians 4:27 (New International Version).
126 Whitfield, The Culture o f  the Cold War, 81.
127 Ibid.
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Graham proclaimed, “can restore our historic heritage, create moral stamina and 
consciousness, bring back the sanctity of our homes, [and] strengthen the bulwarks of
1 9 8freedom.” In other words, only Christianity could resist such a demonic force, and 
only revivalism could save America as a nation. Personal salvation and national 
salvation were closely linked in Graham’s theology. “If you would be a true patriot, then 
become a Christian,” he advised his listeners. “If you would be a loyal American, then 
become a loyal Christian.”129 There was a general perception that being a good Christian 
made one less likely to be a Communist. According to a poll conducted in August 1949, 
77 percent of the interviewees did not think that a good Christian could be a member of 
the Communist Party. Although Graham did not say that non-Christians were disloyal, 
his rhetoric implied that non-Christians were more vulnerable to Communist lies and 
deception.
Undoubtedly, Graham’s anti-Communist preaching defined the religious 
sentiment of the 1950s; but more importantly, according to a cultural historian, Robert S. 
Ellwood, “the religion of the fifties’ revival was largely nationalistic, a spiritual 
chaplaincy to the republic’s world mission.”130 Graham and his preaching added a strong 
religious flavor to the new American nationalism during the formative years of the Cold 
War. From his viewpoint, being an American citizen or holding an American passport 
itself could not prove a person’s real national loyalty, but being a born-again Christian 
with a fundamentalist leaning would be proof of his/her loyalty to the United States of 
America.
128 Billy Graham, “Our Greatest Secret Weapon,” American Magazine, November 1954, 86-88.
129 Whitfield, The Culture o f  the Cold War, 81.
130 Robert S. Ellwood, Fifties Spiritual Marketplace (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 
18.
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In spite of his insistence on a religious solution, Graham also put pressure on the 
government to take a clear stand against Communist expansion. For example, in his 
historic crusade in front of the Capitol in early 1952, he once again defined the Cold War 
clearly as the battle between Communism and Christianity. In addition to urging the 
American people to “turn back to God and back to Christ and back to the Bible,” he also 
preached that the nation “must maintain a strong military for defense at all costs.” 131 
Historian Lee Canipe explained that “for Americans fighting an ideological battle with 
purported ‘atheists,’ religious faith by itself contributed mightily to the defense of the 
nation and the preservation of democracy.”132
As a whole, Graham’s preaching was the rediscovery of the value of religion in 
American life, in American nationalism, and in American foreign policy. According to 
economic historian James German, the capitalist world of the West could not function 
without Christianity. “Material prosperity, in the minds of many Americans,” German 
explained, “was the natural product of political freedom and economic individualism, 
which in turn were rooted in essentially religious conceptions of the human person.”133 If 
a capitalist country were atheistic and “unrestrained by divinely sanctioned morals,” it 
would breed dissent and fall into the hands of Communism, which would take away both 
the properties, the rights and the freedoms of its citizens.134 In other words, religion was 
crucial in saving the American way of life and in unifying its citizens.
131 Transcript from “Graham’s Historic Meeting On the Steps of the Capitol” (Minneapolis, MN: Billy 
Graham Evangelical Association, Inc., 1952).
132 Lee Canipe, “Under God and Anti-Communist: How the Pledge of Allegiance Got Religion in Cold War 
America,” Journal o f  Church and State 45 (March 2003): 312.
133 German, “Economy,” Themes in Religion and American Culture, 287.
134 Ibid.
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Religious historian Lee Canipe explains the relation between religion and 
American anti-communism in this way: “For most Americans, it seemed religion and 
patriotism (which at the time was virtually synonymous with anti-Communism) simply 
represented two sides of the same coin. As the ‘Red Scare’ spread, church attendance 
soared. Religion suddenly became fashionable.” 135 Statistics show that church 
membership rose steadily as the Cold War intensified. In 1940, 49 percent of the 
population was officially enrolled in a church or synagogue, but in 1950, this number had 
risen to 57 percent (see Tables 4.2a, 4.2b, and 4.3a).136
Religious revivals led by Billy Graham and other evangelists paved the way for 
the influence of Christianity to grow in American domestic politics and foreign affairs. 
As more Americans were turning back to Christianity, their interests in foreign missions 
also intensified. Missionaries were delighted to see an enlarged pool of support.
Graham, in particular, had a special connection with Korea and China missions 
through his wife Ruth Graham, daughter of Dr. Nelson and Virginia Bell, missionaries to 
North Jiangsu (Kiangsu), China. When Ruth finished her middle school education in 
North Jiangsu, the Bells decided to enroll her in P’yongyang Foreign School, where 
academics were rigorous and the Bible was acknowledged as the authoritative word of 
God.137 Leaving her family in 1932, Ruth spent two years living in P’yongyang, the 
“Christian Capital of Korea,” and befriended other missionaries’ children. Some of them
135 Canipe, “Under God and Anti-Communist: How the Pledge of Allegiance Got Religion in Cold War 
America,” 312.
136 Leo P. Ribuffo, “God and Contemporary Politics,” Journal o f  American History 80 (March 1993): 1517- 
1518. Ribuffo gave the figure in 1950 as 55 percent, but the Yearbook of American Churches provided a 
higher percentage.
137 Cornwell, A Time fo r  Remembering, 28.
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were children of Korean missionaries who would later return to Korea after World War II 
and fight side by side with American and South Korean soldiers during the Korean War.
After marrying Ruth, Graham became an active supporter of missionary works. 
His family kept close contact with the missionaries who returned from China and Korea. 
Thus, he was well aware of how the Communists had treated to Christians in these two 
countries after they took power. Such knowledge would strengthen his conviction of a 
Satanic agenda to take control of the world. Even though he was registered as a 
Democrat, Graham was highly pro-Chiang Kai-shek and he urged the United States 
government to prevent the fall of Taiwan and the loss of South Korea.
Anti-Communism Sentiment in the Catholic Church 
Anti-Communism among religious leaders was not limited only to Protestant 
groups in the United States. American Catholics were even more outspoken in their 
opposition to Communist expansion. Their stance was a result of Catholic theology, 
combined with the losses of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe. “Communism,” 
Pope Pius XI warned, “strips man of his liberty, robs human personality of all its 
dignity.... There is no recognition of any right of the individual in his relations to the 
collectivity, no natural right is accorded to human personality, which is a mere cog-wheel 
in the communist system.”138 The Catholic Church, on the other hand, was presented as a 
guarantor of human freedom because “in Catholic teaching, all human freedom, all 
individual rights are grounded in a transcendent order.” 139 The conflict between 
Catholicism and Communism, therefore, was inevitable.
138 Quoted in Robert L. Frank, “Prelude to Cold War: American Catholics and Communism,” Journal of  
Church and State 34 (Winter 1992): 47,
139 Ibid.
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These arguments, as historian Robert L. Frank observed, became “a mainstay of 
Catholic Cold War rhetoric.” 140 The fear of Communist infiltration and conspiracies 
drew many nominal Catholics back to the Catholic Church and brought a re-emphasis on 
religious life among Catholic communities. Despite a general dislike of capitalism, they 
emerged as furious defenders of America’s democratic values and way of life. Their 
conversion to the American capitalist system marked the beginning of the amalgamation 
of patriotism and religious faith in American culture.
Father Edmund A. Walsh, the founder of the School of Foreign Service in 
Georgetown University, was the major anti-Communist spokesperson of the American 
Catholics. Throughout the Cold War, Walsh regarded the Soviet Union as a “new 
claimant for the hegemony of Europe” that replaced the role of Nazi Germany.141 His 
book, Total Empire, which analyzed Soviet expansion in the early years of the Cold War
1 AOfrom a geopolitical framework, was a 1951 bestseller. Based on the case of Korea, he 
strongly urged the US government to adopt a stronger stand in building up its military 
strength so that an aggressor would “think more than twice before provoking another 
devastating conflict.”143
In addition to the idea of geopolitics, Walsh also injected a religious element into 
the debate over foreign policy, when American leaders sought to determine whether 
ideology or realistic political objectives motivated Soviet expansionism.144 He pointed 
out that American policy-makers faced a conflict “between spirit and ideals on the one
141 Patrick McNamara, A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics o f  American 
Anticommunism (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 137.
142 Ibid., 135.
143 Quoted in ibid., 155.
144 Ibid., 135.
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hand, and armed materialism on the other.”145 Rising secularism in the West, Walsh 
argued, contributed to the growth of Communism. Therefore, the real challenge for the 
United States was to find strength in the American heritage and rely on the “spiritual faith 
entrusted to Christendom,” which according to Walsh was “the anchor of stability for the 
West.”146
Walsh challenged George Kennan’s realist approach to foreign policy, arguing 
that a clear commitment to moral law was essential to the conduct of US foreign 
affairs.147 Ironically, how to define moral law was a big problem. In fact, the question of 
applying moral law had very little to do with morality itself. For example, although 
Kennan was a realist, he stood against the production of nuclear bombs for moral reasons 
because he saw the bomb as an instrument of genocide and suicide.148 Walsh, on the 
other hand, advocated not only the production of nuclear bombs, but also the “first strike” 
principle because the death of Russian civilians, he believed, would be a “regrettable 
effect, not intended as such.”149 The major difference between Walsh and Kennan was 
that Walsh wanted to invite religious ideas into the making of foreign policy, while 
Kennan firmly opposed any commitment to religion and ideology. Although Walsh’s 
opinions on foreign policy did not represent the position of the Catholic Church, he did 
speak for many of his fellow Jesuit intellectuals and clergymen in America.
Even though the realists wanted to minimize the influence of ideology in making 
foreign policy, religion was too strong a force to ignore in the 1940s and 1950s. Religion
145 Edmund S. Walsh, ‘The Spiritual Aspect of Foreign Policy,” Catholic Mind 50 (June 1952): 641.
146 Ibid., 642.
147 McNamara, A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics o f  American 
Anticommunism, 161.
148 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World they Made, 488.
149 McNamara, A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics o f American 
Anticommunism, 152-153.
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left a clear mark on US politics. Joining with Protestant fundamentalists and evangelists, 
especially through effective religious rhetoric and powerfully networked political 
machines in major cities, Catholics gradually moved from the political periphery to the 
political center. (The process was eventually completed by the election of a Catholic 
President, John F. Kennedy.) Together, they became the backbone of support for the 
many conservative politicians in the decade of McCarthyism, a campaign started by 
Senator Joseph McCarthy (himself a Catholic) to root out Communists from public 
positions, and later from the entertainment industry and other areas of American life. 
Fueled by hysteria, McCarthyism would degenerate into the modem equivalent of a 
witch-hunt. Officers in the State Department such as John Carter Vincent, John Paton 
Davies, and John Stewart Service, who were well-known experts on East Asia, were 
some of the victims of McCarthyism.
AMIERCAN POLICY ON SOUTH KOREA
As the Cold War continued to intensify, American people’s concern over the 
division of Korea also increased. As early as August 31, 1946, a Saturday Evening Post 
feature article, “Our Most Dangerous Boundary” by Dr. Harold Noble, son of American 
missionaries to P’yongyang prior to World War II and a foreign correspondent in Seoul 
in 1946, labeled the 38th Parallel separating north and south Korea as the most dangerous 
line between the United States and the Soviet Union.150 Noble questioned the motives of 
the two powers that occupied Korea, but he also praised American benevolence in the 
south and criticized Soviet control in the north. Analyzing the tension along the 38th
150 Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots o f the Cold War, 117- 
118.
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Parallel, he even predicted that there would be a war in Korea. Korea was a potential 
trouble spot for the United States in its ideological and political competition with the 
Soviet Union.
An Ambiguous Stand on Korea 
What should the United States do concerning the deteriorating conditions in 
Korea? South Korea had been identified as part of the “crucial periphery” in the 
Campaign of Truth, a propaganda program set up by the US government against 
Communism behind the Iron Curtain.151 Korea was regarded by US propaganda experts 
as a valuable spot for spreading anti-Communist and pro-US propaganda or, if possible, 
for rolling back Communist power. From 1947 to 1949, there were internal battles 
between the State Department and the Defense Department, as they searched for the right 
way to deal with the Korea question. John C. Vincent of the State Department observed 
that Korea had become a symbol of the Cold War. If the US army left Korea, Japan 
might question America's commitment to its security and therefore seek an agreement 
with the Soviets for its own protection. Vincent similarly argued that a continued 
American presence might help Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Chinese Nationalist 
regime in Nanjing, in his struggle with the Communists in Manchuria and other areas of 
China.152 Realizing the need for initiative on the Korea problem, the State Department 
created a special 5-member, inter-departmental committee on Korea in early 1947. The 
committee suggested that the US government should stay in Korea for an important 
psychological reason: “to demonstrate to the communists and Koreans, that (the U.S.)
151 Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War 1945-1961,14-15.
152 Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945- 
1950 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1981), 92.
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meant to stay in business in Korea and, practically, to create a viable economy in South 
Korea capable of withstanding subversion.”153
Meanwhile, there were also warning voices expressing their concern over the 
situation in Korea. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican from Michigan and 
chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, argued that 
the United States had an inescapable obligation in Korea even though Korea was 
strategically difficult to defend.154 He believed that the principle of the Truman Doctrine 
and economic programs similar to those in the Marshall Plan should also be extended to 
South Korea.155 If there was strong political pressure to keep Korea free from 
Communist expansion and a determination to make it a symbol of democracy in East 
Asia, why did the Truman administration not make a clear commitment to Korea and 
build up the defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) fully?
There were basically two reasons for the ambiguity of the US position. The first 
reason was that the United States government did not trust the South Korean President, 
Syngman Rhee. During the period of American occupation, Rhee had been very 
outspoken against the policies of the American Military Government in Korea. Although 
his administration was highly pro-American, Rhee had no desire to bow to American 
hegemony. Instead, Rhee hoped that the United States would support his plan to unify 
Korea by all means and keep Korea free from Communist domination. If the United 
States had had a military alliance with him at that time, many American policy makers 
feared that his unpredictable behavior would have dragged the United States into war 
with the Soviet Union.
153 Quoted in ibid., 92-93.
154 Ibid., 95-96.
155 Ibid.
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Therefore, Truman’s administration avoided committing the United States to a 
permanent military partnership with South Korea, even though the President and the US 
military were fully aware that the Russians had supplied powerful weapons to the North 
Korean army.156 The United States even deliberately tried to keep the South Korean 
army weak by not giving them any tanks or heavy artillery, so that Rhee would be 
incapable of initiating any attempt to march his army northward.
Apart from the administration’s distrust of Rhee’s government, another cause for 
the policy ambiguity was that the US military did not see South Korea as strategically 
crucial in comparison to Japan and the Philippines. The Pentagon wanted to withdraw 
from Korea as soon as possible due to the massive reduction of the military budget in
1948. Had it not been for the insistence of the State Department, the US Army would 
have departed as soon as the Republic of Korea was established in August 1948. Most 
US Asian specialists focused their attention more on China and Japan, seeing that the fate 
of the rest of East Asia depended on the result of the ongoing civil war in China and the 
conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. As a result, China, Japan, and the Philippines 
consumed a lot of US attention and resources and the significance of Korea fell far below 
these countries.
The Churches' Clear Stand on Korea
While the US Army was trying to pull out of Korea, American missionaries in 
contrast were eager to go there. Among all private groups in America, churches had the 
strongest ties, the greatest awareness, and the largest interest in Korea. The influence of 
churches on American public opinion has been a very important aspect in analyzing
156 Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee And American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Book 
Company, 1978), 271-277.
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domestic and foreign policy. Cultural historian Christina Klein, author of Cold War 
Orientalism (2003), studied the growth of American interests in Asia during the Cold 
War period and recognized a connection between Christianity and the American image of 
Asia. “The Protestant missionary movement,” Klein explained, “encouraged a U.S.- 
centered internationalism based on spreading American values and institutions and 
transforming other nations along American lines, initially through religious conversion 
and later by building schools, universities, and hospitals.” 157 “With its network of 
congregations and settlements,” Klein pointed out, “the missionary movement created a 
worldwide institutional infrastructure that enabled millions of Americans, especially in 
isolated Midwestern and rural communities, to understand themselves as participating in 
world affairs.”158 In other words, religious belief became a crucial link in drawing a 
common bond between American Christians and Asian converts. “These institutions,” 
Klein argued, “enabled Americans to feel themselves bound to the people of Asia and 
Africa, despite the myriad of differences that separated them, through ties of religion, 
money, and emotional investment.”159
Klein’s study showed that the missionary movement was important in sustaining 
American interests in the Pacific Rim. In a few countries, when the US diplomatic 
establishment was unprepared for the task of US occupation, Christian groups and agents 
filled the need. In the case of Korea in the postwar period, the missionaries were very 
active in providing humanitarian services, such as hospitals, orphanages, and distributing
157 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2003), 30.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid., 30.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
270
relief supplies, proof that American churches were actively supporting missionary work 
in Korea.
Through religious networks, news about Korea and the condition of the Korean 
churches spread from coast to coast and from north to south. Even churchgoers in the 
most isolated Midwestern and rural communities somehow connected with distant Korea 
due to the flow of information through religious journals, pamphlets, and circulating 
letters. Equipped with language skills and cultural exposure, missionaries served as 
influential producers of knowledge through books, newsletters, and photographs. The 
writings and materials distributed by US churches generated increased interest in Korea 
among the American Christian population. While the United States government saw 
South Korea as a military liability, Christian groups in the US had a rather optimistic 
view of the future of Korea.
American churches wanted to send more missionaries back to Korea. Because of 
their intense efforts, the number of American missionaries in Korea increased from a 
dozen in 1945 to more than 200 by the end of 1949. Prominent clergymen also visited 
Korea, bringing back news and reports on the condition of the Korean churches. Bishop 
Arthur J. Moore from the Methodist Church visited Seoul in early 1946. He spoke to 
many Korean churches, reaffirming the commitment of the American Methodist Church 
to the independence and reconstruction of a new Korea.160 In his journey report which 
was published in the form of a pamphlet, he quoted Chiang Kai-shek as saying, “If Korea 
is not independent, the peace of East Asia and the world cannot be secure.”161
160 Arthur J. Moore, The Church Cradled in Conflict: A Report o f  an Episcopal Visit to Korea in 1946 
(New York: The Methodist Church, 1946), 3.
161 Quoted in ibid., 3.
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Bishop Moore was not alone in emphasizing the American commitment to the 
future of Korea. According to the resolutions adopted by the Foreign Mission 
Conference (FMC) of North America in January 1947, Protestant leaders from both the 
US and Canada, acknowledged that there were “close bonds which have long existed 
between Korea and North America through the relations between Christians in these two 
countries.”162 Therefore, the FMC urged its constituency to have “an intelligent and 
active interest in the great cause of our Korean brethren who demand their long-promised 
liberty.”163 The resolution even recognized “the importance of United States policy in 
regard to the Korean situation and [called upon America] to rectify in part the mistakes 
our nation has made in this regard since 1905.”164 Clearly, the Protestant churches in the 
United States had agreed not to let Korea down a second time in this moment of 
uncertainty.
To further propagate their cause, religious groups willingly provided a publicity 
channel for the Korean government. Dr. Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee’s publicity 
advisor from 1942 to 1959, was welcomed by most Protestant groups. They published 
his papers in their religious journals and invited him to give speeches and seminars to 
their congregations. Oliver would skillfully present the case for Korea as a nation 
struggling for its independence and religious freedom. Other Christian figures such as 
Dr. Kim Hwal-lan (Helen Kim), the President of Ewha University, were well known 
among US church communities. According to one American Methodist missionary, 
Marion Lane Conrow, “To many people [in the United States], Korea is Helen Kim, and
162 The resolution was reported by The Voice o f  Korea 6 ,15 February 1947, 1. This publication was found
in the Vertical File: Truman Subject File -  Religion in the Truman Presidential Library
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Helen Kim is Korea. Fortunate is Korea to be so represented!”165 Dr. Kim was so 
popular and famous in the United States that she was even given “the invitation of Smith 
College to receive an honorary degree on Oct. 15th [1949], along with Mrs. Roosevelt and 
other great women.”166 In fact, most contacts that the American public had with Korea 
were through these Korean Christians and church lobbies. Since most of the Korean 
Protestant churches were the fruits of the American missionaries, Rhee’s supporters 
constantly reminded and lectured the churches in the United States of their responsibility 
for the preservation of Korean religious freedom.
As the political and economic situation in Korea showed no sign of improvement 
even though a new republic was established in the south, missionaries continued to send 
positive reports back to their home churches. In a 1948 report prepared by Rev. S. 
Dwight, Presbyterian missionaries not only urged American churches to send out more 
workers to the field, they also portrayed the “New Korea” as a country that “holds the 
center of the stage in international politics in the East.” When they observed political 
developments in Seoul in 1949, they rejoiced because “many Christians [had] 
distinguished themselves as officials in the new government,” and because the churches 
were packed with sympathetic listeners.168 They were hopeful for the future and wanted
165 Marion Lane Conrow, “Helen K. Kim, Ph.D. President of Ewha College,” File Name: Conrow, Marion 
L. (1940-1949), Missionary Vol.3, United Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
166 Alice R. Appenzeller, “Letter IV from Seoul dated Nov. 12,1949,” File Name: Appenzeller, Alice R 
(1929-1949), Missionary Vol.3., United Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
167Rev. S. Dwight, “Korea Mission,” Annual Report o f  the Executive Committee o f  Foreign Missions, 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S. 1948 (Nashville, TN: Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, 1948), 
78-79.
168Rev. Joe B. Hopper, “Korea Mission,” in Annual Report o f  the Executive Committee o f  Foreign 
Missions, Presbyterian Church in the U.S. 1949 (Nashville, TN: Executive Committee of Foreign Missions,
1949), 86.
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the American church to send more missionaries. Otherwise, they would “lose the field of 
battle to heathenism, or communism, or materialism.”169
In his article written in April 1950, “Which Way Korea?” in World Outlook, Dr. 
Thobum T. Brumbaugh, the associate secretary of the Methodist Division of Foreign 
Missions who supervised the missions in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, 
asserted that Korea was the place where “the issue between Communism and Christian 
democracy is more clearly defined than anywhere else in the Far East.”170 The American 
Methodist church viewed the ideological battle in Korea as a struggle “between Soviet 
and Christian concepts of democratic progress.”171 Christianity, Brumbaugh asserted, 
would be “a great factor” in the internal political struggle in South Korea. He told his 
readers that since Methodism was the largest Protestant denomination in the United 
States, “what [the] Methodists think and do about the cause of Christian missions in 
Korea” would determine whether Korea [went] Communist or Christian.172
According to a booklet, Korea at the Crossroads, written by Rev. William E. 
Shaw, a Methodist missionary, and published by the American Methodist Church, “if 
Democracy of a Christian nature wins, America and all democratic nations will retain a 
friend in a most strategic part of the world, and democracy will have an important foot­
hold in the heart of Asia.”173 The fate of South Korea was tied to the policy of the United 
States and the “Christian forces of America.” 174 Rev. Shaw positively asserted that 
“Christianity [was] already the strongest religious influence in Korea” because “Japanese
169 Ibid.
170 Thobum T. Brumbaugh, “Which Way Korea?” World Outlook, April 1950,798.
171 Ibid., 798.
172 Ibid., 800.
173 William E. Shaw, Korea A t the Crossroads (New York: The Methodist Church Editorial Department,
1950), 5.
174 Ibid., 6.
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Shintoism [had] been discredited” and “there [were] no great organized religions which 
[offered] stiff competition.”175 He rallied American Christians to pray for Korea that 
“atheistic Communism may not succeed” and that “Christ and Christian Democracy may 
win.” Shaw’s statement had its own ground. Certainly, the cultural and social 
influence of Confucianism and Buddhism remained strong in Korean society, but in 
terms of the level of political influence on a national level, Christianity took the lead due 
to its organizational strength and leadership quality, despite its relatively small number of 
followers in comparison to the traditional religions. The Korean people looked to well- 
educated Christian leaders for inspiration and guidance. Political groups led by Christian 
laymen were the major forces that could effectively challenge the Communist position in 
Korea.
“The Loss o f China”
The creation of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 fundamentally 
altered American strategy in Asia. The outcome of the Chinese civil war was especially 
frustrating to many Americans who had great hopes for the postwar political, economic, 
and religious development of China. When a Communist victory on the mainland 
became unavoidable, the United States government knew that it would soon lose its most 
valuable ally in East Asia. In 1949, the United States was therefore desperate to find a 
strategy to halt the spread of Communism in Asia.
Many different interest groups in America wished for more to be done to aid 
Chiang Kai-shek’s ailing regime. For one, religious circles considered the possible loss 
of China as devastating, because churches had made substantial investments of
175 Ibid., 6.
176 Ibid., 6-7.
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missionaries and dollars. For another, business interests also regarded the loss of the 
China market as unacceptable. For yet another, Chinese Nationalists sent to America as 
lobbyists by Chiang Kai-shek had a personal interest in the outcome of the civil war. 
These Chinese lobbyists in the US, along with certain American business, media and 
other interests, formed the influential China Lobby and aligned themselves with the 
powerful China Bloc in Congress. They criticized the Truman administration vigorously 
and pushed for more financial and military aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in 
Taiwan, hoping not only to preserve the Nationalists, but if possible to roll back 
Communist influence in China.
In spite of enormous political pressure from the China Lobby, the Truman 
administration refused to continue its aid to the Nationalists. In August 1949, the State 
Department published a thousand-page document known as The China White Paper to 
justify the administration's stand. From that point on, Truman pursued a new approach of 
strengthening the Asian periphery states such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, 
following a strategy of containment. Since Japan was still under American military 
occupation, a speedy and comprehensive reconstruction program for Japan’s war-torn 
economy was necessary to protect the US strategic position in East Asia. Truman wisely 
selected a Republican bipartisan figure, John Foster Dulles, who had enjoyed wide 
religious support through his participation in the FCCC, to lead the American delegation 
to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan.
In contrast, opinion within Truman’s cabinet on how to deal with the newly 
formed, internally unstable, and potentially troublesome South Korean Republic was 
deeply divided. The military favored a complete withdrawal, but diplomats favored
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maintaining American influence in South Korea, lest the domino effect lead to more 
losses in Asia. More important, economists argued that a stable, democratic, and 
capitalist South Korea would be a crucial factor in the recovery of Japan.
The Korean Aid Bill 
By mid-1949, President Truman had made up his mind to support the economic 
recovery of Korea instead of merely providing basic relief. He decided to present a 
Korean aid bill to Congress. In his address to Congress on June 7, 1949, Truman 
explained the importance of Korea as a model that carried American ideals and principles 
for the Asian world in the battle against Communism. Its ultimate survival, the President 
declared, would stand “as a beacon to the people of northern Asia.”177 He proclaimed the 
fierce passion of the Korean people for freedom, and reminded his Congressional 
audience of what American missionaries had contributed to the struggle for freedom 
while the country was still under the bondage of the Japanese. He also appealed to the 
“sympathetic feelings” that the American people had for Korea through their long- 
established religious connections to win support for his economic aid bill.178
Truman had no intention of withdrawing economically from Korea. Instead, the 
administration asked for $150 million dollars for a comprehensive program for the 
economic rehabilitation of Korea.179 The President even identified the progress of the 
Korean people with America's foreign policy goals in East Asia. When Congress debated 
the bill, those who supported giving economic aid to Korea argued along the same lines
177 Message from U.S. President Truman to the Congress of the United States, Regarding Economic 
Assistance to the Republic of Korea, 7 June 1949, Documents on Korean-American Relations 1943-1976, 
ed. Se-jin Kim (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1976), 75.
178 Ibid., 73.
179 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners In Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States, 
1948-1953 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 140.
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as Truman, declaring that the United States had a “moral obligation” and 
“responsibilities” toward the Korean people and arguing the value of South Korea as “the 
last foothold” or “toe hold” to keep the Asian continent free from bondage.180
Nevertheless, the United States government was not ready to commit fully to the 
security of South Korea. According to Secretary Acheson’s National Press Club speech 
on January 12,1950, the United States government was ready to commit to the defense of 
Japan and the Philippines. In the case of Korea, Acheson acknowledged that the United 
States had interests and a responsibility, but he skillfully put its security under the duty of 
the United Nations.181 Acheson’s statement gave many people the erroneous impression 
that the Truman administration had abandoned Korea, but the secretary made it very clear 
at the end of his speech that the United States government intended to continue to support 
South Korea by providing economic aid and that it would be the “most utter defeatism 
and utter madness” to “stop half way [and] scrap all that.”182
South Korea’s Appeal for US Support 
Meanwhile, the Korean administration understood that the United States 
government did not trust Syngman Rhee because he had an aggressive political agenda to 
unify the country on his own terms. To gain American support, South Korea had to 
influence general public opinion in America. Nevertheless, unlike China, Korea attracted 
little direct American economic interests, except related to the recovery of Japan. Its 
strategic position was not as crucial as Japan’s. The Koreans could only appeal to 
America's moral obligation. However, such an obligation by itself could be burdensome 
to the American people, so would not be an effective propaganda tool.
180 Ibid., 141-142.
181 Quoted in Thornton, Odd Man Out, 69.
182 Quoted in Ibid., 71.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
278
Therefore, the Korean government wanted to present a religious connection to the 
American audience and emphasized the symbolic role of Korea in the ideological battle 
between Communism and the Western world. Even though Korea was not a Christian 
nation, with only three to four percent of the population being Christian at that time, 
South Koreans enjoyed religious freedom. Korean propaganda materials also 
emphasized that Korea was on a path to becoming a Christian nation, hoping that the 
sense of Christian brotherhood could bring the two distant nations together. Most of the 
American missionaries endorsed such a vision, praised the potential of the South Korean 
Republic, and continued to present favorable reports to their American supporters.
To build US sentiment, the National Christian Council of Korea organized a 
public demonstration across Korea on June 23, 1949. More than 50,000 Christians 
participated in Seoul alone, carrying slogans such as, “We Christians will defend our 
native land from Communist attack,” “The insecurity of Korea is a threat to world 
peace,” “All Asia is watching America’s action in Korea in defense of democracy,” and 
“Let the churches of the world unite their strength to protect the churches of Korea.” 
They issued a proclamation, declaring that only in the atmosphere of Christian ideals 
could democratic government survive in Asia. They argued that if the Christian world 
refused to protect and help South Korea, the whole of Asia would be lost.183
The Koreans’ desire for American protection was not simply orchestrated 
propaganda. According to the letters of missionaries, Korean Christians were genuinely 
afraid of a Communist invasion. Two weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War, 
Syngman Rhee met with Dr. Bob Pierce, an American evangelist and a close friend of
183 Marion Conrow, “Christian Rally, Seoul, Korea, 23 June 1949,” File Name: Conrow, Marion L. (1946- 
1949), Missionary Vol.3, United Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
279
Billy Graham, and told him that every Christian in Korea knew that they were prime 
targets, especially those who served in the South Korean government. Rhee wanted to 
convince Dr. Pierce that there was not much time left for the South Koreans to live and 
enjoy freedom, if they did not have military protection from the United States.184
Most of the religious leaders and political leaders in the United States understood 
the significance of Korea in both religious and strategic senses. American public opinion 
in general strongly favored the Korean aid bill. But the Republicans, who wanted 
Truman to give economic aid to Chiang Kai-shek, blocked its passage. The rejection of 
the bill by the House on January 19, 1950, was panned by the American press. The New 
York Times, for example, called the failure of the House to pass the bill “a blunder” and 
“something of a legislative fluke” to be rectified. It also blamed the China Bloc and the 
“rat hole” view of its defeat.185 In order to get a speedy passage through Congress, the 
administration was willing to cut $30 million from the original budget and to extend a 
new economic aid program to Taiwan.
What happened to the Korean aid bill revealed something important about the 
attitude of the United States. According to historian Charles Dobbs, the bill paved the 
way for American intervention in the Korean War.186 South Korea moved to the second- 
runner up position on Truman’s list of American interests in Asia. In addition, it also 
reflected the competition in American politics between idealists, who favored a moral 
commitment to Korea, and realists, who rejected the strategic significance of the 
peninsula.187 The ambiguous attitude of the Truman administration, despite its clear aim
184 Franklin Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do (USA: Samaritan’s Purse, 1983), 146.
185 Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War, 142.
186 Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol, 537.
187 Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War, 145.
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to help South Korea, confused American legislators; some congressmen thought that the 
administration had already abandoned Korea. More important, according to historian 
Jongsuk Chay, the delaying of the aid hurt the Korean economy, defeating its very- 
intended purpose, and also strengthening the Communists' belief that the United States 
was uncertain of its commitment to Korea.188
The administration’s ambiguous stand also caused historians to question US 
motives in Korean policies. Historian Richard C. Thornton suggested a theory that the 
US government, under Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s direction, was “tethering a 
goat to trap a tiger” by intentionally keeping South Korea weak to invite an attack from 
the north so that “the United States would mobilize the ‘free world’ in justifiable defense 
against the communist menace, giving firm structure to the Cold War.”189 Thornton’s 
argument was based mostly on circumstantial evidence that the United States not only 
denied South Korea aggressive weapons, but even defensive weapons such as anti-tank 
guns, anti-tank mines, anti-aircraft guns, and coastal patrol craft.190 Such policies, 
Thornton believed, created confusion and invited the North Koreans to march south.
Thorton’s interpretation has difficulty, however, in explaining the unpreparedness 
of the US military in both Washington and Tokyo. If the US had indeed set a trap in 
Korea to lure the Soviet Union into starting a war, then the peninsula should have been 
carefully watched and monitored by the intelligence community, so that the United States 
would be ready to confront the enemy. The evidence suggests that this was not the case. 
US troops in Tokyo were poorly trained and poorly equipped. No effective anti-tank
188 Ibid., 144.
189 Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins o f  the Korean War 
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 147.
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weapon was available during the first month of the war. US aircraft and transportation 
equipment in Japan were insufficient to support the war effort. To explain these military 
deficiencies, Thorton’s interpretation must presume that the State Department did not 
share its strategy with the Pentagon -  a politically unlikely scenario.
Rather than being an elaborate ruse on the part of Acheson, it seems more likely 
that the lack of US support for South Korea was the result of an ill-thought-out foreign 
policy. The ambiguity of the US position sent wrong signals to the North Koreans, 
making them think that the Americans had little interest in Korea. The lack of military 
aid to defend South Korea encouraged Kim Il-sung to be confident that he could unify 
Korea quickly through military action before the United States had enough time to send 
troops. Therefore, impelled by these data and his own personal political ambition, Kim 
Il-sung urged Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong to support his military unification plan.191
CONCLUSION
The years between World War II and the Korean War coincided with the dawn of 
a religious revival in the United States. To understand the religious aspects of the Korean 
War, the character of these prewar years must first be understood. It was an era where 
many were deeply religious, and saw America's place in the world in religious terms. 
The notion of a “civil religion” extended even into political life, with leaders speaking 
openly about God, appealing to Christian nature, and touting the virtues of freedom of 
religion.
191 Kathryn Weathersby, “New Findings on the Korean War,” Cold War International History Project 
Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993): 1,14-15.
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President Truman employed religious ideas and rhetoric when he presented his 
policies to the American people, mobilizing them to support his domestic and foreign 
policy. The main difference between the American way of life and the Soviet way was 
religion, Truman argued. The Cold War was a struggle between godly and godless 
people. By 1949, religious freedom emerged as a major theme in Truman's foreign 
policy. To this end, he sought to build a Western Christian alliance to fight Communism.
Christian clergymen’s anti-Communist preaching made direct connections 
between religious and public life. Such a theology would provide a channel for religious 
factors to enter foreign policy, both prior to the Korean War and even more so after 
fighting began. Religion provided a way to understand the frightening and rapidly 
changing world, and assisted in the internalization of the Cold War in the American 
mind. Religious groups were strong supporters of anti-Communism and anti-Communist 
propaganda both domestically and around the world. When the whole country was 
gripped by fear, religion became a means of rebuilding American confidence and national 
pride.
Religion became a common bond between Korea and the United States. 
Missionary interests aroused economic and political support for Korea. A common 
Christian brotherhood encouraged both personal giving and political leanings that would 
push the US government to act in Korea’s interests. Such efforts met with strong 
government resistance in the pre-war years, as Washington was swamped with other 
concerns. Nevertheless, once the war started, such politics would soon gain a more 
receptive ear in the capital.
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CHAPTER 5 
The Outbreak of the Korean War
INTRODUCTION
The road leading up to the outbreak of the Korean War had both domestic and 
foreign aspects. Internally, the competition between the north and the south intensified 
after the establishment of two separate regimes in Seoul and P’yongyang. Unification 
was a vital political objective for both sides, but neither one could act without the full 
support of their superpower allies. Whatever military designs Syngman Rhee might have 
were futile because he could not secure American backing and supplies to launch a 
military offensive. In contrast, Kim D-sung had better luck with the Russians and the 
Chinese and eventually won the support of both Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong.
This chapter traces the major politically oriented religious developments leading 
to the outbreak of the Korean War. The first part considers the political maneuverings 
and military preparation of North Korea and the rest of the Communist Bloc. The second 
part explores conditions in the south at the time of the attack, focusing on how the 
Christian community in South Korea responded to war rumors. The third section 
examines the perspective of American policymakers and explains how the future 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and various American churches came to view the 
outbreak of the Korean War in a religious context.
284
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PLANNING A SECRET MILITARY ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA
According to historian Kathryn Weathersby, who translated and interpreted most 
of the newly-released Russian documents for the Cold War International History Project 
(CWIHP), from 1946 to 1950, Kim Il-sung had sent forty eight messages to Moscow, 
urging the Russians to allow him to launch a military attack against the ROK.1 Kim 
naturally wanted to unify Korea, but why was he so bent upon a military approach? The 
following three subsections will consider three possible reasons. One possible 
explanation was personal ambition -  that Kim wanted the glory of being a conqueror. 
Another possibility was that a war would allow Kim to eliminate his political enemies. A 
third reason was that should he receive the support of his Communist neighbors, an attack 
might have seemed to him to be the quickest, easiest, and most certain means of unifying 
the peninsula.
Kim Il-sung’s Ambitions and the Personality Cult
Revisionist historians have long described Kim Il-sung more as a nationalist than 
a Communist, arguing that he was not alone in his desire for national unification. His 
political rivals, including Pak Hon-yong and Syngman Rhee, also wanted unification, 
even through military conquest. But this view fails to appreciate the extent of Kim II- 
sung’s personal ambition. From 1945 to 1950, Kim Il-sung took advantage of the 
worldwide Communist revolution in order to strengthen his own position against the 
political challenges from Kim Tu-bong, Kim Mu-jong, and Pak Hon-yong. Regardless of 
how his opponents in the South might have chosen to behave, Kim planned to be the 
“Supreme Leader” of a unified Korea.
1 Kathryn Weathersby, ‘The Cold War in Asia: New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 30-35.
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One religious aspect of Kim’s plan was his establishment of a personality cult. 
Theoretically, Communism should be atheistic, but in North Korea, Kim’s personal 
ambition was to be deified. The campaign to establish a personality cult began in 1946, 
soon after Kim’s purging of the Christian leader Cho Man-sik. During the Founding 
Congress of the North Korean Workers Party (NKWP), Kim Il-sung was hailed as “the 
leader of all the Korean people,” “the hero of the nation,” “the great leader,” and many 
other venerable titles.2 When the Central Historical Museum of P’yongyang opened in 
1947, Kim’s Kapsan supporters tried to highlight his military achievements by 
designating a special room with 316 items on display to show his military credentials as a 
guerrilla ranking as “general” in his campaign against the Japanese. The propagandists 
credited the creation of the People’s Army (Inmingun) to Kim Il-sung. It was an attempt 
to lift Kim up above other famous Communist fighters such as General Kim Mu-jong, 
who had served bravely in the Chinese Communist Army and was a close comrade of 
Mao Zedong. Like Stalin, Kim Il-sung enjoyed military poses and postures, but instead 
of dressing himself in military uniform, Kim wore a gray Mao suit to draw a connection 
with Mao Zedong, casting himself in the images of two supreme Communist leaders.
Kim’s personality cult program was a combination of different religions and 
ideologies including Christianity, Confucian familism, Korean shamanism, Japanese 
emperor worship, and Stalinism.4 Kim sought to portray his family as the consummate 
example of a Korean noble family, embodying the virtues of hard work and nationalistic
2 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2003), 134.
3 Allan R. Millett, The War fo r  Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning (Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 2005), 176.
4 See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 223-224.
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loyalty.5 He represented himself as the successor to his noble father’s nationalistic, anti- 
Japanese revolutionary movement.6 Despite his relatively young age when compared to 
other nationalist leaders, Kim H-sung was able to cultivate the image of being a great 
leader (in Korean terms, a suryong) for the Korean people.7 In 1946, the North Korean 
novelist Han Sor-ya, who became the head of the North Korean writer’s league and the 
chief engineer of Kim’s personality cult, described Kim as the “sun of the nation” -  a title 
that had been formerly used in the Shinto religion to describe the Japanese emperor.8 In 
1947, according to North Korean Communist hagiographical writer Han Chae-dok, Kim 
H-sung’s fight against the Japanese was like a brilliant star and his return to Korea like 
the rising of the sun. Han also borrowed Christian imagery to portray Kim as a savior 
who had shed his “precious blood” for the sake of national salvation.9
Kim also “indigenized” Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism to make it more appealing 
to the popular masses in Korea by incorporating aspects of folk belief.10 In this effort, the 
images of Confucian familism proved useful. Stalin and Kim H-sung became paternalist 
figures for the Korean nation, a replacement of the traditional ancestor worship culture. 
Throughout North Korea, pictures of Stalin and Kim Il-sung were displayed side-by-side 
in courthouses, post offices, schools, theaters, and other public buildings. Even religious 
buildings, including worship halls, temples, and Cathedrals were required to show
5 Yong-ho Ch’oe, “Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-song,” Asian Survey 26 (Oct 
1986): 1083-1085.
6 See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 223.
7 Suryong was a Korean term reserved to address political leaders, such as Yo Un-hyong, Cho Man-sik, 
Syngman Rhee, and Pak H5n-y6ng in very respectful terms. The use of Suryong for Kim Il-sung began 
shortly before the formation o f the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1948 and became his main 
title after the mid-1960s.
8 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 223.
9 Chaedok Han, Kim Ilsong changgun kaeson’gi (Record of the Triumphant Return of General Kim II Sung) 
(P’ySngyang: Minju Chosonsa, 1947), 10. Quoted in Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 223.
10 Young-sook Kim Harvey, ‘The Korean Shaman and the Deaconess: Sisters in Different Guises,”
Religion and Ritual in Korean Society, ed. Laurel Kendall and Griffin Dix (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1987), 156.
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Stalin’s and Kim’s portraits.11 Not surprisingly, some churches refused. The police then 
closed these churches, confiscated their properties, and arrested their leaders.12
To ensure the success of his personality cult and political dictatorship, Kim Il-
sung planned to destroy Christian churches and silence opposition from all religious
1 ^groups. Christians, Ch’ondogyo followers, and Buddhists were identified by the 
Communists as “reactionaries” and individual believers were persecuted by the 
authorities.14 Resistance from Ch’ondogyo worshippers ended in 1948, when its political 
leadership chose to support the Communist authorities. Some Christians, however, 
continued their struggle against the government by organizing underground churches and 
participating in guerrilla activities in Hwanghae Province, the province of Syngman 
Rhee’s ancestors.
Since Korean Christianity had strong connections with Western countries such as 
the United States, Canada, and France, Communist authorities did not trust Christian 
believers, regardless of their political affiliation. The government began to 
systematically destroy the influence of the Christian community. From 1947 to 1950, all 
churches that had been built by foreign missions were considered “enemy alien property” 
and were therefore forced to close down.15 The Communist government and officials 
occupied most of the former mission compounds and mission school buildings. For
11 Letter from Harry Hill, 22 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, 
Folder 14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia. Rev. Harry Hill was a Northern Presbyterian 
(USA) missionary in the P’ydngyang Station before World War II. This information was obtained through 
his interview with North Korean Prisoners of War.
12 Letter from Chaplain Harold Veolkel, 15 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
13 According to Charles Armstrong, the major opposition against the Communist groups came from the 
Christians and Ch’bndogyo. Since Ch’bndogyo’s power base was among the landless masses, the 
Communists’ land reform had very little impact on cutting Ch’dndogyo’s followers. See Armstrong, The 
North Korean Revolution, 125-131.
14 Ibid., 130-131.
15 Letter from Harry Hill, 22 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, 
Folder 14 -Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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example, the Presbyterian mission station in P’yongyang, which had been the largest 
Presbyterian mission station in the world, was converted into the Communist 
headquarters.16 And Kim Il-sung’s own personal office had formerly been the home of 
an American missionary, Margaret Best.
Next, Kim Il-sung sought to prevent the young people from joining religious 
groups by converting them to Communism instead. According to the memoir of No 
Kum-sok, the North Korean pilot who defected to the South with his MIG-15 in 1953, 
students were instructed that there was no God and that the world Communist victory 
would be won with a vast amount of modem weapons, not with religious faith or
17superstition. Sales of Bibles and other religious materials were prohibited. Bookstores 
were allowed only to sell Communist publications and Russian materials. School 
officials harassed children from Christian backgrounds. Naturally, many young people 
left their parents’ churches, while many older believers went underground to avoid 
persecution.
The government also planned to liquidate the church leadership gradually.
Christian leaders and educators were divided by the North Korean secret police into three
categories: 1) openly against Communism, 2) potential hindrances to Communist mle,
and 3) those with a close southern connection. Pastors who refused to join the
18government-sponsored Christian League were arrested and summarily executed. When
16 A confidential letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel from P’yOngyang, 29 October 1950, Documents of 
the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed. Kim Heung Soo (Seoul: Institute of Korean Church History, 2003), 
146-147.
17 No Kum-sok, A MiG-15 to Freedom (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1996), 36. 
No Kum-sok’s mother was a devout Catholic.
18 Seong-Jae Lee, “ffimm  :J tS tS # £ fc #  * 1 6 1 4 ^  MM3H ^  ^ fiffft  Haebangihu 
buk’hankidokkyohoe gongsanjeonggwongwaui gwangyee tehanyeongu Study on the Relation Between 
North Korea Government and North Korean Church since Liberation” (M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 
1992), 70.
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preparations for war intensified in early 1950, the government further tightened its 
control over all religious groups because Kim Il-sung worried that news of his secret war 
plan might leak to the south. On the eve of the attack, the police arrested even more 
pastors and Catholic priests so that they could not hinder the war effort.19 Once the 
attack started, all religious activities were forced to stop. No more worship services or 
religious gatherings were allowed, not even in Communist-controlled churches. The 
police locked the doors of most churches.20
Kim Il-sung’s Political Intentions in Military Conquest 
Kim had two southern political rivals, Pak Hon-yong and Syngman Rhee, and a 
war might enable him to beat both of them and assume supreme control over the whole 
peninsula. Historian Robert Simmons, who has explored domestic conditions in North 
Korea in his book Strained Alliance (1975), attributed Kim Il-sung’s eagerness to march 
south to his power struggle with Pak Hon-yong.21 Simmons argued that Pak pressured 
Kim to attack because Pak wanted to return to Seoul and unify the country.22
However, it was also possible that Kim did not act simply because of Pak’s 
political pressure. Kim intended to nullify the influence of Pak Hon-y6ng in South Korea. 
Pak had the loyal support of most domestic Korean Communists. He had led the 
Communist resistance throughout the colonial area inside Korea and had suffered 
immensely in his pursuit of Korean independence. After the Japanese surrendered to the 
Allies, Pak established the Korean Communist Party in Seoul. Being a native of 
Kwangju, Pak’s main power base was in the southern region of Korea. He headed the
19 Ibid., 71.
20 Ibid.
21 Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, P ’ydngyang, Moscow, and the Politics o f the Korean 
Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1975).
22 Ibid., 104-110.
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Communist guerilla forces in the Cholla region before fleeing to P’yongyang in October 
1946. His credentials made him highly popular among all Korean Communists. Pak 
directly challenged Kim’s claim to the throne in Seoul.
In North Korea, Pak Hon-y6ng received solid support from Communist refugees 
who had fled South Korea because of the anti-Communist purge launched by Rhee’s 
government.23 Once in P’yongyang, Pak plotted how he might return south and lead an 
uprising. He promptly organized the Democratic Front for the Unification of the 
Fatherland (DFUF), which advocated a peaceful unification of Korea.24 Because of his 
invaluable knowledge of the south, he also became the supervisor of the Kangdong 
Political Institute, which was responsible for training guerillas to be sent south for 
infiltration and subversive activities. Since Pak enjoyed wide support in the newly 
unified Korean Workers’ Party, and also among the guerrillas, Kim Il-sung appointed 
him as the Foreign Minister of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 
September 1949, hoping to use his influence in the South to gain Stalin’s support for a 
swift military conquest.
Using military means, nevertheless, was not the only option for the North Koreans. 
There were two other ways to achieve unification: to allow a national election sponsored 
by the United Nations, or to overthrow the Republic of Korea (ROK) regime through 
subversive means and guerrilla attacks. Nevertheless, these two options were not options 
for the benefit of Kim Il-sung because both ways offered Pak the upper hand in the 
control of Seoul. For instance, a national election would certainly favor Pak because
23 Millett, The War fo r  Korea, 1945-1950, 175.
24 Although the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland (DFUF) was organized by Pak H6n- 
y6ng, his name was not listed on the seven-member chairman group of the front. See Dae-sook Suh, Kim II 
Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 120.
25 Simmons, The Strained Alliance, 104.
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leftists in the South knew Pak better than Kim. If Pak succeeded in overthrowing 
Syngman Rhee’s regime in Seoul and eventually unifying the country through subversive 
activities without the help of the North Koreans, then Kim’s position in the newly unified 
Korea would be over-shadowed by Pak’s remarkable success. And since Pak enjoyed a 
larger following in the South than Kim did, the Soviet Union might install Pak in Seoul 
rather than Kim in a newly unified Korea.
From 1945 to 1949, Stalin favored subversive activities to take full control of the 
south. Therefore, he ignored the American plan to have a national election for all Korea 
under the direction of the United Nations and rejected Kim’s constant pleas to march 
south. In March 1949, Stalin told Kim plainly that the 38th Parallel had to be peaceful 
and the Korean People’s Army (KPA) existed only for defensive purposes.26 He would 
allow Kim to use force only if the South Koreans launched an attack against the North.
Kim Il-sung, nonetheless, did not give up his plan, due to his political ambition. 
If Kim wanted to be the supreme ruler of all Korea, he had to march south before Pak’s 
uprising succeeded. To do so, he needed to find ways to control Pak’s power base and 
eliminate all of Pak’s supporters. A swift military operation might allow Kim to absorb 
the guerilla units into the People’s Army (Inmingun). This strategy was consistent with 
Kim Il-sung’s constant efforts to incorporate the Korean Communist Party into the 
Korean Workers’ Party, allowing the northern Communists to control their southern 
comrades.27
26 Quote by Evgueni Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-51,” Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 54.
27 See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 218-219. According to historian Dae-sook Suh, against 
the hope of most domestic Communists, it was Kim Il-sung’s initiative, with Soviet leaders’ support, to 
establish a Worker Party that was independent of the party in Seoul. See Suh, Kim II Sung: The North 
Korean Leader, 70-71.
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Knowing Kim’s political ambitions, Pak Hon-yong also wanted a military 
conquest, but he had a different plan in mind. He knew that time was against him 
because Syngman Rhee was cracking down on the southern guerrilla forces. Two of 
Pak’s guerrilla leaders, Kim Sam-yong and Yi Chu-ha, were arrested by ROK police in 
March 1950.28 Pak needed to act quickly in order to save his comrades from annihilation. 
Since he had the loyalty of the southern guerrillas, Pak depended on them for political 
leverage against Kim Il-sung. His strategy was to divert the ROK army’s attention with a 
military attack from the north, so that the 500,000 loyal members of the South Korean 
Labor Party (about 2 percent of the overall southern population) would rise up and seize 
Seoul before the KPA could enter.29 Perhaps Pak also expected that, with the ROK 
moving all of its troops to the north to prevent the fall of Seoul, his own guerrilla forces 
would have time to overrun the southern half of the peninsula. In this way, Pak might 
have calculated that his guerrilla forces would become the new KPA in the south on their 
own merits and would not be incorporated into Kim’s units.30
Both Kim and Pak took great risks, but Pak thought that he had a better chance 
because his popularity in the South meant that he would be sure to win more support in 
Seoul than Kim Il-sung.31 His failure was tied to the fact that he over-estimated the 
strength of the guerilla forces. In addition, what he did not expect was the overwhelming 
power of the northern army, the ROK’s strategy of withdrawing its army from Seoul, a
28 Suh, Kim II Sung: The North Korean Leader, 121.
29 ‘The North Korean Labor Party’s Internal Factions,” originally published in the Japanese monthly Jiyu. 
Written by ‘The Neighbouring Countries Research Institute.” Translated in the Selected Summaries o f  
Japanese Magazines (U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, June 26-July3,1967), 4; quoted in Simmons, The Strained 
Alliance, 110. The number 500,000 was provided by Pak H6n-y5ng. It is quite possible that Pak 
overestimated the strength of the guerrillas in the south.
30 This line of reasoning is also supported by Dae-sook Suh’s analysis. See Suh, Kim II Sung: The North 
Korean Leader, 121.
31 Simmons, The Strained Alliance, 110.
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lack of public enthusiasm toward guerrilla uprisings, and the effectiveness of ROK police 
action against subversive activities. Pak’s failure to foresee the defeat of his guerrillas 
later made him a convenient scapegoat. Eventually, his comrades in the North arrested 
and sentenced him to death after the conclusion of the armistice.33
Building a North Korean People’s Army 
Since Kim Il-sung calculated that he would need a massive army to overthrow the 
southern government and unify the country under his rule, his preparations began in 1947, 
even before the formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK). During a meeting with the 
North Korean People’s Committee, Kim argued that since “there [existed] aggressive 
forces” in the south under the direction of American imperialists, North Korea would 
need its own army to defend against an attack.34 By exaggerating the southern threat, 
Kim got his proposal accepted by the committee and the process of recruitment for the 
People’s Army began.
The Korean People’s Army (KPA) was initially composed of Kim’s partisan 
contingency, Korean returnees from Russia, the Korean Volunteer Corps and several 
thousand independent Communist fighters from Manchuria and other parts of China.35 
Recruitment efforts sought young men from reliable backgrounds: poor peasants or 
workers, with no relatives in the south. Former landlords, the bourgeois, and Christians
32 The ROK government employed strong tactics against potential guerrilla uprisings once the war started. 
For example in Kochang (Map 5), the police arrested and executed a huge number of leftists and their 
sympathizers. See H. K. Shin, Remembering Korea 1950: A Boy Soldier’s Story (Reno, NV: University of 
Nevada Press, 2001), 39-40.
33 Simmons, Strained Alliance, 109, 234.
34 Kiwon Chung, ‘The North Korean People’s Army and the Party,” The China Quarterly 14 (April-June 
1963: 107.
35 Ibid., 108.
36 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 235.
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< 27were generally excluded. Although marred by low public enthusiasm, falsification, and 
inefficiency, the recruitment effort was, for the most part, smooth and successful.38
Kim Il-sung carefully concealed the size of his army by organizing divisions 
under various non-military names such as the “Peace Preservation Corps,” the “Border 
Constabulary,” and the “Railroad Guards.”39 In the early stages, the People’s Army, 
despite its size, was still inferior to the southern forces, because the KPA lacked weapons 
and ammunition. In his report to Moscow in March 1949, General Terentii Shtykov, 
Ambassador to North Korea, told Stalin that the North Koreans did not have enough 
trained personnel, adequate weapons, and sufficient bullets to defend the country if the 
South attacked.40 In June 1949, the Soviets finally yielded to Kim and Shtykov’s 
requests, supplying numerous planes, tanks, cannons, landing ships, machine-guns, and 
engineering equipment.41
Kim’s war preparations also involved the construction of elaborate bomb shelters. 
According to Lieutenant Howard Moffett, who was among the first to enter the city after 
its fall (having been bom in P’yongyang to missionary parents), the shelter was “a 
fabulous subterranean system of passageways and rooms extending down an estimated 
100 feet.”42 It was “a real atom proof shelter with electricity and air-conditioning.”43
37 See No, A MiG-15 to Freedom, 36-39.
38 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 235.
39 Chung, ‘The North Korean People’s Army and the Party,” 107.
40 Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics of the Korean War 1949-1951,” 54.
41 Ambassador Shtykov reported that the ROK and the United States were preparing a large-scale war 
against the north and complained that the DPRK army would not be able to resist. See Shtykov report to 
Stalin, 2 May 1949, Archives of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), also Marshal Vasilevsky 
and Ambassador Shtykov’s cable to Stalin on 20 April 1949, N 17064, Archives of the President of the 
Russian Federation (APRF). The documents were mentioned by Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics of the 
Korean War, 1949-1951,” 54. For the treaty between the Soviet Union and the DPRK, see APRF, Fond 6, 
list 9, file 14, p 57.
42 Letter from Howard Moffett, 25 October 1950, Documents o f  the WCC Library: The Korean War, 139- 
MO.
43 Ibid.
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Perhaps such preparations were defensive in nature, but they could also indicate that Kim 
Il-sung was ready to confront the atomic threat of the United States, should his invasion 
plan fail.
The military operation would not be successful if China was not on Kim’s side. 
From 1946 to 1950, Kim Il-sung strengthened his ties with the Chinese Communists. In 
December 1947, Kim and Mao reached an agreement. Mao would provide foodstuffs 
and recognize the North Korean People’s Committee as the legitimate government of 
Korea. In exchange, Kim would send two divisions to assist Mao in his revolution. These 
divisions totaled about 100,000 young men, and consisted of both North Koreans and 
Korean residents of Manchuria.44
This deal benefited Kim Il-sung in two ways. First, the Chinese civil war served 
as a training ground for his soldiers. When these two divisions were finally returned to 
North Korea, these veterans doubled the strength and fighting capacity of the KPA. 
Moreover, American intelligence estimated that 80 percent of the officers in the Korean 
People’s Army (KPA) had fought in China. Second, because “the bright five-starred 
national flag of the People’s Republic of China was also dyed with the blood of the 
Korean revolutionaries,”45 Mao would be obligated to support Kim’s own war when the 
time came.
In March 1948, a secret Soviet-Chinese-North Korean Joint Military Council 
(Haptong kunsa hyobuihoe) was established in P’yongyang, for the purpose of 
coordinating military activities between the three Communist countries.46 These military
44 Chung, ‘The North Korean People’s Army and the Party,” 109. See also Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man 
Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao and the Origins o f the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 109.
45 Chung, ‘The North Korean People’s Army and the Party,” 109.
46 Ibid.
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connections between the Chinese and the North Koreans paved the way for Chinese 
intervention. Once the Chinese entered the war, this council would work extensively 
with both Soviet military advisers and Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV).47
Stalin’s Approval o f Kim’s Military Conquest 
Kim Il-sung understood the crucial role of the Soviet Union in his unification 
scheme. Regardless of how well he prepared, his hands were tied unless he had full 
Soviet support and Stalin’s approval. Therefore, Kim carefully cultivated a friendship 
with Stalin, demonstrating his loyalty to the Russian leader and his commitment to 
Communism at every opportunity. He constantly thanked Stalin for liberating Korea 
from the Japanese imperialists and praised the Soviet Union as the Communist fatherland. 
Stalin’s picture was posted everywhere in Korea. Standing before the Russian dictator, 
Kim Il-sung practiced humility and self-control by remaining patient and persistent while 
pursuing his goal of unification.
From 1947 to 1949, Stalin carefully restrained his young Korean comrade from 
stirring up trouble along the 38th Parallel. However, in January 1950, Stalin reversed his 
position -  giving Kim the go-ahead and supplying him with Russia’s most advanced 
weapons. Adam B. Ulam, the ex-director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard 
University and an expert in Russian foreign policy, pointed out that Stalin would never 
have made such a reversal just because of Kim’s persistence.48 The decision to attack in 
1950 must have served Stalin’s own purposes.49 Although it is still not known what was 
truly in Stalin’s mind, his comments to Mao about the “changed international situation”
47 Ibid.
48 Adam B. Ulam, “Letters: Stalin, Kim, and Korean War Origins,” Cold War International History Project 
Bulletin 4  (Fall 1994): 21.
49 Ulam’s idea is further supported by Thornton’s Odd Man Out.
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might be the primary reason for the new Russian strategy.50 Stalin might well have felt
more comfortable with starting a Korean conflict once he had atomic bombs and
Communists were in firm control of the Chinese mainland. Soviet documents further
suggested that Stalin received intelligence information, a message sent from a British spy
Donald MacLean prior to Secretary Dean Acheson’s National Press speech of January 12,
1950, that the United States would not intervene in Korean affairs.51 Acheson’s speech
further strengthened Stalin’s conviction.
Looking at the situation from another angle, historian Richard C. Thornton argued
that Stalin’s real motivation was that he was uncomfortable with Mao’s success in China
and thus tried to control him.52 According to Thornton’s analysis, Stalin had a plan not
only to prevent Mao from conquering Taiwan in August 1950, but also to drag the
Chinese Communists into a war with the United States, thereby isolating China from the
Western world. Stalin may have seen Korea as an opportunity to confront the United
States without using his own troops. One indication of this was Stalin’s insistence that
Kim Il-sung obtain a Chinese commitment to send ground troops if the Americans or the
Japanese intervened.53
Stalin, nevertheless, wanted to conceal his involvement in the planning of a North
Korean attack in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. He
instructed the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, Jacob (Iakvo) Alexandrovich
Malik, to walk out of the UN Security Council on February 3, 1950. Outwardly, Malik
50 Coded message N 5500,14 May 1950, APRF, Fund 45, list 1, file 331, p. 55, Wilson Center Cold War 
International History Project. Document quoted in Paul Wingrove, “Who started Korea?” History Today
50 (July 2000): 46.
51 Kathryn Weathersby, ‘The Korean War Revisited,” Wilson Quarterly 23 (1 June 1999): 91.
52 Thornton, Odd Man Out.
53 Coded message N 5500,14 May 1950, APRF, Fund 45, list 1, file 331, p. 55. Wilson Center Cold War 
International History Project. Document quoted in Paul Wingrove, “Who started Korea?” History Today 
50 (July 2000): 46.
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was protesting the refusal to admit Communist China into the United Nations and the 
presence of the Nationalist representation, but in reality, Malik’s action was to shield his 
country from accusation of any foreknowledge of the attack and to avoid potential 
diplomatic damage caused by the outbreak of the Korean War. Had the Soviets been 
present at the Security Council meeting, Malik would have found himself confronted 
with the decision of whether or not they should use the veto power. If the Soviet Union 
had vetoed the UN resolution against North Korea, it would have been condemned by 
world public opinion. However, if the Soviet Union had supported the UN resolution, it 
would have prevented any other Communist nation from coming to North Korea’s aid. 
Even if the Soviet Union had simply abstained from voting, it would have destroyed its 
credibility in the Communist world by allowing the capitalists to win without putting up a 
fight. Therefore, the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council meetings 
was the best way to avoid a no-win situation.
Stalin’s Use o f Churches for Anti-Atomic Weapons Propaganda
Stalin’s next step was to find a way to nullify US atomic superiority should the 
United States enter the war. In March 1950, Moscow started a propaganda offensive by 
launching the “Signatures For Peace Campaign” in Stockholm, Sweden. The 
Communist-controlled World Congress of Partisans of Peace (WCPP) adopted the 
“Stockholm Resolution,” urging a complete ban on the use of atomic weapons.54 This 
campaign sought to convince the UN to condemn any first-use of atomic weapons.
What was the political purpose of this campaign at this time? Putting this event in 
the context of the upcoming attack in June, it was a psychological offensive in 
preparation for the Korean War. Given the fact that Stalin had in mind to start a war, his
54 “Moscow’ ‘Signatures for Peace’ Campaign,” Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 151.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
300
goal was to prevent the United States from using atomic weapons against North Korea.55 
According to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, shortly before the outbreak of the Korean 
War “more than half the population of North Korea was reported to have signed the 
petition.”56 The petition requested the United States and the Soviet Union not to never to 
use atomic weapons. The campaign played on public sentiments, such as a universal 
aversion to war, the fear of atomic destruction, the concern for economic recovery, and 
the desire for international tensions to cease.57
In fact, the Stockholm Peace Campaign targeted religious groups in the West and 
served to confuse religious opinion on the use of atomic weapons, rendering the weapon 
morally indefensible. To publicize the message of this peace initiative, Communists 
employed religious leaders from Eastern Europe, under the leadership of Bishop Albert 
Berezky, the leader of the Hungarian Reform Church. Stalin was not above benign 
manipulation of religious opinion in the West with one hand, even while his other hand 
crushed the churches in the East. He understood that Christianity was the major moral 
foundation of the Western world, so he appealed to religious morality and ideals to limit 
US military options and hopefully to ground all atomic weapons for the benefit of North 
Korea’s invading army. By May 1950, the WCPP claimed to have received 100 million 
signatures, mostly from behind the Iron Curtain.58 Although there were fewer signatures 
than had been anticipated from the West, the effort was successful in swaying European
55 The North Koreans’ fear of the atomic bomb was real because Kim Il-sung had built an underground 
bomb shelter to protect himself from any potential U.S. atomic bombardment.
56 Statement by Dean Acheson on the “Soviet Peace Petition on July 12, 1950, Documents o f  the WCC 
Library: The Korean War, 45.
57 “Moscow ‘Signatures for Peace’ Campaign,” Documents o f  the WCC Library: The Korean War, 151.
58 Ibid.
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opinion. Religious leaders, such as the Bishop of Chichester, would later lobby the 
British government to prevent the use of atomic weapons in the Korean War.59
Preparing For a Surprise Attack on June 25,1950 
As soon as Kim Il-sung received approval from Stalin, he immediately 
accelerated preparations for war. In March 1950, Kim Il-sung asked to use the Soviet 
credit that had been allocated for 1951, in order to acquire additional military hardware. 
The Soviet Union promptly agreed.60 The Russians also delivered more arms and 
equipment for forming additional units of the KPA. A month later, leaders of the 
southern Communist guerilla forces arrived in P’yongyang to work out a program of 
action for before and after the invasion.61 After Kim H-sung met with Mao Zedong in 
May 1950, the Chinese promised to send food aid and to transfer one army closer to 
Korea, just in case the Japanese entered on the side of the South.”62
In May 1950, Kim Il-sung informed General Shtykov that his general staff had 
started to plan for a June attack, contingent on the arrival of the promised Soviet 
armaments. Kim was in a hurry because he was afraid that a possible leak would spoil 
the element of surprise, or that the July rainy season might hinder its speed.63 At his 
insistence, the war was finally scheduled for June 2 5 ,1950.64
59 The Russians’ planning paid off eventually when the British obtained Truman’s promise not to use the 
atomic bomb without consulting them. Truman’s hands were tied due to international and religious opinion.
60 Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics o f the Korean War 1949-1951,” 54.
61 Ibid.
62 Telegram 362,1950. Quote in Weathersby, “New Findings on the Korean War,” Cold War International 
History Project Electronic Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993): 16.
63 Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics of the Korean War,” 54.
64 Telegram 408, 1950, quoted in Weathersby, “New Findings on the Korean War,” 16.
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A SOUTHERN REVIVAL ON THE EVE OF WAR
According to historian Kathryn Weathersby and Christian F. Ostermann, Director 
of the Cold War International History Project, the North Korean leadership had “greatly 
overestimated the support it enjoyed among the population of the South and 
underestimated the likelihood of U.S. intervention to defend” the South Korean 
government.65 The main reason for this discrepancy was the religious factor, an 
important aspect that was somehow missed by both North Korean leaders and Korean 
War historians. Before the outbreak of the Korean War, the South Korean government, 
the Korean churches, and American missionaries had labored intensively to rescue the 
nation from Communist expansion through religious means.
Church and State
Religion and politics were intertwined in the Republic of Korea (ROK). While 
traditional religions were losing their share of political power, Christianity was on the rise, 
especially after Syngman Rhee came to power.66 Not only did Christians closely identify 
with Rhee’s regime, but they were active in both the National Assembly and the 
provincial governments. In spite of their small percentage in the overall Korean 
population, Christians were gaining political power in the South. By May 1950, about 
half of Rhee’s cabinet members were Christians. Around forty of the newly elected 210 
legislators in the National Assembly were also Christians. The Vice Chairman of the 
Assembly was a Presbyterian elder. The mayor of Seoul and three of the eight provincial
65 Christian F. Ostermann and Kathryn Weathersby, “New Evidence on North Korea,” Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin 14/15 (Winter 2003-Spring 2004): 5-7.
66 The growth o f Christianity and its political influence in the South has been catalogued in chapter 3.
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governors were also Christians. The future of these Christian leaders depended very 
much on keeping the Communists at bay.
Fear and uncertainty were inescapable elements of life in South Korea due to the 
division of the Korean peninsula. Those who were either in the ROK government or 
loyal to Rhee were particularly worried. According to President Rhee, “Every Christian 
knows he is a prime target” since so much of the Korean leadership was closely
/TO
connected to the church and the foreign missionaries. Rhee believed that because these 
Christians had “ideas and convictions and would stand up against the Communists,” they 
would be murdered if the North took control.69
As rumors of war grew louder and the prospect of American military support 
faded away, many Christian clergyman and some ROK officials became convinced that a 
national revival was the only way to avert disaster. They hoped that God’s divine 
intervention would save the country from an invasion and would counteract the climate 
of fear. President Rhee told Rev. Bob Pierce, a Youth for Christ evangelist who visited 
Korea in April 1950 and later became the founder of World Vision, Inc., that “the reason 
Communism had been unable to destroy his government through termite tactics was 
because of the tremendous surge of spiritual passion which had come to his people,” in 
the words of Pierce.70 The nation, Rhee believed, needed “some kind of a spiritual
71renewal” if the South wanted to survive a military conquest from the North. In early
67 Letter from Harold Voelkel to Dr. John C. Decker, 29 July 1950, Documents o f  the WCC Library: The 
Korean War, 61.
68 See quote in Franklin Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do (USA: Samaritan’s Purse, 1983), 146.
69 Ibid.
70 Bob Pierce, The Untold Korean Story (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1951), 5.
71 Rhee as quoted in Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do, 146.
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1950, a National Day of Prayer was called by the churches and supported by the ROK 
government.
Bob Pierce and the “Save the Nation Evangelistic Crusade”
In March 1950, Protestant churches under the sponsorship of the Korean National 
Council of Churches (KNCC) conducted a nationwide evangelistic campaign, entitled the 
“Save the Nation Evangelistic Crusade.”72 American missionaries, such as Rev. Harold 
Voelkel and Rev. Otto De Camp, were involved in the interdenominational preparation 
committee.73 The crusade was to be a series of city-wide evangelistic campaigns in key 
areas throughout the nation, modeled after Billy Graham’s successful American crusades. 
The cities that were chosen represented Korea’s major population centers. The areas with 
the highest Christian population were Taegu, Seoul, and Inch’on, but the campaign also 
went to Pusan, Taejon, and Kaesong (see Map 4), thereby covering the major political, 
economic, and strategic areas of the south (see Table 5.1). During the Korean War, most 
of these cities (except Pusan) would be completely destroyed and many of their residents 
became refugees.
The highlight of this campaign was the participation of three young American 
preachers: Gill Dodds, Rev. Bob Findley, and Rev. Bob Pierce. Their participation arose 
from unplanned happenstance. Rev. Eddie Kilboume of the Oriental Missionary Society 
and his wife Ernie Kilboume were friends of Pierce. They had left China for Korea after 
the fall of Beijing, and had become involved in planning the crusade. When they heard 
that Pierce would be visiting Korea on his way to Tokyo, they invited him to lead the
72 The government did not pay for the campaign, but Rhee’s administration was supportive of the efforts of 
the churches.
73 The crusade was greatly praised by Rev. Harold Voelkel in his letter (29 July 1950) to Dr. John C.
Decker, the Secretary of the International Missionary Council, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War. 
Documents o f  the WCC Library: The Korean War, 61.
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“Save the Nation Evangelistic Crusade.”74 The Kilboumes specifically asked him to 
bring along Gill Dodds, a famous US track star, because of high Korean interest in the 
sport of track and field. Rev. Pierce not only brought Dodds but also invited Bob Findley, 
a national inter-collegiate boxing champion who also planned to take a trip to Korea and 
Japan. Upon arriving in Seoul, they were enthusiastically welcomed by the leading 
sports writers, government officials, Korean church leaders, and missionaries.75 They 
stayed in Korea for almost nine weeks, leaving in early June 1950, a few weeks before 
the outbreak of the Korean War.76 Revival meetings were carried out in major cities 
including Taegu, Pusan, Seoul, Taejon, and Inch’on.
The “crusade” specifically focused on high school and college students -  the very 
groups that Communist propaganda also targeted. Daily meetings were conducted in 
local high schools while the crusade team was in town. These usually were not mission 
schools, but public and non-religious private schools. On every night of the crusade, the 
entire student body of that school (typically one to two thousand) would crowd into the 
school auditorium to listen to the American speakers through a Korean translator. Based 
on data provided by Rev. Pierce, he visited at least forty schools and spoke to about
77seventy to a hundred thousand students during the nine-week schedule.
Why would secular public schools and non-Christian private schools want to 
invite American preachers? It was because the schools were concerned about leftist 
activities among the youth, so that even secular educators encouraged religious teaching
74 Bob Pierce met the Kilbournes in China. After the Communists took power in Korea, they joined the 
Korea mission instead of returning to the United States. See Pierce, The Untold Korean Story, 6.
75 Ibid., 9,
76 Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do, 146.
77 The size of high school was usually from 1000 to 1500. The American team spent 10 days in Taegu, 5 in 
Pusan, 11 in Seoul, and unknown in Taejfin (at least 5 days).
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to counteract Communist utopianism. One non-Christian principal explained to Rev. 
Pierce, “We want you to preach your Christ, because even though most of us on the 
faculty are not Christians, we know that only Christianity offers a challenge strong 
enough and stirring enough to turn these young people from Communism.”78 Since the 
beginning of the century, Christianity had gained a positive reputation among Korean 
educators. Its influence on Korean nationalism and postwar anti-Communism marked it 
as an essential social and political force in South Korea. Although the majority of South 
Koreans were not Christians, most of them respected Christianity and embraced Christian 
ideas.
The ROK military in particular was eager to support the crusade. Many military 
leaders invited the American preachers to preach to their soldiers. In Taegu, Rev. Pierce 
and his companions drove out to an ROK army camp and preached to hundreds of 
soldiers.79 In Kaesong, they visited the 38th Parallel, and again spoke to the troops. Most 
of the guards whom they talked to that day would be captured or killed by the KPA a 
month later.80 The Korean army invited these preachers because they believed that 
Christian soldiers were better fighters and that Christian beliefs were essential to 
containing Communist infiltration.
The best example of the influence of Christianity in the ROK military was the 
case of the Coast Guard. The American Military Government (AMG) organized the 
Coast Guard in early 1946. Like the Constabulary, the Coast Guard attracted many 
dissidents, including Communists from the radical sailors’ unions. Many defected to the 
north with their boats and equipment. When the Republic of Korea was established in
78 Pierce, The Untold Korean Story, 30.
79 Ibid., 32.
80 Ibid., 56-59.
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August 1948, President Rhee appointed Admiral Son Won-il, a Methodist, to take charge 
of the Coast Guard. Admiral Son immediately established a new way to comer the 
subversive elements by making Protestant Christianity the official religion of the Korean 
navy. Starting from November 1948, Admiral Son ordered that sailors who were 
stationed at his Seoul headquarters had to attend chapel services. His policy became 
common practice throughout the ROK navy so that eventually a Chaplain Office was 
established in November 1950, five months ahead of other ROK forces. In addition, 
under Admiral Son’s order, navy recruiters sought out Christian refugees from North 
Korean fishing communities, while investigators were tracking down the last 
Communists hiding in the ROK navy. When the American advisors came to have 
training sessions with the ROK navy, they discovered that the navy had the strongest 
anti-Communist fighters in the ROK military.81
In addition to Admiral Son, there were other Christian generals in the ROK army. 
The most famous one was General Won Yong-dok, the son of a Christian minister from 
North Korea and a medical doctor trained by American missionaries. He was the most 
loyal supporter of Syngman Rhee and took charge of Rhee’s coup against the National 
Assembly in May 1952 and the release of the anti-Communist North Korean POWs in 
June 1953.82 The famous “Paik brothers” in the ROK army -  Colonel Paek Son-yop of 
the Capital Division and Colonel Paek In-yop, the Commander of the 17th Regiment on 
the Ongjin Peninsula -  who were later promoted to become generals during the Korean 
War, were very pro-Christian because of their close connection with Cho Man-sik.
81 Millett, The War fo r  Korea, 1945-1950,174.
82 Sun-yup Paik, From Pusan to Panmunjom: Wartime Memoirs o f the Republic o f  Korea’s First Four-Star 
General (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1992), 82, 194, 229.
83 Ibid., 77 ,79 , and 82.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
308
Support from provincial officials also facilitated the campaign. For example, in 
Taegu, where the crusade began, Pierce recounted, “The city officials gave it their whole­
hearted cooperation.”84 The governor of the province (North Kyongsang) Cho Jae-chon 
(Jo Jae-cheon), who was a Christian, even came to the revival meeting in the Town Hall 
for all eleven nights. Governor Cho allowed them to use the city’s giant stadium to host 
Gill Dodds’ exhibition race. On that day, 60,000 people came to the revival meeting at 
the stadium. The event was highly publicized and students were dismissed from high 
school so that they could participate in the campaign (see Table 5.2).85 Each night, over a 
hundred people came forward to make a public confession of their faith.
In Pusan, the American team was invited by the governor of South Kyongsang 
Province, Yang Song-bong (Yang Seong-bong), who was also a Christian, to combine 
their evangelical meeting with the celebration of the return of 3000 soldiers from guard 
duty along the 38 Parallel, in the city’s biggest stadium. Around 30,000 Pusan residents 
came to the stadium to attend the celebration and to see Dodds, because Korean runners 
had just swept the top three places in the Boston Marathon the week before.86 After the 
ceremony and an exhibition race, all the soldiers and townspeople stayed to listen to 
Dodd’s testimony and Rev. Pierce’s message.87
The “Save the Nation Evangelical Crusade” was the most successful evangelical 
campaign in Korean Church history up to that point. After nine weeks of preaching, Dr. 
Pierce reported that over 25,000 new converts made their public confessions.88 These 
numbers were much higher than the crusades led by Rev. Billy Graham in Los Angeles
84 Ibid., 33.
85 Ibid.
86 Newsweek, 1 May 1950, 70-71.
87 Pierce, The Untold Korean Story, 36-37.
88 Ibid., 29.
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(1949) or any other Youth for Christ rallies in the United States. In fact, Dr. Pierce did 
not plan the campaign. Nor did he personally know much about the Korean churches and 
political, social, and military conditions prior to his visit. The crusade’s planning 
committee headed by missionaries and Korean pastors made all the arrangements. The 
name of the crusade demonstrated the goal of the planners to identify personal salvation 
with national deliverance. Christianity thus emerged as a dominant ideological force 
against Communism in South Korea.
Warnings Go Unheeded 
As North Korea proceeded with preparations for a surprise attack, intelligence 
began to reach the ROK by May 1950. The North’s large concentrations of troops and 
tanks along the border alarmed the Korean Defense Minister, Sin Song-mo (Shin Sung- 
mo). As early as May 10, Minister Sin had called a press conference for foreign 
correspondents to announce the discovery of at least 155 Soviet-made T-34 medium
thtanks, the massive military build-up along the 38 Parallel, and the presence of 118,000 
Communist troops in combat positions.89 Two days later, President Rhee also held a 
press conference, referring to Minister Sin’s report, complaining about the United States’ 
ambivalent position and emphasizing the need for immediate action.90 The ROK hoped 
that the United States and its allies would recognize the threat, respond with military 
supplies, and make preparations to repel an attack.
Nevertheless, neither the US press nor US experts took these warnings seriously. 
The New York Times, for example, buried Sin’s report on page 14, in a thirty-three-word
89 Thornton, Odd Man Out, 172.
90 Ibid., 175.
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newsbrief.91 Minister Sin’s warning was further refuted by Charge d’Affairs Everett 
Drumright who argued that the Korean reports were exaggerated and reasoned that the 
South Koreans intended to manipulate the threat to elicit additional military aid from the 
United States.92 Drumright’s argument was supported by intelligence reports submitted 
by the CIA, the Pentagon, and the Far Eastern Command in Tokyo.93 The United States 
government therefore refused to answer the pleas of the ROK. The South Koreans were 
desperate to find even one sympathetic ear in Washington.
John Foster Dulles Visits Korea Eight Days before the War 
Ambassador Dr. John M. Chang, himself a devoted Korean Catholic, believed 
that John Foster Dulles was the key to persuading the Truman administration to supply 
equipment to the South. He knew that Dulles was an influential Republican foreign 
policy expert who was willing to work with Democrats to pursue a bi-partisan approach 
to post-war reconstruction in East Asia. And, since Chang had previously worked 
closely with Dulles in obtaining recognition of Korea by the United Nations, he felt that 
he could get Dulles’ attention. Hearing that Dulles had been appointed as a special envoy 
to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan, and that he was planning a stopover in Korea, 
Ambassador Chang invited Dulles and other high-ranking State Department officials to a 
dinner at the Wardman-Park Hotel in Washington, DC. He urged Dulles to investigate 
the factual conditions along the 38th Parallel and to speak before the newly elected
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 173.
93 For the CIA report, see CIA report #172: ORE 18-50,19 June 1950, “Current Capabilities of the 
Northern Korean Regime,” National Archives Record Administration (NARA). For the details of the US 
Army position, see James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1972), 64. For Tokyo’s report, see Thornton, Odd Man Out, 175.
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National Assembly. Dulles agreed and prepared a speech, which was approved by 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, for the assembly.
To appreciate how Dulles’ visit would come to impact the religious aspects of the 
war, his political and religious background must first be understood. Dulles’ record 
reveals close connections with the Federal Council of Churches of Christ (FCCC) and the 
Presbyterian Church (USA) throughout the 1940s. He was the son of a liberal 
Presbyterian minister, Rev. Allen Macy Dulles, and the grandson of a missionary to India, 
John Wesley Dulles. On his mother’s side, his grandfather, John Watson Foster, had been 
Secretary of State under President Benjamin Harrison. He therefore inherited the genes 
of a politician and a preacher. Growing up under the influence of his father and 
grandfathers, Dulles held liberal religious beliefs and a worldview of American mission 
and exceptionalism.94 Dulles became a successful lawyer and chaired the Commission to 
Study the Basis of a Just and Durable Peace, created by the FCCC in February 1941. As 
a well-known Christian layman with political and business connections, he rose quickly 
within the ranks of the Republican Party.
Dulles’ influence in Washington was not overlooked by American missionaries in 
Korea. They understood that Dulles would be a great friend within the administration, if 
they could only impress upon him the vitality of Korean Christianity and the spiritual 
nature of the Korean struggle. Since Dulles was coming to Korea, the Presbyterian 
missionaries in Seoul invited him to a special reception in his honor. Being a 
Presbyterian himself, Dulles gladly accepted. Flying from Tokyo to Seoul on June 17, 
Dulles found himself on the same plane as Dr. John C. Smith, the Foreign Secretary of
94 For details, see Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S.
Foreign Policy (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), 1-3.
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the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Mission, who was on his way to Korea to attend the 
Annual Conference of the Northern Presbyterian Mission.
This dinner party with Dulles would be a prime opportunity for the missionaries 
and the Presbyterian Board Secretary to plead for Korea’s need of support, to recount the 
history of the Korean Church, and to present a vision of a future when Korea would be 
largely Christian. They reported the recent success of Bob Pierce’s evangelical crusade 
and the Christian influence within the ROK government. After the dinner party, the 
missionaries persuaded Dulles to take a detour with them to visit the Yongnak Church, a 
well-known North Korean refugee church in Seoul established by Rev. Han Kyong-jik.95 
The church was holding a special Saturday night evangelical meeting of three thousand 
people. Dulles and Smith made a quick stop and briefly greeted the refugees. Although 
there were hundreds of churches in Seoul, Yongnak was the biggest and most beautiful of 
the refugee churches. The missionaries chose to take Dulles to this church because they 
wanted him to tell the American people and the President that the Korean people 
deserved their support because they were fighting for freedom (in particular, religious 
freedom).
Dulles saw his trip as a fact-finding mission and so he paid close attention to 
every detail.96 Before going to the dinner reception, he first visited the 38th Parallel 
together with the Foreign Minister Im Pyong-jik, and other Korean officials. At the same 
time, Dulles sought to counteract the feeling among Koreans that the United States had
95 Letter from Harold Voelkel to Dr. John C. Decker, 29 July 1950, Documents o f  the WCC Library: The 
Korean War, 61.
96 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War: Republic o f  Korea and the United States, 1948- 
1953 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 167-168.
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abandoned them.97 In his address before the Korean National Assembly on June 19, he 
described how he had seen the 38th Parallel, met with ROK soldiers, conversed with 
government officials, educators, and economists, and prayed with North Korean refugees. 
He confided that he was impressed and had found “in the Korean nation a worthy ally for 
peace and justice in the world.”98 He assured the Korean people that they would not 
stand alone against the Communists, so long as they acted worthily in the great design of 
human freedom. After spending five days in Korea, Dulles left for Japan on June 22, 
1950.
Undoubtedly, Dulles’ speech and personal convictions did not represent the 
official policy of the United States government. Also, his visit was too short and 
occurred too late to influence US preparations for an attack that would come in only three 
days. Nor did any practical help immediately follow his visit. His “You are not alone” 
statement, however, was widely circulated across the south, and some Koreans felt that 
he had given “the most explicit assurance of American protection.”99 Though not official 
policy, his words did convey the underlying sentiment of at least some Americans (from 
Senators100 to officials, clergymen, and citizens) that the United States had a moral 
obligation toward Korea. Such sentiments should not be overlooked, especially not in a
97 Ibid.
98 Speech before the National Assembly, 19 June 1950, John Foster Dulles Papers (MC#016), Korea, Box 
48, Folder 1950, Seeley Mudd Library.
99 Quote in Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War, 168.
100 Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg and Congressman Walter Judd were the most outspoken in Congress on 
America’s moral obligation to Korea. When they visited other Asian countries, they were impressed to 
hear the often repeated questions, “What will the US do about Korea?” Korea became an important symbol. 
How the United States handled Korea would seriously affect the confidence o f other Asian countries 
toward the United States leadership position in the Far East. See Robert Oliver’s letter to Syngman Rhee, 
dated January 7, 1950, 29 Taehanmingoksa jaryojip 29
(Documents o f the History of the Republic of Korea Vol. 29: Syngman Rhee Collection (1949-1950)
(Seoul: S3 la  313? I t  la Guksapyeonchan wiwonhoe The Committee o f National History Compilation), 
245.
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highly moralistic and religious decade, when the pressure of public opinion might
t
influence decision making in Washington. Dulles’ visit to Korea transformed his 
understanding of the Korean problem and marked his new personal commitment to the 
defense of South Korea. He became a crucial voice in the State Department advocating a 
firm policy on Korea.
THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR
The outbreak of the Korean War itself was hardly a military surprise to many 
Korean officials because they had already received intelligence reports and observed 
signs of a possible attack, although they did not know the exact date of the operation. 
The real surprises came, however, when the fighting actually began. First, the South 
Korean troops discovered that the strength of the invading North Korean army, especially 
the power of the Russian-made tanks, was completely beyond their calculations. Second, 
the quick abandonment of Seoul by the ROK government shocked most Koreans and 
disappointed many foreign diplomats in Seoul. Third, the swift action of the United 
States to send American troops to defend the Pusan Perimeter upset the plans of the 
North. The focus of this section is on examining how the United States government, the 
missionaries, and the churches responded to the outbreak of the war and how the 
religious factor emerged as the key “selling point” in defending the US military 
intervention to the American people.
The Attack on June 25,1950 
On June 25, 1950, at 4:00 AM on a Sunday morning, while a third of ROK 
officers were in Seoul for a special gathering and half of the Korean soldiers were on
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leave to harvest their crops, the North Koreans launched an all-fronts attack along the 38th 
Parallel. The first shot was fired on the Ongjin Peninsula and the fighting quickly spread 
to six other major points along the border. After five hours of intense fighting, the city of 
Kaesong, once the ancient capital of Koryo, was in Communist hands.101 Five Methodist 
missionaries living in the city, and one missionary visitor from Seoul, became the first 
group of Americans captured by the North Korean soldiers.102 Their internment served as 
a rallying cry among American religious groups, who wished to locate their whereabouts 
and sought their release throughout the Korean War.
News of the assault, sent by the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG), 
reached General Mac Arthur’s office in Tokyo within two hours of the attack. Hours later, 
he also received a chain of telegrams from Ambassador John J. Muccio in Seoul, 
forwarding President Rhee’s pleas for arms and ammunition. In his first complete report 
to Washington, MacArthur warned, “Enemy effort serious in strength and strategic intent 
and is undisguised act of war subject to United Nations censure.” 103 Even before 
directions from Washington arrived, MacArthur ordered General Walton H. Walker, the 
Commander of the US Eighth Army, to load the MSTS Keathley with ammunition and 
mortars to send to the ROK troops so long as they had the ability to use them.104
Dulles rushed from Kyoto to Tokyo to meet with MacArthur as soon as he heard 
the news of the invasion. The general, however, expressed confidence and downplayed 
the attack, telling Dulles that it was just “a bonfire” and that soon “the North Korean
101 Quoted in Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, 65.
102 For the details o f their imprisonment, see Larry Zellers, In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner in North Korea 
(Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1991).
103 Quoted in Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, 65.
104 Ibid., 66.
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tanks would run out of gas.”105 Nevertheless, Dulles’ own recent observations of the 38th 
Parallel had convinced him that the situation was more dire than MacArthur had admitted. 
That evening, Dulles and his assistant from the State Department, John M. Allison, sent a 
telegram to Washington, stating their strong belief that if the South Koreans could not 
repulse the attack, “US force should be used even though this risks Russian counter 
moves.” They suggested that it was possible to ask for UN intervention through the 
Security Council under Article 106.106
Washington’s Response 
To Dulles’ delight, Truman responded to the outbreak of the Korean War swiftly. 
Informed by his Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the President, who was on a weekend 
visit to his hometown, authorized the State Department to bring the problem immediately 
to the UN Security Council. Hurrying back to Washington approximately 20 hours after 
the attack, Truman met with his top advisers from the State Department and the Pentagon. 
Secretary Acheson was convinced that the Soviet Union was behind the attack and that 
“to back away from this challenge” would damage the prestige of the United States. 
Therefore, he concluded that the United States “could not accept the conquest of this 
important area by a Soviet puppet.”107 Most officials believed that Korea was the place 
where the United States had to take a stand against the Soviets. Acheson, in particular, 
advocated taking a clear stand in Korea because he believed that US inaction would 
jeopardize the Western Alliance in Europe.108 The President agreed, but cautioned that
105 Robert H. Ferrell, “Dulles, John Foster 1888-1959,” Historical Dictionary o f the Korean War ed. by 
James I. Matray (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 146.
106 “Korea: Summary o f Actions and Decisions, June 24-25,” Korea Project o f  the Division o f Historical 
Policy Research, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Lot Files 78/D174, National Archives.
107 Acheson as quoted in Wingrove, “Who Started Korea?” History Today 7 (July 2000): 44.
108 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1986), 507.
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the United States “had to meet [the Communists’] thrust without getting embroiled in a 
world-wide war.”109 The President then sent the Far East Air Force (FEAF) to assist in 
the evacuation of American civilians to Japan. The Air Force was authorized to destroy 
enemy tanks if necessary during the evacuation process. Truman also ordered General 
MacArthur to send a survey group, headed by Brig. General John H. Church, to Korea 
and to provide ammunition and military supplies to the South Koreans.
From the beginning, the President made it clear to his advisers that the United 
States would wait for the resolution of the United Nations before acting because he 
believed that the Korean question was the responsibility of the United Nations. The 
United States should react as a firm supporter of the United Nations. Immediately after 
this meeting, the State Department stepped into high gear, preparing a draft resolution 
recommending a police force from all UN member states to restore the international 
boundary between the two Koreas. During the second Blair House meeting a day later, 
the President authorized the Far Eastern Air Force to attack all North Korean tanks, guns, 
military columns and other military targets south of the 38th Parallel. He also ordered the 
Navy to guard South Korea against invading forces.
On June 27, when the UN Security Council passed its resolution condemning the 
North Korean attack and urging its members to aid the South, following Secretary Dean 
Acheson’s suggestion, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan 
Strait.110 This order effectively blocked the advance of Chinese Communists and 
frustrated their plans to launch an assault upon Taiwan in August. Step by step, the 
United States was drawing itself deeper into the Korean conflict. By June 30, US
109 Truman as quoted in Wingrove, “Who Started Korea?” 44.
110 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made, 508.
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involvement was official. Alarmed at the rapid collapse of South Korean defenses, 
Truman committed US ground troops to defend the Pusan Perimeter. Otherwise, the last 
foothold on the Korean peninsula would have been lost. Naturally, South Koreans 
welcomed the President’s decision to confront the crisis in East Asia.
“Operation Highball”
President Truman’s evacuation order reached the American Embassy in Seoul on 
June 26 (Korean time). Ambassador Muccio immediately broadcasted the codeword 
“Highball” over the army radio station, WVTP. American civilians in Seoul had been 
instructed to listen for this word and then assemble at the American Embassy, bringing 
only small hand-carried items.111 The General Headquarters in Tokyo had drawn up the 
evacuation plan, named CHOW CHOW, in July 1949. The American military estimated 
that North Korean forces needed about four days to overrun the Seoul-Inch’on area.112 In 
the evacuation plan, Inch’on and Pusan were the primary evacuation ports.
In June 1950, more than fifteen hundred Americans lived in Korea. The majority 
of them were families of military personnel from the American Mission in Korea 
(AMIK). Others were employees of the State Department, Economic Cooperation 
Administration (ECA), and United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of 
Korea (KMAG) installations. About three hundred were missionaries and their 
dependants. While most Americans lived in Seoul, American missionaries were spread
111 The term “highballing” meant getting away as quickly as possible.
112 Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, 71.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
319
out in major cities on the peninsula. They also were to be evacuated, but would need to 
find their own means of getting to one of the evacuation ports.113
Inauspiciously, the Northern Presbyterian Mission was having its annual 
conference at the beautiful Taech’on Beach, about 135 miles from Seoul (see Map 5), 
when the war broke out. The eighty Americans present at the meeting were unaware of 
their danger because the beach had neither electricity nor telephone service. The closest 
telegraph was eight miles away, in the town of Taech’on. Knowing that an evacuation 
order was imminent, Bob Kinney, who worked for the US embassy, drove to the beach 
through the rain and darkness because his wife, his mother-in-law, and his three children 
were at the conference.114 He awoke some of the missionaries in the middle of the night 
and a patrol was set up to watch the resort perimeter. In the morning, Frank Barnhart, 
another embassy worker and the son of a former YMCA secretary in Korea, arrived with 
news of Operation “Highball” and the evacuation of civilians, mainly women and 
children in Seoul.115
Since they could not get back to Seoul for evacuation, the missionaries at 
Taech’on Beach decided to head south to Pusan. At eleven o’clock in the morning of 
June 26, they headed for Pusan with three rented trucks, five jeeps, two jeep trailers and 
two station wagons.116 They first headed to Taejon, about 85 miles away, in the hopes of 
catching a train to Pusan. It was a slow and painful journey, traveling at 10 miles per 
hour over rough countryside. Upon reaching Taejon, they discovered that most
113 The American military was also responsible for evacuating other foreign diplomats and residences, 
excluding the Chinese (and unclear as to the situation of the White Russians). See Harold Joyce Noble, 
Embassy at War (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1975), 21-23.
114 Letter from John C Smith, 30 June 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 32.
115 Ibid.
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Americans had already left. Hearing rumors that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) had 
landed on the east coast at P’ohang to disrupt road and rail traffic, the missionaries opted 
to drive over the mountains to Taegu in the middle of the night. Dr. John C. Smith, the 
Presbyterian Foreign Mission Secretary from the United States, described this 120-mile 
journey as the worst travel he had ever experienced, having to abandon most of their 
luggage as they fought against numerous punctures, repeated breakdowns and over 25 
washed-out bridges. After 14 hours of struggle, they arrived at Taegu Mission Station, 
one of the large mission stations in Korea.
Their ordeal was more than a memorable adventure; it would have ramifications 
in the years to come. Because they were not evacuated from Seoul, these missionaries 
still had a choice of whether to stay in Korea or retreat to Japan as most other 
missionaries had done. Those who chose to stay behind would not only represent the 
concern of the American churches, but also give valuable services to facilitate the UN 
effort to save South Korea. Those who stayed behind included Rev. Harry Hill, Rev. 
John Underwood, Horace Underwood, Rev. Edward (Ned) Adams, Rev. Arch Campbell, 
and Rev. Fran Kinsler. Their wives also wished to stay, but the group would not allow 
them to, arguing that “the men who remained must have mobility and in addition that the 
presence of American women in a theater of war would be a serious handicap to any 
government.”117 While the rest of the group proceeded to Pusan for evacuation, the 
Underwood brothers and Rev. Harry Hill drove back to Ch’ungju (Ch’ongju) (see Map 5), 
where Rev. Hill and Rev. John Underwood lived.
In Pusan, the majority of the Northern Presbyterian Mission boarded the Lone 
Star State and left for Fukuoka, Japan, on June 28 at two o’clock in the morning (see
117 Ibid., 33.
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Map 6). Before they departed, the group gave all their Korean money to Rev. Edward 
Adams, the Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presbyterian Korea Mission. 
The total amount of this special offering was “over half a million won, almost completely 
filling one pillow case.” 118 The missionaries would soon put this money to use by 
starting their first private relief effort of the Korea War.
Meanwhile, the Southern Presbyterian missionaries were having their annual 
conference in Chonju (see Map 5). As soon they heard the news of a North Korean 
attack, they began to prepare for evacuation to Japan (about 60 people, including women 
and children).119 The mission executive committee decided that mothers and children 
had to leave first, but a skeleton crew of men and a few single female missionaries 
remained to take care of the two major Southern Presbyterian Mission Stations in Chonju 
and Kwangju for as long as possible (see Table 5.3). Eventually, these two groups of 
missionaries, except Miss Florence Root, were all evacuated safely to Pusan on July 16, 
when the People’s Army advanced forcefully into the Cholla region. Miss Root was 
protected by a group of Korean Christians, whom she called “the organization,” living in 
mountain villages in South Cholla Province.120 She survived the ordeal miraculously 
because of their help. Some of them died in order to protect her.
In WSnju, three female Methodist missionaries, Esther Laird, Sadie Maude Moore, 
and Mary Jane Spindlow, were serving in a nursery in the city. Hearing of the war from 
an army sergeant, they left for Pusan on June 26, because they were not sure they could 
get to Inch’on harbor in time. Driving their station jeep, these three American women
118 Ibid.
119 Letter from Robert Knox, 2 July 1950, Presbyterian Church (U.S.) Department of History, Montreat, 
North Carolina.
120 George Thompson Brown, Mission to Korea (USA: Board of World Missions, Presbyterian Church U.S., 
1962), 190.
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undertook a long and dangerous journey over unknown terrain. Fortunately, they evaded 
the Communist guerrillas in the mountains along their route and made it safely to Taegu 
late that night.121
The Koreans in Taegu assured these ladies that the Communists would be driven 
back, but the American soldiers of the KMAG told the missionaries to hurry on to Pusan 
because Seoul was about to fall and the North Koreans might have landed somewhere 
else on the east coast. So they moved on to Pusan, in spite of Esther Laird’s case of food 
poisoning. From Pusan, they boarded the Jesse Lykes for Fukuoka on June 28.122
Back in Seoul, most of the missionaries from different denominations, mainly 
women and children, and other American civilians were evacuated by the Embassy to 
Inch’on and sailed for Japan. The Catholic missionaries, however, were determined to 
stay. The only commercial freighter that could be used for immediate transport was a 
Norwegian fertilizer ship, the SS Reinholt, that had anchored in Inch’on. It normally 
carried twelve passengers, but on the afternoon of June 26, it took on 682 evacuees. The 
stench of nitrate fertilizer made the two-day journey to Fukuoka almost unbearable.
Rev. William E. Shaw, a senior missionary who had served in P’yongyang in the 
1930s, wanted, as did some of the other male missionaries, to stay longer in Seoul once 
their families were safely away. However, on the next day, all Americans in Seoul were 
ordered to evacuate by air immediately.123 Rev. Shaw drove all over Seoul to gather up
121 Letter from Esther Laird, 10 July 1950, Missionary Collection 4, United Methodist Church Archives -  
GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
122 Ibid.
123 Korea Letter #1, 23 July 1950, Church and Society, United Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, 
Madison, New Jersey.
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the remaining missionaries and then headed to Kimp’o Airport, about twenty miles away. 
As they drove, they were “strafed by machine-gun fire” from enemy planes.124
At Kimp’o, there were about 360 people waiting for departure, but only five C-54 
transport planes were available. Each plane could only take sixty people. No baggage 
was allowed and thus a large amount of luggage was left behind at the airport, but there 
were still thirty-six men left standing on the runway, including Rev. Shaw.125 At 7:30 
that evening, one of those planes unexpectedly returned. Without even stopping its 
engines, the C-54 evacuated the last group of men to Tokyo.126 Most of the missionaries 
found refuge in Japan and continued their missionary activities among the Korean 
populations there.127 In the end, when Seoul fell into the hands of the Communists, thirty 
foreign Christian workers, mostly Catholics who refused to be evacuated, were captured 
by the Korean People’s Army (see Table 5.4).
Although the missionaries who had evacuated were physically outside Korea, 
they continued to exert an influential role on the war relief effort. First, they organized 
relief collections in Japan. Second, under Rev. Shaw’s leadership, they published an 
interdenominational newsletter called “Korea Letter” to circulate in American churches. 
Their goal was to supply the latest information on Korea that was provided by the “stay- 
behind” missionaries to stir up public interest in the Korean War. Third, some of these 
missionaries, having served in World War II, reenlisted in the American military as a 
means of finding their way back to Korea. Fourth, those who had returned to the United 
States performed a more direct role in publicity. Supported by their denominations, some
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Letter -  Movement of Missionaries, 10 July 1950, Documents o f  the WCC Library: The Korean War, 19.
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of them traveled across the United States to give lectures and seminars, speaking out for 
the cause in Korea. They also wrote articles for church journals and the secular press, 
thereby encouraging public sentiment for the support of nationwide relief for the Korean 
churches and the American military operation in Korea.
The Conditions in Seoul from June 25 to June 28
In spite of their difficult and dangerous journey, the missionaries who escaped to 
Japan fared better than most of the Korean populace. The majority of Koreans were kept 
in the dark about the true war situation. The ROK government had no plans to evacuate 
the citizens of Seoul. Only top government officials, such as the President and other 
ministers, were able to leave before the army destroyed the Han River Bridge to prevent 
the Russian tanks from crossing.
The speed of the North Korean advance surprised many. With the war just two 
days old, Seoul was already teetering. The blame for this situation fell squarely on 
American shoulders for failing to equip the ROK army with even basic defensive 
weapons. American anti-tank guns were completely useless against the Soviet T-34. 
What made it worse was the fact that most ROK soldiers did not have sufficient antitank 
training due to the rapid expansion of the ROK army from 1948 to 1950. Some had 
never even seen a tank. ROK troops were struck with fear when they first saw the enemy 
tanks and discovered the ineffectiveness of their weapons. Some simply turned their 
backs and ran when they heard the word “tank.” 128 Outnumbered, outgunned, and 
deprived of their best soldiers, the morale of the ROK army quickly deteriorated. Most 
of the troops lost their capacity to fight. The ROK commanders of the 6th, 7th and 10th 
Divisions had no option but to retreat.
128 Paik, From Pusan to Panmunjom, 7.
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Under the leadership of Colonel Paek Son-yop, the ROK 1st Division (also known 
as the Capital Division), however, defended their position bravely, not knowing that the 
other defense lines along the 38th Parallel had already collapsed. The 13th Regiment of 
the 1st Division was able to hold their ground for one day by sending suicide teams to 
destroy the Russian tanks. The loss was huge, but it bought precious time for the 1st 
Division to regroup after the loss of Kaesong. Colonel Paek set up a new defense line in 
Munsan, when the effort to retake Munsan Salient failed. The 1st Division retreated to 
the line of linchpin and asked Seoul for reinforcement. General Ch’ae Pyong-dok, the 
ROK chief of staff, ordered the 1st Division to hold their ground and fight to the death if 
necessary. Unlike other Division commanders who later retreated in spite of the order of 
General Ch’ae, Colonel Paek followed Ch’ae’s direction. What Colonel Paek did not 
know was that shortly after receiving Ch’ae’s order, Seoul fell into the hands of the North
thKoreans when the People’s Army broke through the defense of the 7 Division at 
Uijongbu (see Map 5). As a result, the 1st Division (with about 10,000 ROK soldiers) 
was trapped and left to be annihilated. The condition of Colonel Paek’s troops was 
further weakened when a misinformed U.S. pilot mistook the 1st Division for the North 
Korean troops and bombed the ROK position, causing many more deaths. Without any 
other options, Colonel Paek ordered the 1st Division to withdraw to the south of the Han 
River, hoping to preserve the 1st Division from complete destruction.129
The experience of the 1st Division revealed the lack of coordination of the ROK 
government in facing the attack. Military orders were inconsistent and communication 
between commanders and the headquarters in Seoul was poor. Initially, Rhee had 
planned to remain in the city to boost the morale of the soldiers and to inspire citizens to
129 Ibid., 7-15.
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defend the capital, but the hopelessness of the situation discouraged him from staying. 
His cabinet members feared for their own lives and thus urged Rhee to leave the city 
immediately. They argued that Rhee needed to preserve his life to lead the long term 
battle against North Korea. Against Ambassador Muccio’s advice, Rhee decided to flee 
Seoul on June 26.
The ROK government kept the news of Rhee’s departure from the citizens of 
Seoul, which was about one and one-half million people, because officials feared that a 
negative report would create chaos and affect the morale of the soldiers at the front. An 
official ROK radio broadcast provided false assurances to listeners. The bureaucracy in 
Seoul was left alone to help itself, receiving no clear direction on how to handle the crisis. 
By June 27, when the people finally realized that the North Korean army had reached the 
suburbs of Seoul, it was too late for the majority to get out, especially after the Han River 
Bridge had been hastily destroyed by the ROK army.
When Ambassador Muccio saw that the ROK government had given up the 
defense of Seoul, he ordered the evacuation of all American Embassy personnel. 
Bringing a few key embassy workers with him, Muccio flew to Suwon to meet with Brig. 
General John H. Church and fourteen other officers representing MacArthur’s survey 
team.130 As a testament to America’s unpreparedness, the embassy was abandoned in 
such haste that they left behind “$4.5 million in personal effects, not counting vehicles, 
$100,000 worth of food, and $40,000 worth of duty-free liquor in the commissary -  and a 
considerable number of documents including personnel records.”131
130 For the details of the US embassy response, see Noble, Embassy at War, 36.
131 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 364.
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The Response o f American Churches 
Getting the news of a North Korean attack from the missionaries and ROK 
officials, Protestant church leaders gathered together for prayers. Rev. Han Kyong-jik, 
the pastor of Yongnak Church, met with Dr. Namgung Hyok, the Executive Secretary of 
Korea National Council of Churches (KNCC). They decided that the KNCC should wire 
President Truman in Washington, General MacArthur in Tokyo, and the International 
Missionary Council in New York requesting immediate assistance.132 On June 26 
(American time), Mr. Charles W. Ranson of the International Missionary Council 
received Dr. Namgung’s telegram, and another from C. Y. Hwang of the Salvation Army. 
They urged American churches to use their influence to mobilize the United States to 
support South Korea.133
Responding to the Korean appeal immediately, on June 27, the Methodist Board, 
the Presbyterian Board, and the Foreign Mission Conference of North America sent 
telegrams to the State Department, urging the United States government to support the 
measures already taken by the United Nations.134 To pacify these church groups, the 
State Department responded by sending a staff member, Niles W. Bond, to provide 
information on the evacuation process that was then underway in Seoul and Pusan. On 
June 27 (American Time), the Foreign Mission Conference of North America called for a 
meeting with the Board secretaries from various denominations and religious
132 Letter from Rev. Kyung-chik Han, 12 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, 
Box 16, Folder 37 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
133 Letter from Rowland M. Cross, 27 June 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 1.
134 Ibid., 2.
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organizations with interests in Korea. At the meeting, they decided to mobilize financial
1and prayer support for those missionaries who volunteered to remain in Korea.
Saving the Korean Christians from the hands of Communist persecution would 
become a major theme within Western churches throughout the war years. Dr. Thobum 
T. Brumbaugh, secretary of the Methodist Board of Foreign Missions, wrote an article 
entitled “Disaster to Missions in Korea.”136 He told his Methodist readers that, since the 
democratic developments within Korea were the direct result of the Christian movement, 
American Christians should use whatever means they could to keep the Korean church 
alive. The position of American Christians, according to Brumbaugh, should not only be 
to pray earnestly for Korea, but also to “give of [their] resources to strengthen the morale 
of those who [were] striving still to hold high the banner of Christian enlightenment in 
that unfortunate land.”137
American church leaders also appealed for moral support from the World Council 
of Churches (WCC). On July 13, 1950, the Central Committee of the WCC denounced 
the North Korean attack as “an act of aggression” and called for support of the UN police 
action.138 In particular, the WCC supported the unification of Korea by the United 
Nations, arguing that “every opportunity which [might] arise from the present tragic 
situation must be used to gain this end.”139 Even though the statement issued by the 
WCC recognized that “atomic and bacteriological weapons and obliteration bombing
135 Letter from Rowland M. Cross to Member Boards of the Korea Committee, 27 June 1950, Document of 
the WCC Library: The Korean War, 3.
136 Thobum T. Brumbaugh, “Disaster to Missions in Korea,” Documents o f  the WCC Library: The Korean 
War, 18.
137 Ibid.
138 This statement was adopted unanimously with the exception of the call for a police measure of the UN. 
Two members out o f 45 conscientiously opposed the use of military force.
139 “Korean Situation and World Order,” Approved by the Central Committee of the World Council o f 
Churches, 13 July 1950, Toronto, Canada, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 22.
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[involved] force and destruction of life on so terrible a scale,” it did not rule out their use. 
Instead the WCC formally denounced the “Stockholm Appeal” as “a strategy of 
propaganda,” since it only demanded the outlawing of atomic weapons without providing 
any suggestions for effective international inspection and control.140 Such a position 
taken by the WCC faced serious objection from the Communist-controlled Protestant 
churches in Eastern Europe. Many representatives from Communist countries boycotted 
the WCC to demonstrate their discontent.
Back in the United States, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ (FCCC) 
stood behind the WCC’s position and mobilized the Christian community to support the 
defense of South Korea. Meanwhile, Washington officials also courted the support of 
religious groups because they understood that presenting a just cause and maintaining the 
moral high ground were keys to stirring public favor for a major military operation in 
Korea. In John Foster Dulles, the Truman administration found the ideal champion for 
the war effort: a man who was capable, bi-partisan, and popular in religious circles.
After his brief visit to East Asia, Dulles took a keen personal interest in the 
defense of South Korea, and held strong opinions on how the US should respond. 
According to Ambassador Chang, Dulles felt personally responsible for the well being of 
Korea, because of his remarks to the National Assembly. Upon returning to the States, 
Dulles began to campaign for the Korean cause. On July 1, 1950, a day after the United 
States had committed ground troops, Dulles gave an interview to CBS. He described his 
experiences in Seoul the following way:
This Republic o f Korea was attracting a constant stream of refugees from the north who 
wanted to escape from Communist despotism. Just two weeks ago tonight at this very 
hour, I was meeting at Seoul with a group of 3,000 Christian refugees from the north.
140 Ibid., 23.
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We were in a great new church which was in [the] process of construction. I talked to the 
refugees through an interpreter and I have never seen men and women more clearly 
dedicated to Christian principles. The Communists seem to have felt that they could not 
tolerate this hopeful, attractive Asiatic experiment in democracy. They had found that 
they could not destroy it by indirect aggression, because the political, economic, and 
social life of the Republic was so sound that subversive efforts, which had been tried, had 
failed. The people were loyal to their Republic. Therefore, if this experiment in human 
liberty was to be crushed, this could only be done by armed attack. That is what is being 
attempted.141
Dulles had met many groups in Korea and had seen many things, so why did he mention 
this particular experience with the refugee Christians in such detail, even though he only 
stayed with them briefly? There were two possible explanations. First, this refugee 
church was surely very fervent and must have made a powerful impression upon Dulles. 
Second, speaking on behalf of the administration, he was looking to justify US 
intervention to the American people, so that the Korean War should not be viewed as 
merely a civil war, but as a war for freedom and human liberty.
In a meeting concerning US actions in Korea with several representatives from 
different Protestant denominations on July 17, Dulles told them that the Republic of 
Korea, after a shaky start, had become a promising experiment because the new elections 
in May 1950 had shown democratic vigor.142 His view on the democratic progress of the 
ROK government was positive, despite the various charges that Syngman Rhee had used 
repressive measures against leftists in South Korea. He avoided commenting on Rhee. 
Instead, he emphasized the achievement of the Christian community in leading the 
Korean democratic movement by exaggerating the percentage of Christians in the South 
Korean National Assembly. He stated that one fourth of elected representatives in the 
Assembly were Christians, while the actual number was about 19 percent rather than 25
141 “Speech: Re. Korea and Japan, CBS Broadcast,” 1 July 1950, John Foster Dulles Papers, Speech, 
Statement, Press Conference, etc: 1950 January to August, Box 301, Seeley Mudd Library.
142 “Confidential Notes on Interview (Not to be attributed in any public manner),” 21 July 1950 Documents 
o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 46.
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percent. His emphasis on the influence of Christianity was due to his belief that Korean 
Communists were jealous of the rapid Christianization of South Korea. The success of 
Christianity in the South, Dulles argued, was “an additional factor in the [North Korean] 
attack.”143
Dulles further developed his religious interpretation of the Korean War in his 
article, “To Save Humanity from the Deep Abyss,” published in the New York Times 
Magazine on July 30,1950. He again mentioned his meeting with Christian refugees and 
argued that Korea was worthy of the blood of Americans because it was a land of 
freedom and religious liberty. The Korean War was a “great cause” because it was a 
battle to “preserve human liberty” and “to extend liberty by gradually releasing the 
captive peoples.”144
Judging by Western standards of democracy, South Korea was hardly a truly 
democratic state and Rhee’s regime was not a very democratic government. In fact, the 
majority of South Koreans had very little understanding and limited experience of 
democracy. Rhee’s stem anti-Communist stand and repressive policies might have 
alienated him from American liberals, but perhaps gained him more friends among 
leading American anti-Communists. In a decade when most Americans had very limited 
access to Asia, especially Korea, and when Korean experts were rare even within in the 
US government, Dulles’ interpretation might have earned more sympathetic ears for 
Korea than Rhee’s publicity men in Washington. The Gallup Poll did not conduct a 
public survey on whether or not the United States should intervene in the Korean War,
143 Ibid.
144 John Foster Dulles, “To Save Humanity from the Deep Abyss,” New York Times Magazine, 30 July 
1950. The article can be found in John Foster Dulles Papers (MC#016), Korea Box 48, Folder: Korea 1950, 
Seeley Mudd Library.
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but the majority of the American people gave their approval when they heard that the 
United States would send troops to save South Korea. Almost everyone inside and 
outside the US government agreed that the United States had to intervene to save South 
Korea from the Communists. The support was so overwhelming that Truman’s 
administration did not bother to get any formal congressional resolution or declaration of 
war before sending US troops to Korea.145
CONCLUSION
In the contest between the North and the South, Korean Communists won the first 
round with the help of Soviet weapons. Nevertheless, the attack was a disappointment in 
many ways, despite the fall of Seoul. For one, the ROK army was not destroyed and it 
eventually regrouped at Pusan. For another, despite Kim Il-sung’s belief that America 
had limited interest in defending Korea, US troops were sent quickly to help hold the 
Pusan Perimeter.
Prior to the attack, South Korea gained two friends for it causes. The first one 
was Rev. Bob Pierce. His nine-week visit in April and May drew him closer than ever to 
Korea. He became a key religious actor who crossed the Pacific Ocean back and forth 
throughout the Korean War period, bringing crucial information to shape the American 
perception of Korea. The second one was John Foster Dulles. His one-week stay in 
Seoul gave him a new perspective on the Korean cause. He had been sympathetic to 
South Korea before he arrived, but because of the influence of American missionaries 
and Korean church leaders, he began to interpret the Korean War from a religious 
perspective. The religious factor affected the perspective of these two men on Korean
145 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made, 509.
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affairs and in the next three years, they fought for the interests of Korea by using their 
political and religious influence. Joining hands with the “stay-behind” missionaries, the 
evacuated mission personnel, and American church leaders, they gave life to the religious 
factor that eventually shaped the development of the Korean War.
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Chapter 6
Missionaries and Christians Living in the War Zone 
INTRODUCTION
Just as the decision in Washington to send American troops to Korea was a 
crucial moment for the survival of Syngman Rhee’s government, the decision of 
seventeen American missionaries to remain in Korea had a great impact on the 
preservation of Korean Christianity and the development of Korean-American relations. 
The Christian experience during the Korean War consisted of two aspects. The first 
aspect was the missionaries’ experiences in UN controlled areas, and the second aspect 
was the experiences of the Christian community in the North Korean-controlled areas. 
Although the Korean War was not about religion, religion was a crucial factor that 
dominated the survival of many who were trapped by the war. In Communist-occupied 
areas, whether one lived or died was often related to the religious affiliation and the 
ideological leanings of an individual.
MISSIONARIES AT WAR
When the evacuation call went out, the majority of foreign missionaries fled to 
Japan, some retreated to within the Pusan Perimeter (a total of sixteen Presbyterian 
missionaries), and some chose to stay behind in the North Korean-occupied areas 
(Florence Root and other Catholic priests and nuns). The most influential of these groups 
would be the missionaries in the Pusan Perimeter, because those in Japan would have
334
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difficulty returning, while those who did not evacuate soon fell into Communist hands 
and became civilian internees (see Table 6.1).1
Missionaries within American-held areas would serve as important liaisons 
between American troops and Korean civilians, providing crucial support for the survival 
of Korean Christianity. Some of them were attached to the US military, eating with the 
officers in the mess halls, serving side-by-side with foot soldiers, flying reconnaissance 
with commanding officers, and leading worship services for US troops, Korean soldiers, 
and civilians. Their footprints could be found in every comer of the UN-controlled 
region. As the level of American involvement expanded, so did the number of 
missionaries in the war zone, with many evacuees finding their way back through 
military or diplomatic channels. Collaborating with South Korean Christians, the 
emergency relief program established by these missionaries eased the burden of the 
Korean local governments and saved the lives of many refugees.
Among them, Horace G. Underwood (also known as Hedge Underwood) was the 
most significant. Underwood’s service throughout the Korean War can be divided into 
three periods: the early stage with the 24th Division, the middle stage with the X Corps, 
and the final stage with the Negotiation Team in Panmunjom. This section covers the 
first two periods of his service. Using Underwood’s journey in Korea as a guide, this 
section explores the full extent of missionary activities during the initial stage of the 
Korean War, and examines their contributions to the war and relief efforts.
1 See Larry Zellers, In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner in North Korea (Lexington, KY: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1991).
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Civilians in the US Military 
As soon as Horace Underwood sent his family and fellow mission workers to 
Pusan in late June 1950, he drove back to Taejon with his brother John, an ordained 
minister, and his missionary friend, Rev. Harry Hill. The three men were looking for 
ways to assist their Korean friends to win the war. Rev. Hill and Rev. John Underwood 
decided to head back to Ch’ongju, where their mission station was located. Horace 
Underwood, however, could not return to Seoul because the city had been cut off by the 
destruction of the Han River Bridge. ROK troops, led by Brig. General Yu Chae-hung, 
the commander of the 7th Division, were fighting fiercely to keep North Korean forces 
from crossing the Han River.2
Having no mission station to return to, Horace Underwood therefore decided to 
look for his friends in the ROK government, hoping that he might be able to offer his 
help in the defense of South Korea. When Underwood arrived at Taejon on June 29, he 
found Dr. Paek Nak-chun (George Paik), an ordained pastor and a well-known Christian 
educator, who served as both the president of Yonsei University and the minister of 
education in the ROK government.3 Dr. Paek arranged for him to meet with Gen. Chong 
Il-kwon, who had just returned from the United States in order to serve as the new ROK 
army chief of staff. Chong advised Underwood to find General John H. Church, who was 
the head of the US military survey group, and offer his expertise to assist the US Army.
Nevertheless, no one seemed to know the exact location of the survey team. 
Driving his jeep north for miles, Underwood embarked on a dangerous search for the 
American military while the war waged along the Han River. He first left for Suwon to
2 Harold Joyce Noble, Embassy at War (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1975), 71-72.
3 Horace G. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections o f  Horace G. Underwood, 
ed. Michael J. Devine (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 136.
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look for the general, and then searched again in Taejon after hearing that the group had 
evacuated southward due to the collapse of the Han defense line.4 At that time, the 24th 
Infantry Division led by Lt. Colonel Charles B. Smith (also known as Task Force Smith) 
had arrived at Pusan, and was making its way northward to defend Osan, hoping to delay 
the advance of the North Korean troops.
After days of searching without success, around July 2 Underwood found Major 
General William F. Dean, who had just moved into Taejon to set up the headquarters of 
the 24th Division. General Dean immediately invited him to his division (Underwood did 
not have any formal military commission in the US Army at that point, but simply 
remained “attached” to the 24th Division until August).5 After the Battle of Osan (July 5) 
and the defeat of Task Force Smith, American troops made a full retreat to Ch’onan. By 
July 10, the Kum River became the new defensive line of Taejon (see Map 1). 
Underwood became the first American missionary to fight alongside American troops on 
the front line, helping to defend TaejSn against the advancing North Korean Army.
Underwood had no clear job description within the 24 Division because he was 
merely an attached civilian. He was not required to do any actual fighting, but only to 
assist the troops in whatever ways he could. However, his services were gladly 
welcomed by the 24th Division. This special position made him a useful liaison for the 
stay-behind missionaries and other Korean Christian workers. He was able to arrange 
accommodation and meals for them while they were taking refuge in overcrowded 
Taejon city.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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These stay-behind missionaries soon proved their usefulness to the war effort. 
Underwood asked his younger brother, Rev. John, who had fled from Ch’ongju, to guide 
some of the Army scouts in the Taejon area.6 Being a missionary in Ch’ongju, Rev. John 
was very familiar with the Osan-Ch’ongju-Taejon region due to his frequent visits to the 
local churches in the countryside. Because army scouts lacked accurate maps, in addition 
to their lack of experience, intelligence information, and language skills, Rev. John’s help 
proved invaluable for several critical days.7 After the Taejon defense collapsed on July 
18, Rev. John then moved on to offer relief services to refugees, constantly driving his 
jeep all over the Pusan Perimeter.
Underwood also worked closely with US troops and their commanders. He 
fought, ate, and bathed with the foot soldiers in the 24th Division (and later the 1st 
Cavalry).8 With the Taejon defenses collapsing, the deputy commander of the Division, 
Brigadier General Pearson Menoher, took Underwood with him to Yongdong, where a 
new headquarters was to be established. Underwood’s mission in Yongdong was to 
assist the retreating soldiers. Later, after accompanying the 24 Division to Yongchon, 
he joined the “fire brigade” under General Church, who took over the command of the 
24th Division following General Dean’s capture. General Church’s “fire brigade” was a 
special US mobile task force set up to rescue forces in different locations in order to 
defend the line along the Naktong River.
6 Ibid., 137.
7 We do not know exactly how long John helped to guide the scouts, but it seems reasonable he did so 
during the days before and after the fall o f TaejSn.
8 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 137-138.
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General Church often took Underwood with him on his flights within the Pusan 
Perimeter.9 He probably used Underwood as his interpreter in meetings with ROK troops, 
and valued his advice on the defense of Pusan. Because of his close association with the 
troops and the officers, Underwood witnessed the unpreparedness of US troops and the 
tension between US soldiers and Korean civilians.10 US Army morale was poor: Russian 
tanks were proving difficult to destroy, local guerrillas were constantly infiltrating the US 
army’s positions, and American soldiers knew very little about Korea. Underwood’s 
presence with the troops and his language skills helped to ease some of these tensions.
Underwood’s informal service with the Army ended in early August when his 
request to come back on active duty in the Navy was accepted.11 He was awarded the 
highest civilian honor, the Medal of Freedom, for his two months with the Army.12 This 
medal recognizes civilians who make exceptional contributions to the security of the 
United States.13
Underwood was not alone in serving the US military as a civilian missionary 
during the first two months of war. Wherever a qualified interpreter was needed, 
missionaries would answer the call. On July 6, Rev. Francis Kinsler (Northern 
Presbyterian) went to Taegu as an interpreter for UN officials. The US Army also asked 
Rev. Harry Hill, who had lived in P’yongyang before World War II, to help them 
interrogate North Korean POWs, and to provide religious services to the war-weary US
9 Ibid., 140.
10 Ibid., 137.
11 For these two months, Horace was supported by the Presbyterian Mission. He received no pay check 
from the US government. He applied for re-enlistment because he believed that it was “not right to go on 
working for the Army as a missionary.” See ibid., 140.
12 The Medal of Freedom is also known as the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Ibid., 140.
13 It is given by the President on the recommendation of the Distinguished Civilian Service Board for 
“exceptional meritorious contribution to the security of the United States or other significant public or 
private endeavors.” See Norm Goldstein, ed., The Associated Press Stylebook and Briefing on Media Law 
(New York: The Associated Press, 2004), 200-201.
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troops.14 In return, these missionaries were allowed to preach to North Korean prisoners 
and received informal logistical support from the US military. Rev. William Linton 
(Southern Presbyterian) and Rev. Kinsler also volunteered to help the US army chaplains 
by offering religious services to the US troops.15 Because of the immediate needs of the 
war, missionaries who stayed behind had to play a double role — both as loyal American 
citizens to the US government, and as ambassadors of mercy to suffering Korean 
refugees. They were kept very busy with their work among POWs, US troops, ROK 
soldiers, and refugees.
Up to this point, American missionaries received no compensation from the US 
government. Instead their salaries were still paid by American churches. The churches 
were willing to support them because they saw their presence in Korea as important to 
the preservation of Christian influence in Korea. They believed that missionary activities 
would facilitate the long-term collaboration between Korea and America in their battle to 
contain the spread of Communism. According to Dr. John C. Smith, the Secretary of the 
Presbyterian Foreign Mission to the Far East, the presence of the Presbyterian 
missionaries in the Pusan Perimeter was “very important to the future of the work in 
Korea” and crucial to the development of the Korean-American relationship. Smith 
promised to “push very hard” and “do everything” needed for full-scale relief work in
1 fiKorea and for the return of missionaries.
14 Letter from Rev. Harry Hill, 22 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, 
Folder 14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
15 Letter from Mrs. (Charlotte) Linton to her children, 13 August 1950, in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
16 Dr. John Smith’s letter to Ned Adams, 5 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 197, 
Box 1, Folder 2 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Meanwhile, American military authorities in the war zone also understood that 
American missionaries and their Korean Christian friends were their best allies in Korea. 
In return, the military provided informal support to the missionaries, and allowed them 
some special freedoms in the defense perimeter, so long as they did not hinder the 
military effort. The close partnership between these missionaries and the US military 
gave them the clout that they would need to carry out their essential tasks among the 
refugees -  something that native Korean preachers would not have been able to do.
Returning to Korea on a Military Ticket
The uncertain war situation and the complications of logistical support, however,
17discouraged the immediate return of other missionaries. The Army could not approve 
the return of civilian missionaries unless the tide of war turned in favor of UN forces and 
unless the applicants were able to guarantee their own supplies of food and shelter. Such 
demands were reasonable, given that the Army was straining to feed its own soldiers, and 
was fighting a losing battle in the defense of Pusan.18
Nevertheless, these restrictions did not prevent some missionaries from finding 
various ways back into Korea. Since some of them, like Horace Underwood, had served 
the US military during World War II and the US occupation in Korea, the quickest way 
was for them to re-enlist. The Army was quick to approve their requests; with the 
memories of cooperation between the American Military Government (AMG) and the 
missionary community still fresh in the minds of many US commanders in the field, they 
knew that these missionaries’ knowledge, skills, and expertise would help the war effort.
17 Letter from Harold Voelkel, 12 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 
18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
18 Ibid.
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The first returnee from Tokyo was Dr. Howard Moffett, a Presbyterian medical 
missionary bom in P’yongyang. Moffett held a commission as lieutenant in the Naval 
Medical Corps Reserve due to his service in World War II. After being evacuated to 
Tokyo with other US nationals, Moffett requested that he be given active duty status as a 
naval medical officer. His request was approved on July 27, 1950, by Vice Admiral 
Charles T. Joy, commander of US naval forces in the Far East.19 His commission came 
quickly because of his medical skills and experience as a residence in Taegu, the 
Headquarters of the Eighth Army in the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. Since the Navy 
had no direct action within the Pusan Perimeter, and because his medical and language 
skills were badly needed inside Korea, Moffett was sent back to Taegu in an Air Force 
uniform instead. His job with the 5th Air Force in the city was to manage the Taegu 
hospital, which he had ran before the evacuation. While the city was being subjected to 
heavy shelling by the North Koreans, Dr. Moffett remained from July to September to 
keep the hospital running, thereby saving countless American and Korean lives.
Horace Underwood’s father, Dr. Horace H. Underwood, was with his youngest 
son, Richard, visiting family and friends in the United States when the war broke out on 
June 25,1950. The news was brought to them through General Archibald Arnold, the ex­
military governor of Korea, whom Dr. Underwood had worked closely with during the 
American occupation. Their friendship continued to grow even after the general’s 
retirement. In fact, the Underwoods were attending worship service with the general that
91Sunday morning when he told them of the attack.
19 Religious New Service, 27 July 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 
15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
20 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 140.
21 Richard Underwood, “Memories and Thoughts,” (unpublished manuscripts, 2002), 78-79.
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Hoping to find a way to return to Korea and lobby the U.S. government to save 
Korea from the invading army, the Underwoods drove down to Washington, D.C. from 
New York the following day. Dr. Underwood had friends in Congress and the Pentagon. 
With the help of Major General Thomas W. Herren, the commander of the Military 
District of Washington (MDW), who had previously been to Korea, Richard Underwood 
was quickly re-commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Army intelligence service, 
waiving all the red tape of obtaining a new top-secret clearance.22 He arrived in Pusan in 
mid-September and was immediately assigned to the Advance Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section (ADVATIS). His job was to interrogate North Korean POWs, in the 
town of Tongnae, east of Pusan (see Map 7).23
Shortly after Richard’s arrival in Japan, Dr. Underwood also flew to Tokyo from 
the United States as a DAC (Department of the Army Civilian) advisor. According to 
Richard Underwood, his father’s assignment in Korea was somewhat “mysterious” 
because, though he wore a DAC uniform, he had “no acknowledged assignment, and 
worse yet, no support in rations, quarters or even gasoline.” His father had told him that 
his association with the military agency was supposed to be a secret so that no one would
OAsuspect him of having any connection with the US government. Therefore, none of his 
sons knew exactly what he did in Korea for the US government.
Like Dr. Underwood, other older missionaries also tried to find ways to return 
through the Army civilian office. For example, while waiting in Tokyo, Rev. William 
Shaw (Methodist) and later Rev. Harold Voelkel (Northern Presbyterian), both of whom 
had worked in P’yongyang before World War II, applied to be civilian chaplains. The
22 Ibid., 79-80.
23 Ibid., 81.
24 Ibid, 91.
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US Army hired them specifically to minister to South Korean troops and North Korean 
POWs. Their work among the ROK soldiers facilitated the establishment of a formal 
Chaplain Corps for the South Korean Army during the war.
It is important to note that most American denominations did not encourage their 
missionaries to formally join the US military during the war because they wanted to keep 
their staff ready for regular missionary work once the field was opened for re-entry. 
Nevertheless, they also recognized the difficulties of endless waiting, the desires of 
individual workers, and the potential benefit of having their people in the military. Once 
individuals made up their minds to join the military, their mission boards in the United 
States would support their decisions and continue to pay for their pensions even though 
the missionaries picked up their military assignments and received government 
paychecks. Except for those who worked on top-secret military projects, most of the 
civilian personnel were able to keep in close contact with their boards, and provide them 
with the latest war information. They also worked closely with other civilian 
missionaries to minister to the needs of the refugees, soldiers, and POWs.
REFUGEE PROBLEMS AND CHRISTIAN RELIEF EFFORTS
There were not only battles along the frontlines between the two opposing armies, 
but also battles behind the lines against hunger and diseases. Many innocent people 
were forced to flee their homes or were caught in crossfire. War destroyed their homes 
and robbed them of their possessions. The destitute wandered around the south without 
food or shelter. Most able-bodied men were drafted into the war, while the women and
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children were left to themselves, thus destroying the traditional family structure of 
Korean society.
The war also weakened traditional Korean religions, such as Buddhism, 
Confucianism, and Shamanism. Their crippling lack of resources, effective nationwide 
organizations, and foreign connections proscribed them from offering extensive practical 
help to the dislocated masses over a prolonged period of time. Nevertheless, this 
humanitarian crisis was an unprecedented opportunity for the Christian churches. 
Despite being targeted by the Communists, and suffering great losses of leadership and 
materials following the fall of Seoul, the church soon rebounded with the help of the 
missionaries and their overseas funding. With the US military and American churches on 
their side, American missionaries were able to organize private relief services to cope 
with the mounting needs of the refugees. In the process, they also trained new leadership 
for the Korean churches. Throughout the war, the fame and influence of Christianity 
increased. This section explores how Korean Christians responded to the war and how 
missionaries and Christian workers gained influence and popularity through their 
immediate relief efforts.
Christians’ Initial Response to the Outbreak of the Korean War
As soon as news of a northern invasion reached Christian clergymen in Seoul, 
most Christian ministers of the city met together to discuss the subject of helping 
refugees and aiding the soldiers. They declared June 27 a special day of prayer.25 They 
prayed for the victory of the south and the preservation of Korean Christianity. The 
situation, however, deteriorated rapidly. By nightfall, most ROK government agencies
25 Letter from Rev. Kyung chik Han, 12 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, 
Box 16, Folder 37 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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had stopped functioning because many officials had received instructions to flee south. 
As ROK troops withdrew, the danger of a Communist uprising within the city threatened 
the lives of many North Korean refugees and South Korean rightists.
While some native South Korean pastors and Catholic priests and nuns bravely 
decided not to desert their congregations in Seoul despite the danger, refugee Christians 
from North Korea sought every means of escape, because they saw no hope in staying 
behind. According to the testimony of Chang Sang, a young refugee girl from Sinuiju, 
who decades later would become the President of Ewha University, her family and many 
Christian friends from the north chose to leave immediately because they feared that the 
local people might turn them in to Communist authorities in exchange for favors and food. 
Being outsiders, Chang explained, the refugees could not expect any help from the native
O ft •southerners. Hong U-jun (Hong Woo-jun), a homeless and young Christian refugee 
from P’yongyang, who later rose to become a millionaire and famous educator in postwar 
Korea, reached the same conclusion. His fiancee and her family urged him to leave
onSeoul because of his anti-Communist background.
Of all people, refugee pastors had the strongest reason to flee, because most of 
them were blacklisted and hunted by the North as national traitors and potential trouble­
makers. They knew that if they stayed, they would surely be arrested and possibly 
executed. On June 28, with the fall of Seoul inevitable, refugee pastors and their 
congregations began the trek south. Rev. Han Kyong-jik of the Yongnak Church, 
together with a group of refugee pastors and Christians, left Seoul at eleven in the
26 Allan R. Millett, Their War fo r Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians 1945- 
1953 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002), 25.
27 Hong Woo-jun was the Vice-chairman of an underground anti-Communist youth league in P’ydngyang, 
which had plotted to assassinate Kim Il-sung during the March First ceremony on March 1946. Donald B. 
Sheley, Beggar A t the Banquet (San Bruno, CA: Donald B. Sheley, 1979), 25, 66.
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morning. By the time they reached the Han River Bridge, they had to cross the river by 
small boats because ROK engineers under orders from General Ch’ae Pyong-dok, chief 
of staff of the ROK army, had destroyed the bridge earlier. Since the ROK had 
established its defenses along the southern bank of the Han, the army drove the refugees 
further south to Suwon.28 Joining with the current of other refugees from Seoul, they 
began the slow march to Pusan.
The Influx o f Refugees to the Southern Cities
On their journey south, these Christian pastors traveled roads clogged with people 
in heart-wrenching agony. Everywhere orphans cried for their lost parents. Tired and 
weary refugees sat under the sun begging for food or a ride from passing vehicles. Many 
had had to flee Seoul in such haste that they had brought no food or supplies. Even a 
single bowl of rice soup or a simple shelter could make the difference between survival 
and death. Taejon was the worst of the refugee centers because it was located mid-way 
between Seoul and Taegu. It was overcrowded and had a severe food shortage. The 
suffering in Taegu was getting worse after the fall of Taejon, and Pusan was rapidly 
catching up, as refugees flooded into the city.
From July to August, approximately one million people took the road to Pusan. 
Feeding, clothing, and transporting these people was an impossible challenge for a South 
Korean government that needed all its resources for the war effort. At the same time, the 
government needed to find a solution before these crowds turned violent and brought 
internal disturbance to the southern provinces. Initially, provincial authorities turned 
local churches, temples, school buildings, factories, and department stores into temporary
28 Letter from Rev. Kyung chik Han, dated August 12, 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 16, Folder 37 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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refugee centers.29 Sympathetic citizens offered what help they could. But these local 
relief efforts quickly collapsed as the North Korean army continued to advance, 
overrunning these relief centers, one by one. Those offering relief soon joined the ranks 
of those needing relief, as the ROK army continued to retreat. More and more people 
took to the roads as the North Korean army conquered more and more land. The national 
government was on the verge of collapse, the military situation was rapidly deteriorating, 
and the provincial governments had many other urgent needs besides feeding the 
multitudes.
The refugee problem became so serious that on July 22, Im Pyong-jik, minister of 
foreign affairs, sent a letter to Colonel Afred G. Katzin, the personal representative of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations in Korea, pleading for UN relief assistance.30 
The UN decided to offer help on July 31, 1950. But their organized relief effort did not 
actually start until October 1950, too late for those who perished in the interim. The 
situation continued to deteriorate throughout August, and on September 1, 1950,
President Rhee sent a letter directly to General MacArthur asking for supplies of
•2 1
emergency food, clothes, and shelter for his people. During the first three months of the 
war, massive organized relief programs did not exist. The only noticeable support came 
from private local charities, Christian churches, and the meager resources of the ROK 
government.
29 Letter from Mrs. (Charlotte) Linton to “folks,” 10 September 1950, in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 
Department of History, Montreat, North Carolina.
30 Letter from Ben Limb to Afred G. Katzin, 22 M y  1950, 29
M Taehanmingoksa jaryojip 29 (Documents of the History of the Republic of Korea Vol. 29: Syngman 
Rhee Collection) (1949-1950) (Seoul: §3!£IS31 S I M #  Guksapyeonchan wiwonhoe The Committee of 
National History Compilation), 327.
29  ( 1949-1950), 338.
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Patriotic Relief Effort Initiated by Korean Christians 
Seeing that the country was in turmoil and that a major relief effort was needed 
among the homeless refugees, Christian clergymen took their own initiative to mobilize 
their congregations to support the nation’s war effort. In Taejon, on July 3, Rev. Han 
Kyong-jik was able to gather a number of northern pastors, and formed the Save the 
Nation Christian Assembly (Kidokkyo Kugukhae) to promote and coordinate patriotic 
relief activities among Christians. Rev. Han was elected chairman, and decided to set up 
the headquarters in Taegu.32 By mid-July, in Taegu alone there were about four hundred 
Christian workers taking refuge in the city,33 with more on their way to Pusan.
By fleeing to the south, Rev. Han had become a prominent leader among Korean 
Christians. Having a master’s degree from Princeton Theological Seminary, Rev. Han 
was also well-known among American church leaders. He worked closely with other 
Protestant leaders, including Dr. Yu Hyong-gi (Lew Hyung-ki), the acting bishop of the 
Korean Methodist Church, who had also been educated in the United States. Both men 
became pillars and spokespersons of the Korean Christian community during the war. 
They both took a trip to the United States in August 1951, representing the Korean 
churches to “express appreciation for aid given” to the South Korean people.34
The Christian National Salvation Assembly organized human networks to collect 
intelligence information and provide immediate relief for the refugees. Since some of the 
Korean clergy and Christian laymen knew English, they could find ways to affiliate with 
UN troops and offer their services to the United Nations authorities. Within the Pusan
32 Letter from Rev. Kyung chik Han, 12 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, 
Box 16, Folder 37 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
33 John C. Smith, “Our Stake in Korea,” Presbyterian Life, 2 September 1950,13.
34 Edward Adams, ‘The Church Met a Need in Korea,” Presbyterian Survey, August 1951,17.
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Perimeter, interpreters and English-speaking chauffeurs were in high demand.35 Young 
Christians, such as Sin Yong-il (Shin Young II) and his YMCA friends, who left their 
families in Seoul, quickly found jobs working for the US Army. Sin, for example, served 
the 25th Division, 35th Regiment as an interpreter in the Intelligence and Reconnaissance 
Section in Masan (see Map 7).36 Although the clergymen had formed a basic structure 
for relief operations, they lacked the money or resources to carry out a nationwide 
campaign.
Missionaries and the Beginning of a Christian Relief Program
It was during this period that the presence of American missionaries would have 
the greatest impact upon the fate of Christian refugees and the lives of the Korean people. 
Although American missionaries numbered less than two dozen, they had various 
resources and skills: they were the only civilians who still had their vehicles, they had 
external means of support, they had connections with local churches to organize workers, 
and they had influence within the US army to obtain special permission for their activities.
In Pusan, the three stay-behind Northern Presbyterian missionaries, Rev. Edward 
Adams, Rev. Archibald Campbell, and Rev. Francis Kinsler, who had earlier sent their 
families across the Korean Strait to Fukuoka, immediately launched an emergency relief 
program. Initially, they had only the million won offered by the missionary evacuees.37 
Then, as Seoul’s collapse precipitated a financial crisis, banks in Taegu would only issue 
10,000 won per person per week.38 However, Rev. Adams was able to use his American
35 Letter from Mrs. Linton to her children, 13 August 1950, in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.),
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
36 Letter from Shin Young-il to Kyung Ho, 20 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 16, Folder 37 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
37 See Chapter 5.
38 Edward Adams to wife, 6 July 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 
14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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citizenship to negotiate the withdrawal of “a couple hundred thousand won,” and 
establish a credit line for relief purposes with a New York bank.39 All this money was 
urgently needed for food supplies, supporting refugee pastors to continue evangelical 
work, hiring more relief workers, and paying for the transportation costs of relief 
materials.
Since they could not bring their supplies from Inch’on and Seoul, missionaries 
could only use materials owned by the Church World Service (CWS) that were stored in 
its Pusan warehouse.40 Rev. Adams received authorization from the CWS in the United 
States and took charge of distributing these supplies until the arrival of the new CWS 
director, Rev. Henry Appenzeller, the son of the first Methodist missionary to Korea.41 
The supplies in this warehouse were only a temporary solution, however. Missionaries 
had to secure a continuous flow of relief materials if they were to establish a long-term 
relief program. Otherwise, they would be “out of business soon.”42 Mission workers in 
Tokyo and American friends in the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) 
arranged the transport of fresh supplies in September 1950.43
Getting these supplies into the hands of the refugees was another problem. Small 
quantities could be moved by truck, but to service a whole city full of refugees, they
39 Edward Adams to wife, 12 July 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 
14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
40 Church World Service (CWS) was founded to relieve needy people regardless of nationality, party, and 
religion. It supported Korean relief and restoration from 1946 under the guidance of Dr. Bliss Billings, a 
Methodist missionary, and later Dr. A. G. Fletcher, another Methodist missionary. From 1946 to 1950, the 
agency helped mainly refugees from North Korea with supplies sent by churches in the United States.
41 Rev. Henry Appenzeller, however, did not arrive until January 1951. For six months, the relief work of 
CWS was directed by Rev. Edward Adams.
42 Letter from Edward Adams to wife, 9 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, 
Box 18, Folder 1 4 -Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
43 According to the letter from Grace H. Wood to friends, the missionaries in Tokyo were able to send a 
large amount o f relief goods belonging to the Presbyterian groups through the ECA because Bob Kinney, 
whose wife and in-laws were Presbyterian missionaries, was the ECA’s Acting Director in Korea. Letter 
dated 21 September 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 37 -  
Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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would need the railroad. Empty freight cars for bulky materials were hard to come by, as 
the transportation network was being used almost exclusively for military purposes. 
After about two weeks of paperwork, Rev. Adams finally found a freight car and was 
ready, on July 12, to transport the CWS materials to Taejon, where the refugee problem 
was most serious.
In order to distribute the materials to both Taegu and Taejon, relief workers were 
divided into two groups. One group was headed by Rev. Kinsler and the other by Rev. 
Adams. While Rev. Kinsler drove loads of materials with his team of relief workers from 
Pusan to Taegu and its adjacent areas, Rev. Adams left for Taejon with the other team. It 
was important for at least one missionary to escort with the trucks, otherwise both the 
vehicles and the supplies could have easily been taken by the ROK army -  one more way 
in which even a single missionary could be very important to the relief work. 
Nevertheless, due to the deteriorating military situation and transportation confusion, 
Adam’s freight car never left Pusan. Rev. Kinsler re-routed it to Taegu instead.44
Not knowing what Kinsler had done, Rev. Adams was waiting vainly for “the lost 
freight car” in Taejon, while the North Koreans were trying to cross the Kum River 45 
Following the main roads, most refugees fled Taejon to Yongdong and Kimch’on. On 
July 15, Rev. Adams became the last American civilian to depart the now empty city 46 
He and his faithful Korean CWS relief workers took a jeep, and laboriously dragged a
44 Letter from Edward Adams, 21 July 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, 
Folder 14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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broken wagon to Taegu.47 As soon as they arrived, Rev. Adams again looked for his lost 
freight car and was delighted to find it parked at the railroad station 48
The missionaries then established Taegu as their main relief center within the 
Pusan Perimeter. Trucks loaded with supplies were sent to different refugee-crowded 
cities, including Yongdong and Kimch’on. Local churches were often used as 
distribution points. The relief materials were mainly food such as beans, flour, wheat, 
and lard. The missionaries usually contacted local pastors and laymen ahead of time, 
depending on them to organize the local people and get the word out. Once the crowd 
gathered, relief workers distributed food together with some Christian tracts to the non- 
Christians. To Christians, they offered gospels or New Testaments instead. Rev. Adams 
reported that relief work was the “most excellent approach to the Gospel” in the midst of 
war because “the gratitude of recipients [was] most pathetic.” 49 Christians were 
particularly grateful because most of them had fled in such haste that they had left their 
Bibles behind. The gospels, Christian tracts, and New Testaments were in great demand.
Although supplies were distributed to all the refugees, those who were Christian 
received the most, because many American churches had made donations expressly to the 
Korean Christian community. Since their American supporters wanted to see the goods 
reach the hands of their intended beneficiaries, the missionaries usually left behind relief 
supplies for local churches so that pastors and elders could support the needs of the 
Christian community. Churches became famous places for additional relief supplies. As
47 Transportation equipment was precious during the war because all kinds of vehicles were in hot demand. 
The missionaries did not want to lose even one broken wagon.
48 -
49 •
48 Ibid.
'Ibid.
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a result, the influence of Christianity continued to grow despite the destruction of many 
churches and the loss of leadership.
A Christian relief effort was, however, no substitute for government or UN 
programs. Its effectiveness lay in its collaboration with the authorities. Rev. Adams 
explained the goal of their relief effort to his American supporters: “In any case we 
recognize the major problem is a government and military one, in which we need to fill in 
by supplementing and personalizing -  taking care of the fringes where the larger machine 
fails to function.” 50 The missionaries were in constant communication with ROK 
officials to identify neglected areas, and fill the gaps. For example, on July 21, they 
received a report from the Minister of Welfare on the number of refugees in each county, 
and discovered that Uisong (Eui Sung) County had, at that point, more refugees than 
Pusan. The next day, they sent a truckload of food to Uisong.51
The relief work organized by these missionaries was not limited to food 
distribution, but also included emergency evacuation. The ROK government had 
conscripted most Korean-owned automobiles for military purposes; only those vehicles 
driven by the missionaries or high-ranking Korean officials had escaped. The 
missionaries’ jeeps, trucks, and wagons became vital for moving supplies, people, and 
equipment. As the Communist soldiers advanced, private facilities depended on CWS 
transportation for their evacuation. For example, missionaries helped to move the 
important medical supplies of the Salvation Army Hospital of Ybngdong to Taegu before 
that city fell to the North Korean army.
50 Letter from Edward Adams, 1 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, 
Folder 37 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
51 Letter from Edward Adams, 21 July 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, 
Folder 14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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American missionaries were especially interested in evacuating Christian leaders 
since they were certain to be killed if captured. They would drive in their trucks to 
evacuate pastors and their families, bringing them to safety along the coast near Pusan. 
They often even went into the war zone to rescue congregations of Christians who were 
caught between the two opposing armies. For example, about four hundred pastors and 
their families were trapped in Taegu when it came under heavy bombing from the North 
in August. Missionaries immediately arranged a large school building for them at a place 
called Kamp’ori on the east coast, about sixty miles north of Pusan and twenty miles 
south of P’ohang (see Map 7). In order to bring them there, they transported around sixty 
to eighty people each day, and arranged government relief supplies for them in addition 
to the little they could provide from the CWS supplies.52
The missionaries expanded their operation to the non-Christian population as they 
saw the military becoming increasingly hostile towards the refugees. After the fall of 
Taejon, the sheer number of refugees on the main road became a serious hindrance to 
military operations. The army, needing the roads cleared for supplies and troop 
transports, were constantly driving refugees away. Worse still, the refugee population 
was chaotic and unregulated. Many guerillas had infiltrated their ranks, causing serious 
problems for the military. Fearing clandestine attacks, some ROK and US soldiers 
became hostile to the civilians that they encountered while clearing the roads for military 
transports.
Refugee distrust flared up around the time of the fall of Taejon. On July 25, top 
staff officers of the U.S. 8th Army met with Ambassador Muccio's representative, Harold
52 Letter from Edward Adams, 9 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, 
Folder 14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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J. Noble, and other South Korean officials to discuss the refugees problem. They decided 
to take serious measures to stop refugees from crossing US defense lines. According to a 
written report from Ambassador Muccio to Dean Rusk, at that time Assistant Secretary of 
State for Far Eastern Affairs, if refugees ignored warnings from US troops and continued 
to advance toward their defensive lines, US soldiers were allowed to use lethal force to 
halt them.53
With the defensive line shifting daily, many refugees on the road from Taejon to 
Taegu were caught in between the retreating US army and the advancing North Korean 
forces. For example, in Nogun-ni, a village between Yongdong and Kimch’on (see Map 
7), where the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry Regiment held position, there was a report that 
about 400 people were killed by US troops on July 26. Although the actual death toll has 
been widely disputed, civilian casualties in Nogun-ni were an undeniable fact.54 Similar 
incidents happened all along the road to Taegu. It was unknown how many innocent 
people lost their lives due to the combination of friendly fire and US efforts to keep 
refugees away from their defensive positions.
53 Sahr Conway-Lanz, “Beyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War,” 
Diplomatic History 29 (January 2005): 56. See also Charles J. Hanley and Martha Mendoza, “U.S. Policy 
Was to Shoot Korean Refugees,” Washington Post, 29 May 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dyn/content/article/2006/05/29/AR2006052900485.html.
54 The number 400 was provided by North Korean troops who took over the Nogun-ni bridge later. See 
Spencer C. Tucker, “Nogun-ni Railroad Bridge Incident,” in Encyclopedia o f  The Korean War: A Political, 
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 490. The actual 
number o f victims, however, remained controversial. A report o f the Yeongdong County Office in South 
Korea claimed that 248 people were injured, missing or killed by the US troops. Some Korean victims 
believed that the numbers should be higher according to the investigation conducted by the Associated 
Press. The study provided a list o f 181 victims killed, 20 missing, and 50 wounded. See Charles J. Hanley, 
Sang-hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare From the Korean 
War (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 291-295. This report, however, was disputed by a West 
Point historian, Robert Bateman, who argued that apart from testimonies of the victims fifty years later, 
there was no hardcore evidence supporting the claim. See Robert L. Bateman, No Gun Ri: A Military 
History o f  the Korean War Incident (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002).
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The movement of troops and equipment was hampered by the refugees who were 
clogging the roads and railways. To prevent any further loss of time, all those evacuated 
from Kimch’Sn and along the railroad line after the fall of Yongdong were shunted off 
the side, and/or pushed into the mountains by the military. The refugees coming from the 
north (the area around Andong) and the east were also diverted into the mountains (see 
Map 7). The hillsides and streambeds became packed with refugees. These people had 
nowhere to flee. Their suffering out in the open without shelter was beyond description. 
They had little food and were perishing in the heat of the sun and the chill of the rain. 
Unless they were transported into the Pusan Perimeter immediately, they would soon fall 
into the hands of the North Korean army or die of hunger or disease. The only people 
with the will and the means to help were the missionaries. With their trucks, jeeps, and 
wagons, Rev. Adams and his CWS workers directed and transported about 10,000 people 
who had been camped in the hills for days to refugee centers within the Pusan 
Perimeter.55
Relief Work within the Pusan Perimeter
When the war finally stabilized along the Pusan perimeter in August, the 
government was able to organize refugees according to their original counties (kun). The 
living conditions within these herds of people, however, were terrible. Pusan was 
particularly overcrowded. Every school building, department store, or other large 
building was being used either as a hospital, a barracks, or a refugee camp. Many 
temporary buildings were erected to house more refugees. Churches and temples were 
also overcrowded with people. In some cases, thousands of people lived in one
55 Letter from Edward Adams to wife, 9 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, 
Box 18, Folder 14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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temporary building. Each family had about ten square feet of space.56 Rev. Adams 
described their conditions as living “like flies,” and feared that without adequate medical 
attention, an epidemic might break out.57
These overcrowded refugee centers needed immediate attention. The American 
missionaries again mobilized their limited resources.58 Since most of the Southern 
Presbyterian missionaries had taken refuge in Pusan,59 they began serving the city’s 
crowded refugee centers. A few women missionaries and their Christian helpers visited 
the overcrowded refugee centers regularly, bringing relief supplies and providing basic 
medical care. They would send for a missionary doctor if the cases were serious.
The Northern Presbyterians, who possessed more resources, were able to expand 
their work among the more remote comers of the perimeter, particularly those living 
outdoors in stream beds or on the hillsides, by using their precious tracks. The ROK 
government had tried to bring food to these people, but a lack of transportation 
equipment had slowed down the process. The conditions were far worse for those who 
did not have shelters or receive government support. “When it rains,” Rev. Adams 
described, “they get soaked. The nights have turned chilly, so during the night they 
shiver. During the day they bake.”60
56 Letter from Mrs. (Charlotte) Linton to “folks,” 10 September 1950, in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
57 Letter from Edward Adams, 1 September 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 
16, Folder 37 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
58 The Northern Presbyterians were the Presbyterian Mission (USA) and the Southern Presbyterians were 
the Presbyterian Mission (US).
59 Pusan was the mission base o f the Australian Presbyterian mission. Most Australians were evacuated 
when the war broke out. Most of them did not return until the war was stabilized in 1952. The most 
famous ones were Dr. Helen MacKenzie and her sister Catherine MacKenzie. They ran the Australian 
Presbyterian Mission Hospital from 1952 to 1975.
60 Letter from Edward Adams, 1 September 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 
16, Folder 37 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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In addition to providing regular relief supplies, missionaries were concerned with 
ministering to the multitude, and hoped to develop a long-term evangelical network to 
reach out to the most remote places. They first established a relief program for the 
families of Christian clergymen and evangelists (not limited to Presbyterians). 
Missionaries would be responsible for supplying food and special shelter for their 
families so that the Korean pastors could go back to living in the refugee camps 
according to the kun from which they had originally come. Rev. Adams hoped that they 
could arrange at least one pastor or lay evangelist for each kun. In this way, each pastor 
would establish relationships with the refugees and be able to continue caring for his 
flock even after the refugees returned to their homes. These Christian workers, however, 
were not paid a monthly salary. Instead, the missions guaranteed “enough food and 
clothing to protect their health” so that they could focus on their work among the 
refugees “without compromising their voluntary spirit.”61
Missionaries also prepared one large tent for each kun to serve as a relief station 
and a temporary worship hall. These tents became the headquarters for church workers. 
The major practical function of each tent was to serve as a first-aid center for the sick, 
small babies, and pregnant mothers. Dr. Howard Moffett, being in the Air Force, 
supplied these stations with basic medicines like aspirin, mercurochrome, and 
penicillin. According to Rev. Adams, the US Army advisor to the Minister of the 
Interior was so moved when he heard of the program that tears came to his eyes.63
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
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The Impact o f Missionaries on the Overall War Relief Effort
Although no data was collected to confirm the effectiveness of the relief program 
operated by the missionaries in the first three months of war, their efforts certainly saved 
many lives. The long-term impact of these initiatives was equally important. Their work 
aroused public interest and inspired many Christians in the United States and other 
Western countries to support the survival of South Korea.
Church leaders in the United States were the first group to answer the requests of 
these missionaries. On October 19, 1950, shortly after the announcement of a centralized 
UN relief effort, American church leaders held a meeting at the office of International 
Mission Committee in New York with representatives from the World Council of the 
Churches (WCC), Foreign Mission Conference (FMC), International Missionary Council 
(IMC), and Church World Service (CWS). They recognized that “Christian concerns 
must find expression in an organized effort for Christian relief in Korea.”64 They first 
decided to establish a formal Christian relief committee in Korea through the Korean 
National Christian Council (KNCC). This committee in Korea would evaluate the needs 
and report to the IMC and WCC for funds and supplies. It would also be responsible for 
carrying out Christian relief work and correspondence with UN relief officials in Korea. 
The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) would negotiate with 
the UN relief agencies in New York to allow Christian groups to distribute their own 
materials.65
This meeting was historic because afterward the tide of the Korean War turned 
against the United Nations forces. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese “volunteers”
64 C. W. Randon, “Korean Relief,” in Documents o f  the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed. Kim Heung 
Soo (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 136-137.
65 Ibid.
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entered the war in November 1950, and the severe cold weather in Korea threatened the 
lives of many Korean refugees.66 The need for immediate relief was even more pressing 
than before. A lack of clothing and fuel was more critical than food, because Koreans in 
the Cholla regions were able to harvest their rice crop when the UN pushed the line back
thup to the 38 Parallel in September 1950. Food was not the most pressing issue in the 
winter of 1950, because the local government organized soup kitchens to feed hungry 
crowds with their rice reserve. The need for clothing and fuel was more pressing when 
civilians were forced to leave home during one of the coldest winters in Korean history.
Religious news in the United States highlighted Korean suffering. The latest 
letters and reports of missionaries and Christians in the war zone were regularly 
published in an open pamphlet, “Korea Letters,” produced by evacuated missionaries in 
Japan under the leadership of Rev. William Shaw and his wife, and supported by the 
Methodist Board of Foreign Missions. Christians in the United States were encouraged 
to pray and to donate money and relief materials. Retired missionaries, church leaders, 
Korean Christian churches in the United States, and interdenominational organizations 
mobilized to distribute the publication across the country. News about the missionaries 
and Korean refugees was also frequently reported in a variety of other denominational 
magazines.
Drives for cash donations and clothing began in November among individual 
denominations. A joint effort through the Church World Service’s “One Great Hour of 
Sharing” was organized in December 1950. Churches and individual Christian groups 
throughout the United States and Canada responded eagerly by sending money to the 
Presbyterian Boards, Methodist Boards, Church World Service (CWS), Salvation Army,
66 The discussion of the Chinese entry into the Korean War is in Chapter 7.
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Catholic Relief Service, Maryknoll Sisters, and other interdenominational relief 
organizations to support of Christian refugees in Korea. In that winter alone, the CWS 
shipped 223,000 pounds of cloth, and 95,000 pounds of food (milk, beans, vitamins, etc.) 
Churches in England and Australia also sent funds and relief supplies to Pusan.67 The 
supplies were distributed to both Christians and non-Christians by the CWS.
Rev. Bob Pierce, who had visited South Korea shortly before the outbreak of the 
war, also returned to Korea to investigate the damage. The suffering he saw led him to 
establish World Vision, Inc. on September 22, 1950, which is now the largest Christian 
relief and development organization in the world. Later, he returned to Korea as a war 
correspondent for the United Nations, and traveled all over the war-torn country. Hoping 
“to shake people up,” he focused his reports on the plight of the Christians, widows, 
orphans, and babies that were left for dead in dump heaps.68
During the Korean War, Rev. Pierce made two documentaries on Korea. The first 
one, The 38th Parallel, documented conditions in Korea prior to the outbreak of the 
Korean War. Reports on the success of “Save the Nation Evangelistic Crusade” were 
presented, showing thousands of Koreans who became Christians after they heard Rev. 
Pierce’s preaching. One local newspaper described the film as telling “the story of 
[Korea’s] tragedies as well as its hopes found in the Christian way of life.”69 Pierce’s 
story supported Dulles’ interpretation of the religious nature of the Korean conflict.
67 Heung-soo Kim, A17] 7] 5] -%) Han'gukjeonjeong sigi gidokkyo
oewondancheui guhohwaldong (Relief Activities of Foreign Christian Voluntary Agencies during the 
Korean War),” Hangukkidokgyo yeoksa History o f Korean Christianity 23 (2005):
105-108.
68 Franklin Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do (USA: Samaritan’s Purse, 1983), 170.
69 “Korean Movies at Youth for Christ,” Walla Walla, Wash, 7 December 1951. See also “Korean Film 
Listed For Youth Rally,” The Gettysburg Times, 13 April 1951, and “Speaks and Shows Film,” Mansfield 
O. News-Journal, 9 April 1952.
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The most noteworthy result was Pierce’s second movie, The Flames, a Christian 
documentary on the Korean War released in 1952.70 It was regarded as “one of the 
outstanding documentary records of all time.”71 Rev. Pierce showed the film to churches 
across America and invited their members to help the refugees and Korean orphans. It 
was the beginning of the World Vision Child Sponsorship Program. His graphic 
depiction of suffering women and children shocked the American people, and stirred 
great enthusiasm for Korean relief. The survival of the Korean Christian community and 
the future of these Korean orphans became familiar concerns to churches across America.
Throughout the Korean War, church relief organizers discovered that whenever 
the label “Korea” was attached to a relief drive the public response was exceptionally 
generous. Most of the Christian donors intended to send the relief supplies to the Korean 
Christians, especially women and children. These wishes could not be granted, however, 
since supplies had to be sent through the UN; once in UN hands, individual charities lost 
control over how the materials were distributed.
Nevertheless, cooperation with the UN brought many benefits to all concerned. 
First, given the astronomical costs of shipping bulky goods to Asia, the charities could 
not have sent their materials without UN help. Second, the relief work established “good 
will” between Christian charities and the UN and US army. The UN needed the 
experience, advice, and support of these Christian organizations. Third, Christians would, 
in turn, gain access to official information so that they could have a “better chance to help 
in steering supplies in the [neediest] areas, and reduce “irregularities in distribution.”72
70 Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do, 170.
71 “Dr. Pierce’s Film on Korea to be Shown Here Oct. 1,” Bralaerd Daily Dispatch, 23 September 1952.
72 Letter to Dr. John Smith, sender unknown, 19 September 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 197, Box 1, Folder 3 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Therefore, most religious groups participated in the UN effort and volunteered to collect 
and distribute relief supplies on behalf of the UN.73 By 1952, a total of forty Christian 
organizations were carrying out relief programs in South Korea through the UN. From 
July 1950 to November 1952, they offered as much as US $4,856,446 worth of church 
donations for UN distribution, which was about 44 percent of the total donations by all 
US voluntary agencies (see Table 6.2).74
In 1953, when the UN eventually allowed private organizations to conduct their 
own distribution, Protestant churches in the US sent a total of US $271,341.70 in cash, 
US $1,599,752.82 worth of clothing, and 5,469,882 pounds of relief supplies through the 
Church World Service.75 Under the leadership of Rev. Edward Adams and Dr. Henry 
Appenzeller, the Korea Church World Service emerged as the model relief agency (see 
Table 6.3 for the full list of staff members).76 The money was used for orphanages, 
children’s welfare, housing for widows, anti-tuberculosis projects, medical supplies, the 
purchase and distribution of relief supplies, and so on. These figures did not include 
materials and funds sent through individual denominations for church reconstruction and 
the rehabilitation of Christian education and medical institutions. It also did not include 
contributions made through Catholic charities or materials sent directly through the UN 
relief agencies.
73 Letter from TTB to Shaw, 6 October 1950, Missionary Collection 4, United Methodist Church Archives 
— GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
74 This amount does not include cash distributed through private church channels which the UN did not 
control. See Kim, A] 7] 7 | -5;-12. -£| *)].£] Relief Activities o f Foreign
Christian Voluntary Agencies during the Korean War,” 107-108.
75 Harry A. Rhodes and Archibald Campbell, History o f  the Korean Mission Presbyterian Church in the 
USA, Vol. 2,1935-1959 (New York: Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations, The United 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A, 1964), 323.
76 Kim, *<§ A17] 71 5] -£1 o] Relief Activities of Foreign Christian
Voluntary Agencies during the Korean War,” 109-110.
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The Christian relief program, in the end, benefited the Korean Christian 
community the most. Pastors, Bible women,77 and Christian teachers received special 
help from the churches and relief agencies in addition to the meager government supplies, 
which gave them a better chance of survival. For example, although the CWS supported 
a policy of equal distribution among both believers and non-believers, its long-term goal 
favored the development of Christianity. Its objectives were to encourage Christian 
social services, and strengthen ties of friendship between Korea and the United States, 
and also between Korean and Western churches.78 Their hope was to build a new Korea 
based on the American Christian model.
In addition, missionaries helped to secure jobs for Christians not only as relief 
workers, but also as interpreters for US troops and chauffeurs for government officials. 
Seminaries, Christian colleges and schools, orphanages, and widows’ houses were 
established throughout South Korea. Partly through the relief agencies’ influence and 
partly through the evangelizing efforts of the Korean church, Christianity continued to 
expand during and after the Korean War. Foreign funding enabled the training of new 
Christian clergymen and the expansion of Christian institutions in post-war Korea. It 
marked the new beginning of an intimate American-Korean church relationship. For the 
first time in Church history, Korea replaced China and Japan as the primary recipient of 
American paternalism in East Asia. In this way, Christianity emerged as a dominant 
political, economic, religious, and social force in postwar South Korea.
77 Bible women were female evangelists supported by the Korean churches to evangelize women and 
children. They served as Bible teachers for women group and Sunday schools. In the remote countryside, 
the influence of Bible women was sometime as strong as pastors and elders.
78 Arnold B. Vaught, “Relief and Rehabilitation,” Report to Korea Planning Conference (October 13-14, 
1953), World Council o f Church Library (CCIA Country Files: Asia-Korea 1953-1973), Geneva, 
Switzerland.
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THE FALL AND RECOVERY OF SEOUL
While some Koreans fled before the advancing Northern army, many more 
remained without being fully aware of the consequences of their decisions.79 They soon 
found themselves behind the iron curtain. The Communists immediately began purging 
all their opponents in the conquered territories. Christians were prime targets. Their 
experience during the North Korean occupation was a central component in 
understanding the religious aspects of the Korean War. Reports of their suffering would 
be widely circulated in Korea and the United States. These, in turn, mobilized American 
public opinion to provide political, economic, military, and moral support to the Republic 
of Korea.
The Fall o f Seoul
At roughly 3:30 on the morning of June 27, shortly after President Syngman Rhee 
and his cabinet left Seoul, about 140 members of the National Assembly held an 
emergency session. Mr. Sin Ik-hui (Patrick Henry Shinicky), the Speaker of the 
Assembly80 and Syngman Rhee’s major political opponent after the mid-1950s, asked the 
Assembly to decide whether or not they should follow Rhee’s government. Following a 
heated debate, the Assembly passed a resolution that all assembly members should 
remain in the Capital, even if it meant imprisonment or death. The resolution also
79 Because of strict censorship by the South Korean Defense Ministry, most Korean newspapers and official 
announcements did not provide accurate reports on front-line conditions, during the first few days of the 
war. Some reporters were asked by government officials to write false stories to ease the people’s fears.
See Raymond S. H. Lee, “Early Korean War Coverage,” Journalism Quarterly 55, no.4 (1978): 789-791.
80 Donald Stone MacDonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1996), 120.
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criticized Rhee’s government for betraying the trust of the Korean people by giving up 
the defense of Seoul.81
The majority of the Assemblymen, including Sin himself, switched their position 
within a few hours, however, and had fled south by nightfall. Out of 210 members of the 
Assembly, only 60 ultimately stayed behind -  mostly moderates and liberals.82 Among 
them was Assemblywoman Pak Sun-Ch’on, who, as president of Women’s Daily News 
(Yocha Ilbo) in Seoul, was one of the most influential women in Korea.83 Pak stayed 
behind not because she was sympathetic toward Communism, but because of the 
Assembly resolution and her personal responsibility to the voters in Seoul District A. But, 
she urged all her subordinates and friends to evacuate immediately.84
Initially, many Communists and leftists were excited over the war, and rose up to 
welcome the North Korean army. Students in Seoul and elsewhere were the most active 
supporters of the occupation, volunteering readily for all sorts of tasks. During the 
occupation period, women in particular experienced a great liberation, and enjoyed wide 
employment opportunities, holding jobs of honor.85 Nevertheless, such cases were a 
small minority. The majority of those people who were not targets of the Communist 
persecution suffered severe hardships under the North’s occupation policy.
During the transition period between the departure of the ROK government and 
the arrival of the Korean People’s Army, the city of Seoul was in turmoil. There was
81 Sun-Chon Park, “Wearing a Blood-Stained Skirt,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, 
Box 16, Folder 39: 1 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
82 Hugh Deane, The Korean War: 1945-1953 (San Francisco, CA: China Books & Periodicals, 1999), 94.
83 Andrew C. Nahm, Historical Dictionary o f the Republic o f Korea (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, 
1993), 161.
84 Deane, The Korean War: 1945-1953, 94
85 Ibid.
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looting of foreigners’ houses, and many shooting incidents.86 Because the North Korean 
army lacked effective logistical support, very often the soldiers demanded food from 
local residents without giving any compensation. For three months, most of the people 
lived on barley gruel.87 When an occupying army behaved in such a way, it did not 
endear itself to the native population. As the food started to run out, even leftists and 
leftist sympathizers began to regret the arrival of the Communists.88 Abuse by Northern 
soldiers only became more prevalent as the tide of war started to turn against them.
Another source of conflict between North Korean authorities and the South 
Korean population was the KPA policy of conscripting young men and women from the 
ages of seventeen to thirty-eight, to serve in the North Korean army. Christians were 
particularly reluctant to serve in the KPA. Those loyal to the ROK went into hiding to 
avoid serving.89 Pae Sun-Yong (Pai Soon-young), a Christian woman, hid her husband 
and her brother in their attic to avoid being found by the Communist police.90 Many, 
however, were unable to escape the order. Some who were seized tried to escape, but 
only a few succeeded.91
86 Maud K. Jensen, “Korea Evacuation 1950,” undated pamphlet printed for family and friends. Quoted by 
Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT: 
EastBridge, 2003), 364.
87 Letter from Soon-Young to Rev. Min-soo Pai, 23 October 1950, Presbyterian Archive, Record Group 
140, Box 1, Folder, 19 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
88 Letter from Soon-Young Pai to her uncle Rev. Minsoo Pai in the United States, 10 December 1950, 
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, 
Philadelphia.
89 Letter from Soon-Young to Rev. Min-soo Pai, 23 October 1950, Presbyterian Archive, Record Group 
140, Box 1, Folder, 19 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
90 Ibid.
91 The exact extent of conscription remained unclear. Yet, the testimonies o f most survivors confirmed the 
policy o f the North Korean authorities. The number of North Korean POWs who were determined as 
South Korean citizens was rather high. About 37,000 were determined as civilian internees. Most of them 
refused to be repatriated to North Korea and created a serious problem during the Truce Negotiation in 
Panmunjom.
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Skilled personnel, such as the doctors and nurses in the Severance Hospital92 and 
Seoul Sanitarium and Hospital, were conscripted as soon as the North arrived and 
occupied Seoul. Since their medical skills were badly needed on the frontline, some of 
them were dispersed to different KPA units to serve with other North Korean medical 
personnel.94 Very few survived the occupation.
The Fate o f South Korean Politicians and Officials
Once Seoul was secured, the Communist police began to round up ROK officials, 
police, and Assemblymen. Since most top officials had fled, while the rest were hiding in 
friends’ houses or in the mountains, it took the KPA a great effort to root them out. First, 
the KPA collected information from secret informers and infiltrators. Then based on 
these reports, soldiers conducted house searches and set up road blocks to check 
identification. Few escaped.
One such case was ex-Assemblyman Kim Sang-don, a Presbyterian who had to 
stay in Seoul because of his large family. Kim’s political record showed that he had 
always been critical of the policies of the ROK government. Some people suspected him 
of being pro-Communist because he did not leave the city. The North Koreans wanted to 
enlist his support. Knowing that he was a wanted man, Kim went into hiding in the attic 
of a church elder’s house for months to avoid working for the Communists. When
92 The Severance Hospital was staffed by the joint effort of both Presbyterian and Methodist missions. It 
was the best-known medical institution in South Korea. Some reported that all the doctors and nurses were 
murdered by the Communists. The stories, however, were hard to confirm. It is highly possible that those 
who refused to collaborate with the North Korean authorities were shot on the spot. According to the 
investigation of the UN, mass graves were uncovered in the back yard of the hospital. The identity o f these 
victims, however, was hard to determine. Those who were willing to work with the Communists were 
possibly taken by the North Korean Army when they departed from Seoul.
The hospital was established by the Seventh-day Adventists. Most of the medical staff were trained by 
Dr. George Rue and his wife Grace.
94 Penny Young Sook Kim and Charles Milles, Though Bombs May Fall: The Extraordinary Story of 
George Rue, Missionary Doctor to Korea (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 2003), 79.
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someone reported his location to the authorities, the Communists came to search the 
house. Though they could not find him, they shot many holes in the ceiling. Kim 
miraculously lived to tell his story.95
Assemblywoman Pak Sun-Ch’on was not so lucky. She went into hiding with her 
friends in Chaedong as soon as Seoul fell, but was betrayed. On July 3, a young 
Communist policeman from North Korea dragged her out from her hiding place. He told 
her that he had “been well acquainted with” her because he had seen “her picture in the 
north part of the country.”96 The policeman forced her to “walk with him” to the Chong- 
no Police Station because the Communist authorities wanted to show people that she 
came with them voluntarily.97 During interrogation, the interrogator tried to force her to 
agree that it was the ROK government that had started the war, but Pak refused to comply. 
Some of her other colleagues in the National Assembly, who had not left Seoul, were also 
arrested by the Communists, and faced the same pressure. Pak and her colleagues 
remained in prison for more than a week before they were released on July 13.
Political Pressure against Rightists
Kim Il-sung had planned to establish Seoul as the new capital of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea. In order to earn national support and establish a legitimate 
government, he needed to convince the southern population and the international 
community that Syngman Rhee and the ROK were to blame for the war. To do so, Kim 
Il-sung needed the collaboration of ex-ROK officials and politicians in Seoul. The
95 Letter from Kim Eun-Hyung, ex-Assemblyman Kim Sangdon’s daughter, to her sister Kim Shing Hyung, 
5 October 1950, Presbyterian Archives, Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 -  Presbyterian Historical 
Society, Philadelphia.
96 Park, “Wearing a Blood-Stained Skirt,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16,
Folder 39: 4-5. The manuscript was sent to the Presbyterian Church and later published by John W. Riley, 
Jr. and Wilbur Schramm, The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation o f Seoul with Eyewitness 
Accounts (New Brunswick, NY: Rutgers University Press, 1951), 193-198.
97 Ibid.
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Communists, therefore, launched a propaganda effort aimed at discrediting Rhee’s 
government, and disputing the justifications for UN intervention.
First, the North Korean authorities pressured South Korean politicians to pledge 
their allegiance to the Northern regime, and make broadcasts on behalf of the 
Communists, condemning the corruption of the ROK regime. They put the most pressure 
on Assemblymen and famous Korean politicians. The authorities’ goal was to convert 
them to the Communist idea of unification, and to use them to condemn the ROK for 
starting the war. A program led by Northern political officers to re-educate National 
Assembly members began on July 8. Most of the Assemblymen were released by the 
authorities temporarily on July 13, as a gesture to win their support. In the end, about 
forty-eight of the sixty captured assemblymen pledged allegiance to the Democratic 
People’s Republic. Some of them were appointed to judgeships and other offices.98
Pak Sun-Ch’on was one of the twelve who refused to support the Communist 
government. After her release on July 13, she immediately organized a “suicide squad of 
the Republican volunteers,” and for the next two months secretly led an underground 
resistance movement.99 When word came of the Inch’on landing, she hid to avoid being 
rearrested.
Second, the North Korean authorities also pressured Christian clergymen and 
laymen to support the Communist cause, in a bid to obtain international recognition for 
their government. Kim Kyu-sik, the famous moderate Christian leader, a political rival of 
Syngman Rhee, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Kyongsin Boys’ Academy
98 Deane, The Korean War: 1945-1953, 95.
99 Park, “Wearing a Blood-Stained Skirt,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, 
Folder 39: 6 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
372
in Seoul, was forced to give “a few speeches,” criticizing the ROK government.100 He, 
however, refused to join the North Korean government.101 His life was spared, but the 
Communists took Kim with them when they retreated north.102
Many Christian clergymen, however, refused to cooperate. For example, the 
Communists wanted Dr. Namgung Hyok, the executive secretary of the Korea National 
Council of Churches, to lead their Korean National Christian Council, because he was 
well-known in American churches. Despite intense pressure, Dr. Namgung refused to 
participate in broadcasts supporting the Communists. He was arrested and never seen
Clashes between North Korean Authorities and Christians 
Since the North Korean army needed places to stay in Seoul, conflict immediately 
arose with church laymen who had stayed to guard church buildings, schools, hospitals, 
and mission compounds. For example, at the Yongnak Church, six members were killed 
with one elder being shot down in the churchyard. The Communists turned this beautiful, 
newly-constructed building into their ammunition and weapon storage base. They knew
100 Letter from Harold Voelkel to Dr. John C. Decker, 29 July 1950, Documents o f  the WCC Library: The 
Korean War, ed. Kim Heung Soo (Seoul: Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 61.
101 See Deane, The Korean War, 95.
102 According to the North Koreans, Kim Kyu-sik voluntarily left with them. It is possible that this account 
is accurate because Kim had worked with the Communists and would not be welcomed again by the South 
Koreans. Yet, according to the testimony of Park Sun-chon, her friend Wo Se-hun was about to inform 
Kim Kyu-sik about the coming of the UN troops and advise him to hide from the Communists on 
September 17, but the North Koreans were a step ahead of them. They had to flee before they could reach 
Kim. See Sun-Chon Park, “Wearing a Blood-Stained Skirt,” 6. His son’s testimony also supported the 
contention that his father was not pro-Communist and did not work closely with the North Korean 
government. In fact, Kim had already permanently retired from Korean politics due to his disillusionment 
after the failure of his trip to North Korea in 1948. He had no intention to seek office for himself. 
According to Rev. Harold Voelkel, who knew Kim Kyu-sik well, Kim was “one o f the most dedicated 
Christian men in Korea.” He believed that Kim did the broadcast under great pressure from the 
Communists. See Voelkel’s letter to Dr. John C. Decker, 29 July 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library: 
The Korean War, 61. Thus, Kim Kyu-sik’s decision to go north and his death remained a mystery.
103 Letter from Harold Voelkel to Dr. Charles Ranson, 1 November 1950, Documents o f  the WCC Library: 
The Korean War, 158.
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that American forces would not bomb this famous refugee church because of its symbolic
104reputation.
Based on the generally strong anti-Communist sentiment in the Christian 
community and the refusal of clergymen and laymen to collaborate with the authorities, 
the North Koreans were highly suspicious of the loyalty of all Christians, fearing that 
they would leak information to the ROK. These fears were justified; Christians tended to 
support underground anti-Communist activities throughout the South. As a result, the 
homes of Christians were constantly checked by soldiers. If they found any suspicious 
items in a home, the whole family would be in danger. In the case of Pastor Kim In- 
Yong (Kim In-yung), the Communists accused him of installing a short-wave radio 
transmitter inside a church organ. He was arrested and tortured for three days. Finally, 
he was released when they could not find any radio transmitter in the organ.105 Pastor 
Kim immediately went into hiding to avoid further arrest.
Seoul City Sue: The Beginning of Psychological Warfare 
The North put similar pressure on US POWs. Under coercion, one American 
officer of the 24th Infantry Division gave a 900-word radio speech denouncing American 
involvement in the war:
We did not know at all the cause of the war and the real state of affairs, and were 
compelled to fight against the people of Korea. It was really most generous of the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Korea to forgive us and give kind consideration for our 
health, for food, clothing and habitation.106
104 The Young Nak church was constructed by the offerings of Northern Korean refugees and American 
Christians. The construction was completed in 1950.
105 Riley and Schramm, The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation o f Seoul with Eyewitness 
Accounts, 190-191.
106 Philip D. Chinnery, Korean Atrocity! Forgotten War Crimes 1950-1953 (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2000), 9.
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To further confuse and weaken the morale of the US soldiers, the North aired 
messages from “Seoul City Sue.” “Sue” spoke with a standard American accent and was 
familiar with American culture and society. She told her radio audience that if she, a 
white traitor, were to return home to the United States, she would get better treatment 
from ordinary Americans than would a black soldier.107 Although the identity of “Seoul 
City Sue” was a mystery, the most widely accepted theory is that she was Anna Wallis
1 ftRSuhr, a Methodist ex-missionary to Korea. If so, then “Seoul City Sue” was an 
unintended by-product of the American missionary movement, and marked the beginning 
of religious workers’ involvement in psychological warfare.
While the Communists’ favorite attack against the United States was racism, the 
US fought back by criticizing Communist persecution of Christian churches behind the 
Iron Curtain. The American government enlisted ex-missionaries in Korea and China, 
and escaped native clergymen to wage their own brand of psychological warfare against 
the North through the Voice o f America (VOA). Religious freedom became the 
championing cry of the VGA’s broadcasts during the Korean War. According to Foy D. 
Kohler, chief of the VOA, the United States had used “every peg” they could find to hang 
their hats on the idea of religious freedom.109 The VOA covered the progress of the
107 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 374.
108 Anna Wallis came to Korea in 1935 but she lost both her position as a missionary and her American 
citizenship when she married a Korean leftist named Suhr (also spelt as So). They spent the years of World 
War II in exile in China. When the Suhrs finally returned to Korea and she sought to reclaim her US 
citizenship, she was rejected because her husband was a leftist. When the war broke out and US citizens 
were being evacuated from Seoul, she was therefore ineligible and had to stay behind. Some reports 
indicate that the Suhrs were arrested and taken north against their will. Most of Anna Wallis’ missionary 
friends felt sympathy for her, believing that if  she was indeed “Seoul City Sue” then she probably only 
served to save her life and the life of her husband, as was the case with many collaborators. Ibid., 374-375. 
According to Raymond B. Lech, however, Anna Wallis Suhr was active also in the northern POW camps, 
indoctrinating American soldiers. If so, then Anna Wallis Suhr’s support of the Communists might have 
been voluntary. See Raymond B. Lech, Broken Soldiers (Chicago, IL: Board of Trustees of the University 
of Illinois, 2000), 119-121.
109 Harriet Rasooli-sa’eed, ‘The Iron Curtain is Not Soundproof,” Presbyterian Life, 14 August 1951, 8.
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Korean War from its headquarters in New York. Koreans who possessed short-wave 
radios, especially Christians in the areas controlled by the North, secretly listened to the 
VOA, risking their lives to get up-to-date news on the war. No Kum-s6k, the North 
Korean pilot of Catholic background who later defected to South Korea together with a 
MiG-15, was in fact a secret listener to the VOA.110
“Korea Kids” and the Inch’on Landing 
As the citizens of Seoul suffered under northern policies, many of them held out 
hope of rescue. “When we heard the U.S. planes flying in the sky,” Kim Un-hyong (Eun- 
hyung) wrote to her sister in the United States, “we were encouraged and happy. But we 
were sad and disappointed on the days of quietness. Everybody predicted out of his 
wishful thinking [sic]. Someone said the Allies [would] enter the city on August 15, 
while others said it would be on September l .”111 As days became weeks and weeks 
became months, many people gave up hope, especially when food ran out.
Nevertheless, the US Far Eastern Command under General MacArthur’s 
leadership was eager to launch a daring amphibious assault on Inch’on just as many ROK 
supporters in Seoul hoped. Mac Arthur favored Inch’on over all other sites because it was 
the closest harbor to Seoul (about 15 miles away). His plan was to catch the North 
Koreans by surprise, recapture Seoul in short order, and cut the North Korean forces in 
half. The general believed that by opening a second front, he would also relieve the
110 No Kum-sok, A MiG-15 to Freedom: Memoir o f  the Wartime North Korean Defector Who First 
Delivered to the Secret Fighter Jet to the Americans in 1953 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 
Publishers, 1996), 47.
111 Letter from Kim Eun-Hyung, ex-Assemblyman Kim Sangdon’s daughter, to her sister Kim Shing 
Hyung, 5 October 1950, Presbyterian Archives, Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 -  Presbyterian 
Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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stress on the Pusan Perimeter and strengthen the morale of the Korean people by 
recovering their capital. It was a political as well as a military move.
The choice of Inch’on, however, was generally regarded by amphibious experts in 
the Navy as unrealistic and dangerous. The channel leading to the harbor (which is 
known as the Flying Fish Channel) was not only narrow, but also studded with reefs and 
shoals. Its five-knot current created another problem. What made it worse was that there 
was no beach, but only twelve-foot-high sea walls that enabled big ships to approach the 
harbor. Since the water rose and fell an average of twenty-eight feet every six hours, 
there would be no way out once inside the harbor until the next high tide. All ships 
would be stuck on the mud beach, making the landing particularly vulnerable if the beach 
was guarded by heavy guns. Secrecy, careful planning, adequate preparation, and a 
strong will and heart were the only hopes for success. General MacArthur appointed 
General Edward Almond to oversee the landing. MacArthur combined the 7th Army and 
the 1st Marine together with other supporting units and formed the X Corps. Under huge 
pressure from MacArthur, the X Corps had to be ready to land by September 15.
During this preparation time, Navy re-enlistment applications arrived from three 
Korean-born second-generation missionaries: William H. Shaw, Jim Lampe, and Horace 
Underwood (who was already in Korea, and whose earlier missionary work was explored 
in the first section of this chapter).112 These men, who had all served as naval officers 
during World War II, had “spent their boyhood summers boating to and from Sorai 
Beach,”113 so they were very familiar with the treacherous tides of the Yellow Sea, and in
112 Jim Lampe was the son of Rev. Henry Lampe, a Presbyterian missionary in Seoul.
113 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 376.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
377
particular the Flying Fish Channel.114 Furthermore, growing up in Japanese-occupied 
Korea, they had no language problem in working with Japanese advisors, Korean soldiers, 
and American officers.115
Bom in P’yongyang in June 1922, William H. Shaw (also known as Bill Shaw), 
the son of Rev. William E. Shaw,116 was particularly gifted. When the Korean War broke 
out, he was pursuing a Ph.D. in political science at Harvard in preparation to serve as a 
missionary professor at Yonsei University. As soon as Bill Shaw heard the news, he 
wrote to his father from Harvard, “What [good is] it for me to go out to Korea in times of 
peace, if I’m not willing to go out now and serve them in their time of stress.” 117 
Delaying his Ph.D. studies and leaving his wife and two young children, Bill Shaw 
rejoined the Navy in order to return to Korea. As soon as his application arrived at the 
Pentagon, he was sent to Tokyo to assist with the top-secret Inch’on Landing.
1 I Q
These three “Korea Kids” were all assigned to duty with the intelligence 
section of COMNAVFE, under the command of Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. They 
participated in planning the landing operation (under the top-secret code name, 
OPERATION CHROMITE). While the Navy was responsible for transporting troops 
and bombing Inch’on Harbor, the actual combat would be the job of the 1st Marine 
Division under Major General Oliver P. Smith. The three “Korea Kids” were attached to 
the amphibious force headquarters command during the landing. They were not,
114 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 42-45, 72.
115 Both Horace and Bill received formal Japanese language training in the Navy during World War II.
116 In order not to confuse him with his father Rev. William Shaw, he will be called “Bill” from now on.
117 Quoted in “For His Friends,” by R. J. C., Presbyterian Life, 3 February 1951, 37.
118 This was how the children o f American missionaries to Korea were called. See Underwood, Korea in 
War, Revolution and Peace, 141.
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however, assigned to combat. Instead, their job was to “guide the landing craft” and 
“answer questions along the coast as they came in.”119
To the surprise of many, the Inch’on Landing was an exceptional success despite 
being delayed by Typhoon Kezia. The North Koreans failed to guard the harbor, in spite 
of warnings from Mao Zedong. Lt. Eugene Franklin Clark, an intelligence officer under 
MacArthur, was sent to secure the off-shore islands on Inch’on with his Korean aides. 
When he landed on Tokchok-do {do means island), he received information sent from a 
Christian school master in Yonghung-do that the North Korean army had “temporarily 
withdrawn all but a handful of troops from [Yonghung-do],” an island very close to 
Inch’on.120 Lt. Clark felt that the report was trustworthy, partly because the messenger 
was a Christian. So he decided to immediately take Yonghung-do with the help of the 
Christian schoolmaster and the village headman. This earlier-than-planned capture of 
Yonghung-do was fortuitous to the invasion, because the island became a crucial base for 
taking the other outer islands, including Wolmi-do, right before the Inch’on Landing.121 
Lt. Clark discovered that the North Koreans had placed only very limited defenses along 
the Inch’on harbor.
On September 15, the X Corps first landed on W61mi-do and then proceeded to 
the mainland. The landing party encountered very little resistance. Within twenty-four 
hours the marines had secured the beach. Within four days, the 5th Regiment of the 
Marines occupied Kimp’o Airport. Lt. Horace Underwood’s job was to interrogate 
dozens of Koreans, including North Korean POWs and Korean civilians, collecting
119 “For His Friends,” by R. J. C., Presbyterian Life, 3 February 1951, 37.
120 Eugene Franklin Clark, The Secrets o f Inch ’on: The Untold Story o f  the Most Daring Covert Mission o f  
the Korean War (New York: Berkley Book, 2002), 30.
121 Ibid., 31-58.
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information on the enemies’ defenses in Seoul.122 The Marines needed this intelligence 
quickly because they were racing to capture Seoul before September 25th, the deadline set 
by General MacArthur. For his part in the Inch’on landing, Horace Underwood was 
awarded the Navy Commendation Medal with V (“V” indicated combat).123
The Death of Bill Shaw 
Since the Marines needed experienced guides to find the best route to Seoul, the 
1st Division gladly accepted the requests of Lt. Horace Underwood and Lt. Bill Shaw to 
join the march. Both of them went with the 5th Regiment commanded by Lt. Col 
Raymond L. Murray.124 They reached the Han River on September 19. Pushed by 
General Almond to meet the schedule, the Marines were ordered to brave the Han River 
without strong air support, not knowing that the North Koreans had moved in from Nung- 
gok (Nung-gol) to defend the far shore (see Map 7).125 Lt. Col. Murray sent Captain 
Kenneth Houghton across the Han with a small advance team, which included Lt. 
Underwood and another Navy Public Information Officer. After swimming the river and 
preparing for the assault craft to cross, the North Koreans attacked from the hill behind 
the village, forcing the assault craft and the team to turn back. The next day, with heavy 
artillery and air support, the 5th Regiment forced their way across the river. Lt. 
Underwood received the Bronze Star with V for his daring crossing the night before.126
On September 22, once across the Han, the Marines waged a pitched battle to 
retake Seoul in combat street by street, block by block, and house by house. The
122 Walt Sheldon, Hell or High Water: MacArthur’s Landing at Inch'on (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1968), 247.
123 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 187.
124 Ibid, 142.
125 Ibid., 143. See also Shelby L. Stanton, Ten Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1989, 
1996), 97-106.
126 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 143,187.
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casualties were not only soldiers but also innocent civilians who were “sandwiched” 
between the KPA and UN forces, and “had no place to run.”127 To fight the street war, 
the 5th Regiment split up into two groups. Lt. Underwood went with one Marine 
company toward Moraenae (Morinai) and Sinch’on (Shinchon), while Lt. Bill Shaw went 
with the other toward Hongje-dong. Both units came under heavy fire. About five miles 
outside of Seoul, Shaw’s company was ambushed on three sides, and he was killed while 
“trying to assist a group of Korean civilians [who were] caught up in the skirmish.”128 
He was one of five hundred American soldiers who lost their lives in the battle for Seoul.
Lt. Bill Shaw’s death was not only a great loss to his family, but also to the US 
military and the Korean people. His death revealed something unique about American 
missionaries in uniform. First, Shaw was not alone in his concern for Korean civilians. 
Missionaries and their children in uniform all showed a similar concern for the well­
being of the Korean people. They would make special requests of the military to assist 
the civilians. Their courage and religious beliefs sometimes influenced US soldiers 
around them to also volunteer to help rescue innocents in danger.
Bill Shaw’s death also showed the value of these mission workers in the war 
effort. The report of Shaw’s death shocked the Marine Division Headquarters so much 
that the Commander immediately ordered Lt. Underwood back to the headquarters 
because they did not “want their few language officers out on the front lines.”129 This
127 Letter from Soon-Young Pai to Rev. Minsoo Pai, 23 October 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
128 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 144.
129 Ibid., 144.
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thdecision probably spared Underwood’s life, because the Marine 5 Regiment suffered the 
highest casualties in the battle for Seoul, with losses of 85 percent in Company D.130
“Hedge Goes Home”131 
Lt. Underwood, however, did not receive the order to report back to headquarters 
until late in the afternoon. He was with the 5 Marines crossing the Yonhui Valley near 
the Yonsei University campus. His company faced strong resistance because the KPA 
had decided to make the hill (Hill #104), where the Underwood House was located, their 
defense line for western Seoul. Since Lt. Underwood was very familiar with the area, he 
was “to brief people on various features” and direct artillery fire to attack the enemy’s 
positions.132 This battle was one of the most difficult in Seoul, requiring four all-out 
assaults to take the hill. Casualties were high on both sides.133 In the end, the 
Underwood House was completely destroyed, while the rest of Yonsei campus was badly 
damaged.
Lt. Horace Underwood’s participation in the Inch’on landing and the battle to 
liberate Seoul was reported by TIME on October 2. The article “Hedge Goes Home” 
pointed out that the Underwood family had labored for decades in Korea, and built up a 
fine institution, Chosen Christian University (today’s Yonsei University), to educate 
Korean young men and women. It was precious not only to Koreans, but to Americans as 
well. “Perhaps more clearly than other U.S. officers,” TIME wrote, “[Underwood] knew 
what he was fighting for” -  to prevent “one of the most Christianized nations of the
130 Stanton, Ten Corps in Korea, 1 9 5 0 ,102.
131 “Hedge Goes Home,” TIME, 2 October 1950.
132 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 144.
133 Underwood found at least 150 dead North Koreans around the central part of the campus. The ROK 
Marine platoon had only 19 survivors after the battle.
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Orient” from falling into the hands of the Communists.134 Here TIME, which was always 
sympathetic to the missionary cause, presented to the American public a religious 
rationale to support UN action in Korea.135
The Liberation o f  Seoul 
Because Lt. Horace Underwood was with the Division Headquarters, he had the 
opportunity to participate in the ceremony of the liberation of Seoul in front of the “Blue 
House,” the National Assembly building in Seoul. General MacArthur was determined to 
have a ceremony to mark the liberation of Seoul, despite opposition from Washington.136 
It created conflict with the State Department, which objected to “any participation by the 
military commander in ROK government matters.”137 Nevertheless, as usual, MacArthur 
had his way; and the Joint Chiefs reluctantly authorized him to “facilitate the restoration,”
1 ^ Rbut warned him not to get involved in Korean politics. Because of pressure from 
General MacArthur, the X Corps had to rush to fight their way into the city. Even before 
the Marines had effective control, General Almond hastily declared Seoul recaptured on 
September 25 in order to meet his boss’s timeline.
On September 29, General MacArthur held the handover ceremony in front of the 
smoldering National Assembly building, while the Marines continued to fight only a few 
blocks away. From a military view point, it was unrealistic and even dangerous to have a 
ceremony in the midst of severe street fighting, but from a political perspective,
134 “Hedge Goes Home,” TIME, 2 October 1950.
135 TIME’s owner Henry Luce, the son of American missionaries to China, favored the missionary cause 
and was strongly behind Syngman Rhee. See Robert Edwin Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, Time, and the 
American Crusade in Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 114-115.
136 Stanley Weintraub, MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing o f An American Hero (New York: The 
Free Press, 2000), 152.
137 Ibid.
138 TU i A
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MacArthur was trying to establish unity between the US and ROK troops and boost 
morale.
The tone of the handover ceremony was deeply religious and sentimental. The 
service began at noon when General MacArthur and President Rhee stepped up to the 
platform. The general announced before the UN troops, “By the grace of a merciful 
Providence, our forces fighting under the standard of that greatest hope and inspiration of 
mankind, the United Nations, have liberated this ancient capital city of Korea...” while 
the rumble of artillery firing was still echoing outside the courtyard.139 The general 
shook hands with President Syngman Rhee and told him, “[On] behalf of the United 
Nations Command I am happy to restore to you, Mr. President, the seat of your 
government that from it you may better fulfill your constitutional responsibilities.”140 
Then, the general “sanctified” the proceedings by asking everyone to join him in the 
Lord’s Prayer.141 Tears came to MacArthur’s eyes during the recitation. “If there had 
been any chaplains around,” said Admiral James H. Doyle, the master of amphibious 
tactics who was present at the ceremony, “they would have had to have gone back to 
school again.”142 Most of the soldiers at that time, however, did not quite understand the 
action of their army general. One Marine officer whispered to Lt. Horace Underwood, 
“They didn’t take the city. What are they doing, giving it back?”143 Nevertheless, the 
ceremony was widely reported all over the United States. Church opinion in the United 
States praised MacArthur as a great Christian general in American history.144
139 Sheldon, Hell or High Water, 327-328.
140 Ibid.
141 Stanton, Ten Corps in Korea, 1 9 5 0 ,112.
142 Quote in Weintraub, MacArthur’s War, 154.
143 Sheldon, Hell or High Water, 329.
144 “Hail To The General!” The United Presbyterian 109,15 January 1951, 2.
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Some historians have interpreted this ceremony as a colonial-style imposition of 
the Christian religion upon the Korean people,145 but, given that Rhee was a Christian and 
that Christians dominated Korean politics and the anti-Communist movement, 
MacArthur’s performance had a clear political purpose. No doubt the recapture of Seoul 
did boost morale in the UN and ROK forces, but the message of God’s divine will for the 
restoration of the city carried a significant message for the entire free world. MacArthur 
intended to convey to the whole world that he stood as the leader of a just and righteous 
army under the banner of the United Nations, returning Korea’s capital to its rightful 
ruler, Syngman Rhee.
The ceremony also showed that at least for MacArthur the Korean War had 
become symbolic of a religious crusade against atheistic Communism. On September 1, 
1950, when President Truman reported the situation of the Korean War to the American 
people, he again emphasized the idea of freedom -  including religious freedom -  in the 
battle to save Korea:
It is your liberty and mine which is involved. What is at stake is the free way of life-- the 
right to worship as we please, the right to express our opinions, the right to raise our 
children in our own way, the right to choose our jobs, the right to plan our future and to 
live without fear. All these are bound up in the present action of the United Nations to 
put down aggression in Korea.... Right now the battle in Korea is the frontline in the 
struggle between freedom and tyranny. But the fighting there is part of a larger struggle 
to build a world in which a just and lasting peace can be maintained.146
Truman believed that the American concept of freedom had “deep religious roots” and 
that the American people were “under a divine command to be concerned about the 
welfare of [their] neighbors, and to help one another.”147 He therefore saw the UN action
145 See Weintraub, MacArthur’s War, 154.
146 Harry S. Truman, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation in Korea, 1 
September 1950, Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: Harry S. Truman 1950 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 610-611.
147 Harry S. Truman, Address in Independence at the Dedication of the Liberty Bell, 6 November 1950, 
ibid., 706.
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as a just and righteous response. The United States had no wish to occupy Korea or 
destroy its people and property, as Communist propaganda claimed.148
War Atrocities
Following the liberation of Seoul, the UN began to investigate reports of atrocities 
committed by the North against both UN troops and the Korean people. Among the 
general population in the South, ROK government workers, pro-ROK politicians, 
professionals, and Christian leaders were the main victims, because the North Koreans 
wanted to deny South Korea any future political, social, economic, or religious leadership.
As the KPA prepared to pull back from Seoul, North Korean authorities set out to 
liquidate many of the remaining ROK government officials, civic and business leaders, 
and well-educated professionals. Professors, teachers, engineers, and mechanics were the 
principal victims of this final round of violence. Many people could not be found once 
the UN troops recaptured the city, including several political activists, such as An Chae- 
hong who had been the American-appointed Civil Administrator of the South Korean 
Interim Government, and Yo Un-hong, the brother of Yo Un-hyong.149
Communist authorities also called a meeting of all Christian pastors in Seoul. The 
police sent cars around to pick them up and escort them to the meeting place. But when 
the pastors arrived, they discovered that the “meeting” was a trap. They were promptly 
arrested and sent marching northward.150 In the end, about fifteen Presbyterian pastors
148 Before the attack on Inch’On, General MacArthur issued to his troops a statement explaining the military 
purpose of the operation, but the Russian media translated the statement falsely: “Before you is a rich city. 
In it are many sweets and wines. Take Seoul and all the girls will be yours. The property of the inhabitants 
belongs to the victors and you can send it home in packages.” See “In Package,” TIME, October 2,1950.
149 Deane, The Korean War, 95.
150 Letter from James M. Philips to John Smith, 8 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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and prominent laymen, fifteen Methodists, six Orientals,151 and one Salvation Army 
worker disappeared.152 According to data collected by the World Council of Churches 
(WCC), about one hundred eighty pastors and evangelists were taken by the Northern 
Army (see Table 6.4). In addition, hundreds of ROK army and police personnel and 
rightist youths were also involuntarily sent north.153
Many more were killed outright. According to CIA estimates, about a thousand 
people in Seoul alone were executed in the days before the KPA retreated.154 But the 
killing of political prisoners was by no means limited to Seoul; the KPA left atrocities 
behind in every major city. For instance, in Inch’on, on the night just before the 
American landing, approximately fifty-three Korean civilians were killed and twenty- 
eight others were wounded when three guards at the city’s police station attempted to 
murder all the ROK leaders and United Nations sympathizers incarcerated in the jail.155
To be fair, the South Korean police also committed some atrocities against 
civilians during the first three months of battle. For example, in order to weaken the 
Communists’ power in the southern provinces, the ROK police arrested many local 
leftists and suspected Communist sympathizers as the invading army drew closer.156 At 
least 1,200 suspected Communists were executed without a fair trial between June 25 and 
July 14.157
151 “6 Orientals” referred to the six Korean pastors supported by the Oriental Missionary Society.
152 Korea News Letter Number 3, 2 November 1950, Documents o f the WWC Library: The Korean War, 
160-161.
153 Ibid.
154 Deane, The Korean War, 95.
155 Chinnery, Korean Atrocity, 42.
156 H. K. Shin, Remembering Korea 1950: A Boy Soldier’s Story (Reno & Las Vegas, NV: University of 
Nevada Press, 2001), 39-40.
157 Deane, The Korean War, 96.
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Nevertheless, the systematic extermination of ROK supporters by the North was 
more organized and on a vastly larger scale. In Taejon alone, about five thousand to 
seven thousand people were murdered by North Korean authorities during the occupation, 
according to the investigations of the War Crimes Division within the Judge Advocate
1 5ftGenerals Corps. Most were policemen, officers of the Youth Defense Army, chiefs of 
the South Korean Youth Association, chiefs of local government offices, or headmen 
from various villages.159 Many were Christians. Similar massacres also took place in 
Chonju, Sunch’on, and other areas in the southern provinces (see Table 6.5 for the 
civilian casualties of the Korean War).160 A US investigation revealed that some 14,606 
or 84.6 percent of the total were killed during the last four days of September.161 Most of 
those who escaped, like Pastor Kim In-Yong, did so by hiding during those critical 
days. The Christian community concluded that “another occupation of Seoul, or any 
part of Korea, [would mean] the wholesale slaughter of Christians and all other 
outstanding people.”163
These reports of Communist atrocities were widely circulated in the United States. 
Not only were Koreans appalled, but so was the rest of the world. As firsthand witnesses, 
missionaries were particularly sickened by what they saw. For example, Dr. Horace H.
158 The War Crimes Division was established by the General Headquarters, Far East Command with 
Colonel James W. Hanley as its head. See Millett, Their War fo r Korea: American, Asian, and European 
Combatants and Civilians 1945-1953, 226-232 and also Chinney, Korean Atrocity, 21.
159 Chinnery, Korean Atrocity, 47.
160 In these cases, formal investigations were conducted by the United Nations and therefore recorded. But, 
in most o f other areas, the loss would be hard to account for. The South Korean government had too few 
resources to investigate most of the cases, leaving the actual condition inconclusive.
161 Chinnery, Korean Atrocity, 39.
162 Letter from James M. Philips to John Smith, 8 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia. A similar story was also 
told by Lee Hyun Sook, a housewife from Seoul, seeking refuge in Hong Song. See Richard Peters and 
Xiaobing Li, Voices from the Korean War (Lexington, KY: The University of Press o f Kentucky, 2004), 
206-209.
163 Letter from Rev. Francis Kinsler to Dear Friends, 9 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Underwood, bitterly expressed his views on Communism a few days before his death, in 
January 1951:
When oh when will Christians in America begin to realize that Communism is avowedly 
and unchangeable [sic] ANTI-CHRIST? ... Americans are more highly educated than the 
Koreans understand various theories of politics better and of economics but the millions 
of people fleeing in abject terror before the Communists are not merely disagreeing with 
an economic theory, or even because they prefer one type o f constitution to another, they 
are not afraid of the kindly old traffic cop -  they have learned through massacred sons 
and kidnapped daughters, through all kinds of terrors what Communism is .... There is no 
compromise possible between Christ and Anti-Christ, there is no strategy that will avail 
except that of faith in God to the death if necessary. I was about to say that I hope 
America could learn what it means yet as I think back over what even I have seen I can 
only say I hope she doesn’t have to learn the way Korea has learned.164
Dr. Underwood’s portrait of Communism as the Anti-Christ was confirmed by these tales 
of unreasonable persecutions and the mass murder of innocent lives. The desires for 
justice and victory were strong in both Korea and the United States. Hatred and 
resentment of the Communists and their supporters intensified.
Therefore, even though President Rhee emphasized “unity, understanding, and 
forgiveness” in his speech at the handover ceremony, anger against accused collaborators 
seriously radicalized the Southern population. Even Christians, who should theoretically 
be forgiving and not seek revenge, were caught in an emotional dilemma. According to a 
letter from a Presbyterian elder, Yun Yong-ch’un (Young Choon Youn), a high school 
teacher who had been arrested and physically tortured by the KPA, could not forgive the 
Communists for what they had done to him and his nation. Following his release, he had 
hidden underground for forty days “like a rat” to escape death. In a letter, he asked his 
friend, Rev. Pae Min-su (Pai Min-soo), who was living in the United States at that time:
I had redetermined [sic] to consecrate my life to the Lord and our people.... That rascal 
[Choi Moon-sik] came out of the prison (on June 28 when the Reds opened the gate) and 
was very active. I saw him a few times according to the former fellowship, but when I 
look back [at] what they have done, I would shoot and kill him right away. I am so rough 
now. Is this a sin to kill such a fellow, Reverend? No, I have understood through the
164 Letter from Dr. Horace H. Underwood to My Dear Dr. Smith, 31 January 1951, Presbyterian Church 
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 17 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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experience of this war that it is not a sin to get rid of such a fellow. I have lost 
innumerable friends and all possessions. The Lord left me to finish the job for this 
country.165
Hatred caused revenge and further loss of life after the occupied areas were retaken by 
the South. Many survivors of the Communist occupation sought reprisals to revenge 
themselves on those who had collaborated with the North Koreans.166
Extensive violence against leftists, therefore, haunted the liberated areas. 
Investigations against Communist collaborators began as soon as Seoul was conquered, 
but many accused collaborators were arrested and even shot by ROK authorities without 
a fair trial. One man, Pai Sun-yong (Pai Soon-young), witnessed such an atrocity. As the 
troops entered Seoul, a large crowd of young men ran up the mountain with ROK 
national flags to greet them. Many people were shouting “Manseil” (a greeting of praise) 
to the troops. The ROK Army shook hands “with boys and men with long hair and 
whiskers on white faces,” but immediately shot those “who had clean dresses, haircuts,
1 f\1and good looking people.” Their reasoning was that only those who had been in hiding 
could be trusted.
The discovery of signed statements of contrition or cooperation during the 
northern occupation inspired further revenge on collaborators. Some historians 
suggested that the figure for innocent lives lost in these retributions could be as high as 
100,000.169 When Colonel James M. Hanley, chief investigator of the War Crimes 
Division within the Judge Advocate Generals Corps, “raised the issue of investigating
165 Letter from Young Choon Youn to Rev. Pai Minsoo, 10 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
166 Lee Hyun Sook, “Housewife in Seoul, Korea,” translated by her daughter, Lee Hong Im. See Peters and 
Li, Voices from the Korean War, 209.
167 Letter from Soon-Young Pai to her uncle Rev. Minsoo Pai in the United States, 10 December 1950, 
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, 
Philadelphia.
168 Deane, The Korean War, 96,
169 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
390
war crimes committed by the South Korean army, the Korean National Police, 
paramilitary and special forces under ROK control, and civilian vigilantes,” he found that 
the UN command was uninterested in the issue.170 Since his initiative was dropped, the 
true figure remains forever unknown.
The US military was similarly unenthusiastic over investigating misconduct by its 
troops during the Korean War. The most serious US atrocity was the use of lethal 
weapons against refugees. This crime was completely neglected during and after the war. 
Nor did the ROK government raise the issue either, for fear of controversy and of losing 
American military support. For many years, the Nogun-ni Incident and other attacks on 
refugees remained unacknowledged by the US government.
In the late 1990s, the incident was rediscovered by journalists from the Associated 
Press. Based on the testimonies of victims, veterans, and declassified documents, they 
published a Pulitzer Prize winning account that was later expanded into the book, The 
Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare From the Korean War (2001). The 
allegations stirred controversy in South Korea as well as in the United States. Under 
public pressure, the US defense department investigated the event and concluded that it 
had not been a deliberate killing of Korean civilians.171 The incident, they determined, 
was a tragic and regrettable event caused by the poor training of the US soldiers, 
combined with fears that Communist guerrillas were pretending to be refugees. West 
Point historian Robert Bateman supported this claim, arguing that the number of victims
170 Millett, Their War fo r  Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians 1945-1953, 
232.
171 Report o f the No Gun Ri Review. U.S. Department o f Army Inspector General, January 2001, 
http://www.army.mil/nogunri/.
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was far smaller than the AP journalists had suggested and that there was no direct order 
from the US Command to massacre refugees.172
In response, historian Sahr Conway-Lanz discovered a letter from Ambassador 
John J. Muccio to Dean Rusk, proving that it was an existing policy within the US 
Command to shoot at refugees if they did not stop running toward American defenses. 
This policy was to prevent guerilla attacks. Although Conway-Lanz’s discovery did not 
directly answer what specifically had happened in Nogun-ni, it did raise concerns over 
the general conduct of US troops throughout the Korean War and how much violence 
civilians had suffered. This finding unmasked the ugliness of war and showed the 
difficulties of upholding basic human rights or meeting the minimum humanitarian 
standards set by the international community when inexperienced soldiers faced a
17^complicated wartime situation.
CONCLUSION
During this early period of the war, the US military’s harsh policy on handling the 
security problems posed by the massive influx of refugees into its defense lines presented 
a sharp contrast to the US missionaries’ relief efforts among the refugees. It is perhaps 
not surprising that the stress of fighting a losing battle and the paranoia of guerilla attacks 
would override humanitarian concerns for many soldiers and US officials. It was also 
natural for missionaries to champion the destitute.
American missionaries in the war zone constantly advocated the need for relief 
and fought for the rights of the refugees. Yet, it would be wrong to imply that the US
172 See Bateman, No Gun Ri: A Military History o f  the Korean War Incident, 123-130.
173 Conway-Lanz, “Beyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War,” 50.
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army showed no concern for the refugees; on many occasions, the military assisted the 
missionaries’ efforts, as when officers would allow missionaries to cross the battle lines 
in order to bring refugees to safer locations. Although the missionaries could only help a 
limited number of people, their moral guidance perhaps saved US involvement in Korea 
from becoming bogged down in atrocity scandals and a public outcry over the ignoring of 
the refugee crisis. It is hard to measure the level of their success or contributions, but the 
voices of the missionaries were surely heard both in the battlefield and on the home front. 
Their presence in the war zone made the difference between life and death for many 
Korean civilians.
As the US entered the Korean conflict, religion offered a way for Americans to 
identify with the Korean cause in a decade of revival. The efforts of missionaries to 
bring the war home to America through reports and food-and-clothing drives 
strengthened this connection and produced a paternalistic view of the Korean people. 
Then, as reports of Communist atrocities against the southern people, particularly 
Christians, flooded in, America felt as a father would at the persecution of his children.
The relief work of the missionaries served a vital role, particularly in the first 
critical months of the war, when need was great, supplies were limited, and no other 
relief agencies had yet noticed the problem or gotten through the bureaucracy to address 
it. Countless lives were saved in this brief period. Furthermore, in being the first, the 
missionaries established their leading role in raising and distributing relief supplies. It 
was in this period that American Christians began or expanded some of the most famous 
charities of today. They became outspoken, and actively worked to promote awareness of 
the war and the plight of the Korean people, thereby influencing American public opinion.
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The war also offered new opportunities for the growth of the Korean church 
despite its initial losses. Missionaries connected relief work with pastoral care by 
providing pastors for each kun in the overcrowded refugee centers. People began to 
identify the church as the place to find compassion and practical help, leading to an even 
more positive public image than the church had enjoyed before. The phenomenal growth 
of the Korean churches during and after the war is therefore understandable. In addition, 
with the help of American missionaries, the Christian community emerged as the most 
prominent political-moral force in consolidating South Korean nationalism against 
Communist expansion.
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CHAPTER 7 
Occupation and Evacuation
INTRODUCTION
The victory at Inch’on encouraged the United Nations to pursue a new goal of 
unifying Korea by force. The crossing of the 38 Parallel parted the Iron Curtain for a 
brief period, affording the world a rare glimpse of life under Communism. As UN 
troops marched into North Korea, missionaries, especially those who had worked in the 
North before World War II, eagerly followed behind. These missionaries would lend 
assistance to the brief UN occupation of North Korea. Then, in the ensuing evacuation 
crisis, they pressed the UN forces to transport hundreds of thousands of refugees. 
Although missionaries had no real authority, their eagerness to save civilians made an 
impression on those who did have authority. Their work was a major factor in the 
military decision to lend its support to the most massive human evacuation process in 
history. And though the evacuation of so many destitute human beings had no military 
advantage, this decision would prove to be a great psychological weapon. To the troops 
on the ground, it would give them a sense that the cause they fought for was just; and to 
the eyes of observers back home, it would serve as proof that people, given a choice, 
would choose freedom over Communism in droves.
394
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UN OCCUPATION OF NORTH KOREA
The UN occupation of North Korea was a unique period of the Korean War, but 
no historian has carefully analyzed its impact on the development of the war. Because of 
the success of the Inch’on Landing, more missionaries were allowed to return to Korea; 
some even entered North Korea. Religious interests filled a special role in these events, 
as the US military, in an effort to stabilize the occupied regions, enlisted the help of 
missionaries and other religiously motivated people.
The Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel 
The decision to cross the 38th parallel has been a controversial issue in Korean 
War historiography. Historian Jongsuk Chay provided critical analysis of the debate in 
the State Department, while historian William Stueck has explored the international 
dimensions of the decision.1 Within the Truman administration, there was a desire to 
unify Korea, so long as there was no definite sign of Chinese or Soviet intervention. The 
President authorized the crossing of the 38th Parallel on August 27,1950.2 It took another 
month for the United States to secure United Nations approval. On October 7, the UN 
passed a resolution “to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea.” In its 
ambiguity, this resolution sanctioned UN forces to cross the 38 Parallel. Public opinion 
in the United States also favored a plan to “continue fighting” in pushing northward until
1 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War: The Republic o f  Korea and the United States, 1948- 
1953 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 210. See also William Stueck, The Korean War: An International 
History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 85-126.
2 Ibid., 209-210.
3 Ibid., 210.
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the North Koreans surrendered.4
Among South Korean officials, however, there was never any debate. President 
Syngman Rhee and his troops were eager to liberate the North. Rhee believed that the 
ROK Army had the right to cross the parallel and unify the country even if the United 
Nations refused to do so. Unification was both a personal and national crusade. Rhee’s 
position was supported by a majority of the Southern population. Christians and northern 
refugees were particularly vocal supporters -  the refugees were eager to return home, 
while the Christians wanted to liberate P’yongyang, the so-called “Christian capital of 
Korea.” On October 1, without waiting for the final decision of the UN, President Rhee 
(with General MacArthur’s permission) ordered the 3rd ROK Infantry Division, which 
was waiting at Kangnung on the East Coast, to march north (see Map 8).5 The 26th and 
23rd Infantry Regiments were sent next. They first reached KosSng, and then pushed 
toward Wonsan. With the help of the Capital Division, the 3rd Division captured Wonsan 
on October 10. ROK troops, however, did not stop but continued to march north and 
reached Hamhung on October 17. Ten days later, the ROK 6th Division reached the 
Manchurian border separating China from North Korea.
Rhee’s political ambition and autocratic rule in South Korea had alarmed 
members of the United Nations, so they sought to deny him jurisdiction over the North by
4 In October 1950, the Gallup Poll did a public opinion survey on the question: “What do you, yourself, 
think -- should the fighting stop when we have succeeded in pushing the NK back over the line from where 
they started — or do you think we should continue the fight in their own territory until they have 
surrendered?” 64% favored “continue fighting” in North Korean territory while 27% thought that the UN  
should “stop fighting.” See George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, 1949-1958 
(New York: Random House, 1972), 2:943.
5 Chi Op Lee, Call Me “Speedy Lee”: Memoirs o f a Korean War Soldiers (Seoul: Won Min Publishing 
House, 2001), 98. The United States had already decided to cross the 38th Parallel with UN troops on 
September 29. See Secretary Marshall’s directions to MacArthur, Foreign Relations o f  the United States 
1950, Vol. VII Korea (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 826. Rhee’s action was 
not completely on his own initiative, but he was glad to obtain permission from MacArthur.
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instructing General MacArthur to set up a military government in the North. When UN 
troops marched North on October 9, the race with the ROK army was on. General
thMacArthur directed General Walton H. Walker’s 8 Army to take P’yongyang as soon as 
possible, while General Edward M. Almond’s X Corps was to make an amphibious 
landing somewhere along the North Korean east coast. MacArthur’s plan was that, if 
P’yongyang fell before General Almond landed, then he should no longer strike 
westward across the peninsula.6 Instead, the X Corps would continue north to catch up 
with the ROK troops. This decision proved fatal, however, because a failure to secure the 
P’yongyang-Sinanju-Hungnam-Wonsan quadrilateral -  the “bottle-neck” and the heart 
of North Korea -  left UN troops vulnerable to counter-attack (see Map 8). In addition, 
there was no coordination between the 8th Army and X Corps; they had poor 
communication and were under different commanding generals.
The Capture of Pyongyang and Other North Korean Cities 
P’yongyang fell to the UN on October 19. Before the war began, the city had 
approximately 300,000 residents. While most Communists had fled the city before UN 
forces arrived, the majority of the civilian population remained. The damage from UN 
bombing was not severe, and the public welcomed the troops enthusiastically. According 
to TIME correspondent Dwight Martin, who had traveled with the army, “the people of 
P’yongyang cheered, waving South Korean flags, British flags, Chinese Nationalist flags
6 James A. Field, Jr., History o f  United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1962), 253.
7 In the P’ y6ngyang-Sinanj u-Hungnam-W5nsan quadrilateral, the axial range was low because the 
mountains rarely rose above 3000 feet. It had also the best transverse communications in the entire 
peninsula. Moreover, the harbors on both coasts were useful to forces sustained by sea, and that area’s 
industrial towns were linked by a road net of considerable density in Korean terms. Thus, it was easy to 
defend and important to keep. See ibid., 253.
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and improvised U.N. flags, which had been designed from hearsay.”8 He described the
scene as “the most spontaneous demonstration seen in any Asiatic city since the World
War II liberation of Shanghai from the Japanese.”9 Many citizens in P’yongyang cried
out at the tops of their voices, “Chayu (Jayu) Haebong Mansei! Chayu (Jayu) Haebang
Mansei!” (“Hurrah for our freedom and our independence!”)10
It was strange that Dwight Martin did not mention the waving of American flags.
Perhaps he forgot or perhaps it was just too obvious to list. Everywhere in the north,
North Korean citizens made their own American flags, and waved them to welcome the
American troops, not only in P’yongyang, but also in other cities as well.11 Everywhere
American soldiers went, they were joyfully welcomed by local citizens. Pfc. Leonard
Korgie of G Company of the 21st Infantry wrote:
The civilians were so happy to see us. I was thrilled for them. They wanted to give us 
eggs and produce, not like the South Koreans, who tried to sell them to us. They lined 
the road in their villages, looking like they’d been relieved of a heavy burden -  silent, 
happy, meek as lambs. I guess five years of Communist rule would do that to a people.12
The Underwood brothers also recorded how grateful the North Korean civilians were 
when they entered the North. In Hamhung, Lt. Richard Underwood told his aunt Grace 
Underwood about the atmosphere after the US soldiers entered Hamhung:
The entire atmosphere was one of thanksgiving that at last, after five years of Communist 
domination, they could laugh at jokes, visit their friends, go to church and come out from 
caves and holes where so many of the young men had been hiding to avoid the necessity 
of fighting for Reds.13
8 “Substantial Citizens,” TIME, 20 October 1950.
9 Ibid.
10 Chulho Awe, Decision A t Dawn: The Underground Christian Witness in Red Korea (New York: Harper 
& Row, Publisher, 1965), 145.
11 Michael R. Skerik, “Camouflage,” in I Remember Korea: Veterans Tell Their Stories o f  the Korean War, 
1950-53, ed. Linda Granfield (New York: Clarion Books, 2003), 57. When Skerik saw a homemade flag 
flying in WQnsan, he asked for the flag and the Koreans gave it to him. It was a flag with only forty-nine 
stars by mistake.
12 Pfc. Leondard Korgie’s recollection in Donald Knox, The Korean War An Oral History: Pusan to Chosin 
(San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publisher, 1985), 392.
13 Quoted in Horace G. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections o f  Horace G. 
Underwood, ed. Michael J. Devine (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 147-148.
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Like Pfc. Korgie, Lt. Richard Underwood reported that the civilians offered American 
troops “their homes and their food (short as they were themselves).”14 Some, according 
to Richard Underwood, were even willing to work for the UN for free.
Christians were particularly cheerful because they had just survived a month of 
the most intensive anti-Christian persecution since the Communists took power. Between 
the Inch’on Landing on September 15 and the fall of P’yongyang on October 19, a reign 
of terror had claimed many innocent lives as the retreating North Korean authorities 
sought to eradicate anyone they suspected might collaborate with the UN. The Catholic 
Church in the North lost one hundred percent of its priests (the actual number was sixty 
in total),15 while more than one hundred fifty Korean Protestant pastors disappeared -  not 
including elders, deacons, and prominent laymen.16 Communists also executed many 
doctors, teachers, and skilled technicians.17 Upon entering the city, UN troops discovered 
hundreds of fresh bodies in open fields, basements, and shallow mass-graves.18 The 
ROK and the X Corps uncovered similar atrocities in every major city they captured, 
including Wonsan, Hungnam, and Hamhung.19
The violence did not stop with the Northern retreat, however. Communist 
guerrillas in the mountains and countryside threatened to punish anyone who collaborated
14 Ibid., 148.
15 “Vatican Delegation’s Mission in North Korea: No Priests Left and No Data on Number of Catholics,” 
Information provided by the Immaculate Conception Chapel in Seoul.
16 According to Chulho Awe, a resident and an underground anti-Communist in P’ySngyang, Christian 
leaders were arrested and executed prior to the fall o f P’ySngyang. Many o f the underground anti­
communists in the North were Christians. Ibid., 82-85,141. See also Donald N. Clark, Living 
Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2003), 387.
17 A confidential letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 29 October 1950, Documents o f  the WCC Library: 
The Korean War, ed. Kim Heung Soo (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 146.
18 Ibid, 147. See also Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 387.
19 For the case of WSnsan, see Richard Underwood, “Memories and Thoughts,” (Unpublished Manuscripts, 
2002), 84-85. For the case o f Hungnam, see Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 148. For 
the case o f Hamhung, see letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 15 November 1950, Presbyterian Church 
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15.
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with the UN. These localized power struggles raised tensions and hampered the 
occupation government. To root out Communist influence, ROK armies brought with 
them South Korean police and rightist youth groups. Some of them were originally 
refugees from the North. These ROK supporters doled out their own brand of wartime 
justice, further escalating the tensions between the pro-Communist and the anti- 
Communist residents. UN troops watched helplessly, with no means of controlling the 
violence erupting from intense hatred, retaliation, and deep ideological conflicts.20
Missionaries Going “Home”
From October to November, missionaries returned to Korea from Japan and the 
United States under the sponsorship of the American embassy in Pusan. The victory of 
Inch’on and the recapture of Seoul encouraged Ambassador John J. Muccio to support 
the missionaries’ return. Medical missionaries received top priority, given the great need 
for medical and relief workers. Dr. George Rue, the Director of the Seoul Sanitarium and 
Hospital, returned on October 15 with his wife Grace, flying with Muccio on General 
MacArthur’s plane Bataan.21 Others followed, including trained nurses. Among those 
sent by Presbyterian Boards were Rev. Earle J. Woodberry, who used to be a missionary 
to China, Mr. James M. Phillips and Mr. Raymond C. Provost.22 The Methodists sent 
back Rev. Charles A. Sauer, Mr. Donald Payne, and Dr. Fred Manget, who would take 
charge of the Severance Hospital.23 The exact number of returnees was unclear because 
most of them returned through different channels and it was hard to track all of them
20 See Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 388.
21 Penny Young Sook Kim and Charles Milles, Though Bombs May Fall: The Extraordinary Story of 
George Rue, Missionary Doctor to Korea (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 2003), 83.
22 ‘The One Hundred and Fourteenth Annual Report of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian 
Church in the United States of America,” Presented to the General Assembly, May 1951 (New York) -  
Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
23 “Korea News Letter Number 3,” 2 November 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United Methodist Church 
Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
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down. Perhaps no less than twenty had returned from overseas and served either in their 
own mission stations or in various relief organizations.
Following the 5th Air Force’s northward advancement, Lt. (Doctor) Howard 
Moffett was the first missionary to arrive in P’yongyang City, his birthplace. The 
Commander of the 5th Air Force, Lieutenant General Earle E. Partridge, had sent Lt. 
Moffett ahead to secure a suitable base to serve as their headquarters within the city, 
because the lieutenant “[knew] every inch of that terrain.”24 To the first group of 
civilians that he found, he asked whether they were Christians. One of them said that he 
was, and then asked the lieutenant whether he knew “Ma-Moksa” -  the Korean title of 
Dr. Moffett’s father, Rev. Samuel A. Moffett, the most famous and well-respected 
missionary in North Korea. As soon as the Korean found out that Lt. Moffett was the son 
of Ma-Moksa, he insisted on going with him into the city. Soon, fifteen more Christians 
were following along, “excitedly talking.” It was a kind of welcome that even Lt. 
Moffett himself did not expect. Once inside the city, Lt. Moffett surveyed the Capitol 
building of the North Korean government, which was built on a Presbyterian Mission 
compound, and took a nap inside Kim H-sung’s office. During the UN occupation of
t h  tTiP’yongyang, the building became the headquarters of the 8 Army and the 5 Air Force.
A few days later, Lt. Richard Underwood, Rev. Harold Voelkel (Civilian 
Chaplain), and Rev. William Shaw (Civilian Chaplain), also arrived with the UN troops. 
The two Reverends were former missionaries to P’yongyang, who spoke Korean with a 
strong P’yongyang accent. Next, other civilian missionaries came, including Rev. 
Edward Adams, Rev. Harry Hills, Rev. Archibald Campbell, and Rev. Francis Kinsler,
24 Letter from Howard Moffett, 30 October 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 
18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
25 Ibid.
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and brought with them five Korean refugee pastors, Rev. Yun Ha-yong, Rev. Han 
Kyong-jik, Rev. Yi In-sik, Rev. Kim Yong-son, and Rev. Yu Hwa-jun.26
These missionaries and Korean pastors met with surviving pastors and church 
elders, hearing, again and again, similar stories of life under Communism. “From all we 
learn,” Chaplain Voelkel wrote, “the method of liquidation was to march them along 
stretches from day to day northward until wearied and then in their exhaustion, unable to 
trudge along any longer, they were shot.” Because of what they saw and heard from 
their Christian friends, these missionaries were convinced that “the Reds conducted a 
systematic, apparently a fine-tooth-combed extermination of the leadership of North 
Korea.”28 Voelkel’s report on the loss of the North Korean leadership was published by 
Presbyterian Life on December 9, 1950, and also later by Time Magazine on April 2, 
1951.
The visit of the missionaries and refugee church leaders brought hope to North 
Korean Christians. A special service was held on October 29 at the Somun (West Gate) 
Presbyterian Church. For the first time since the 1945 liberation, North Korean
9QChristians received Gospels and New Testaments. During the service, Rev. Han 
Kyong-jik gave a sermon on Isaiah 60:1: “Arise and shine for the light is come and the 
glory of the Lord is risen upon thee.” In his message to Korean Christians, Rev. Hein 
“challenged the people to get to work, not to lean on America or the United Nations as
26 A confidential letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 29 October 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library: 
The Korean War, 146-147.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Chaplain Voelkel brought boxes of religious supplies with him from Seoul for distribution in 
P’ybngyang. Ibid.
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great and generous as their help might be.”30 Revival meetings were held in different 
locations with the support of the US Chaplain Office.31
According to Lt. Howard Moffett, the response to the coming of these 
missionaries and refugee pastors was enthusiastic. “People were packed in like sardines 
[in the church] and thousands turned away,” due to a lack of room.32 Many American 
soldiers and their chaplains were surprised to see that the streets in P’yongyang “were 
covered with people carrying Bibles and hymnbooks” on Sunday.33 Some soldiers 
invited Lt. Moffett “over to supper so as to talk about it.”34 Lt. Moffett was delighted at 
the opportunity “to give them a good insight into Christian work” in P’yongyang and 
North Korea. As a result, many soldiers mistook him as “Chaplain Moffett.”35 Often, 
UN soldiers were invited by missionaries to churches, and participated in worship side- 
by-side with Korean natives.
Since they knew more about North Korea and North Koreans than anyone else, 
missionaries enjoyed good publicity as the foreign press flooded into P’yongyang. Time 
reporters, Life photographers, and American Broadcasting Company writers all asked 
missionaries for information to conduct their reports. Religious journalists, such as the
30 A confidential letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 29 October 1950, Documents o f  the WCC Library: 
The Korean War, 146.
31 Awe, Decision At Dawn, 159.
32 Letter from Howard Moffett, 30 October 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 
18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
33 Lt. Howard Moffett mentioned the reaction of American soldiers in his letter and Rev. Ned Adams 
reported the same kind of response to the Board published by the Presbyterian Life. See “The Church in 
Korea: Slow but Sure,” Presbyterian Life, 9 December 1950, 15.
34 Ibid.
35 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 5 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Editor of Presbyterian Life, Robert J. Cadigan, also visited P’yongyang. He regarded his 
visit as “one of the greatest ambitions of [his] life.”36
Most of these correspondents recognized the contribution of American 
missionaries and wrote positive reports on the influence of Christian churches in North 
Korea. For example, Time Magazine presented a story by Dwight Martin on the Russian 
occupation of North Korea which was based entirely on an interview with Na Song-dok 
(La Sung-duk), a 59-year-old elder in the P’yongyang’s Somun Presbyterian Church. 
Martin outlined Communist persecution of the Christian churches and the disappearance 
of various key church leaders. Although about thirty to forty percent of the Christian 
population passively collaborated with the Communist authorities, Martin recognized the 
Christian population as the strongest anti-Communist force in North Korea.37 Other 
journalists also shared Martin’s pro-Christian attitude as well. According to a United 
Press report from P’yongyang, North Korean authorities “suffered a severe propaganda 
defeat during the control of North Korea by trying to discredit American missionaries.”38 
The main reason for such a defeat, the report explained, was that the citizens in
-2Q
P’yongyang “knew them to be kind, honest, and magnificent people.” Therefore, 
“when the Russians painted them as lying, thieving scoundrels,” most of the people 
recognized the general dishonesty of Communist propaganda, and as a result, refused to 
take any Communist reports at their face value.40
The Christian Century was particularly interested in the development of 
Christianity in Korea. This non-denominational journal urged cooperation between the
36 “The World Scene: From Hope to Snowy Death,” Presbyterian Life, 6 January 1951,15.
37 “Carrots and Radishes,” TIME, 13 November 1950.
38 “The Church in Korea: All the News Is Not Bad,” Presbyterian Life, 11 November 1950,15.
39 Ibid.
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Presbyterians and Methodists for the reconstruction of Korean churches.41 Its editor 
pointed out that the Western church had a moral obligation to provide for the families of 
those who had been killed by the North Korean authorities because Communist leaders 
feared that they were undercover agents working for UN forces.42 The losses of the 
Korean churches, the editor argued, would “give to Christianity a new power and moral 
status in its approach to the Korean people.”43
In early November, Major Alfred D. Simenski, who had just been elected to 
Congress from Newark, New Jersey, paid an important political visit to North Korea. 
Major Simenski’s job was to investigate Communist atrocities for the Department of 
Public Information. Chaplain Voelkel invited Major Simenski, in addition to several 
chaplains, including a Jewish chaplain, to attend a church meeting in Hamhung (see Map 
8). Lt. Richard Underwood served as their interpreter. The Korean Christians “prepared 
a statement of thanks which was read [to express their] gratitude to America for 
deliverance from oppression.”44 In response, Major Simenski promised to report their 
gratitude in his first speech before Congress on January 3, 1951. The Jewish chaplain 
also spoke and told the Korean Christians, “I bring you greetings from Jews 
everywhere.”45 “It was heartening to the Koreans to know that they had so many friends 
who were anxious to help them in their time of need,” Chaplain Voelkel explained, “and 
it did the visitors good to see such a crowd of ardent Korean Christians.”46
41 Garland Evans Hopkins, “Korea’s Effect -  Plus and Minus” (editorial correspondence), The Christian 
Century LXVII (15 November 1950): 352-353.
42 “Korea Lengthens Roll of Christian Martyrs,” The Christian Century LXVII (29 November 1950): 1412.
43 Ibid.
44 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 19 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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By building relationships with American politicians and publicizing Korean 
Christianity, US religious and secular journalists fostered an increased awareness and 
interest in Korea among the American public. Although the excitement over the 
successes of the occupation period was to be short-lived, it paved the way for an 
enthusiastic outpouring of American support for the relief efforts that would soon be 
needed, once the Chinese Communists entered the war and turned the tables again.
Missionary Activities in the Occupied Areas
Since the Communists had purged the educated class before fleeing, the US Army 
had difficulty finding natives who were qualified to run the government.47 Colonel 
Archibald W. Melchior, a civil-affairs officer who was responsible for organizing a 
provisional city council, could not identify the leading citizens in the city. His initial 
method was to find a well-dressed Korean and ask him to “round up some substantial 
citizens.”49 Of course, the loyalty of these recruits, as well as their training, was very 
questionable. Without experienced administrators or qualified interpreters, American 
civilian affairs officers faced a severe challenge. In some areas, the search was so 
desperate that some US officials wanted to reinstate the Communist government in order 
to prevent a state of anarchy. By doing so, of course, the troops offended the local anti­
communists, and created confusion and misunderstanding between the occupation forces 
and the Korean civilians.
With such challenges, the US Army welcomed the help of missionaries and 
Korean Christians in the administration of the occupied regions. Lt. Moffett and
47 Letter from Edward Adams to John C. Smith, 12 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 140, Box 18, Folder 14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
48 “Substantial Citizens,” TIME, 30 October 1950.
49 Ibid.
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Chaplain Voelkel sought help from various Christian communities to locate anti­
communists to work for the UN. Christians in P’yongyang proved eager and supportive; 
while in some other less-Christianized cities, such as Wonsan, many feared retribution for 
collaborating should the Communists return.50 Frequent guerilla attacks also led local 
people to shy away from Americans. Still, according to the missionaries, the Christian 
community in the North remained the most loyal supporter of the UN occupation.
As missionaries served the UN military government, they also provided materials 
and protection to the Christian community. One example of material support occurred 
when missionaries learned of an abandoned Communist grain stockpile in the 
countryside; they secured “free passage” for two Christian youth organizations to bring 
the grain to P’yongyang for relief.51
An example of the protection was the missionaries’ efforts to free Christians 
mistakenly imprisoned by UN forces. Because of active Communist guerilla moments, 
many North Korean civilians had been arrested as suspected Communists. Chaplain 
Voelkel’s position in the POW administration enabled him to release those he knew were 
falsely imprisoned. For instance, in Anju, eighteen Christians were mistaken for 
guerrillas because they possessed several Soviet weapons. The elder of the church found 
Chaplain Voelkel and explained that these men belonged to a local defense force for 
security against guerrillas. Voelkel immediately went to the POW camp and arranged for 
their release.52
50 Letter from Chaplain Voelkel, 19 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, 
Box 18, Folder 15. See also Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 387, 390.
51 Letter from Edward Adams to John C. Smith, 12 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 140, Box 18, Folder 14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
52 Letter from Chaplain Voelkel, 5 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 
18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Since the occupation period was short, missionaries in fact could do very little for 
the North Korean Christian community. Instead, their brief visits caused serious 
problems for the Korean Christians. Communist supporters blacklisted those who 
collaborated with the UN forces and waited for revenge when the Communist authorities 
returned. Christians were identified as traitors because of their close relationship with the 
occupation troops. Although missionaries did make some contributions to assist the 
military in governing the occupied areas, their real impact would be felt during the 
impending evacuation of hundreds of thousands of refugees, following the Chinese 
intervention in late 1950 that quickly changed the tide of the Korean War.
MISSIONARIES AND OPERATION HEARTBREAK
On October 18, the day before UN troops captured P’yongyang, Chinese People’s 
Volunteers (CPV) had secretly crossed the Yalu River. The Chinese had warned the UN 
several times in late September and early October against any violation of the 38th 
Parallel through the Indian Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Sardar 
K. M. Panikkar. Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai told Panikkar plainly that the 
Chinese would tolerate the presence of South Korean forces in the North, but that an 
“American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese resistance.”53 The State 
Department received this warning through London on the same day.54 Nevertheless,
53 Quote in Priscilla Roberts, “Panikkar, Sardar K. M„” in Encyclopedia o f the Korean War: A Political, 
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002): 510.
54 Foreign Relations o f the United States 1950, Vol. VII Korea, 839.
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Washington seems to have underestimated the significance of Zhou’s warning and 
thereby caused one of the worst military disasters in US history.55
China Enters the Korean War 
Mao Zedong’s decision to send troops to save North Korea quickly changed the 
direction of the Korean War. Historian Chen Jian argued that China entered the war 
because of Chinese Communist “leaders’ perception of China’s security interests and 
their judgment of to what extent and in which ways such interests had been challenged 
during the Korean crisis.”56 Truman’s decision to send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan 
Strait had upset Mao’s plan to invade Taiwan in August 1950. The US had interfered in 
what they considered to be a domestic affair. And now US troops (under a UN label) 
were marching towards China’s North Korean border. Chinese Communist leaders were 
initially divided over how to respond. Mao won the debate, however, by arguing that 
China should reassert its historical influence over East Asia and also protect itself by 
resisting foreign encroachment around its borders. Therefore, the Chinese government
55 The puzzling part of this phase of UN operations was that even though the United States might not have 
halted its attack against the North, the Far Eastern Command in Tokyo should have exercised caution in 
directing the troops’ movements in North Korea. Military historians generally attributed such failure to 
General MacArthur’s arrogance and the lack of coordination between the 8th Army and X Corps. See 
Shelby L. Stanton, The Ten Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996) and Stanley 
Weintraub, MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing o f an American Hero (New York: The Free Press, 
2000).
56 Jian Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making o f the Sino-American Confrontation (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 4.
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clearly warned that China would intervene if US troops crossed the 38th Parallel.57
It was not that the US turned a deaf ear to such threats. From August 1950, the 
Truman administration took actions that suggested they considered Chinese intervention 
as a serious possibility. The State Department and the intelligence agencies examined 
and re-examined the Chinese warning. The President later disclosed that he had flown on 
October 15 to Wake Island for a meeting with General MacArthur to discuss the 
possibility of Chinese intervention. But if this is all true, then why did the US army not 
exercise more caution as it advanced toward the Yalu River?
Two primary reasons for America’s miscalculation were poor communication 
with China and pride in US military strength. The United States had refused to recognize 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after it was established on October 1, 1949, so 
there were no direct official communication channels between the two governments. 
Such indirect diplomacy as existed was less effective than direct communication, helping 
to breed mutual misunderstanding of the other’s intentions. In addition, the amazing 
success of MacArthur’s gamble at the In’chon Landing likely clouded American leaders’ 
judgment. Few were willing to challenge General MacArthur’s confidence that the 
Chinese Communists would not intervene or that the UN forces would be able to defeat 
them even if they did.
57 The reasons they chose India as their channel of communication instead of other Western nations 
continues to be investigated. A possible explanation is that, because of the resentment against Western 
imperialists and the new sense of Asia’s ascent to power and influence, the Chinese chose a recently 
independent Asian country as their spokesperson rather than a neutral Western state. An even more 
plausible explanation involves matters of diplomatic and military maneuvering. Mao Zedong chose to fight 
the United States in Korea instead of in Taiwan because of the relative advantage o f “human-wave” tactics 
in ground assaults. China would be at a disadvantage in naval and air warfare. He did not expect the 
United States to back off and give up its military objectives even if  China delivered its ultimatum loud and 
clear. Sending his messages through India would keep the Americans in suspense, while at the same time 
giving the Chinese soldiers more time to sneak through the China-Korean border for a surprise attack.
Mao, as a matter o f fact, did not want to confront the United States openly. Therefore, he never declared 
war against the United States. Instead, he sent “volunteers,” so that the United States would not have an 
excuse to attack the Chinese mainland.
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And yet, ironically, the Chinese Communists secretly entered North Korea on the 
same day that General MacArthur was on Wake Island offering assurances to President 
Truman. The Chinese strategy was specifically designed to take advantage of 
MacArthur’s north-bound movement. From October 15 to November 25, Chinese 
“volunteers” traveled by night along the ridge of Nangnim Sanmaek, taking up positions 
surrounding the isolated UN units. Prior to their major offensive, China only sent a few 
regiments to test the strength of the UN troops along the Chinese-Korean border, thereby 
misrepresenting their actual strength and concealing their infiltration behind the UN 
defenses. MacArthur took the bait when both the 8th Army and the X Corps marched 
north toward the Yalu River.
“Missionary Kids” in US Intelligence Units 
As the US failed to take the Communist threat seriously and continued to march 
toward the border between China and North Korea, frontline soldiers began to encounter 
periodic attacks from the Chinese “volunteers.” There were also additional warnings and 
signs of the possibility of Chinese intervention when UN troops entered P’yongyang. 
Before the North Korean Communists left the city, they threatened P’yongyang residents 
that they would return with the Chinese army, and that any person collaborating with the 
UN forces would certainly be punished. In late October, locals informed ROK soldiers 
that Chinese troops had been spotted in the northern mountains. These rumors were 
confirmed when the ROK’s 26th Infantry Regiment captured the first Chinese prisoner on 
October 28. Prior to that day, UN troops near the Yalu River had already captured eleven 
Chinese. Both Lt. Richard Underwood with the X Corps in the east and Captain Charles 
Bemheisel with the 8th Army in the west, because of their language skills, had
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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interrogated these prisoners and concluded that the Chinese forces had entered the war. 
They sent their reports to the UN Command headquarters in Tokyo.
Nevertheless, US intelligence analysts in Tokyo dismissed these Chinese 
prisoners as Korean-Chinese who fought with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria 
during the Chinese civil war. Because of the headquarters’ refusal to accept their field 
reports, Lt. Richard Underwood was “furious” and “often ranted to the X-Corps G-2 
(Intelligence Unit) about it.”58 But his superiors refused to do anything to pressure 
Tokyo, leaving Lt. Underwood frustrated and fearing for the safety of the UN forces.
Captain Charles Bemheisel was with the 8th Army at the frontline. In early 
November, with his superiors refusing to acknowledge the Chinese intervention, he 
loaded several Chinese POWs in a vehicle from the frontline, and drove them several 
hours south to the 8 Army Headquarters in P’yongyang in order to warn the commander 
of the 8th Army. Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, General Walker 
immediately recalled his probing columns and formed his army up along the south bank 
of the Ch’ongch’on River. Before moving his troops further north, he waited for the 
logistical deficiencies of the 8th Army to be resolved by the reopening of Chinnamp’o, a 
vital seaport for logistic support on the west coast (see Map 8).59
General Walker’s caution merited praise and a military fiasco could have been 
avoided if MacArthur had slowed down his advance and established defenses between 
Sinanju and Hungnam. But General MacArthur, commanding from Tokyo, pursued an 
aggressive policy built around a desire to end the war quickly and an underestimation of 
the numerical strength of the Chinese troops. When the port was finally opened on
58 Underwood, “Memories and Thoughts,” 88.
59 James A. Field, Jr., History o f  United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington, D.C.: Naval History, 
1962), 256.
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November 20, 40,000 tons of supplies were unloaded for the 8th Army. On November 
24, in spite of confirmation that the Chinese were intervening, MacArthur ordered a new 
offensive, because he considered the UN forces to be strong enough to repulse the 
Chinese Army.60 In reality, the UN defensive line was stretched too thin, especially since
t l ithe rugged terrain hamstrung communications between the 8 Army and the X Corps. 
The competitive spirit between the two commanding generals did not help 
communications and coordination. The divided and isolated UN divisions, moving into 
rough, unfamiliar terrain under unfavorable weather conditions, were waiting to be 
slaughtered.
This new offensive sent the UN troops straight into a Chinese ambush. After four 
days of fierce battle, to MacArthur’s surprise, the fronts of both the ROK Army and the X 
Corps collapsed. The Chinese used the tactic of “human sea waves” to terrorize UN 
forces. They sent hundreds, or sometimes thousands, of troops in waves, screaming and 
yelling in the face of the UN’s withering firepower. Some troops in the following waves 
were unarmed because they were expected to find rifles on the ground as they advanced 
among their fallen comrades.61 Many UN soldiers were shocked and demoralized by the 
brutality of war and this massive loss of life. The Marines in the Ch’angjin (Chosin) 
Reservoir were particularly hard hit and fighting for their lives. Casualties among ROK 
and US Marines were high. Even though the UN had stronger firepower and enjoyed 
almost unchallenged air superiority, the troops were overwhelmed by the number of the 
enemy and frustrated by the malfunctioning of their weapons in the cold weather.
60 Ibid., 240.
61 Stephen E. Pease, Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 
Books, 1992): 86.
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On November 28, General Walker and General Almond were summoned to 
Tokyo for a conference with General MacArthur. The truth of the strength of the Chinese 
offensive was finally revealed. Beijing had sent 30 divisions, totaling 250,000 men, to 
Korea. United with the 180,000 North Korean new recruits, the enemy was considered 
too strong for the current UN forces. In order to preserve the strength of UN troops, the
thCommander authorized both the 8 Army and the X Corps to withdraw immediately. On
thDecember 3, the 8 Army began a full retreat from P’yongyang, and the X Corps from 
Hamhung.
Evacuation from Pyongyang 
The sudden reversal of the Korean War disappointed many pro-American and 
anti-Communist Koreans, especially those who had actively collaborated with the United 
Nations. The Christian population was particularly at risk since they had worked closely 
with UN occupation forces. American missionaries feared for their Christian friends. 
They immediately arranged transportation for them. They organized what they called, 
“Operation Heartbreak,” an attempt to evacuate Christian leaders to the south.62 Trucks 
loaded with Christian leaders and their families were sent southward.63
In order to make their way southward, refugees had to find a means to cross the 
Taedong River because the bridge was destroyed by Communist agents. Many risked 
their lives by crawling over the broken bridge. Along the Taedong River, UN soldiers 
constructed temporary pontoon bridges to allow only tanks and army vehicles to cross; 
refugees were not allowed to use these bridges. Missionaries wrote each of the Korean 
drivers a note declaring that the passengers were Christians, and asking UN troops to
62 ‘The World Scene: From Hope to Snowy Death,” Presbyterian Life, 6 January 1950,15.
63 Letter from Rev. Edward Adams to Dr. John Smith, 1 January 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 197, Box 1, Folder 3 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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assist their escape. Most of these trucks were able to cross the pontoon bridges and pass 
the UN checkpoints unchallenged.64
Lt. Moffett could have left the city with Ambassador Muccio earlier when the 5th 
Air Force abandoned P’yongyang, but he decided to stay on a little longer in order to 
assist the refugees. Luckily, he had requisitioned a 1939 Plymouth in P’yongyang. The 
car had once belonged to his missionary neighbors. His uniform allowed him to use the 
car to start ferrying carloads of Koreans on the pontoon bridge across the Taedong River 
before the city fell into the hands of the Communists on December 5. He did not count 
how many people he had helped, but he tried to assist as many as he could before the 
troops destroyed the bridge. His final carload included the family of a long-time 
Presbyterian Mission employee. They all jammed into the car for the seventeen-hour ride 
to Seoul. There exists no data on how many people left P’yongyang, or how many 
Christians the missionaries evacuated, but the estimated number of all refugees on the 
road to the South was more than one million.65
A Small Miracle in Chinnamp’o 
Refugees who could not cross the Taedong River turned westward toward 
Chinnamp’o, hoping to find luck in crossing the river or catching a boat to the South. On 
December 5, Lt. Jim Lampe, a Korean-born missionary child who had participated in the 
Inch’on Landing earlier, was with the Navy at the port of Chinnamp’o. His job was to 
direct the evacuation of troops and materials. Having spent his high school years in 
P’yongyang attending Pyeng Yang Foreign School, Lt. Lampe’s heart was bitter about
64 Awe, Decision at Dawn, 163-164,168.
65 Gertrude Samuels, “Korea’s Refugees -  Misery on the March,” New York Times, 11 February 1951, 156.
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the deterioration of the war situation and the decision to retreat from North Korea. 
Nevertheless, there was very little he could do.
The situation at the dock was disorganized and chaotic. The naval units that had 
already anchored at the port were: the Destroyer Foss, under Lieutenant Commander 
Henry J. Ereckson which was providing the city with electric power; a small Korean 
naval base command with three motor launches; and a minesweeping group at the mouth 
of the Taedong River.66 Waiting for evacuation at the port were about 1,700 American 
soldiers belonging to the port logistics group and roughly 6,000 Koreans, including 
wounded soldiers, government workers, military and political prisoners, police and boy 
scouts.67 But in addition to these people, who had an official claim for transportation, 
there were also 50,000 refugees.
At the time, no officers knew exactly how many transport ships were coming or 
whether the Navy could evacuate these panic-stricken refugees. All that the South 
Korean Navy could offer was one hundred sailboats. Taking 50,000 people on boats to 
Pusan would be impossible, but an effort was made to transport 20,000 across the river so 
that they could move southward on foot.68 Lt. Lampe worked anxiously to evacuate as 
many Korean civilians as possible before the Americans abandoned the port.
Time was running out, however. By noon December 5, Lt. Lampe’s ship had 
already loaded the most valuable supplies on the landing craft and the captain wanted to 
be under way. Lt. Lampe struggled to postpone the pullout while he directed local 
sampans and junks to fill with refugees. He used the power craft to pull them to the other 
side of the River so that they could proceed southward to Seoul. More people were
66 Field, History o f  United States Naval Operations: Korea, 271-272.
67 Ibid., 273.
68 Ibid.
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flooding into the dock even at the last minute. Eventually, Lt. Lampe had to leave with 
his ship, lamenting his failure to save them all.69
Nevertheless, his sincere attempt to save the refugees probably enlightened other 
Naval officers too. What Lt. Lampe did not know after his departure was that a US navy 
transportation ship, Bexar, which had failed to receive notice of its diversion to a safer 
destination, arrived at the port unexpectedly. The Naval officers sent all the remaining 
three thousand latecomers at the docks onboard before they destroyed the oil storage, 
harbor cranes, and railway equipment at the port.70 Those rescued considered it a small 
miracle.
A Great Disappointment in Wonsan 
While the Navy was destroying Chinnamp’o, another military evacuation was 
under way in Wonsan. The decision was made earlier on December 2. Chaplain Voelkel 
was in Wonsan visiting churches when the evacuation command was issued. Wonsan 
was his wife’s birthplace. Being the son-in-law of “So-al-lun Moksa” (Rev. William L. 
Swallen), Voelkel was warmly welcomed by the Christian community in Wonsan. 
Originally, he had planned to stay for a week, but the news of a full scale Chinese 
intervention and the order of evacuation disrupted his plans. He could not even attend a 
union service of all the Presbyterian churches on Sunday afternoon because the Army 
ordered all civilian personnel to move out and proceed northward to Hungnam by air.
His sudden departure disappointed many church leaders. Chaplain Voelkel, 
however, could not tell them the details of the military situation since it was “restricted
69 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 389-390.
70 Field, History o f  United States Naval Operations: Korea, 273.
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information.”71 As he was leaving, the officers showed him the direction where an 
estimated seven-thousand Communist guerrillas were about to attack the city. The 
inability to assist his fellow friends in Wonsan depressed the missionary, but he refused 
to quit the Chaplain Corps in the midst of this crisis. He remained in the war zone in 
order to find a way to minister to ROK troops, POWs, and the Christian community in 
Hamhung and Hungnam, the last beachhead the UN forces were holding in North 
Korea.72
The defense of the Wonsan port perimeter was conducted by one US Army 
battalion and two battalions of Korean Marines. The destroyers Saint Paul, Zellars, 
Hank, and Sperry were standing by offshore, firing missiles against any enemy troop 
concentrations.73 Hearing the sound of gunfire and facing attack by Communist 
guerrillas, refugees followed the retreating troops into the perimeter. By December 7, 
except for one ROK Marine Battalion which was assigned to cover the removal of the 
last pile of equipment, all UN forces were evacuated.
Meanwhile, the number of refugees at the dock had increased rapidly from 
December 7 to December 9. Since the Navy did not expect such a huge influx of 
refugees to the perimeter, there was only one transport ship available. About 7,000 
jammed onboard, a total far above the normal capacity of the ship.74 Many, however, had 
to be left behind. Some of them proceeded to Hungnam on foot along the coast. By 
December 9, the Navy had evacuated 3,800 troops, 1,146 vehicles, and 10,000 tons of 
cargo -  exceeding the total amount of military equipment and personnel removed from
71 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 6 December 1950 (from Hungnam), Presbyterian Church 
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
72 Ibid.
73 Field, History o f  United States Naval Operations: Korea, 286.
74 It was not clear whether or not the Navy left any more refugees onshore.
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Chinnamp’o.75 Vice Admiral James H. Doyle, who was in charge of the Wonsan 
evacuation, was shocked to discover so many people wanting to depart North Korea. 
With the lesson he learned from Wonsan, Admiral Doyle planned to take 25,000 refugees 
with him in his next operation in Hungnam.76
The Hungnam Perimeter 
About ten miles from Hungnam was Hamhung, another major political and 
industrial center in North Korea where the Headquarters of the X Corps had been 
established in late October. Hamhung was the capital of Hamgyong Province and one of 
the most Westernized cities in North Korea. It had a population of around 100,000 
people. The Canadian Presbyterian Mission had its Korean headquarters there. 
Americans had been enthusiastically welcomed by many Hamhung residents. Lt. 
Richard Underwood spent most of his time with POWs and intelligence units in 
Hamhung. Chaplain Voelkel was also stationed there with the Chaplain Corps to 
minister to ROK troops and POWs. A Korean Christian, Dr. Hyon Pong-hak (Hyun 
Bong-hak),77 who had grown up in Hamhung and later escaped to South Korea in 1945,
75 Field, History o f United States Naval Operations: Korea, 286-287.
76 James H. Doyle and Arthur J. Mayer, “December 1950 at Hflngnam,” The U.S. Naval Institute (April 
1949): 4.
77 Bom in Hamhflng, Dr. Hy6n Pong-hak was the son of an influential Presbyterian minister and educator. 
His family fled from Hamhflng to Seoul in December 1945. Sponsored by the Presbyterian Missions in 
Seoul, Hydn received his medical degree from Severance Union Medical College and spent two years 
studying pathology at the Medical College of Virginia. During the Korean War, he joined the ROK 
Marines. Because the Marines needed interpreters more than doctors at that point, he became a civilian 
interpreter for General Hyun Joon Shin, the Commanding General, and Colonel Sung Eun Kim, the Chief 
of Staff. When General Almond visited the ROK Marines in mid-October, he was particularly impressed 
by Hydn’s fluency in English. After learning that he had studied in Virginia, Almond’s home state, and 
that he was from Hamhflng, which would be the Headquarters of the X Corps, General Almond arranged 
for Hydn’s transfer to X Corps as his Civil Affairs Advisor. Later, Dr. Hydn became a professor of 
pathology and hematology at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital in Philadelphia. See Bong Hak Hyun, 
“Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers The Hflngnam Evacuation,” Korean and Korean American 
Studies Bulletin 8 (Spring/Summer 1997): 33.
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was General Almond’s civil affairs advisor. His responsibility was to check the 
credentials of local politicians who wanted to participate in the military government.78
In early December, General Almond, the Commander of the X Corps, established 
Hungnam harbor as the final base of evacuation for the remaining UN Units in North 
Korea. The troops up north in the Ch’angjin (Chosin) Reservoir area had to break the 
Chinese encirclement and fight their way back to the Hungnam Perimeter if they wanted 
to evacuate back to the South. With the support of several hundred Navy and Marine 
aircraft operated from the airfield and from the ships of Task Force 77, the 1st Marine 
Division, 7th Infantry Divison, 3rd Infantry Division, and the ROK I Corps all managed to 
fight their way out of the frozen hills, making their way to Hungnam.
General Almond planned to clear Hungnam harbor by December 25, bringing a 
total of 400,000 tons of military equipment with him. He did not want to let any supplies 
or equipment be destroyed or left behind. In order to do so, the general estimated that he 
would need to mobilize 75 cargo vessels, 15 troop ships, and 40 Tank landing ships 
(LST’s ships). He would also want the air force to lift 500 tons of men and equipment 
from December 14 to 18. There was no precedent for this daring evacuation plan, but the 
general was determined to get the job done.
Pressure from Christians in Hamhung 
In early December, as the retreat of the UN troops became obvious to Hamhung 
residents, many of them panicked. Christians, local military government officials, and 
those who had cooperated with UN forces were certain that they would be executed when 
the Communists returned.79 Members of the Christian community first approached
78 Ibid.
79
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Chaplain Voelkel in tears on December 5, asking him to “secure permission from the 
Army authorities to provide the Christians of [Hamhung], 3000 of them, transportation in 
the event of an evacuation.”80 Although he understood their desperation and wanted to 
offer his help, it was difficult for Voelkel to give them any assurance. At that point, all 
Voelkel could think of was to give the Christian refugees letters asking the American 
officers to assist them if room was available for them to evacuate.81
Seeing that Voelkel had made no commitment to guarantee their evacuation, the 
Christian leaders turned to Dr. Hyon. Like Voelkel, Hyon initially had no confidence 
about getting such a guarantee either, because his boss, Lt. Colonel Moore, chief of the 
Civil Affair Section, had earlier refused to help, claiming that the army had no plan and
R9no room to evacuate the civilians. Hyon, however, received support from Colonel 
Edward Forney, one of Almond’s able assistants, who directed the operation of Hungnam 
evacuation. Both of them petitioned their requests to the general together. Their 
argument was that both pro-American local leaders and Christians would be massacred if 
the US Army turned its back on them.
Military Priority over Civilian Concern 
General Almond understood their plea but was hesitant for four reasons. First, the 
general did not know whether he had enough transportation for even his own troops. 
Second, port facilities would not be able to support both military and civilian evacuation. 
Third, he was concerned about Communist infiltration among the refugees that might 
jeopardize the position of the UN forces. Fourth, he needed Tokyo’s approval. Even so,
80 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 6 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
81 Ibid.
82 Hyun, “Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers The Hungnam Evacuation,” 34.
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Almond was sympathetic to Hyon’s plea for the Christians in Hamhung, and promised to 
contact Headquarters and discuss the issue with General MacArthur.83
On December 9, any hope of a civilian evacuation seemed lost when the US 
Army announced that it would not be able to evacuate even its Korean civilian
R4.employees, because the Navy did not have enough ships for them. The official date for 
the final pullout from Hamhung was December 15. An order was given to clear the main 
roads between Hamhung and Hungnam for military transportation. US troops set up road 
blocks to prevent refugees from traveling from Hamhung to Hungnam on foot.
According to Chaplain Voelkel, who drove frequently between Hamhung and 
Hungnam with his jeep, “great groups were held up at bridges and other check-points at 
the point of a gun and bayonet.”85 In some cases, when Christian groups pleaded that 
being Christians, they would be a priority target for the Communists, some sympathetic
o<r
soldiers furnished trucks and took them to Hungnam. Nevertheless, such tactics did not 
work for everyone. Most refugees were turned back. By December 15, even the most 
sympathetic US officers could do nothing to help the refugees because most of the 
vehicles had been transported to Hungnam, waiting for evacuation. Chaplain Voelkel 
thus advised Christians to keep off the main road, traveling on back ones so that they 
could get to Hungnam before it was cut off. Whenever he saw people stopped at a 
checkpoint, he tried to direct them to back roads and comfort them through prayer.87
83 Ibid., 2-3.
84 Ibid., 3.
85 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 6 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
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A Change o f Policy
Meanwhile, Dr. Hyon did not sit idly by. Together with Father Patrick Cleary, a 
Maryknoll missionary to Korea assigned as a Catholic Chaplain to the X Corps, Hyon 
approached the ROK Marines, hoping to secure boats for Christians. Because of their 
pressure, Colonel Sin Chun-hyon (Shin Jun Hyun), the Commander of 1st ROK Marines, 
informed Dr. Hy6n the next day that he would allow refugees to board the two ships, 
Landing Ship and Tank, that were assigned to move out the ROK Marines’ equipment the 
following day.88 More good news came on December 15, the last day of the Hamhung 
evacuation. General Almond finally announced that he would evacuate four to five 
thousand civilians from Hamhung to Hungnam by train that night.89 One thousand 
spaces in particular would be reserved for Korean Christians, but he could not guarantee 
their passage to South Korea because no ship was available at that time.90
While Father Cleary was responsible for gathering the Catholics, Dr. Hyon and 
Voelkel went to inform the Protestants with the help of a local Christian, Ch’ae Ch’ung- 
muk (Chai Chung-muk). On arriving at Hamhung, they spread the word to the local UN 
employees, who had already given up any hope of being able to leave. The news revived 
and mobilized them to proceed to the railroad station. When Dr. Hyon and Ch’ae heard 
the report that some Christian refugees had been arrested by American military police the 
day before, they insisted on stopping by the prison. According to Chaplain Voelkel, they 
found out that in addition to local Christians they knew, some Christian refugees from 
Paech’on were there also. One of them was so oveijoyed that he broke out and cried,
88 Hyun, “Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers The Hungnam Evacuation,” 36.
89 Ibid.
90 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 6 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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“Jesus, Jesus,” in his gratitude. Chaplain Voelkel, Dr. Hyon, and Ch’ae cleared about 
thirty of them with the officer-in-charge.91 They sent them home to get ready for 
evacuation.
Then they drove to all the Protestant churches in the city, telling them the good 
news. The plan was for each congregation to gather at its church before eight o’clock 
instead of going to the station on its own. The main reason was that UN authorities had 
imposed a curfew in Hamhung City from six o’clock at night to six o’clock in the 
morning in order to control potential Communist infiltration. Chaplain Voelkel went to 
the Provost Marshall at Hamhung City Hall and found Colonel Hammond, who was in 
charge of the Military Police (M.P.) and informed him of their plan to evacuate Christians 
to Hungnam. Colonel Hammond was very sympathetic toward the Christian cause 
because his sister, who was a missionary in Africa, had been martyred only a year before. 
He immediately instructed his M.P. officers not to fire at people until after eight. For 
double safety, he also sent two M.P. officers to escort each congregation to the railroad 
station.
By midnight, there were about 50,000 people crowded at the station, ten times 
more than General Almond had promised to transport. Many people wanted to leave the 
city because they were afraid of the Chinese “volunteers.” This created a huge moral 
dilemma for the officers, given the limited capacity of the train. In the end, the precious 
spaces were offered to those who faced certain of death when the Communists returned.
91 Ibid. See also Hyun, “Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers The Hungnam Evacuation,” 36. There 
are a few small discrepancies between Voelkel’s letter and HyQn’s recollection of the event. After careful 
examination o f the two documents, Voelkel’s description is probably closer to the truth because it was 
written two days after the event while HySn’s was a recollection decades later.
92 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 6 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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The majority had to be turned away. Colonel Hammond and his M.P. (Military Police) 
officers were in charge of screening the refugees. It took four hours for his men to locate 
all Christians at the station and put them on board.93 The exact number of refugees who 
were eventually transported by the last train to Hungnam was not clear, but the way to the 
harbor was not completely blocked. Some who were not able to get on the train tried to 
cross by walking through frozen rice fields and mountain roads; about half of them made 
it to the seashore.94 Some single men were so desperate that they even pretended to be 
Communist soldiers so that the M.P. officers would take them to the South as POWs. 
According to Lt. Richard Underwood, at least one individual did son successfully.
The Evacuation o f Civilians by Boats 
The next day there were about one hundred-thousand refugees crowded at 
Hungnam. The majority were from Hamhung, with some from Wonsan, while others had 
followed the troops from the north.95 Their numbers hampered the military evacuation. 
General Almond set the priorities clearly, but they were not irreversible. Military 
personnel came first, then vehicles, equipment, supplies, and, last of all, refugees.96 No 
one could be sure whether there would be boats left for the refugees. The temperature 
dropped rapidly overnight to -10 degrees. It was so cold that a cup of boiling water
07would be covered with ice within a few minutes. How to take care of these refugees 
became a big problem for the Civilian Affairs officers. They distributed flour, barley, 
and rice for the hungry refugees, and directed some of them to Sohojin, a suburb of 
Hungnam.
93 Ibid.
94 Hyun, “Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers The Hflngnam Evacuation,” 36
95 Doyle and Mayer, “December 1950 at Hflngnam,” 4,
96 Ibid.
97 Underwood, “Memories and Thoughts,” 89.
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General Almond and his young aide-de-camp Lt. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., who 
would later become a four-star general and eventually Secretary of State, flew over the 
chaotic scene at Hungnam in two light liaison planes (L-19). Seeing the masses of 
refugees “carrying their meager belongings had intermingled with [their] troops,” the 
general told his young lieutenant through the radio, “We can’t leave those people. Take 
care of that, Haig.”98 It was an impossible task, but for a young lieutenant the word of 
the general was absolute for him to follow. When requesting the necessary number of 
ships from his senior officers, Lt. Haig spoke with authority by emphasizing the will of 
the commanding general. After hearing him, other senior officers found ships for the 
refugees.99
The boarding of refugees onto transport ships began on December 16, according 
to Chaplain Voelkel.100 The process was difficult because it was hard for the officers to 
keep 100,000 frantic people in line. Sometimes, officers on the ship needed to fire their 
guns in order to stop people from climbing onto an already overcrowded boat.101 Each 
day, the Navy continued to move out tens of thousands of refugees. Most of the LST’s 
ships expanded their capacities to four to five times higher than usual. The LST 668 took 
10,500, and Virginia Victory carried 14,500. One average, other ships that carried 
equipment had about 5,000 refugees on board. The SS Meredith Victory, which was 
already loaded with jet fuel before its arrival, was the last refugee ship to depart from
98 Bill Gilbert, Ship o f Miracles: 14,000 Lives and One Miraculous Voyage (Chicago: Triumph Books, 
2001), 94.
99 Ibid., 96.
100 In HySn’s account, he said it was December 19. But, Voelkel’s letter was written on December 17 
while he was on his way to Pusan, and before he left HQngnam. He witnessed how many refugees 
crowded on the LST’s ships. His account should be more accurate than HySn’s recollection. Letter from 
Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 17 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, 
Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
101 Dwight Martin, “Like a Fire Drill,” TIME, 25 December 1950.
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Hungnam. It carried the last 14,000 refugees to Pusan on December 23. According to 
General Haig, “they all got out” before the US Navy destroyed the dock facilities.102 
Haig’s words were also confirmed by a warrant officer in the Third Infantry Division at 
Hungnam, John Middlemas. By the time his division was evacuated, Middlemas said, 
“All the refugees were gone. The only thing left was what we were blowing up.”103
There were also other smaller-scale evacuations along the eastern coast while the 
X-Corps was leaving.104 Sohunbong (Suh Hun Pong), a small fishing town near 
Hungnam, had about 3,600 refugees waiting for a boat to go south. On December 16, 
shortly before he left on Hunter Victory for Pusan, he visited the Christians in the area. 
Knowing that there was no boat for these refugees, he immediately contacted naval 
officers to ensure that these refugees were not forgotten. The officers promised to help, 
but the people had to wait.105 After Voelkel left, the refugees waited four more days in 
cold and hunger until the arrival of a LST boat, taking all of them to Koje Island, off 
Masan (see Map 4). One baby was bom onboard. Chaplain Voelkel found the refugees 
later through Colonel Hammond, who had been given the new responsibility of taking 
care of the 70,000 refugees on Koje Island.106
All the refugees transported by sea from North Korea to Pusan were screened by 
the Eighth Army’s Logistical Command. Those refugees who were determined to be
102 Gilbert, Ship o f Miracles, 113.
103 Ibid., 118-120.
104 For the Iwon, Chaplain Harold Voelkel mentioned the event in his letter, 17 December 1950, 
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15. In the case of Songjin, a South 
Korean transport, BM 501, carried 4,300 people. See Stanton, The Ten Corps in Korea 1950, 314. Data for 
other cases were unavailable. Nevertheless, under President Rhee’s direction, ROK troops facilitated many 
of their resources to bring out numerous North Korean refugees. They depended mainly on private fishing 
boats. For a huge evacuation like Hflngnam, they had to depend very much on the United States.
105 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 17 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
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Communists residing north of the 38th Parallel would be detained in POW Enclosure 1 in 
Tongnae, and Communists whose residence was south of the 38th Parallel would be 
turned over to local civil authorities. All non-Communist refugees would be released 
through civil assistance or ROK civilian channels. In late December, due to the 
overcrowding in the city of Pusan, the ROK government decided to divert refugee ships 
to Koje Island or Cheju Island for relocation.107 Among the total estimated 1,912,500 
refugees from North Korea, 545,000 of them were lucky enough to find their slots in 
refugee camps by February 1951.108 The rest had to camp out in the country, waiting for 
the ROK government and UN relief agencies to construct more refugee camps.
The Evacuation of Christians from Seoul 
In South Korea, the shocking news of the Chinese intervention demoralized many 
citizens who had just settled back into Seoul. With the memory of the Communist 
occupation and the experience of being caught between two armies still fresh in their 
minds, many Seoul residents, especially Christians, wanted to evacuate immediately. 
Missionaries in Seoul called for an emergency inter-denominational meeting and decided 
to find means to evacuate all the Christian clergymen and their families from Seoul 
quickly.
Through their political connections with top South Korean officials, missionaries 
were able to obtain a refugee center. The governor of South Kyongsang Province, Yang 
Song-bong, designated “a place six miles north of Pusan in a quiet country place as a 
refuge for the pastors’ families.” 109 The main difficulty was getting there. It was
107 “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War,” 8-5.1 A AA.K (Military History Office: 
Office o f the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960): 8.
108 Samuels, “Korea’s Refugees -  Misery on the March,” 156.
109 Letter from Rev. Edward Adams to Dr. John Smith, 1 January 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives,
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hundreds of miles away from Seoul and the Han River bridges had been destroyed since 
the onset of the war. Although an army pontoon bridge had been built, it was reserved 
for military purposes. Pedestrians were not permitted to cross it. Only mission trucks 
driven by American missionaries were allowed onto the bridge.110
With two trucks in their possession, the Presbyterian missionaries ran a “truck 
service” between Seoul and Taegu so that the refugees could take other public 
transportation to the Christian refugee camp in the designated area. Instead of using only 
Korean drivers, at least one missionary had to escort the group because the ROK Army 
would seize any privately owned vehicles. The Methodist Mission, due to a shortage of 
missionaries, had already lost two of their precious trucks when they sent Korean drivers 
on the road alone.111 In other words, truck evacuations were possible because of the 
missionaries, and only the Presbyterian Missions had the missionary manpower to do so.
Presbyterian missionaries started their evacuation operation sometime in mid- 
December, a week earlier than the ROK government. The first trip used “two large 
mission trucks, 2-Vi and 3-Vi tons, which were packed to the limit with some of [their] 
most important pastors and their families and baggage,” a total of eighty people.112 Rev. 
Francis Kinsler was the driver for one truck, and Ray Provost another. It was a rough and 
dangerous ten-hour journey because they had to pass guerilla patrolled areas. Altogether, 
more than two hundred people, mostly Christian pastors and their families, were 
evacuated in three trips.
Record Group 197, Box 1, Folder 3 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Meanwhile, through an inter-denominational effort to appeal to the ROK 
government, missionaries also succeeded in getting several boxes on a train to Pusan.113 
In this way, more than seven-hundred Christian pastors and their families were 
evacuated, except for sons between the ages of eighteen to thirty-seven -  since these were 
subject to a mandatory draft. The Church World Service (CWS) also had a freight box for 
its relief supplies. An additional one-hundred men rode on top of it.114 Before they 
departed, the Presbyterian missionaries gave each pastor relief money -  about US$20 -  
the equivalent of one month’s income. A total of US$1,800 was distributed on that day 
alone.115 Although no such expenditure was provided for in the Mission budget, the 
Presbyterian Mission Board in New York gave its Korea Mission a great degree of 
freedom. A wire from the Board, written by Rev. John C. Smith, the Secretary for Korea 
and Japan, promised the missionaries, “IF YOU NEED FUNDS SPEND IT PERIOD WE 
WILL FIND THE MONEY SOMEHOW.”116 Later in February 11, 1951, twenty-two 
denominational groups of the American Protestant Church under the banner of the United 
Appeal for Christian Services called for special money offerings for Korea and paid for 
part of these cash advances.117
Chaplain William Shaw and Father George M. Carroll were the most helpful in 
arranging sea transportation for Christians, through the US and ROK Navy at Inch’on. 
According to Rev. Harry Rhodes and Rev. Archibald Campbell, the ROK government 
allowed Christian refugees to join the government-organized evacuation program,
113 Ibid.
114 Letter from Rev. Edward Adams to Dr. John Smith, 1 January 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 197, Box 1, Folder 3 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
115 Letter from James Philip to his Dad, 25 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia. See also Rhodes and Campbell, 
History o f  the Korean Mission, 44.
116 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f  the Korean Mission, 45.
117 “US Church Mission Help Korean Homeless,” The Sunday Messenger, 11 February 1951.
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because of the Communists’ hatred for Christianity. They departed on December 24. 
Each denomination was given a quota to distribute among its individual churches. Since 
baggage took space that people could fill, evacuees were allowed to bring only a large 
bundle of bedding per family, one suitcase for each adult, and half a suitcase for each 
child. They also needed to prepare enough food for about a week. Just like their brethren 
in the North, these families were “leaving behind everything else in the way of worldly 
goods and chattel.”118
Nevertheless, a major difference was that their passage was secure and the 
evacuation process was orderly and peaceful. On the dock, there were seventy orphans 
from the Yongnak Orphanage with only six women to care for them. If they had been in 
Hungnam, they would have perished because of the crowds and the cold weather. But in 
Inch’on, people on the dock -  refugees, Korean navy men, police, missionaries and 
bystanders of all sorts -  were patient enough to “[form] a human chain stretching from 
the place where the orphans were encamped on the pier to the loading platform.”119 
Compared to other mass evacuations, according to James Philips, it was “the finest 
example of self-restraint.”120 More than one thousand Christians were evacuated on that 
day, including the last group of pastors and their families, and Catholic priests and nuns.
From that point on, missionaries began to evacuate church “elders, school 
workers, deacons, and lay people of all walks of life,” 121 including tired and weary 
Christian refugees from North Korea. Evacuation continued on a daily basis through 
Inch’on. On January 1, however, there were no more boats and about fifteen hundred
118 Letter from James Philip to his Dad, 25 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Christians faced the danger of being left behind. The next day, missionaries received 
information that since “a section of government families had been overlooked,” high 
officials secured another boat and carried the fifteen hundred Christians with them.122 
Before the Han River Bridge was closed on January 3, all missionaries, together with the 
remaining Christian refugees, evacuated safely to Taegu.123
IMPACT OF MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES DURING THE EVACUATION
The evacuation of Hungnam was not only a successful military operation that 
brought out 105,000 troops, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of bulk cargo, but also the 
biggest humanitarian evacuation of civilians ever in American military history.124 In 
eight days, a total of 98,000 refugees, not including babies carried on their mother’s 
backs, were shipped out by the US Navy. The real victory was not how many tons of 
equipment were saved. For those who were there, it was the saving of so many refugees 
that stuck in their hearts. According to the memory of Lt. J. Robert Lunney, a crewman 
on the Meredith Victory, the refugees’ willingness to endure severe pain and suffering in 
order to leave North Korea showed him “what it must be to live under Communist 
rule.”125 When he looked back, Lunney realized how happy his captain and other fellow 
crew members felt after they brought the refugees to Pusan. It was because they “had 
rescued these people and they would live in freedom,” an idea that “was extremely
122 Edward Adams, ‘The Church Met a Need in Korea,” Presbyterian Survey, August 1951,17.
123 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f  the Korean Mission, 47.
124 James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, 1972), 304.
125 Quoted in Gilbert, Ship o f  Miracles, 154.
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important to everyone in those years,” when people feared for “the growing communist
11ftinfluence throughout the world.”
Obtaining a Psychological Victory 
Focused on military objectives, the US Army initially had no plans to evacuate 
civilians, not even those who had worked for them. The winning of Colonel Forney’s 
support for civilian evacuations through Dr. Hyon was a major breakthrough. According 
to Admiral Doyle, the key to the evacuation's success was Forney's don't-take-no-for-an- 
answer management style which achieved the impossible: allowing all refugees to be 
rescued without compromising his military objectives.127
The evacuation of civilians from North Korea gave the brief UN operation above 
the 38th Parallel a new meaning and purpose. Although UN troops had to withdraw back 
to the South due to Chinese intervention, many people believed that the United Nations 
had won a psychological victory. In the words of Joseph R. Owen, a young US Marine 
lieutenant and a survivor of Ch’angjin (Chosin) Reservoir withdrawal as well as author of 
the book Colder Than Hell published by the Naval Institute, “If that was their 
participation in a civil war, they showed what side they were on with their feet. They did 
not leave their homes and come out at the point of a bayonet.” He then added, “It made 
me realize that we were doing the right thing in Korea, and I’m proud to have been a part 
of it.”128 A similar sentiment was also expressed by Admiral Arleigh Burke, one of the 
Navy’s most fabled officers, “I remember the thousands of woebegone Koreans who 
were hungry, destitute, and fearful, but who at the same time had that strong desire for
126 Ibid., 163.
127 Doyle and Mayer, “December 1950 at Hflngnam,” 4-7.
128 Quoted in Gilbert, Ship o f  Miracles, 104.
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freedom and the willingness to make sacrifices for freedom.”129 The successful saving of 
hundreds of thousands of civilians lifted the morale of the retreating army. President 
Truman, hearing of the successful evacuation of Hungnam, called the operation “the best 
Christmas present I’ve ever had.”130
The South Korean government was delighted by the efforts of the US Navy, not 
only because they also cared about the fate of their northern countrymen, but also 
because it gave a psychological and political boost to Rhee’s regime. When Admiral 
Doyle later arrived at Pusan, President Rhee sent several high-ranking South Korean 
officials to congratulate Admiral Doyle on his achievement. These officials wept, 
according to Doyle, as they thanked him for the number of refugees that he had helped to 
rescue. Honors and medals were given to General Almond and Admiral Doyle for their 
contributions in evacuating 98,000 refugees.131
The evacuations at Hungnam and other locations along the coasts of North Korea 
also caused many American political leaders in Washington to confront the dilemma of 
upholding moral and humanitarian principles in the midst of a total war. On the one 
hand, the evacuation of refugees gave a moral and psychological boost to the UN war 
efforts, but on the other hand, moral and humanitarian principles imposed limits on the 
choice of weapons and the military tactics that could be used against the enemy. 
Securing a total victory by any means became politically difficult under the potential 
objections of some religious and humanitarian groups in the United States and Europe 
because of their high moral principles.
129 Quoted in ibid., 105.
130 Quoted in Robert Leckie, Conflict: The History o f the Korean War, 1950-1953 (New York: G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1962), 228.
131 Doyle and Mayer, “December 1950 at Hungnam,” 7. See also “Presidential Unit Citation” given by the 
Republic of Korea on 16 August 1951, Record Group 38, Box 4, Folder 4, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk.
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The Preservation and Expansion of Christian Influence
Missionary efforts helped preserve the influence of the church in Korea, saving 
Christians in both North and South from the retribution of the Communist armies. The 
road from Seoul to Pusan was a trail of tears in the merciless Korean winter. The 
refugees were frequently harassed and driven off the roads by retreating soldiers.132 
Many died, especially women and children. While the majority of these South Korean 
refugees had to fend largely for themselves, church leaders received special assistance 
from missionaries under government backing. No other group, except government 
officials and their families, received the same level of professional help. Christians were, 
in many ways, specially provided for and protected by missionaries, a privilege that often
1 3 3made the difference between life and death.
More than that, once Christian refugees arrived in Pusan, they received donations 
from American churches,134 helping them to not only survive but also to build churches, 
orphanages, temporary schools, technical institutes, shelters for widows, and clinics. In 
the end, these social services benefited all Korean refugees, and strengthened the church's 
positive public image. Dr. Thobum T. Brumbaugh, the Secretary of the Methodist Board 
of Foreign Missions (Far East), reported that the United Methodist Church in the United 
States -  the largest Protestant denomination in America -  wanted to mobilize every 
resource at its disposal to “[make] Christianity a vital and constructive force” in Korea, 
especially “among all those who have been driven out of the routine course of daily
132 Russell Spurr, Enter The Dragon: China’s Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-51 (New 
York: Newmarket Press, 1988), 280-282.
133 For a graphic description of the refugees’ flight from Seoul, see Spurr, Enter the Dragon, 281-282.
134 Letter from Dr. John Smith to Rev. Edward Adams, 3 January 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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living.”135 The two Presbyterian boards, and the American Catholic Church, all of which 
had major interests in Korea, did the same. Therefore, the efforts of missionaries were 
crucial not only to the survival of the Christian Community in Korea, but also to the 
future expansion of Christian influence in South Korea.
There is no solid data available on how many Christians actually were evacuated 
from North Korea. However, judging from the cases in P’yongyang and Hamhung, 
perhaps fifty percent of the Christian population within the UN-occupied areas had fled 
south. The biggest and most famous refugee church, the Yongnak Church, reported that, 
following the fall of P’yongyang, an average of about one thousand new Christian 
refugees arrived and sought their help each day.135 In the south, North Korean Christians 
clustered together and established their own congregations in Pusan, Koje Island, and 
Cheju Island.
As the war developed, Christians became an even more prominent political force 
in South Korea. By early 1951, a total of five million North Koreans were living in the 
South, having arrived as refugees either before the war or during the evacuations 
described above. Countless more had died along the road; North Korea was missing 
nearly half of its population. These refugees in the South accounted for about twenty 
percent of the total South Korean population. They eagerly supported Syngman Rhee’s 
policy to “advance northward and achieve unification” (pukchin t ’ongil) because they all 
wanted to return to their homeland.
135 Letter from Dr. Thoburn T. Brumbaugh to “Dear Korea friends,” 3 March 1951, Missionary Vol.4, 
United Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
136 Harold Voelkel, Open Door to Korea (Grand Rapids, MI: Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House, 
1958), 50-60.
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The Church community, in particular, stood firmly behind Rhee because of his 
pro-Christian attitude. In the 1952 presidential election, Christians set up the Korean 
Church Committee for Election, which was based in some 3,500 churches with 700,000 
adherents, mobilizing their resources to support Rhee’s re-election.137 Preachers 
presented Rhee as the “Moses of Korea” and his running mate, Yi Ki-bung, as “Joshua.” 
They defined the election as a religious battle between Christians and anti-Christians.138 
Two days before the election, 3,500 churches held prayer meetings and intensified their 
final effort to boost Rhee’s support. Despite charges of electoral fraud, Rhee received 
about five million votes, while his three rivals received under two million.139
The influence of the religious factor was also shown in the vice-presidential 
campaign. According to the new Korean Constitution, the President and the Vice- 
President were to be elected separately. Many people calculated that if Rhee died in 
office, the Vice-President would become the President of South Korea. Fraud charges 
were less serious in this case and therefore, reflected general public sentiment. Although 
Yi Ki-bung was Rhee’s official running mate two weeks before the election, Rhee gave 
his endorsement to another Vice-Presidential candidate, Ham T’ae-yong, a senior 
Presbyterian minister from the North who had been a judge in the Late Choson Dynasty. 
If Ham wanted to win, he had to defeat not only Yi Ki-bung, but also Yi Pom-sok 
(Rhee’s ex-home minister, who assisted Rhee in undertaking the coup against the 
National Assembly), Yim Yong-sin (Louise Yim) (a well-known Christian woman
137 Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle, WA: University o f Washington Press, 
2003), 179.
138 Ibid.
139 Priscilla Roberts, “Syngman Rhee (1875-1965),” in Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, 
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 627.
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educator),140 and six other competitors. Being both a political novice and older than Rhee 
himself, Ham was an unlikely victor.141
Nevertheless, quite unexpectedly, Ham T’ae-yong received about 3 million votes, 
Yi Pom-sok got only 1.8 million, and seven other candidates split the rest of the 7.1 
million votes.142 Perhaps Ham attracted not only Christian votes, but also votes from the 
North Korean refugees. A religious interpretation of the election did not hinder the non- 
Christian population from casting their support behind Rhee and Ham. The 1952 election 
marked the beginning of a church-govemment partnership in the First Republic of 
Korea.143
The Witnesses o f Atrocities 
During the brief period when the UN occupied North Korea, missionaries not 
only saw evidence of Communist atrocities against rightists, but they also witnessed 
cases of UN brutality against Northerners. For instance, Chaplain Voelkel reported that 
“the discipline of both American and Korean troops [was] bad.”144 “The looting and 
robbing by the South Korean troops is terrible,” he wrote. One of his Christian friends, 
Elder Yun Chang-no, was beaten by South Korean soldiers mercilessly at night in his 
own house when they tried to rob him.145
Rape was a common crime committed by UN troops in the North. On one 
occasion, as Rev. Harry Hill and Rev. Francis Kinsler passed by McMurtrie’s house (a
140 Hakjoon Kim, “Yim, Louise (Im Yong-sin 1899-1977),” ibid., 541.
141 Edward C. Keefer, “South Korean Presidential Elections of 1952,” in Historical Dictionary o f the 
Korean War, ed. James I. Matray (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 431.
142 Ibid., 431-432.
143 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 179. Syngman Rhee’s regime was known as the First 
Republic. Chang Myun’s regime was the Second Republic and Pak Jong-hi’s military government was the 
Third Republic.
144 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 12 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
145 Ibid.
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former missionary) in P’yongyang, they heard a girl's scream coming from inside the 
house. An armed American G.I. was standing outside the building, so they rushed over 
to him. He refused to allow them to enter the house, so they rushed off, and were 
fortunate to find an American officer nearby, who agreed to intervene. Inside the house, 
they discovered an American G.I. and a Korean soldier attempting to rape a Korean girl, 
the daughter of a former missionary’s helper. The victim had been on her way to a prayer 
meeting that afternoon with her mother.146 According to Chaplain Voelkel, similar 
events happened in other UN controlled areas as well. When missionaries witnessed or 
discovered such crimes they brought them before the military authorities, but many more 
probably occurred and went unreported. Young women suffered immensely because 
Korean society showed no mercy to any woman who had sexual relations with a 
foreigner, regardless of whether this was voluntary or by force.147
The Demand for Chaplains for US troops 
Although most of these incidents were random, individual, criminal acts, it was a 
serious matter. If American soldiers did not behave morally in the eyes of the Korean 
people, they would eventually jeopardize the UN's mission in Korea, the missionary 
work, and Korean public opinion of America. Missionaries felt a personal obligation to 
combat immorality and ignorance among US and Korean troops, particularly since it 
caused so much anguish to their Korean friends. Since the UN Command was 
unenthusiastic about investigating atrocities committed by UN and ROK soldiers,148 the 
missionaries were left with few options. They could not reveal these incidents to the
146 Ibid.
147 Elizabeth Kim, Ten Thousand Sorrows: The Extraordinary Journey o f a Korean War Orphan (New 
York: Doubleday, 2000), 20.
148 Allan R. Millett, Their War fo r  Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians 1945- 
1953 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002), 232.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
440
press without sabotaging the war effort, so missionaries instead reported these incidents 
to their own boards, in addition to the military police. They hoped that their church 
leaders back home might pressure the US military to improve the moral quality of 
American soldiers. From their perspective, the solution was to provide US troops with 
more chaplains so that they could resist the temptations and corruptions caused by the 
lonesome and often dangerous military life.
Ironically, the lack of chaplains was something that the churches had as much 
control over as did the US military. The army understood the benefits of religious 
guidance for the troops, but they could not find enough candidates to fill the need.149 
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the American government had already carried out 
steps to expand the Chaplains’ Corps to match the needs of a large peace-time army, but 
the deployment in Korea had been too rapid and extensive for the Corps to keep pace.150 
Even though the military recalled all their chaplains on reserve, they still could not meet 
the rising authorized ceiling.151 The overworked chaplains in Korea frequently enlisted 
the help of missionaries in offering religious services for the troops. Some American 
G.I.s even joined local church gatherings at the invitation of missionaries and Korean 
pastors.
The missionaries' reports of atrocities helped to mobilize their home boards in the 
United States. These boards encouraged more ordained ministers to join the Chaplain 
Corps as early as possible; the response from church leadership was tremendous.
149 “Best Soldiers Are Religious Soldiers,” The United Presbyterian, 4  June 1951, 5.
150 See “Chaplaincy Needs Are Revealed,” The United Presbyterian, 6 November 1950, 7. See also 
“Chaplains’ Corps to be Increased,” Presbyterian Life, September 2, 1950,13.
151 From June 1950 to June 1951, US Army chaplain strength rose from 706 to 1,208, but it was still below 
the 1,331 authorized quota. See Rodger R. Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace: The United 
States Army Chaplaincy 1945-1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 5:72.
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Seminaries gradually modified their programs to train more students for the Chaplain
1 S'?Corps. Stories of the chaplains’ heroism were reported widely in both religious and
1 C O
secular journals so as to attract potential candidates. Many religious groups in the 
United States made “valiant and sacrificial efforts” to help encourage their members to 
go to Korea.154
In the end, more chaplains were sent to serve the troops in Korea. They helped 
not only American soldiers, but also Korean churches, prisoners, and ROK soldiers 
because they were allowed to use their extra time to assist civilians.155 Chaplains served 
as intermediaries between the troops and the civilians. Under the leadership of chaplains 
in their regiments, US soldiers made offerings to support local relief programs organized 
by local churches that helped to alleviate the suffering among orphans and widows.156 
The Formation of a Christian ROK Chaplain Corps 
Missionaries and Korean pastors were involved in the formation of the ROK 
Chaplain Corps even before the outbreak of the Korean War. Rev. Archibald Campbell 
and Rev. Cha Chey-wha took the first steps by obtaining permission from the Korea 
Military Advisory Group of the U.S. Army (KMAG), to work among the ROK trainees in 
Taegu. The first organized Christian service was held in May 1949. About 400 Korean
1 ^ 7soldiers and officers attended.
152 “Protestant Seminaries Setting Up Chaplaincy Training Programs,” Presbyterian Survey, December 
1953,61.
153 “Six Korea Chaplains Commended For Heroism,” The United Presbyterian, 1 January 1951,14. See 
also “Chaplains Courageous,” TIME, 1 December 1952. The number of recruits was gradually improving. 
In September 1951, they had 1,398 while the quota was 1,464. A month later, the number increased to 
1,448, coming very close to the authorized ceiling. See Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace, 
5:72.
154 Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace, 5:73.
155 John H. Muller, Wearing the Cross in Korea (Redlands, CA: Arthur Commercial Press, 1954), 18.
156 Ibid., 57-62.
157 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f  the Korean Mission, 344-345.
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Christian leaders believed that the morale of South Korean troops suffered due to 
a lack of moral guidance. The solution was to form a ROK Chaplain Corps. 
Missionaries and Korean church leaders, therefore, pressed for the establishment of a 
Chaplain Corps based on the US model in the ROK Army. As early as July 1950, Rev. 
Edward Adams and Rev. Campbell had approached officers of the KMAG, urging them 
to formally establish a chaplain service for the ROK army forces. In order to facilitate 
the process, Rev. Campbell translated the U.S. Army regulations concerning Chaplains 
into Korean and modified them to include representatives of other traditional religions. 
To temporarily supply the needs of the ROK troops, Rev. William Shaw and Monsignor 
George M. Carroll were hired by the US Army to minister to Korean soldiers in August 
1950.158
When Rev. Campbell visited Japan in September, he met with Chaplain (Colonel) 
Ivan H. Bennett, Chief of Chaplains, SCAP, who was later to be promoted to Major 
General, Chief of Chaplains, U.S.A., and urged him to assist in the forming of a ROK 
Chaplain Corps. Chaplain Bennett took a strong interest in the plan and asked for support 
from General MacArthur.159
In Korea, meanwhile, Rev. William Shaw, who was serving as a civilian Chaplain 
among the ROK troops, approached President Rhee on the subject. He found that Rhee 
was similarly concerned about the morale of the army. Rhee thought that Christianity 
would produce better soldiers. Nevertheless, instead of seeking to form an army-
158 Letter from Adeline H. Shaw, 14 September 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United Methodist Church 
Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
159 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f  the Korean Mission, 345.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
443
controlled Chaplain Corps, Rhee favored a civilian, Christian Chaplain Corps.160 He had 
three reasons. First, Rhee did not think the army could afford to pay for a Chaplain 
Corps. Second, Rhee wanted the corps to be predominantly Christian. He feared that, if 
he asked for funds from the National Assembly, they would push him to form a non- 
Christian Chaplain Corps, since most Korean soldiers were not Christian.161 Third, 
traditional Korean religious groups did not have or might not be willing to supply 
chaplains to the Corps because the idea was alien to them. Therefore, the requirement 
that other religions participate might delay the process of the formation of the Corps.
Since the ROK government could not or would not run the sort of program that 
Rhee envisioned, he instead sought a civilian solution, using funding from non-
1 f\)government sources to avoid political controversy. It would be a significant 
undertaking. To succeed, he needed the help of missionaries, Korean clergymen, and 
American churches to finance and provide workers for this civilian Christian Chaplain 
Corps.163 Missionaries were delighted to hear Rhee’s plan, and were confident that many 
ROK troops would become Christian if they had “a Christian Chaplaincy leadership.”164
160 Letter from Rev. William Shaw to T. T. Brumbaugh, 24 October 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United 
Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
161 About 1.6% of Korean soldiers were Confucianists, 1.2% Buddhists, 4.6% Christians (mostly 
Presbyterians), and 92.6% were without any religious affiliation at all. See “Chaplains for the ROK,” 
TIME, 1 July 1953.
162 “Interview between Robert Cadigan and Chaplain William Shaw in Korea,” 21 November 1950, 
Missionary Vol.4, United Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
163 As an old time Methodist missionary to Korea since 1921, Rev. William Shaw was well respected 
within the missionary community and among Korean leaders. He had a very close friendship with 
President Rhee and many high-ranking Korean officials. Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, the Director of The 
Commission o f the Churches on International Affairs, a non-governmental agency holding consultative 
status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, was impressed with Rev. Shaw’s 
credentials. See Nolde’s report on his trip to Korea, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed. 
Heung Soo Kim (Seoul: Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 369-370.
164 Letter from Rev. William Shaw to T. T. Brumbaugh, 24 October 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United 
Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
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After seeing the poor discipline of the Korean troops from July to November, the 
missionary community -  in particular Chaplain Shaw and Chaplain Voelkel -  
wholeheartedly supported the plan. They believed that it was a golden opportunity to 
evangelize Korean youth, and to extend the influence of Christianity. The Director of the 
Korea Church World Service, Dr. Henry Appenzeller, also fully endorsed the idea, 
arguing that “to miss this opportunity [might] mean the loss of a section of the youth of 
Korea.”165 While the missionaries organized Korean churches and seminaries to supply 
qualified evangelists for the cause, they also labored endlessly to persuade their own 
boards in the United States to fund the project.
American Protestant denominations were, however, initially skeptical of the plan. 
They feared that if American churches and mission agencies threw their “influence and 
finances” behind such a program, it would send a confusing signal to the world that 
“Americans [were] willing to use even [their] religion to take Korea into [their] camp.”166 
The idea of the separation of church and state kept them from giving their endorsement.
I  /T 'J
Only the Catholics and the Presbyterians agreed to support the plan.
Pressure from missionaries in both Korea and Japan bore fruit in January 1951. 
Both Chaplain Shaw and Father Carroll received orders to start a chaplains’ school in 
Taegu. Thirty-nine Korean Christian pastors received training and graduated in 
February. Initially, they had only civilian chaplain status. Yet, when the Assembly 
finally did approve a Chaplain Corps, they were all commissioned. On April 11, 1951,
165 Letter from Henry Appenzeller to T. T. Brumbaugh, 31 January 1951, Missionary Vol.4, United 
Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
166 From T. T. Brumbaugh to Chaplain William Shaw, 16 October 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United 
Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
167 From Chaplain William Shaw to T. T. Brumbaugh, 24 October 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United 
Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey. See also Shaw’s letter to T. T. Brumbaugh,
10 February 1951, Missionary Vol.4, United Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
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following the model of the United States, the ROK government provided a small amount 
of funds for a formal military corps to replace the civilian organization.
To the delight of Rhee and the missionaries, the ROK Army was willing to 
maintain the Christian nature of the Chaplain Corps. It called for 77 Christian clergymen 
to fill its ranks. At first, no other religions were represented.168 Chaplain Shaw and 
Chaplain Carroll continued to be responsible for recruiting and training these Korean 
Chaplains. Another forty-three trainees graduated in April 1951.169 By June 1953, the 
training school in Taegu had graduated a total of 113 trainees that year.170 The Corps 
expanded gradually to include other religions by a decade or two later. Buddhist monks, 
for example, entered the Corps in 1968. Nevertheless, Christian clergymen remained the 
vast majority of the Chaplain Corps members.
Initially, since the ROK government paid these chaplains barely enough to 
survive, they had nothing to send back home to support their families. This discouraged 
qualified clergymen from applying. To show their support for the Chaplain Corps,
171American missionaries decided to provide for these chaplains’ families. This new 
project, unlike the original plan, won the support of all major Protestant denominations 
and the Catholic Church in the United States, because American religious leaders
168 The quota for each Christian group was: 32 Presbyterian, 17 Methodist, 20 Catholic, 7 Holiness, and 1 
Salvation Army. Letter from Chaplain William Shaw to T. T. Brumbaugh, 19 March 1951, Missionary, 
Vol.4, United Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey. The same letter was also found 
in the Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 39 -  Presbyterian Historical 
Society, Philadelphia.
169 The breakdown here was: 15 Presbyterians, 11 Catholics, 7 Methodists, 4 Holiness. The second class 
graduated on April 13. There were 6 Catholics, 2 Methodists, and 1 Holiness. See “Excerpts from letters 
from Chaplain William E. Shaw,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 39 -  
Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
170 “Chaplains for ROK,” TIME, 1 June 1953.
171 Letter from Rev. Ned Adams to Dr. John C. Smith, 24 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 193, Box 1, Folder 3 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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recognized that the establishment of a Christian-dominated Chaplain Corps had become 
“so vital a part of the present evangelistic program of Christianity in Korea.”172
In the end, this project was a milestone for Christianity in Korea. Not only did 
hundreds of thousands of Korean soldiers encounter the Christian faith through their 
chaplains during the war, but also Christianity became more firmly entrenched within the 
Korean ruling class.173 Regardless of whether or not these young men would remain in 
the military after the war, they would be the backbone of Korean society in the decades to 
come. And the Corps definitely led many soldiers to join churches. Just before the end 
of the War, the Chief of ROK Chaplains, told a graduating class at the Chaplain Training 
School in Taegu, “The War has given us a spiritual revival.”174
CONCLUSION
Although missionaries were relatively few in number, they contributed 
significantly to overall relief efforts. Church leaders and religious networks in the United 
States helped to publicize the needs of Korea. In collaboration, religious and non­
religious groups in the United States as well as other Western countries sent hundreds of 
thousands of tons of relief materials to Korea. It marked the biggest relief effort in 
American history.
Missionaries in the North were a valuable asset to the occupation forces. 
Missionary chaplains served as a link both between the native population and the troops, 
and between the American public and the Korean people. Through the press, they
172 Letter from T. T. Brumbaugh to Chaplain William Shaw, 23 April 1951, Missionary Vol.4, United 
Methodist Church Archives -  GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
173 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 175-183.
174 Quoted in Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace, 78.
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provided information, pictures, and commentary to audiences on the American home- 
front. They collected evidence of Communist atrocities against Christians and UN 
soldiers, while also witnessing (but not necessarily publicizing) UN atrocities against 
North Koreans. They demanded justice and change through religious means.
The Christian community, in particular, benefited the most from the labor of 
missionaries. Christians received priority in the evacuation process, and sometimes 
gained access to special refugee facilities. With the support of American churches, 
Christian influence reached into the ROK Army through the newly established Chaplain 
Corps. Just as the missionaries had hoped, not only was Christianity preserved, but the 
church also rose in political influence and power in South Korea.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 8 
The Truce Talks and POW Controversy
INTRODUCTION
The Chinese intervention entirely altered the nature and development of the 
Korean War. Not only did the Chinese push back UN and South Korean forces, but the 
US government also faced challenges from other quarters, both abroad and at home. 
Within the United States, a major political debate erupted over what the war strategy 
should be. Some believed that a larger conflict would be more winnable, so they wished 
to allow the field commander in the Far East to “strike wherever military necessity 
dictates, behind the Yalu River, or anywhere else.” 1 Many pressured the Truman 
administration to use Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea. While there was domestic 
political pressure on the President to pursue victory aggressively, international opinion 
was very different. European leaders, in particular, feared that an escalation of the war 
might cause it to spread to Europe, and they demanded accountability for US military 
actions in Korea. By June 1951, both sides agreed to sit down and negotiate a truce, but 
the process lasted for two more years.
The major question that held up the negotiation was the dispute over the POW 
issue. The United States government insisted on the principle of voluntary repatriation, 
whereas the Communist side demanded the repatriation of all prisoners. Why did the 
United States insist on voluntary repatriation, taking a great risk to prolong the war?
1 It was the opinion of Senator Harry Cain of Washington. Quoted in William W. Stueck, Jr., The Korean 
War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 131.
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American missionaries were active among the prisoners. Could there have been a 
religious angle to this debate?
THE PATH TO THE TRUCE TABLE
According to a Gallup Poll report on December 6, 1950, fifty-five percent of 
interviewees felt that the United States was fighting a World War III in Korea.2 Another 
poll around that time showed that fifty percent thought that the United States government 
had done a poor job in Korea.3 Fear and discontent swept across the country. Critics 
accused the government of failing both in Korea and in China.4 Although President 
Truman faced strong political pressure to expand the war, public opinion remained 
cautious because the poll showed that more people wanted to limit the war in Korea.5 
The strongest support for a limited war strategy was from mainstream Protestant religious 
organizations, especially leaders in the National Council of Churches of Christ (NCCC). 
The Influence of National Council o f Churches 
The National Council of Churches of Christ (NCCC) came into official existence 
on November 29,1950 at a constitutional convention in Cleveland, Ohio. Delegates from 
29 Protestant denominations and 3 Eastern Orthodox churches attended the conference. 
The NCCC also consisted of eight interdenominational agencies, which by their official 
actions transferred their functions and responsibilities to the NCCC. These eight
2 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 V o l.2 ,1949-1958 (New York: Random 
House, 1972), 951.
3 Ibid., 953.
4 The initial “loss” o f China accusation has been discussed in Chapter 4. The military setback caused by 
Chinese intervention further frustrated US public opinion on Truman’s China policy. The administration’s 
inability to predict or deter Chinese entry into the Korean War aroused strong criticism of the President and 
caused a serious loss of confidence in Truman’s ability to lead the nation to victory in Korea.
5 The Gallup Poll reported on December 4 that 46% of the interviewees thought that the UN should restrict 
the fighting to Korea while only 39% favored crossing the border and extending the war to Chinese 
territory. (The other 15% had no opinion.) See ibid., 951.
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agencies were: Federal Council of Churches of Christ (FCCC), Foreign Missions 
Conference of North America (FMC), Home Missions Council of North America (HMC), 
International Council of Religious Education (ICRE), Missionary Education Movement 
of the United States and Canada, National Protestant Council on Higher Education, 
United Council of Church Women, and United Stewardship Council. Shortly afterward, 
four more agencies decided to merge their interests in the NCCC: Church World Service 
(CWS), Inter-Seminary Committee, Protestant File Commission, and Protestant Radio 
Commission.
The NCCC was both a replacement for and an expansion of the FCCC. 
According to a statement in the December 1950 issue of the Federal Council Bulletin, the 
NCCC would continue all the work of the FCCC and expect that “the program [would] 
be enlarged as the new organization gains increased support.”6 While the FCCC claimed 
to have about 28,000,000 members in 1949, the NCCC reported 30,629,225 members in 
1951 (see Table 8.1), a gain of two million in new members. The agglomeration of these 
twelve organizations made the NCCC the most powerful inter-church agency in 
American history because it had access not only to mainstream domestic churches, but 
also to missionary organizations and various overseas relief agencies. This giant 
organization could effectively mobilize religious public opinion, and distribute religious 
propaganda throughout the United States and Canada.7
John Foster Dulles viewed the NCCC as an unprecedented Christian organization 
that could exert influence over domestic and foreign affairs through public appeal and
6 Quote in Edgar C. Bundy, Collectivism in the Churches: A Documented Account o f  the Political Activities 
o f the Federal, National, and World Councils o f Churches (Wheaton, IL: The Church League of America, 
1960), 49.
7 “National Council,” TIME, 11 December 1950.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
451
effective lobbying.8 The NCCC had the resources and manpower to conduct systematic 
religious, social, and political campaigns. Its close connections with major 
denominations and various missionary organizations positioned the NCCC to present a 
unified Protestant voice to the US public and policy makers. Rev. Richard M. Fagley, 
Director of the Department of International Justice and Goodwill of the NCCC, the same 
position that Dulles had held earlier, explained the role of NCCC in foreign affairs:
In the search for a fully responsible foreign policy and for the strong, unwavering support 
it requires, our churches have a major function to perform. It is through them and them 
alone that the well-springs of the faith that sustains American life and the moral vitality 
of our society can be renewed. It is through our churches, challenging the pretensions of 
national power and upholding the principle that power is a trust, that the moral 
foundations of policy can be undergirded. It is through our churches that individual 
citizens can gain a new sense of their own responsibility for national policy.9
Rev. Fagley saw that partnership between churches and state as essential to establishing 
long-term foreign policy objectives in the Cold War. Churches should not shy from their 
responsibility, and the government should also consult the churches for moral support.
Therefore, since its birth, the NCCC had set its aim clearly: to influence the 
direction of US foreign policy. An active lobbying machine was established in the 
nation’s capital. Politicians and government officials were routinely invited to NCCC 
meetings and conferences. For example, the main speaker at the Constitutional 
Convention of the NCCC in November 1950 was Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The 
presence of Acheson generated great interest and intense discussion on the direction of 
US foreign policy in facing the crisis in East Asia. Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, Director of 
the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), presented “A Christian 
View on the International Crisis.” He urged the American people to guard themselves
8 John Foster Dulles’ speech on November 27, 1950, Seeley Mudd Library, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 
302, Folder: Speech Federal Council o f Churches, NY.
9 Richard M. Fagley, “Responsibility and Foreign Policy,” Christianity and Crisis 5 (22 January 1951): 189.
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against hysteria, self-righteousness and hatred, unilateral action, false pride and face-
saving tendencies, complacency, prejudice, impatience, and making the US economy
dependent on military production.10 The NCCC and its supporters stood against the use
of the atomic bomb against China, and ruled out the justification of any “preventive war”
because both were morally wrong.11
When President Truman voiced his frustration with the Chinese and hinted at the
possibility of using atomic weapons in the Korean War, the NCCC was alarmed.
Telegrams by individual clergymen were sent to the President, urging him to consider Dr.
Nolde’s position.12 On December 7,1950, the President received a special telegram from
Dr. Henry Sherrill, the President of the NCCC. Dr. Sherrill warned against not only the
use of atomic weapons, but also “false pride and face-saving tendencies.” He advised the
President “to guard against unilateral action” and “to manifest consistent readiness to 
1 ^negotiation.”
Meanwhile, the NCCC also launched a nationwide campaign against the use of 
atomic weapons. Religious publications emphasized the need for “restraint.” The 
Presbyterians published Dr. Nolde’s speech in the December 11, 1950 issue of The 
United Presbyterian.u  Two days later, The Christian Century and Christianity and 
Crisis reprinted an old report by a commission of theologians and church leaders in the 
FCCC which had been published several months earlier, “The Christian Conscience and
10 O. Frederick Nolde, “A Christian View on the International Crisis,” The United Presbyterian, 11 
December 1950, 10-12.
11 “Preventive War Morally Wrong,” The United Presbyterian, 26 March 1951, 6.
12 Paul C. Payne and G. Merrill Lenox sent separate telegrams to the President. See Box 1360 of the Papers 
of Harry S. Truman (Official File), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
13 Dr. Henry Sherrill, President of the NCCC, telegram to the President, 7 December 1950; NCCCA Files 
#5573, Truman Library.
14 Nolde, “A Christian View on the International Crisis,” 10-12.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction.” 15 The leaders of mainstream Protestantism rejected the 
call for “total war.” Protestant leaders wished to set not only geographical boundaries on 
the Korean War, but also boundaries on the kinds of weapons and tactics that the United 
States should employ. The report also “condemned any potential killing of prisoners,” 
“the massacre of civilian populations, especially of women and children,” and “the 
bombardment of ‘undefended’ towns.”16 Reinhold Niebuhr regarded the attempt of the 
NCCC as “the most effective religious protest against the hysteria which [had] engulfed 
the country.”17 In February 1951, a Gallup Poll survey concluded that 77 percent thought 
that the US should not start an all-out war with China. A month later, another survey 
reported that 56 percent of the people wanted the US government to try harder to reach an 
agreement with Communist China on Korea, and 73 percent of them thought that the UN 
forces should stop at the 38th Parallel if the Chinese agreed to stop fighting.18
Since the NCCC believed that the contest between Communism and democracy 
would not end with Korea and a real victory would not be secured by bombs, it advocated 
a humanitarian approach to foreign affairs, by injecting ideas of morality and religious 
principles into US foreign policy.19 A victory over Communism could only be achieved 
through a peace crusade of relief efforts, education, technical and financial assistance,
15 “The Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report of a Commission Appointed by 
the Federal Council o f the Churches of Christ in America,” The Christian Century 50 (13 December 1950): 
1489.
16 Ibid.
17 Reinhold Niebuhr, ‘The Church Speaks to the Nation,” Christianity and Crisis XIII (30 November 1953): 
153.
18 The Gallup Poll, 668-669.
19 Paul Calvin Payne, “Editorial Comment,” Presbyterian Life, 17 March 1951,7. Payne was the vice- 
president representing the division o f Christian Education in the NCCC.
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and support for human rights.20 The NCCC was particularly interested in Truman’s Point 
IV Program, a new program of technical assistance for underdeveloped areas.
There were two major reasons why they were interested. First, NCCC leaders 
thought that the program was “a promising pointer in the direction of a coherent long- 
range policy.”21 Second, Christian groups had extensive missionary works in these areas, 
meaning church-state collaboration was beneficial to both. When the government asked 
for the religious organizations’ assistance for the Point IV Program, the NCCC responded 
positively.22
Truman’s Response to Religious Public Opinion 
President Truman tried to maintain good relations with mainstream religious 
groups throughout his administration. His hope to enlist the support of religious leaders 
against Communism, and his interest in the ecumenical movement, drew Truman closer 
to the NCCC. His idea that the social gospel was an effective answer to counteract the 
growth of Communism aligned him with mainstream Protestant opinion, especially 
among the “Social Gospelers.” “The menace of Communism,” Truman pointed out, “lies 
in areas of American life where the promise of democracy remains unfulfilled.”23 He 
referred to the exciting social problems of slums in inner cities, wage differences, lack of 
medical care, unemployment, price fluctuations caused by uncontrolled inflation, and 
human rights abuses. His Point IV Program was an extension to foreign policy of his 
liberal view on social affairs. His willingness to adopt a humanitarian and moral
20 Payne, “Editorial Comment,” 7. See also Nolde, “A Christian View On the International Crisis,” 12; and 
‘The Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 1491. See also ‘The Churches and Point 
IV,” The Christian Century 68 (9 May 1951): 581.
21 Fagley, “Responsibility and Foreign Policy,” 187.
22 ‘The Churches and Point IV,” The Christian Century 68 (9 May 1951): 581.
23 “Speech to the Swedish Pioneer Centennial Association, Chicago Stadium,” 4 June 1948, Public Papers 
o f the Presidents: Harry S Truman, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php.
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approach to foreign issues earned him support from some liberal religious leaders and the 
Catholic Church.24
Truman’s decision to limit the war in Korea also satisfied the position of the 
NCCC. In meeting with a group of Methodist ministers on February 7, 1951, he told 
them that his foreign policy objectives were to prevent the outbreak of a third world war, 
and restore peace. “We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended,” the President 
explained.25 “The best way to do that,” he insisted, “is to make it plain that we and the 
other free countries will continue to resist the attack.”26 He ruled out suggestions both to 
bomb mainland China and to use Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces in Korea because 
he wanted to minimize the risk of starting a general war. By doing so, President Truman 
was hoping to find a peaceful settlement in Korea.27
In addition to his effort to gain support from the NCCC, the President also sought 
means to mobilize religious public opinion on his Korea policy. Since the missionary 
organization had vast interests in Korea, Truman continued to define the Korean War as a 
battle for religious freedom. Speaking at the Presbyterian Church on New York Avenue
24 For example, in September 1951, Dr. John L. Peter, a professor of religion at Oklahoma City University, 
preached a sermon at St. Luke’s Methodist Church on the importance of sending out missionaries as an 
effective means to combat the spread of Communism. In response, the Christian community in Oklahoma 
City was so aroused that they mobilized a city-wide effort to lobby Congress to support the Point IV 
program of sending out Christian technicians, educators, and other skilled workers as missionaries to the 
underdeveloped world. See Drew Pearson, “The Washington Merry-Go-Round,” Northwest Arkansas 
Times, 5 October 1951,4. The President also tried to enlist the Pope’s support by expressing his desire to 
select General Mark Clark, the field commander of the 8th Army in Korea at that time, to be ambassador to 
the Roman Catholic Church because he felt, according to a White House Statement, that the “purposes of 
diplomacy and humanitarianism [would] be served’ and that “direct relations with the Vatican [would] help 
coordinate a common fight against Communism. See “Wave of Protest Against Appointment of Clark to 
Vatican Post Rolls Across U.S,” The Ada Weekly, 25 October 1951, 4.
25 “Remarks to a Group of Methodist Ministers,” 7 February 1951, Public Papers o f  the Presidents: Harry 
S. Truman, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php.
26 Ibid.
27 “Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far East,” 11 April 1951, 
Public Papers o f  the President: Harry S. Truman, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php.
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in Washington D.C. on April 3, 1951, he appealed for moral support from religious 
leaders:
There has never been a cause which had a stronger moral claim on all of us. We are 
defending the religious principles upon which our Nation and our whole way of life are 
founded. We are defending the right to worship God -  each as he sees fit according to his 
own conscience. We are defending the right to follow the precepts and the example 
which God has set for us. We are defending the right of people to gather together, all 
across our land, in churches such as this one. For the danger that threatens us in the 
world today is utterly and totally opposed to all these things. The international 
Communist movement is based on a fierce and terrible fanaticism. It denies the existence 
of God and, wherever it can, it stamps out the worship of God. Our religious faith gives 
us the answer to the false beliefs o f communism. Our faith shows us the way to create a 
society where man can find his greatest happiness under God. Surely, we can follow that 
faith with the same devotion and determination the Communists give to their godless 
creed.28
Religious freedom was an important principle in Truman’s mind because it was also a 
principle shared by all religious groups in the United States and other Western countries. 
Therefore, the administration began to increase the use of religious materials in radio 
programs, pamphlets, and motion pictures in its propaganda campaign against 
Communism.29 By April 1951, Truman wanted to make peace, but he made it very clear 
that he would not compromise American principles.
General Ridgway and the Stabilization of the Front 
US forces suffered a major setback when General Walton H. Walker, field
thcommander of the 8 Army, was killed in a car accident on December 23, 1950, while 
visiting to American units in the vicinity of Uijongbu. The sudden death of General 
Walker caused serious confusion and widespread fatalism among US and ROK troops. 
Washington immediately sent General Matthew B. Ridgway, the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Operations and Administration in the Department of Army, to replace Walker.
28 “Address at the Cornerstone Laying of the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church,” 3 April 1951, 
Public Papers o f  the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php.
29 In July 1951, the State Department formed a religious advisory panel to counsel Assistant Secretary of 
State Edward W. Barrett, who was in charge of the “Voice of America,” on the religious content of their 
programs. See “Religion Panel on Voice of U.S,” Religion Today and Tomorrow, 14 July 1951, 1.
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Ridgway proved to be the right man for the job due to his knowledge of the Korean War, 
and his previous war experience in China and the Philippines. As soon as he arrived,
thGeneral MacArthur authorized him to command both the 8 Army and the X Corps. It 
was a vital change that strengthened Ridgway’s position in conducting a new war 
strategy in Korea.
To lift the morale of UN troops, Ridgway first encouraged the ROK Army by 
making it clear that he had come to Korea to stay. He ordered his divisional commanders 
to hold their line by seizing high ground north of Taejon, abandoning Walker’s “road- 
bound” approach. In February, the UN side eventually launched a major counter­
offensive, Operation KILLER, taking advantage of their superior firepower to inflict
- in
maximum damage on the enemy. A month later, UN forces retook Seoul and pushed 
the Chinese back to the 38th Parallel where the battle lines began to stabilize.
The Recall o f General MacArther 
Increasingly disturbed by the military stalemate along the 38th Parallel and the 
military restrictions imposed by Washington, General MacArthur grew restless and 
impatient with the Truman administration. Washington wanted a limited war, but 
MacArthur sought to expand the war and bring in the Chinese Nationalists. After the 
Joint Chiefs rejected MacArthur’s demand to attack the North Korean electrical 
installation in Najin, a harbor near Soviet territory, MacArthur became more vocal in his 
criticism of the administration. In defiance of his commander in chief, he constantly 
embarrassed the President, especially by discussing his plans to secure a total victory by 
any means. MacArthur pushed Truman too far when he endorsed House Minority
30 Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclared War Against the US in Korea 1950-51 (New York: 
Newmarket Press, 1988), 277.
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Leader Joseph Martin’s call to open a second front in China, and when he mocked the 
idea of limited warfare, declaring, “there is no substitute for victory.” After consulting 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense George Marshall, General Omar 
Bradley, and W. Averell Harriman, then special assistant to the President for national 
security affairs, the President relieved MacArthur of his command on April 11.
US public reaction to MacArthur’s recall was extremely emotional and confused. 
The Republican Party manipulated the popularity of the five-star general to turn public 
sentiment into an anti-Truman campaign. Many Americans were as frustrated as 
MacArthur over the handling of the war, feeling that Truman did not have the strength to 
win the war or stop the fighting. The nation was deeply divided. Even the press was split 
over this controversy. The Hearst, McCormick, and Scripps-Howard news chains 
attacked Truman as a scoundrel, while the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the 
Atlanta Journal supported the President.
The religious opinion in the United States was similarly divided over this 
controversy. While fundamentalist Christians and the Catholic Church supported 
MacArthur, most liberals favored the President. The opinion of the NCCC and many 
liberal Protestant church leaders sided with the President and supported his stand on 
limited warfare. An editorial by The Christian Century praised the President, and 
denounced MacArthur’s ideas on the use of the atomic bomb and the expansion of the 
war into Communist China.32 John C. Bennett, an editor of Christianity and Crisis, 
regarded a large-scale war in Asia as “a momentous blunder, a blunder based upon
31 Quote in Stanley Weintraub, MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing o f An American Hero (New 
York: The Free Press, 2000), 330.
32 “MacArthur,” The Christian Century 68 (25 April 1951): 519. See also “Peace Hopes Rise at U.N.: 
Editorial Correspondence,” The Christian Century 68 (2 May 1951): 551.
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blindness to the real sources of Communist strength in Asia and upon blindness to the 
need of broad international support for effective police action against Communism.”33 
The editor of United Presbyterian, who had been highly pro-MacArthur, made it clear 
that the President of the United States had the “legal right to relieve any military officer 
of his command and turn his authority over to another.”34 Support from these religious 
leaders strengthened the position of the President.
Differing from the position of their denominations, missionaries tended to support 
MacArthur’s tough stance. They feared that Korea might go the way of China. In the 
three years that Communists had controlled China, the number of American missionaries 
had plummeted from 2,986 (2,536 Protestant and 450 Catholics) to only 193.35 
Missionaries expelled from China were vocal within the religious community. Some 
were staunch supporters of the China Lobby, a pro-Nationalist political lobby in
"XftWashington. China’s entry into the Korean War further damaged mission enterprises in 
China. With the exception of the Catholic Church, missionaries began to be recalled or 
advised to return.37 From late 1950 through the end of 1951, many of those who tried to 
stay in China and continue their work were arrested. It was regarded as “the worst mass 
persecution of American missionaries in [US] history.” This persecution hardened the 
opinions of many ex-China missionaries. Some of them would be among those who 
wanted the US government to allow Chiang Kai-shek to send his troops to Korea. While
33 John C. Bennett, “The MacArthur Controversy,” Christianity and Crisis 11 (14 May 1951): 58.
34 Henry W. Temple, ‘The MacArthur Affair,” The United Presbyterian, 23 April 1951, 6.
35 Ibid.
36 George E. Sokolsky, ‘The China Lobby,” The Portsmouth Times, 13 June 1951,4.
37 “Exit,” TIME, 15 January 1951.
38 The NCCC reported that 32 American missionaries were in prison, 25 under house arrest, and 136 
restricted in their movements. They were prevented from leaving China and subjected to criminal 
accusations and attacks. See George Cornell, “Cite Peril to Ministers Overseas: Call Treatment of 
Missionaries Worst in History,” Austin Daily Herald, 8 May 1952, 1.
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US church leaders wanted to achieve peace and prevent an expansion of war, there were 
individual missionaries who wanted a firm policy to achieve a military victory.
Many of the missionaries to Korea shared the philosophy of their Chinese 
missionary counterparts. And like the Chinese missionaries, they also found themselves 
at odds with their denominational leaders on the idea of peace. Missionaries in the war 
zone had personally witnessed Communist hostility against Christianity. Hoping to 
liberate the North, many appreciated MacArthur’s tough stance against compromise. 
When MacArthur was recalled, therefore, missionaries and Korean Christians alike were 
devastated and angered by Washington’s decision. Rev. William C. Kerr, a Korean 
missionary who was in Japan working with the US military for the re-orientation program 
of Communist prisoners of war, wrote of his great disappointment to Dr. John C. Smith, 
the Secretary of the Board of Presbyterian Foreign Mission (USA):
We are stunned this evening by the news of Gen. MacArthur being superseded. If an 
awful howl does not immediately follow this action I shall be surprised. If the person 
who made this decision had handed in his own resignation I should have been much 
better pleased. But let some people with more authority than I have be the ones to speak
39up.
Such frustration was common among missionaries in Korea. They sympathized with the 
South Korean desire to unify the country, even though prolonging the war would cost 
more lives. At the same time, however, most were amenable to a peace settlement, so 
long as the United States made a clear commitment to protect the security of South Korea.
Among US allies, however, the firing of MacArthur was welcome news. They 
had grown weary of MacArthur’s insubordination. Unlike the American public, who 
generally disapproved of Truman’s decision to fire MacArthur, 55 percent of the British
39 Letter from Rev. William C. Kerr to Dr. John C. Smith, 11 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archive, 
Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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favored his decision.40 As public emotions began to cool down and arguments from both 
sides were reexamined by Congress, Truman regained his support among the elite and 
those well-informed on foreign affairs. In May 1951, a Gallup Poll conducted among 
people listed in Who’s Who in America found that 51 percent favored the president’s 
action. Among educators on the list, 64 percent supported the president41 The public’s 
anti-Truman sentiment also decreased from 66 percent disapproving his action in May, to 
56 percent a month later.42 People started to recognize the danger of MacArthur’s 
aggressive strategy and had to concede the wisdom of Truman’s approach, though it hurt 
their pride to seek a truce instead of victory.
The Road to the Truce Talks 
Following General Ridgway’s successful operations in the spring of 1951, UN 
forces were in a better bargaining position for a truce. President Truman sent US 
diplomat George Kennan to contact Russian UN Ambassador Jacob Malik about Korea in 
May. Malik’s response during their second meeting in early June was encouraging. The 
Russians suggested that the United States negotiate directly with the North Koreans and 
the Chinese. The door to talks negotiations was gradually opened. Public sentiment in 
the United States also favored negotiations. A survey by the Gallup Poll in early July 
showed that 51 percent approved the UN call for a truce at the 38th Parallel.43 Christian 
churches also supported the call for negotiations. For example, the largest Protestant 
denomination in the United States, the Methodist Church, urged the UN “to secure a 
thorough-going ceasefire negotiation in Korea” and cautioned against “militarism which
40 The Gallup Poll, 21 May 1951, 984.
41 The Gallup Poll, 16 May 1951, 983.
42 The Gallup Poll, 3 May 1951, 981, and 8 June 1951, 988.
43 The Gallup Poll, July 2, 1951, 993.
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[promoted] war as the solution of world problems.”44 Catholics also called upon US 
leaders “to exert every effort to reach a settlement of [the] international problems in 
harmony with Christian principles.”45
After receiving instructions from Washington, General Ridgway announced that 
the United Nations Command (UNC) was willing to negotiate an armistice. The 
Communist side suggested Kaesong as the conference site, and a preliminary meeting by 
liaison officers was scheduled on July 8, 1951. Formal truce talks began two days later. 
The UNC chief negotiator was Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy, Commander of U.S. 
Naval Forces (Far East). The Republic of Korea sent Major General Paek Son-yop as an 
observer. The Communist side was led by General Nam II, the Korean People’s Army 
(KPA) chief of staff and vice foreign minister of North Korea. The Chinese sent Lt. 
General Deng Hua, the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ Army (CPVA) Deputy Commander.
On the first day, both sides presented their positions. The UNC wanted the 
negotiations to be limited only to Korea-related military matters. Admiral Joy requested 
the Communists to allow the International Red Cross to inspect the prisoner of war (POW) 
camps, and suggested a joint supervisory mechanism to inspect both sides’ observance of 
the armistice. The Communist side asked for an immediate ceasefire, the establishment 
of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the 38th Parallel, and the withdrawal of all foreign 
troops from Korea.
The negotiations, however, had a rocky start because of the Communist attempt to 
control Kaesong and score a propaganda victory. After US troops withdrew from
44 See “Methodists Call for Peace But Without Appeasement,” Religion Today and Tomorrow, 14 July 
1951,1.
45 “Catholic Women Want Peace With Christian Principles,” Religion Today and Tomorrow, 14 July 1951,
1.
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Kaesong to honor the pledge to keep the city a neutral zone, the Communists moved in 
and completely took over the city. According to historian Rosemary Foot, the 
Communists were trying to “bolster their negotiating position” due to their weaker 
military position.46 The original goal of the Communist side -  to unify Korea -  was 
dashed by the UNC counter-offensive in June. In order to cover their weakness before 
their domestic and foreign audiences, the North Koreans and the Chinese tried to 
manipulate the press and radio to give a false sense of its success on the battlefield. Since 
Kaesong was located south of the 38th Parallel, they could claim a clear victory by taking 
over the ancient city of Korea. More than that, UN forces agreed to reduce their attacks 
at the beginning of the truce talks, providing a critical breathing period for the 
Communist side to dig in and consolidate their military position along the front. The 
Kaesong period of the truce talks made very little progress and eventually Admiral Joy 
insisted on a new negotiation site at P’anmunjom if the Communists withed to continue 
the negotiations.
The Underwood Brothers as Interpreters for the UNC
There were many obstacles for the two sides to overcome. One of them was 
language interpretation. Good interpreters in the military were hard to find. Candidates 
needed not only excellent language skills, but also a security clearance for such a top 
secret responsibility. Because the negotiations involved both Koreans and Chinese, a 
trilingual interpretation was needed. Thus, missionary kids in the military would become 
important to the peace process. Lt. Richard Underwood and Warrant Officer Kenneth 
Wu were called separately to duty in Kaesong. Every sentence had to be translated twice,
46 Rosemary Foot, A Substitute fo r  Victory: The Politics o f  Peacemaking A t the Korean Armistice Talks 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 44.
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first in Korean by Underwood and then in Chinese by Wu. Interpreting a formal military 
negotiation was not easy because if they made mistakes in translation, the negotiations 
would suffer. On the first day, both Officer Wu and Lt. Underwood were overwhelmed 
by the difficulties of their job. “Suffice it to say that I sweat blood,” Lt. Underwood 
recalled, “died of humiliation, and did a very poor job that day.”47
Nevertheless, there were good reasons for the poor performance of the interpreters 
at the initial stage. First of all, UN negotiators did not appreciate the importance of 
interpreters. For the opening session, Admiral Joy and his team worked hours to “polish 
and sharpen their words to mean exactly what they wanted to say,” but no one bothered 
to give Lt. Underwood or Officer Wu a copy of the prepared speech. As a result, they 
had a hard time not just interpreting correctly, but also recalling exactly what the Admiral 
had said. Second, US military personnel were not familiar with the process of 
interpretation at the negotiation table. The admiral spoke too fast and sometimes too long, 
making it impossible for his interpreters to catch up. Third, as a missionary kid, Lt. 
Underwood was fluent in Korean only in terms of basic, daily conversation, but the
4R
vocabulary of the negotiations was strange to him. Although he was assigned as a 
language specialist in the US Army at the beginning of the Korean War, he had never 
received any formal training in Korean linguistics.
To address these problems, Underwood and Wu made three key suggestions to 
the UN negotiators. First, they asked that Lt. Horace G. Underwood be brought to 
Kaesong. Being ten years older than his brother Richard Underwood, and having 
received formal Japanese language training in the Navy, Horace Underwood was better
47 Richard F. Underwood, “Memoirs and Thoughts,” (Unpublished Manuscript, 2002) 93.
48 Ibid., 94.
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prepared for the job. Knowledge of Chinese characters was absolutely necessary to 
translate many technical terms from English into Korean, since the Korean language, like 
the Japanese, uses many Chinese characters. Second, they asked for advance copies of 
all “position papers” so they could translate them beforehand. Third, they requested that 
each delegate learn how and when to pause for interpretation.49
Admiral Joy immediately arranged the transfer of Lt. Horace Underwood to 
Kaesong to be the Chief UN Interpreter.50 He assigned Horace Underwood as the 
primary interpreter for all plenary sessions, while Richard Underwood took responsibility 
for sub-committees and liaison, or investigative, missions. The admiral also allowed the 
three interpreters “to sit in on the staff work sessions in which the speeches were 
hammered out.” 51 In this way, all interpreters were able to understand fully the 
background thinking for each speech and proposal. In addition, the interpreters were also 
invited to participate in policy discussions to offer insights into Korean or Chinese 
thinking. The negotiation team also valued the interpreters’ comments on broader issues, 
treating them with respect in spite of their low rank.52 Horace Underwood’s background 
as an educator and missionary in Seoul and Richard Underwood’s experience as an 
intelligence officer working with POWs in Tongnae and Hamhung perhaps enabled them 
to advise the UN delegates informally on a variety of issues.
49 Ibid.
50 Harry A. Rhodes and Archibald Campbell, eds., History o f  the Korean Mission: Presbyterian Church in 
the USA Volume II: 1935-1959 (New York: The United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1964), 59.
51 Underwood, “Memoirs and Thoughts,” 94.
52 Horace G. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections o f  Horace G. 
Underwood, ed. Michael J. Devine (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 161.
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The workload for these three interpreters was exhausting when the truce talks 
were in session, even though they had a small staff of assistants to help them.53 Each 
night after the staff meetings, the interpreters and their assistants had to “start the long but 
necessary task of going through each paper” given by the delegates.54 They added notes, 
made vocabulary reminders, and sometimes rephrased words into Korean on the margins 
in order to make sure that they translated “the meaning and flavor of our delegate’s 
statements, not just the words.”55 After staying up late, they would then get up early in 
the morning, because the support staff had to travel by jeep, while the negotiators flew to 
the negotiation site later in the day. (Only later in P’anmunjom, when more helicopters 
became available, could the staff officers and interpreters fly to the negotiation site.)56
During the negotiations, interpreters had to stay alert because they needed not 
only to interpret for the UN side, but also keep a close check on the interpretation done 
by the other side, making sure that the Communist interpreters were interpreting exactly 
what their delegates had said. On several occasions, the UN interpreters had to step in 
and make corrections when the interpreters on the other side made mistakes. In one case, 
the Communist interpreter spoke so poorly and incorrectly that Lt. Richard Underwood 
had to inform the North Korean liaison officer, and the interpreter was fired on the spot. 
The North Korean colonel asked him to take over interpretation for the Communist side 
for the rest of the day.57
53 There were two typists, one Chinese-character typist and one Korean-language typist. They also 
depended heavily on Colonel Lee Su-yong, the senior Korean liaison office, for assistance with the Korean 
language. See ibid., 163.
54 Underwood, “Memoirs and Thoughts,” 94.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid. See also Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 171.
57 Underwood, “Memoirs and Thoughts,” 94.
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After the truce meeting concluded on day, UN interpreters had to hurry back to 
the review meeting, assisting the UN delegates and other liaison officers to fully 
understand what had been said. When dinner was over, they would begin the routine 
again for the next day with another evening planning session followed by more late-night 
translation work. Sometimes, in the middle of the night, they were called to attend 
special “investigation” meetings with Communist liaison officers.58 Many times, they 
had to refute Communist allegations of UN bombings in the neutral zone. On one 
occasion while the negotiation site was still in Kaesong, they documented a case of germ 
warfare that the Communists had staged to embarrass UN negotiators.
The negotiation process was made even more difficult by Communist attempts to 
“twist and exploit every possible word or admission.”59 This left the interpreters with no 
margin for error. Under such difficult conditions, the Underwood brothers served with 
distinction. Their performance was praised by Admiral Joy in his memoirs.60 After 
serving for about a year in P’anmunjom, Lt Richard Underwood chose not to reenlist 
because he wanted to continue his college education and get married. The Army 
rewarded his services with a Bronze Star medal with oak leaf cluster (the equivalent of a 
second Bronze Star), and promoted him to 1st Lieutenant.61
Lt. Horace Underwood also wanted to resign so that he could resume his 
missionary work, but the Navy was reluctant to release him because he was probably “the 
only officer in the U.S. Navy who [knew] Korean.”62 He served not only as interpreter
58 Ibid.
59 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 181.
60 Admiral C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan Company, 1955), 26.
61 Underwood, “Memoirs and Thoughts,” 101.
62 Letter from Horace G. Underwood to Dr. John C. Smith, 18 August 1952, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
RG 140, Box 18, Folder 17 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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for the truce talks, but also as Aide, Staff Officer, and Interpreter to Admiral H. B. 
Hanlon, Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, Far East Command.63 He also attended 
many meetings in dealing with issues concerning the South Korean government 
throughout the war. In the end, Horace Underwood stayed until a few days before the 
conclusion of the armistice.64 For his contribution at P’anmunjom, the US Army 
rewarded him with the Legion of Merit, which was rarely given to lower ranks.65 
Altogether, he received four medals for his services in Korea and served longer than most 
of the American military personnel in the Korean War.
RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN THE POW ISSUE
Initially, no one on the UN side expected that the truce negotiations would be so 
grueling and prolonged. It took fourteen days for both sides to agree to a five-point 
agenda. (Item 1 was the adoption of the agenda. Item 2 was about fixing a military 
demarcation line and the establishment of a demilitarized zone. Item 3 dealt with 
concrete arrangements for a cease-fire, an armistice, and a supervisory organization. 
Item 4 concerned arrangements for prisoners of war. Item 5 was the submission of 
recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides). It took 
another four months for both sides to agree on Item 2. By March 1952, they had resolved 
the question of a supervisory organization in Item 3, and submitted their 
recommendations in Item 5. The negotiations, however, had reached deadlock over the 
question of voluntary repatriation in Item 4.
63 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f  the Korean Mission, Vol.2, 60.
64 He chose to leave earlier to dissociate himself from it, fearing that the unpopular truce might jeopardize 
his missionary work in Korea. See Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 180.
65 Ibid., 187.
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The desire for non-repatriation was nothing a new. After the end of World War II, 
repatriation issues created serious difficulties for the Allied Forces, because numerous 
Russian troops and civilians, who had deserted to the Germans and been captured by the 
allies, refused to be repatriated. Many committed suicide when the Allies decided to send 
them back.66 The legacy of this incident affected the consciences of many American 
leaders and shaped their strong views on the principle of voluntary repatriation.
Capturing North Korean Prisoners
During the early stages of the Korean War, the POW administration was 
extremely disorganized and confusing. UN authorities had no systematic procedures to 
handle their North Korean prisoners of war. In August 1950, when the number of 
prisoners increased to about a thousand, the UN side set up a permanent POW camp 
(known as Enclosure 1) in Tongnae, a town 10 miles north of Pusan.67 Due to 
insufficient manpower, Americans used ROK troops under close supervision by US 
Army personnel to guard the prisoners. All UN forces were ordered to send their 
prisoners to Tongnae for interrogation and imprisonment as quickly as possible.
Prisoners of war were “the best source of intelligence information” throughout the 
Korean War, but qualified military personnel who could obtain this information were 
essential.68 In the US military, Korean linguists were almost non-existent in the Far 
Eastern Command. In the first three months of the war, only fourteen of the 158 Korean 
linguists had security clearances. Even among these fourteen, only seven were fluent
66 Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1971), 130.
67 “The Handling o f Prisoners of War During the Korean War,” 8-5.1 A AA.K (Military History Office: 
Office of the Assistant Chief o f Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960): 3-5.
68 Being told o f possible death and torture by Communist authorities, most North Koreans POWs tended to 
tell lies instead of truth when they were captured. See “Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems 
during the Korean conflict,” 8-5.1 A AA.G (US Army Center of Military History): 6-7.
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enough to be usable in all situations,69 and headquarters had retained most of these for the 
Inch’on Landing operation. Therefore, at the beginning, interrogations were mainly 
conducted by South Korean or Japanese interpreters.
South Korean interrogators were mostly stem anti-Communists. They followed 
the ROK Army to the front and conducted interrogations on the spot. If the prisoners 
were determined to be South Koreans, the ROK army would release them immediately. 
If they proved cooperative, the ROK treated them well and learned information through 
“soft” means. If the prisoners were found to be hard-core Communists (mostly KPA 
officers), more coercive means were employed. No statistics exist today on exactly how 
many prisoners were simply released or how many were tortured to death by the ROK. 
No formal investigation was ever conducted. Because “of the tendency of ROK forces to 
mistreat or kill [prisoners] with even slight provocation,” the US Army decided to assume 
full responsibility for taking care of POWs as early as August 1950, asking the ROK 
units to transfer all their POWs to US custody immediately.70
Lacking interpreters during the first two months of the war, US troops depended 
heavily on the voluntary services of missionaries, who took refuge in Taegu and Pusan. 
Rev. Harry Hill, who had worked in North Korea before World War II, gave valuable 
help to American officers. They invited him to check on information given by the 
prisoners and verify their stories. By doing so, Rev. Hill had the privilege not only to talk 
with POWs, but also to preach to them as well. “Most of them give excellent attention,”
69 Ibid., 26-27.
70 ‘The Handling o f Prisoners of War During the Korean War,” 5. According to Dr. Woo Jun Hong, who 
worked for the ROK army to distinguish Communists from non-Communists, the South Korean Army had 
the policy of killing Communists and releasing the South Koreans during the early stage of the war. See 
Donald B. Sheley, Beggar A t the Banquet, ed. by David Esterline (San Bruno, CA: Church of the 
Highlands, 1979), 73.
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Hill recalled, because “atheism [had] not satisfied their hearts, and they [were] eager to 
receive copies of the gospels.”71 Therefore, evangelism among the POWs was ongoing 
from the very start of the war.
In Pusan, UN troops invited Rev. Francis Kinsler and Rev. William Linton to 
provide assistance. Army chaplains asked the missionaries to preach to the POWs in 
Tongnae (about a thousand inmates at that time). Rev. Linton observed that they seemed 
to be merely “uneducated, country boys,” not the kind of hardcore Communists that 
people had expected. He also discovered that “a good many [were] from Christian
7 7families.” In fact, the North Korean government’s distrust of Christians was reasonable 
because the number of defections among North Korean Christians to the UN side was 
quite high. Some Christian parents even instructed their children who were conscripted 
into the North Korean Army not to return to North Korea if they had a chance to stay in 
the South.73
A Rapid Numerical Growth o f Prisoners in UN Custody 
Many more North Koreans surrendered after UN troops captured Seoul, because 
the X Corps blocked the retreat of half of the KPA. By the end of September, Enclosure 
1 in Tongnae contained 10,829 prisoners, an increase of approximately 9,000 over the 
previous thirty days. Prisoners were brought in so rapidly that facilities were not ready 
for them. Because shelter, food, and water were all in short supply, approximately 1,100
71 Since Rev. Harry Hill was neither an army officer nor a chaplain, his work in the POW camp was not 
recorded in any o f the military documents. At that time, the politically oriented education program had not 
started yet. Missionaries were offered “a free hand” and almost “free access” to their POWs. See letter 
from Rev. Harry Hill, 22 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 
14 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
72 Letter from Mrs. (Charlotte) Linton, 28 August 1950, in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Department of 
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
73 Jeong Chung-seop’s parents urged him not to return to the North. Therefore, he and his cousin, who was 
a Presbyterian elder, refused to be repatriated. Interview with Jeong Chun-Seop, an ex-North Korean POW 
who resided in South Korea, 18 May 2004, College Park, Maryland.
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had to be placed in compounds without shelter.74 Still, thousands were coming each day. 
By November 1950, there were more than one hundred thousand prisoners in UN custody 
(33,478 were in Inch’on enclosures, 62,697 at Pusan, and 20,647 at P’yongyang).75 The
1f\total number of prisoners reached 146,135 by December 3,1950.
The changing tide of the war in December 1950 forced UN authorities to move all 
the prisoners first to Pusan, and then to Koje Island, an island twenty miles southwest of 
the port of Pusan. Koje Island contained a total 28 compounds. They were divided 
among 4 huge enclosures: Enclosure 6 was in the Central Valley, and Enclosures 7, 8, 
and 9 were in the East Valley. These compounds were severely overcrowded. Sanitation 
was poor and food at first inadequate. There were about 8,000 POWs in each compound 
with around 500 people in each tent or barrack. Only 4,000 US and ROK troops were 
stationed in Koje Island, about one to every five hundred prisoners. It was difficult for 
UN authorities to maintain effective control. Since the 8th Army could not spare more 
forces to guard these camps, management of these prison compounds relied on the 
prisoners’ cooperation. Each compound elected its own representatives to be responsible 
for discipline, supplies distribution, and communication with the camp commanders.
As a result, some compounds fell into the control of anti-Communists, and others 
into the hands of hardcore Communists. US guards rarely entered POW enclosures due 
to a lack of experience and manpower. The situation was peaceful initially, but 
deteriorated rapidly when truce talks began in Kaesong. From June 1951 to May 1952, 
the Koje camps became a new battlefield of the Korean War, and emerged as a key issue
74 “The Handling o f Prisoners of War During the Korean War,” 8-5.1 A AA.K (Military History Office: 
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960): 6.
75 Ibid., 7.
76 Outgoing message from CINCFE Tokyo, Japan to CG Army Eight Korea, 4 December 1950, Record 
Group 9, Box 37, Folder: “Army 8 -  out, Dec 50”, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
473
during the truce talks. The battles in these prison compounds were a constant 
embarrassment for the UN negotiators and the source of tension between both sides. To 
understand the nature of the POW controversy, it is important to analyze the origins of 
the problem accurately. There were five major factors that contributed to the polarization 
of the POW camps and the controversy over the repatriation issue.
(1) US Political Indoctrination o f Communist Prisoners
General MacArthur believed that freedom was the antithesis of Communism 
because Communism gained control through terrorism, subversion, and deceit. If an 
open atmosphere were allowed, Communism would lose its power over its converts.77 
Communist prisoners would be the best testing subjects for MacArthur’s assumption. 
Plans were made to re-educate POWs by feeding them with new information and 
religious services. The Far Eastern Command hired Dr. William C. Kerr and Dr. Dexter 
Lutz, both missionaries from the Presbyterian Mission (USA), to organize a program for 
the reorientation of POWs. The preparation work for this program began in Tokyo.78
As early as October 1950, the 8th Army started a pilot program at Yongdung-p’o 
(near Seoul) to test the possibility of changing the attitude of the prisoners, making them 
receptive to Western values, and correcting their distorted ideas about Western 
democracy. Five hundred North Korean inmates were selected for the study. Class 
attendance was voluntary. Participants heard daily propaganda news releases and 
commentaries from the radio, read weekly United States Information Service (USIS) 
translations of news releases, and watched USIS film releases that had been used
77 From MacArthur to Mr. George Djamgaroff, Chairman Organizational Committee of the 4th Anti- 
Communist Convention, 22 February 1951, Record Group 16a, Box 4, Folder 7, MacArthur Archives, 
Norfolk.
78 Letter from William C. Kerr to Dr. John C. Smith, 11 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record 
Group 140, Box 18, Folder 17 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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previously in Japan to explain the democratic process. In addition, Protestant and Roman 
Catholic religious services were held by missionary chaplains (Rev. William Shaw and 
Father George M. Carroll). ROK government officials and businessmen were invited to 
explain ROK accomplishments under democracy. The full impact of the pilot program, 
however, remained unclear because the experiment was cut short when Chinese 
intervention forced the evacuation of Seoul. However, it did lay down the premise for a
7Qnew re-education program later on Koje Island.
As soon as the prisoners settled down on Koje Island, prison authorities began a 
comprehensive education program known as “CI&E” (Civilian Information and 
Education). The CI&E was responsible for political and educational programs, while the 
US Chaplain Corps was responsible for religious services. The new system was designed 
“to develop ... an understanding and appreciation of the political, social, and economic 
objectives of the United Nations and to assist [the prisoners] in various other ways so that 
they may become better citizens in their country.” 80 The CI&E section operated 
independently of the camp command in carrying out its assigned mission, communicating 
directly with the high command in Tokyo, instead. Religion played a major role in the 
programs of the CI&E. Not only was there a specifically stated religious component to 
the indoctrination program, but even the “political and educational” component was to be 
run by civilian missionaries. While Dr. Kerr “[supervised] the preparation of materials”
79 “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War,” 102-103.
80 Quoted in William C. Bradbury, ‘The Political Behavior of Korean and Chinese Prisoners of War in the 
Korean Conflict: A Historical Analysis,” Mass Behavior In Battle and Captivity: The Communist Soldier in 
the Korean War (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 219.
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for the CI&E program from Tokyo,81 Dr. Lutz ran the agricultural program in Korea.82
The program began on June 1 in Compound 63 with 7,500 prisoners and 
gradually extended to all compounds. Prisoners were invited to attend a minimum of 
four hours of orientation on a weekly basis. Although the orientation was not a religious 
service, “it [was],” according to Dr. Kerr, “closely allied to one, and immediately 
[impressed] one with its importance.”83 The goal of the program was to inculcate in the 
prisoners a more favorable attitude toward Western and democratic ways, and instill a 
distrust of Communist ideology. Some qualified teachers were hired from South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong, but most were selected from among POWs. They led 
discussions on six major topics: the background of the war, democracy and 
totalitarianism, the lives of people of the free world, Korea/China and the world, the 
reconstruction of Korea/China, and developing leadership and skills in group action.84
Roughly sixty to ninety percent of the prisoners (depending on the compound) 
chose to attend the orientation classes. The classes also provided other educational 
programs such as literacy and vocational training to prepare prisoners for life after 
internment (see Table 8.5). Various recreational activities were also introduced in the 
compounds. Among them, reading groups, literacy classes, and agricultural classes were 
the most popular. Compounds that had detained more Communists had the lowest 
attendance because the Communists were very resistant. No CI&E programs were 
conducted in compounds that were firmly controlled by the Communists. To reach them,
81 Letter from the General Headquarters Supreme Commander from the Allied Powers to Dr. John 
Coventry Smith, 23 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 17 -  
Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
82 Letter from William Kerr to John Smith, 17 May 1951, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group 140, 
Box 18, Folder 17 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
83 Letter from William Kerr to John Smith, 11 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 17 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
84 ‘The Handling o f Prisoners o f War During the Korean War,” 102.
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camp authorities depended on daily broadcasts of music programs, news reports, and 
announcements. In the end, the CI&E section had only a modest effect, mainly among 
non-Communists, the illiterate, and youths.
The impact of the CI&E programs was hard to measure, but it did generate some 
degree of anti-Communist sentiment among those POWs who were not party members. 
The Communist side accused some Chinese CI&E instructors of being spies for Chiang 
Kai-shek’s regime. According to the memoirs of the non-repatriates, Taiwanese teachers 
did encourage them to go to Taiwan, and assured them of support from Chiang Kai-shek. 
Some of them served as messengers between the Taiwanese government and Nationalist 
leaders in the POW camps.85 The United States initially had no plan to send prisoners to 
Taiwan, but because of the secret work of these Taiwanese teachers, the confidence and 
the cause of the pro-Chiang prisoners was strengthened.
In the Communist-controlled compounds, where the CI&E section was not 
effectively enacted, Communist leaders set up their own political indoctrination program. 
They emphasized the importance of loyalty to their fatherland. They organized singing 
and drama teams, and offered literacy classes to the illiterate. Those who knew foreign 
languages gave classes in Russian and English. Politically indoctrinated Communist 
agents were sent out by the “Underground Communist Party” to organize pro-Communist 
prisoners to challenge prison authorities and punish traitors. An ideological war was 
fought between the Communists and the anti-Communists to win the loyalty of the 
prisoners.
85 Min-jin Guo, Hanzhanyiwang: Yuxue Rensheng Huarenquan (Memoir of
the Korean War: Human Rights of the POWs in the Contest o f Bloody Survival) (Taiwan: Shangzhi 
Minhwa Shiyi Ltd., 2000), 160-162.
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(2) US Religious Indoctrination o f Prisoners
As early as August 1950, the Far Eastern Command in Tokyo began formally 
enlisting the help of missionaries. Rev. William Shaw and Rev. Harold Voelkel, both of 
whom had been in North Korea before World War II, were hired as liaison civilian 
chaplains and assigned to minister to Korean troops and prisoners of war. As soon as 
Rev. Shaw arrived at Pusan in late August, he was sent to a POW camp to inspect and 
interrogate 175 inmates with Swiss International Red Cross officials.86
Chaplain Voelkel was sent to Inch’on. When he met the inmates there, he 
discovered that “there [were] many Christians among them.” These Christian prisoners 
insisted that “they had been forced into bearing arms.”87 Chaplain Voelkel was popular 
among these inmates. His North Korean accent and religious preaching helped to pacify 
many prisoners who because of Communist propaganda feared torture or death at 
American hands. Voelkel preached to hundreds or sometimes thousands of prisoners. 
He usually began by asking some questions about North Korea to win their attention, and 
then went on to contrast Communism with the Gospel and urging them to turn to Christ
no
to be forgiven and saved. His message was one of comfort, but it was also one of anti­
communism, constantly “reminding them of the evil of godless Communism.”89 He 
found his listeners eager to participate and ready to accept. The officer in charge of the
86 Letter from Adeline H. Shaw, 4 September 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United Methodist Church Archives -  
GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
87 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel to Dr. Decker, 13 October 1950, Presbyterian Church Archive, 
Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
88 Chaplain Harold Voelkel’s letter #6, 21 October 1950, Documents o f  the WCC [World Council o f Church] 
Library: The Korean War, ed. Heung Soo Kim (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 138.
89 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 9 October 1950, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group 140, 
Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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prisoners at P’yongyang even specifically requested that Voelkel be transferred there.90 
Rev. Shaw continued to stay in Seoul and frequently visited the POWs in Inch’on prison.
In Pusan, one of the North Korean inmates was Pastor Im Han-sang, who was 
mistaken by American soldiers for a Communist fugitive and taken prisoner. Once UN 
authorities determined his real identity, he was not only re-classified as a Civilian 
Internee (Cl), but also offered a tent to use as a chapel for worship services and Bible 
studies within the Pusan POW camp. American officers nicknamed him “The Chaplain.” 
On December 25, 1950, even before the arrival of Voelkel at Pusan, Pastor Im’s 
Christmas service attracted 4,000 POW attendants, including many non-believers. US 
authorities and missionaries provided Pastor Im with Bibles, scripture portions, hymn 
books, and tracts. His ministry inside the POW camps grew continuously.91
The success stories of both Chaplain Voelkel and Pastor Im motivated UN 
authorities to implement an evangelical program in all their prison camps on Koje Island. 
From March 1951 to June 1952, Chaplain Voelkel took full responsibility for organizing 
religious activities in the K5je Island POW compounds. Chaplain Rev. John E. Talmage 
and Chaplain Rev. Bruce A. Cumming, who were missionaries in the Cholla provinces, 
were transferred to minister to the prisoners in Koje as well. At that time, there were 
only about three thousand Protestants and around a thousand Catholics among the 
147,000 Korean POWs. A church tent was set up in each Koje compound.93 The 
Protestants elected deacons and elders, held dawn prayer meetings, and engaged in
90 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 5 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group 
140, Box 18, Folder 15 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
91 Harold Voelkel, Behind Barbed Wire in Korea (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1953), 
11-13.
92 George Thompson Brown, Mission to Korea (USA: Board of World Missions, Presbyterian Church U.S., 
1962), 198.
93 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
479
personal evangelism. Chaplains were responsible for organizing mass meetings from 
compound to compound, and attendance was always voluntary. Usually hundreds, and 
on some occasions thousands, of POWs would come.
Since the prisoners responded to religious services enthusiastically, Chaplain 
Voelkel and Pastor Im saw the need to train new Christian leadership among these 
prisoners. They decided to organize Bible institutes in the various compounds in addition 
to weekly worship services and prayer gatherings. With limited resources, the first Bible 
academy began with thirty-eight prisoners, but by 1953 gradually expanded to reach 
3,883 prisoners per week in fifteen institutes. The daily schedule of these institutes 
consisted of four classes: the Bible, hymns, English, and calisthenics. The curriculum 
improved when more civilian Korean pastors and missionaries joined the staff of 
chaplains inside the POW camps. Among those who had participated in the program, a 
total of 642 expressed interest in going to seminary after their release.94 One of them was 
a Buddhist priest who converted to Christianity during his internment.95 These POWs 
later became part of a new generation of Christian pastors and prominent laymen in 
postwar South Korea.
In about a year, a total of 2,266 Korean POWs were baptized (see Tables 8.6 and 
8.7). More than 1,500 more became catechumens (people who finished their doctrinal 
instructional courses and waited to be baptized) and 11,000 were preparing for the 
catechumenate (see Table 8.7). Overall whole, nearly 20,000 Korean POWs regularly 
participated in religious services. Using private donations from the United States, Dr. 
Bob Pierce, the president of World Vision, Inc., supplied Chaplain Voelkel with a new
94 Voelkel, Behind Barbed Wire in Korea, 15-16.
95 Ibid., 25-27.
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jeep (costing about US$2,500) so that the chaplain could drive around to visit different 
prison compounds in Koje Island with his Korean assistants.96
The initial success of religious activities among North Korean POWs during the 
early stage of the Korean War encouraged US Commanders to introduce a similar 
religious program for the Chinese camps, in addition to the CI&E programs -  although, 
unlike the case of the North Koreans, there were actually very few Christians among the 
prisoners. The 8th Army requested Rev. Earle Woodberry and Father Thomas O’Sullivan 
to be chaplains for the Chinese POWs. Both had been missionaries to China for decades, 
and were completely fluent in Chinese.
American churches took special interest in the conversion of Chinese prisoners. 
When Rev. Woodberry accepted the position as chaplain for the Chinese POWs, the 
Presbyterian Board Secretary, Dr. John C. Smith, specifically requested that he inform 
them “about the experiences” and “the attitude of some of these Chinese” prisoners, 
because the American people had great interest in his ministry among Chinese POWs. 
The secretary promised Woodberry that his stories “[would] be given wide publicity” in 
the United States.97
In March 1951, Chaplain Woodberry began his work among prisoners in Pusan 
and then proceeded to Koje Island. He obtained invaluable help from two Korean pastors. 
One of them was Rev. Lee Tae-yong, a Korean ex-missionary to China. At first, the 
average attendance at their meetings was between 1,500 and 2,000. During the first 
month of their ministry, Woodberry reported that about six hundred Chinese soldiers 
came forward to “[receive] Christ as their Savior,” and among them, 75 were officers.
96 Ibid., 19.
97 Letter from John Smith to Chaplain Earle Woodberry, 18 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 197, Box 1, Folder 3 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Three months later, 493 more officers had joined the group of believers. The average 
worship attendance increased to six or seven thousand per gathering. At least six 
thousand of them expressed “a purpose to believe in Christ,” and some even wanted to be 
baptized.98 The growth was so rapid that Chaplain Woodberry and his staff had to “hold 
them back from recording their decisions in order to be sure they were genuine.”99
About a year later, in June 1952, the chaplain and his Korean staff held between 
eight and twelve worship services per month (2 to 3 on each Sunday in different 
compounds), and had an average attendance of more than 4,000 each.100 Even after the 
Chinese prison camps moved from Koje Island to Cheju Island, the number in attendance 
in the non-repatriated camp (#3) did not drop.101 Chaplain Woodberry and his fellow 
American officers were “astounded at the spontaneous outburst of Christian evangelism” 
among the prisoners, especially when they knew for sure that the services were conducted 
on a voluntary basis.102 The chaplain immediately saw the political value and
1 mpsychological effect of these conversion stories.
Communist prisoners frequently condemned the chaplains as spies of the US 
imperialists. Wu Chuen-sang, a Chinese Communist prisoner in Compound 86,
98 Letter from Rev. Earle Woodberry to “Dear Praying Friends,” undated, received on July 10, 1952, 
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 360, Folder Earle Woodberry -  Presbyterian Historical 
Society, Philadelphia.
99 “Six Months in the Chinese POW Camps” (Resume#l -  Abridged), Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 360, Folder Earle Woodberry -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
100 “Copies of EJW’s reports for April, May, and June, 1952,” received on November 19, 1952, 
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 17 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, 
Philadelphia.
101 Memo from Dr. Wysham to the Secretary Council, 29 June 1953, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 360, Folder: Earle J. Woodberry -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
102 Six Months in the Chinese POW Camps” (Resume#l -  Abridged), Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 360, Folder Earle Woodberry -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
103 Letter from Rev. Earle Woodberry to “Dear Praying Friends,” undated, received on July 10, 1952, 
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 360, Folder Earle Woodberry -  Presbyterian Historical 
Society, Philadelphia.
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described how the American authorities sent Chaplain Woodberry to weaken Communist 
control by empowering the pro-Nationalist elements in each compound:
This old fox [Woodberry] was very crafty. He was very alert when he came in and out of 
the prison compound. I remembered that when he first came to preach, there were only a 
few prisoners surrounding him. Some of them even spoke cold words against him. 
Nevertheless, he was neither upset nor discouraged, but continued to perform his drama 
of sincerity before the “Lord of Heaven.” As days went by, I was surprised that some 
people were converted into Christianity. ... “Chaplain” Woodberry came more and more 
often, and more and more people listened to him. The “principal” Qin Li-ren [a CI&E 
teacher] did not do any formal work, but was busy in establishing “Anti-Communist and 
Anti-Russian Alliances” among “converts.”... Meanwhile, a mysterious person, Zhou 
Yen-da, came to be the Police Chief of Compound 86... Soon after, people from the 
“Anti-Communist and Anti-Russian Alliance” completely controlled the police force of 
the compound. As a result, the CI&E School added “political lessons.” The Prison 
Police forced every person to attend the reactionary lessons.104 (Quotation originally in 
Chinese)
Of course, US authorities did not send Woodberry to take control of Compound 86, but 
religious services did boost the influence of anti-Communists there. The large number of 
conversions alarmed the Communists in the compound and caused them to fight back. In 
the eyes of the Communists, religious activities were a real threat. Therefore, they 
constantly sought to “ban chaplains from preaching in the compounds.”105
As the missionary chaplains continued to visit the camps, Communist prisoners 
vented their frustration and hatred of the missionaries and religion by attacking Christian 
prisoners. Many victims were faithful attendees at Voelkel’s services and Bible 
classes.106 In August, a deacon of a POW church congregation returning to his tent from 
a prayer meeting was stoned to death. His death stirred up more confrontations. 
Prisoners began taking sides and ganging up on each other. On September 17, in 
Compound 85, Communist prisoners staged a coup and took power by killing all the non-
104 Testimony by Wu Chuen-sang in Zhe-shi Zhang, ed., Meijuti Jizhongying Qinli Ji
(Personal Records in the American Prison Camps) (Beijing: Chinese Archives Press, 1996), 134-136.
105 This request was listed as one of the demands submitted by Communist prisoners in Pusan Enclosure 11. 
See ibid., 110.
106 Rodger R. Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace: The United States Army Chaplaincy 
1945-1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 5:94.
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Communist leadership. Seventeen non-Communists were brutally murdered.107 Among 
them, six were Christians, two of whom were also deacons in the prison congregation.108
In response to the incident, Christians in Compound 85 drew up a petition, and 
signed it in their own blood, proclaiming that they would rather die than return to North 
Korea. This petition was entrusted to Chaplain Voelkel and brought to the camp 
authorities (see pictures). Within days, Christians in every compound of North Korean 
POWs had written blood petitions, asking to be put to death rather than return to 
Communist control.109 These blood petitions, according to a newspaper report, 
“eventually became the mightiest propaganda weapon in the peace talks.”110 Christians 
became active leaders among the non-repatriated POWs, organizing anti-Communist 
protests against repatriation.111
(3) A Mixture o f Different Kinds of Prisoners
The POW controversy was further complicated by the existence of different kinds 
of prisoners in UN custody. Prisoners constituted a representative cross section of the 
Chinese and Koreans, Communist and non-Communist. Some groups were strongly 
against repatriation for personal reasons. The first group consisted of South Korean 
citizens and soldiers who were impressed into the North Korean Army. On October 12, 
1950, General Headquarters of Far Eastern Command in Tokyo sent a direction to the 8th 
Army, instructing it to prepare for the possible release of these prisoners. Headquarters 
wanted each prisoner to prepare a statement on his impressment in the North Korean
107 The exact number varied. Meyers and Bradbury recorded it as seventeen, but Chaplain Voelkel said it 
was sixteen. The actual number I believe should be seventeen because Meyers and Bradbury’s historical 
account should be more accurate than Voelkel’s data. See Meyers and Bradbury, ‘The Political Behavior 
of Korean and Chinese Prisoners of War in the Korean Conflict: A Historical Analysis,” 262.
108 Voelkel, Behind Barbed Wire in Korea, 28-29.
109 Ibid.
110 “Missionary Tells o f Red Brutality in War Camp,” The Post-Standard, 15 October 1953.
111 Voelkel, Behind Barbed Wire in Korea, 29.
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army. The 8th Army would investigate each case and verify the testimony of each South 
Korean prisoner.112 By mid 1951, about 37,000 South Korean civilians and 10,216 ex- 
ROK soldiers were in UN custody (see Table 8.9). UN authorities removed the name of 
the South Korean civilians from the list, and later released them to the South Korean 
government. 10,216 ex-ROK soldiers remained in UN custody until June 1953. 
Nevertheless, repatriation of these two kinds of prisoners eventually became less of an 
issue at the negotiating table, because in April 1952 the Communist side at P’anmunjom 
agreed to allow POWs of South Korean origins to stay in the south. The main 
controversy, therefore, was over North Korean and Chinese non-repatriates.
In the case of the Chinese, UN forces had 20,344 Chinese prisoners in custody in 
July 1953. 14,704, about 72 percent of the total number of Chinese prisoners, claimed 
that they did not want to be repatriated. The majority of these non-repatriates were ex- 
Nationalist soldiers who had surrendered to the Chinese Communists during the Chinese 
civil war. Most of them expressed their unwillingness to return to Communist China as 
soon as they were placed under UN custody.113 At first, they were interned together with 
North Korean prisoners. Despite their anti-Communism, they were mistreated by both 
Korean POWs and South Korean guards simply because they were Chinese. The Chinese 
prisoners therefore petitioned for a separate Chinese unit, and their request was granted. 
As the number of Chinese prisoners continued to increase in spring 1951, they were 
housed in two compounds on Koje Island, completely separate from the Korean inmates.
112 Outgoing message (confidential) from CINCFE to CG Army Eight Korea, 12 October 1950, Record 
Group 38, Folder: “Army 8 -  out, Oct 50,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk.
113 Meyers and Bradbury, “The Political Behavior of Korean and Chinese Prisoners of War in the Korean 
Conflict: A Historical Analysis,” 252-253.
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There were about 16,000 Chinese POWs at that time. An ex-Nationalist officer named 
Ching was the unofficial leader of the anti-Communist inmates.114
There were also non-Nationalist prisoners who refused repatriation. Some of 
them were even Chinese Communist Party members. They wanted to go to Taiwan not 
because they liked Chiang Kai-shek, but because they were horrified by human-wave 
tactics, and disillusioned over the dictatorship of the Chinese Communists.115 The 
element of fear was also at work. According to the Communist Party Code, a party 
member should fight the enemy unto death. Surrender was not an option, and thus 
anyone taken prisoner was guilty of treason. Therefore, some party members did not 
want to return for fear of punishment and out of distrust of the Communist 
government. 116 To address this problem, both the Chinese and North Korean 
governments declared an amnesty to guarantee that the prisoners would be pardoned for 
their violation of the party code, but the impact of this amnesty was marginal. Due partly 
to the general distrust of the Communist government, and partly to tight control by 
Nationalist leaders, the number of Chinese non-repatriate prisoners remained rather stable 
(compared Tables 8.4, 8.11, and 8.13a).
In the case of North Korean prisoners (excluding prisoners of South Korean 
origin), of 104,024 prisoners, 33,462 refused to be repatriated. This was about 32 percent 
of the total number of North Korean prisoners. There was no clear description of these 
non-repatriates. More than 10,000 of them were Christians, or newly converted 
Christians. Others were pro-Rhee rightists, but their loyalty to Rhee differed from that of
114 Ibid., 253-254.
115 Jian-guo Wang, Renhai Da Beiju (The Tragedy of Human-wave Tactics) (Hong Kong: 
Asian Press, 1955), 221.
116 Ibid., 210.
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the pro-Chiang Nationalists. Very few had a direct relationship with Rhee. According to 
Lt. Horace Underwood, who was sent by Admiral Joy to investigate the situation, during
117the initial screening, the number of North Korean non-repatriates was actually higher.
It decreased afterwards due to effective Communist infiltration and re-indoctrination. 
Although the final percentage of the North Korean non-repatriates was lower than among 
the Chinese, the actual number of non-repatriated North Koreans was more twice as high 
as the Chinese figure (see Table 8.4).
According to the testimony of Jeong Chun-seop, a prisoner in Compound 71, 
North Korean anti-Communist leaders did not use force to coerce prisoners to select 
repatriation because most of the North Korean Communists and anti-Communists were 
actually lived in separate compounds.118 His story was also supported by reports from 
the missionary chaplains.119 In the North Korean compounds, Communist prisoners were 
the ones who used excessive violence to resist screening or force prisoners to sign up for 
repatriation. Therefore, the decisions of these 33,462 North Korean non-repatriates had a 
more legitimate claim to represent the real defection of citizens from a Communist 
country to a non-Communist one.
The existence of different groups of prisoners in the POW camps revealed the 
complexity of the POW issue. A diverse set of prisoners from different backgrounds 
created the potential for conflict and trouble in each compound. Prisoners who desired 
repatriation were not necessarily Communists, but they usually collaborated with 
Communist leaders in their actions against the non-repatriates. When the Kaesong truce
117 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 176.
118 Interview with Jeong Chung-seop on 17 December 2005, College Park, Maryland.
119 “Missionary Tells o f Red Brutality in War Camp,” The Post-Standard, October 15, 1953.
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talks began, the confrontation between two opposing ideological groups further 
aggravated the situation.
(4) Power Struggle between Communists and Anti-Communists
A power struggle between Communists and anti-Communists began when the 
Communist side sent out trained agents to be captured so that they could organize the 
prisoners and stir up trouble in the camps. North Korean Communists were far better 
organized than Chinese Communists, because the North Koreans enjoyed an effective 
underground information network extending from P’yongyang to Koje Island. Orders 
were sent directly from the Korean Communist Party and carried by messengers to Koje.
Inside the prison camps, the North Korean Communist leader was Pak Sang- 
hyon.120 In order to wrest control of all prisoner compounds from the anti-Communists 
and strengthen the position of the Communist side at the negotiation table, Pak sent 
Communist agents to infiltrate each non-Communist controlled compound.121 Their 
mission was to exterminate all traitors [anti-Communists and those who collaborated with 
their captors], resist screening, and initiate confrontations to embarrass UN authorities. 
The goal was to discredit the idea of voluntary repatriation and reduce the number of 
non-repatriates. To prepare for riots and confrontations with prison camp authorities, the 
Communists took advantage of the CI&E program, turning some vocational training 
workshops into weapon-making centers. All kinds of lethal weapons -  hatchets, spears,
19"?knives and flails tipped with barbed wire -  were mass-produced.
120 Zhang, Meijun Zizhongying Qinliji, 56. See also Michael Hickey, The Korean War: The West Confronts 
Communism (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 1999), 354.
121 “Missionary Tells of Red Brutality in War Camp,” The Post-Standard, October 15, 1953.
122 Hickey, The Korean War, 348-349.
123 Ibid., 349.
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For example, in Compound 62, where 9,000 civilian internees were kept, a small
number of hardcore Communists overthrew anti-Communist control by beating or
murdering non-Communists, including many Christians.124 The anti-Communists were
caught by surprise. Within a short period of time, Communist agents controlled all the
key posts inside the compound, and subdued most of the core anti-Communists. A reign
of terror began and the power of Communists expanded. Since the inmates were mostly
civilians, the anti-Communist organization was weak and unable to repel the assault of
the hardcore Communists. With the help of Chaplain Voelkel, some Christians were able
to be transferred to “more congenial quarters.”125
Of course, the camp commander wanted to secure compound 62 and protect all
the non-Communists. Before daybreak on February 18, screening personnel and the 3rd
Battalion of the US 27th Infantry Regiment approached the compound under the cover of
darkness. The effort not only failed, however, but backfired, triggering a riot. In the end,
55 POWs were killed, 159 severely wounded, and 22 more died of their injuries later.
Camp authorities lost one soldier, with another seriously wounded, and 22 more suffered
minor injury.126 Despite all these losses, compound 62 remained in Communist hands.
Within days, the Communist side used this event to voice their complaints about the UN
prison management, and news of the incident was widely reported in the world’s left- 
127wing press.
124 ‘The Handling o f Prisoners of War During the Korean War,” 24. See also Hickey, The Korean War, 
349.
125 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 29 February 1952, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean 
War, 270. See also the letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel to Chaplain (Colonel) Ivan L. Bennett, 22 Sept 
1951, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 17 -  Presbyterian Historical 
Society, Philadelphia.
126 ‘The Handling o f Prisoners of War During the Korean War,” 62-63.
127 Hickey, The Korean War, 349.
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The Communists also took full control of the POW medical center in Pusan 
(Enclosure 11). The infiltration was possible because the American staff depended 
heavily on the service of North Korean prisoners.128 Anti-Communist patients were 
murdered in the wards by Communist agents at night when the American staff was gone. 
Since some Chinese had anti-Communist slogans tattooed on their bodies, they were the 
most vulnerable. When news of mass murders reached the ears of the pro-Nationalists, 
no one was willing to use the hospital.129 From then on, Enclosure 11 became the 
meeting place for all Communist agents. Communist leaders pretended to be sick in 
order to go to Pusan, where they received directions from Pak’s agents.130 When the 
second screening was carried out in April 1952, Communists in the medical center 
forcefully prevented all patients from being re-screened. As a result, many sick patients 
died. Because of Pak’s efforts, many North Koreans were forced to accept repatriation 
out of terror.131
In the case of the Chinese, the pro-Nationalist Chinese were influential because 
most of them had surrendered earlier and established good relationships with prison 
authorities. As a result, they took over leadership positions inside the prisoner camps. 
They also cultivated friendships with Chaplain Woodberry and gained his trust and 
support. Compound 72 in Koje Island was under the complete domination of these anti- 
Communists. Nationalist leaders, such as Li Da-an, used their positions in the camp to 
organize other anti-Communist prisoners and build up their political support.132 Very
128 Zhang, Meijun Jizhongying Qinliji, 86-96.
129 Wang, Renhai Da Beiju, 224.
130 Zhang, Meijun Jizongying Qinliji, 54 and 62.
131 Stanley Weintraub, The War in the Wards: Korea’s Unknown Battle in a Prisoner-of-War Hospital 
Camp (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964), 28-38.
132 Zhang, Meijun Jizhongying Qinliji, 136.
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often, the Nationalists treated hardcore Communist party members very harshly once they 
discovered their true identity and intentions.
As soon as news of the truce talks reached the ears of the pro-Nationalists on July 
28, 1951, they immediately stepped up their campaign against repatriation. Many 
prisoners in Compound 72 sent blood petitions to prison authorities, because they feared 
that the Americans would treat them as they had the non-repatriated Russians for the sake 
of recovering their own prisoners in Communist hands. The tattoo campaign began in the 
hope of gaining public sympathy. In some cases, ex-Nationalist officers forced prisoners 
who had wanted repatriation to change their minds and to tattoo anti-Communist slogans 
on their bodies. They believed that the larger the number of non-repatriates, the stronger 
their bargaining position would be.
According to an investigation conducted by US personnel, Lts. Wu and May, 
interpreters in the UN Negotiation Team whom Admiral Joy sent to observe the initial 
screening of Chinese POWs, pro-Nationalist Chinese used violence against those who 
wanted to be repatriated. They believed that if prisoners were left alone, the percentage 
of those who would choose repatriation would increase from 15 to 85 percent.133 Their 
observation was also supported by other reports from State Department officials.134 This 
was the basic reason why Admiral Joy insisted on re-screening the prisoners when the 
Communist side, especially the Chinese Communists, challenged the accuracy of the 
number of non-repatriates. Actually, the smaller the number, the better this would have 
been for both sides.
133 Allan E. Goodman, ed., Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary o f  Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean 
Armistice Conference (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 355.
134 Foot, A Substitute fo r  Victory, 113.
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However, the POW Camp Commander, General Francis T. Dodd, argued that the 
result of the first screening was accurate within 10 percent.135 Lt. Aoa Meisling, one of 
the senior linguists handling the screening of Chinese POWs, estimated that the pro- 
Nationalists suppressed about 2,000 Chinese prisoners, preventing them from freely 
expressing their true will on repatriation. This was about 10 percent of the total number 
of prisoners.136
Chinese Communists fought back by spreading rumors about the war and
threatening that anyone who sided with the traitors would be punished, and their family
would suffer too.137 They also formed underground Communist organizations to carry
out their political indoctrination programs. Those who wanted to go home had to find
ways not only to survive the pro-Nationalist control, but also to prove their loyalty to the
Chinese Communist Party. Their only hope was to cause serious trouble in the POW
camps to embarrass UN authorities. Their first strategy was to stir up riots and bloody
confrontations between the prisoners and their UN guards.
The most serious effort was a collaborative effort by both Chinese and North
Korean Communists to plot the abduction of General Dodd in May 1952. Dodd was held
hostage by the prisoners for four days. The Communist side scored a major victory when
both General Dodd and General Charles F. Colson, Dodd’s successor, agreed to sign
statements conceding that UN authorities had mistreated the prisoners and that they
1 '18would stop the process of screening prisoners, allowing all prisoners to return home.
135 Goodman, Negotiating While Fighting, 356.
136 Telegram from Muccio (Pusan) to Secretary of State, 12 May 1952, 695A.0024/7-1951 -  5-2825, 
Problem of POW’s related international issue, 1951-1952/Acheson, Dean/ US Dept o f State, Records of the 
U.S. Department o f State relating to Korea: international political relations, 1950-1954, National Archives.
137 Wang, Renhai Da Beiju, 223.
138 Hickey, The Korean War, 350-352.
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In order to halt the spread of violence and assume control over all the prison
camps, UN authorities appointed Brigade General Haydon L. Boatner to take over the
command of Koje Island. General Boatner had lived in China for years and spoke fluent
Chinese. He tackled the situation by subdividing the overcrowded compounds
(Operation BREAKUP) and bringing in other UN troops to guard the Communists.
While most of the Korean repatriates remained in Koje Island, Boatner moved all the
Chinese prisoners from Koje Island to Cheju Island and separated the repatriates from
non-repatriates. In this way, the violence between the Nationalists and the Communists
ceased and UN authorities regained control over most of the Communist compounds.
(5) President Truman’s Firm Commitment to Voluntary Repatriation
When the POW issue was first discussed among policy-makers in Washington,
the Pentagon and the State Department disliked the idea of voluntary repatriation because
the military feared that the Communists would use it to prevent US soldiers from coming
home. In other words, US interests would be better served if the government could bring
1back all its soldiers as soon as possible. The president, however, had strong personal 
opinions on the subject.140 The experience of the Russian soldiers in 1945, who violently 
refused repatriation, had a deep impact on Truman and convinced him that it was morally 
wrong to send back prisoners who wanted freedom instead of slavery.141 When Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson learned of the president’s position, he changed his stance and 
supported voluntary repatriation for humanitarian reasons.142
139 Acheson, The Korean War, 130-131. See also Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory, 88.
140 Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers o f  Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & 
Row, Publishers, 1980), 250-251. See also Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Vol.2 Years o f  
Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), 460.
141 Ibid. See also Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory, 89.
142 Acheson, The Korean War, 131. See also Foot, A Substitute fo r  Victory, 89.
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Meanwhile, the army’s chief of psychological warfare, General Robert McClure, 
offered a strong political argument to support voluntary repatriation, pointing out that 
voluntary repatriation would have positive effects upon future U.S. psychological warfare 
operations and give a boost to its Asian policies.143 McClure’s analysis appealed to many 
policymakers in Washington. In January 1952, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), and the State Department all agreed to stand fast in support of voluntary 
repatriation even though it might lead the Communists to break off armistice talks, and 
prolong the war.144
On May 7, the same day when General Dodd was abducted by Communist 
prisoners, President Truman gave a stem speech on the POW issue:
... [T]here shall not be a forced repatriation of prisoners of war -  as the Communists 
have insisted. To agree to forced repatriation would be unthinkable. It would be 
repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian principles which underlie our 
action in Korea. To return these prisoners of war in our hands by force would result in 
misery and bloodshed to the eternal dishonor of the United States and of the United 
Nations. We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or 
slavery.145
Truman’s position was supported by General Ridgway, Admiral Joy, and Secretary 
Acheson, showing the Communist side that the US government was united in its position 
on voluntary repatriation.146 Truman’s firm stance left little room for compromise. The 
United States was willing to continue fighting and suffering losses if the Communists 
refused to accept voluntary repatriation.
143 Foot, A Substitute fo r  Victory, 87.
144 Ibid., 91.
145 Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Vol.2 Years o f  Trial and Hope, 461.
146 Grace B. Ruckh’s reply to Mrs. Howard R. Pyfy’s letter to Secretary Acheson, 5 June 1952, 
695A.0024/7-1951 -  5-2825, Problem of POW’s related international issue, 1951-1952/Acheson, Dean/ US 
Dept of State, Record of the U.S. Department of State relating to Korea: International political relations, 
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Public Support for Voluntary Repatriation
President Truman’s decision also reflected public opinion at that time. Although 
the war in Korea was no longer popular and many people regarded the American 
involvement as a mistake,147 the general sentiment was that the United States should not 
withdraw without securing at least a symbolic victory. Public discourse over voluntary 
repatriation intensified from early 1952, when the truce talks boiled down to discussions 
over the POWs. There was a general fear that the United States might yield on the 
voluntary repatriation issue for the sake of an armistice. Many letters and telegrams from 
refugee groups, private relief agencies, and religious organizations that supported 
voluntary repatriation arrived at the State Department and the White House. The China 
Lobby and the Korea Lobby (a small group of Americans who were pro-Syngman-Rhee 
due to religious, military, or political interests) also strengthened their pressure in 
Washington. Both Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee’s publicity men in Washington 
lobbied the U.S. government to take a firm stance on the POW issue. Because of the 
religious factor, their appeals for the principle of voluntary repatriation made a stronger 
case.
Through the National Council of Churches (NCCC), the three Presbyterian boards 
in the United States, the Methodist Board, Billy Graham Evangelical Association, and 
Rev. Robert Pierce’s World Vision, the missionaries’ ministry among POWs and the 
mass conversions within the camps became well-known to American churchgoers. Both 
religious and secular journals also reported the success of the POW ministry. The report 
of Voelkel’s work among POWs appeared in The United Presbyterian on December 17, 
1951. Local newspapers across the United States, such as The Fredericksburg News,
147 The Gallup Poll, 2 April 1952,1053.
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Herald-Press and Panama City News Herald, also reported on how missionaries
converted Communist POWs.148 On January 18, 1952, the New York Times ran a story
on POW conversions. When Woodberry’s wife visited the United States in February
1953, she was invited by churches to speak on her husband’s work among Chinese
Communist prisoners in Korea.149
It did not matter greatly to the American people exactly how many were
converted or whether or not they were religiously sincere. For many, the point was not
necessarily even Christian -  it was the implication of this phenomenon. Droves of people
who had lived under Communist influence and even fought under its banner were
choosing the side of Christianity and the United States. This gave Americans a sense of
righteousness and provided a boost to the moral case for US intervention. Dr. Eugene
Carson Blake from the NCCC explained the arguments for voluntary repatriation:
These men who became Christians know that if  they are returned or exchanged to North 
Korea, they will be men marked for death, because there are Communist informers in 
every POW Compound. (Ever since the truce talks began last August, commanders have 
been receiving petitions -  written in blood -  from North Korean and Chinese Christians 
pleading not to be sent back to Communist terror.) The most tremendous vote of 
confidence ever given by an Asiatic people to western democracy and Christianity is 
being given daily by these men, many of whom, impressed into the Communist army, 
allowed themselves to be captured at the first opportunity. The barbed-wire prayer 
meeting proves one thing more. Communism hasn’t got a chance when faced with a vital, 
virile, trained Christian faith. Six months ago Communist leaders were beating up 
Christians and democrats in the compounds. Scores were killed. Now, after the 
Communist ringleaders have been segregated, there is freedom of religion in every one of 
the compounds and the Christian Church is active in every one. Here is one place, the 
last you might have expected it, where Communism is on the run.150
Based on Dr. Blake’s line of reasoning, if the people behind the Iron Curtain were given 
religious freedom, they would no longer support Communism. Communism had
148 “Korean POWs Hold Service,” The Fredericksburg News (November 8, 1951), “Some Are Converted: 
Missionaries Working With Red Prisoners and Internees,” Panama City News-Herald, 8 Jan 1952); and 
“Missionaries Convert POW’s: Christians Find Large Field For Work Among Reds,” The Herald-Press, 8 
Jan 1952).
149 “Missionary Address Trinity Unit,” The Lima News, 10 February 1953; and “Presbyterian Aid Society 
Has Program,” The Lima News, 13 February 1953.
150 Eugene Carson Blake, “Barbed-wire Prayer Meetings,” Presbyterian Life, 2 February 1952, 27.
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revealed its vulnerability. Religion proved an effective weapon to break the Communist 
chains on human minds. It also proved that the Communists were wise to seek the 
eradication of Christianity because it was, among all religions, the greatest threat to their 
ideology and power. Religion was critical to the ideological battle of the Cold War. 
Given that President Truman cherished religious freedom and had in mind forming a 
Western religious alliance to combat Communism, it was logical for the President to 
support the principle of voluntary repatriation, even if this delayed the armistice 
negotiations.
Religious factors also greatly increased America’s moral obligation to the POWs. 
Initially, most prisoners (except for the pro-Nationalist Chinese and the Christians) would 
have faced no known persecution in going back home, if the United States had not 
initiated any religious or educational programs for them. But the US authorities not only 
designed educational programs to influence their political views, but also allowed 
missionaries to convert these POWs to the Christian faith (which was actually more 
successful than the educational programs). Once prisoners were exposed to Western 
ideas and converted to Christianity, Communist authorities would treat them with 
contempt. Lacking religious freedom in North Korea and China, Christians would face 
almost certain religious persecution or even death -  and their blood would be on 
America’s hands for giving them hope and then taking it away. It would, therefore, be 
unethical for the United States government to “buy an armistice by turning over human 
beings for slaughter or slavery,” to borrow President Truman’s words. The sheer number 
of these North Korean and Chinese non-repatriates (see Table 8.9) was too large for the 
US government to overlook.
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Truman’s administration in fact explored the political value of religion in the 
POW controversy. In a telegram he sent to the US Ambassador in Pusan, Secretary 
Acheson reflected upon Dr. Blake’s opinion, and instructed the US embassy to 
“corroborate and furnish [the State Department] enough [information] material for [a] 
pamphlet.” 151 The administration took the religious interpretation of the POW issue 
seriously. Both the White House and State Department received many letters from relief 
organizations, political refugees’ associations, religious groups, and individuals urging 
them not to compromise on this principle. Motivated by strong public support within the 
United States and major political gains on the issue, the administration was fully 
committed to voluntary repatriation.
According to a top-secret memo prepared by the State Department just prior to 
President Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953, the free world’s opinion on 
voluntary repatriation was “probably at its maximum point of unity on the question.” 
Truman’s administration sought support from the new administration “to obtain Allied 
agreement to, and carry out a unilateral release of non-repatriates.” 152 However, 
President-elect Eisenhower refused to act upon Acheson’s suggestion because he did not 
want to associate himself with Truman’s policy. The plan for a unilateral release of all 
Chinese and North Korean non-repatriates before the conclusion of the truce was 
therefore dropped, and the fate of these POWs and the prospects for peace rested on the
151 Telegram from Acheson (Department of State) to US Embassy in Pusan, 7 April 1952, 695A.0024/7- 
1951 -  5-2825, Problem of POW’s related international issue, 1951-1952/Acheson, Dean/ US Dept of State, 
Records of the U.S. Department o f State relating to Korea: International political relations, 1950-1954, 
National Archives.
152 Memo on Disposition of Anti-Communist POWs (Top-Secret Security Information, 695A.0024/10-2952 
-  12-2952] “International Political Relations, 1950-1954/Acheson, Dean/  US Dept of State, Records of the 
US Dept of State relating to Korea: International political relations, 1950-1954, National Archives.
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shoulders of the new administration. Eisenhower had to create new initiatives to bring 
the war to a quick end.
THE FINAL CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE
As Eisenhower entered the White House in January 1953, the war had drained US 
resources, overtaxed its economy, and over-extended its military capabilities. But it was 
not easy to bring the war to a close conclusively. For four months there was little 
progress, but Eisenhower and his outspoken secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, used 
patience and diplomatic skill to end the war by July 1953. Under the new administration, 
religious groups had an even more active role in foreign affairs.
Dulles’ New Foreign Policy Approach 
Truman’s commitment to the idea of limited warfare and his unwillingness to use 
the atomic bomb in Korea had caused serious handicaps in the conduct of foreign affairs. 
In Dulles’ eyes, US policy in Korea had become too timid and predictable by the enemy, 
ineffective, and lacking initiative to deal with the Communist bloc. The leverage of 
atomic weapons had been lost since the United States had taken them off the table. 
Therefore, during the presidential election, Dulles had advocated a “New Look” in US 
foreign policy, emphasizing “Massive Retaliation” and the use of “brinkmanship” and the 
“madman theory” so that the United States could have wider policy options in Korea. As 
Secretary of State, Dulles would make bold speeches to spread fear and uncertainty in the 
Communist world regarding US nuclear plans. The administration even claimed to 
regard atomic bombs much as it did conventional weapons, as a viable option in war.153
153 Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Wilmington, DE: A Scholarly Resources, 1999), 69.
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If Truman and Acheson had tried such an aggressive approach, there would have 
been an outcry from the Protestant churches. While Secretary Dulles was not above 
criticism from his political enemies, he definitely had more maneuvering room than his 
Democratic predecessors. Coming from a liberal Presbyterian background, and having 
worked for many years with the Federal Council of Churches (FCCC) through chairing 
the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace since 1941, Dulles 
enjoyed close ties with many Protestant leaders. Although he had resigned from his 
NCCC position when he became secretary of state, Dulles told Dr. Walter W. Van Kirk, 
Secretary of the Department of International Justice and Goodwill (an NCCC committee), 
“You may rest assured that the views of the National Council of the Churches of Christ 
will continue to receive my most earnest consideration.” 154 In return, the NCCC 
courteously refrained from openly criticizing Dulles’ foreign policy approach.
The Influence o f Religious Leaders upon the Eisenhower Administration
The NCCC was particularly concerned that the new Eisenhower administration 
might compromise on the POW issue out of political expediency. As soon as Eisenhower 
was elected, the NCCC met with Dulles and submitted a memo on Korea to the 
President-elect, emphasizing the importance of Christianity in Korean life, the suffering 
of the Korean churches, the evangelical work among POWs and refugees, and the 
irrepressible conflict between Communism and Christianity in Korean society.155 The 
NCCC requested that the President-elect meet with Christian leaders during his upcoming
154 Letter from John Foster Dulles to Dr. Walter W. Van Kirk, 30 April 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, 
Box 77, Folder: Van Kirk, Walter W -  Seeley Mudd Library.
155 Memorandum Regarding Christians in Korea, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 62, Folder: National 
Council of the Churches o f Christ in America -  Seeley Mudd Library
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
500
visit to Korea in late 1952.156 Following their advice, Dulles recommended two Catholic 
and two Protestant missionaries to meet with Eisenhower. Although there is no evidence 
to indicate that the meeting took place during Eisenhower’s three-day visit, at the very 
least an effort was made.157
Anti-American Sentiment Caused by Pang Wang-iPs Tragic Death 
On December 5, 1952, the same day that Eisenhower finished his visit and 
returned to the United States, an incident occurred that would produce widespread anti- 
American sentiment in South Korea. The Assistant General Secretary of the Korean 
National Council of Christ (KNCC), Rev. Pang Wang-il, was brutally beaten to death by 
several American soldiers. Pang was originally a Presbyterian pastor from North Korea. 
He was regarded as a hero among the refugee Christians because he had “survived two 
and a half years of Japanese imprisonment and torture for refusing to bow to the Shinto 
shrines during World War II.” His wife had been left mentally ill after being tortured 
by both the Japanese and Korean Communists prior their escape to the South. During the 
Korean War, Rev. Pang led a refugee church in Pusan.159 He spoke English fluently and 
was well known by the missionaries and US chaplains. Shortly before his death, he had 
received a scholarship to study in the United States.
On the evening of December 5, Pang went to visit his brother in Pyong Taek, a 
small town located north of Taejon and south of Seoul. While Pang was waiting for his 
brother to come home, he fell asleep. He was wakened by a loud noise outside of the
156 Letter from Rowland M. Cross to JFD, 18 November 1952, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 62, Folder: 
National Council o f Churches of Christ in America -  Seeley Mudd Library.
157 No newspaper, not even religious journals, mentioned any meetings between Eisenhower and the 
Christian groups in Korea. It is quite clear that although it was planned, the planned meeting never took 
place.
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February 1953, 39.
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house, and found that his sister-in-law was being assaulted by four apparently drunken 
American soldiers, according to eyewitness accounts. The soldiers seized Pang, ignoring 
his protests in English that he was a Presbyterian pastor. Lt. James D. Goff, the leader of 
the gang, beat Pang with his pistol until Pang was unconscious. They then took Pang to a 
military post, where he was charged as a thief that they had caught in the streets. Pang’s 
sister-in-law found an Army chaplain who was able to identify Pang, however, and have 
him flown by helicopter to a hospital ship in In’chon Harbor on December 6. Pang died 
four days later.160
The death of Rev. Pang was a critical moment in Korean-American relations 
during the Korean War. American atrocities were generally overlooked by the ROK 
government and the media, but Pang’s death prompted an outcry, not only because of 
who Pang was, but also because of how his attackers were treated. On the day after the 
assault, instead of being taken into custody, the commander of the army post placed Lt. 
Goff in charge of all Korean laborers. Many Koreans and missionaries interpreted the 
commander’s action as an assertion of his authority without any regard for Korean 
sensibilities.161 While other incidents could be forgiven as the result of either the 
inexperience of the American soldiers involved or communication difficulties with 
civilians, Pang’s case blatantly revealed the poor discipline of US troops and the 
command structure’s indifference towards investigating crimes committed by its soldiers.
Even after Pang died from his injuries, the military police took no action against 
the suspects until the incident was reported, in January 1953, by Donald E. Hoke, chief 
editor of Christian Life. His article caught the attention of the American public and put
160 “Memorandum on the Reverend Pang Wha-il Case,” 18 March 1953, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 197, Box 1, Folder 4 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
161 Ibid.
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pressure on the military to take action. A court martial was held almost two months after 
the incident. Lt. Goff was found “not guilty of murder, but guilty of aggravated assault in
t AOwhich grievous bodily harm was intentionally inflicted.” In the end, he was 
“sentenced to be dismissed from the Service, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and to 
be confined at hard labor for two years.”163
The relative lightness of the sentence disappointed many Koreans and led them to 
think that “a Korean’s life is worth two years of an American’s freedom.”164 Although 
individual soldiers and officers collected relief money for Pang’s family, no official 
concern was shown for Pang’s psychologically-impaired widow and four young 
children.165 Although the incident had little effect on the relationship between the two 
governments, extensive anti-American sentiment was reported by the missionaries.
In response, American churches launched a nationwide special relief effort for 
Pang’s family. The yearly “One Great Time of Sharing” church-sponsored, 
humanitarian-relief fundraising campaign included money for the Pang family. Private 
donations were also sent by sympathetic individuals and organizations across the country 
to the Presbyterian Church and the Presbyterian Korea Mission Station in the field. The 
NCCC also took up the case and petitioned the Eisenhower administration to compensate 
the family for death of Pang. The petition letter emphasized that this incident had caused 
so much distrust among the Korean people that it merited the President’s attention either 
to initiate new legal procedures to satisfy the claims, or else to take administrative action
162 Letter from Colonel George Patrick Welch, Chief Public Information Division of the Department of the 
Army to Dr. Earl F. Adams, 16 February 1953, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 197, Box 4, 
Folder 19 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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to assist the family. Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) took an interest in the case and 
introduced a bill to reimburse Pang’s family.166 The President signed the bill in October 
1954, awarding $10,000 (US) to the family.167
The Pang case sheds light on the influence of religious institutions and 
publications on US public opinion and government actions. Missionaries and religious 
leaders were sensitive to Korean opinion and sentiment. Throughout the Korean War the 
missionaries served not only as liaisons between the US military and Korean civilians, 
but also as self-appointed goodwill ambassadors between the US government and the 
Korean people. The impact of their efforts was seen in both Korea and America. They 
helped the American people to care about Korean suffering, and they helped the Korean 
people to support the American military presence. Religious groups showed an ability to 
arouse public interest and to even shape US policy in Korea. The most historically 
significant use of that ability would be seen when the truce talks derailed over the issue of 
voluntary repatriation.
Billy Graham’s Visit to Korea
The Rev. Billy Graham, a popular evangelist, also took a trip to Korea in 
December 1952, shortly after Eisenhower had returned from the Far East. He was a 
personal friend of the newly-elected president. General Mark W. Clark in Tokyo 
welcomed Graham and his companions (Rev. Grady Wilson, Rev. Bob Pierce, and Ray 
Provost, a Presbyterian missionary to Korea who served as the professional photographer 
for the journey team). Clark gave Graham the rank of field general so that he could have
166 Letter from John C. Smith to Rev. E. Otto DeCamp, 26 March 1953, Presbyterian Church Archives, 
Record Group 197, Box 4, Folder 19 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
167 Letter from Wallace C. Merwin to J. Calvitt Clarke o f Christian Children’s Fund, Inc., 18 October 1954, 
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full access to all military facilities and the frontline. He arrived in Pusan four days after 
Rev. Pang’s death. During his three weeks in Korea, Graham met with many 
missionaries; political leaders, including President Syngman Rhee; Korean church leaders; 
and field generals. He also spoke to soldiers, visited POW camps, and attended the 
funeral of Rev. Pang.
Rev. Billy Graham’s trip was heavily reported in the United States, and he 
recorded two special Hour o f Decision radio shows from Korea with testimonies from 
American soldiers and Korean pastors. His journey diary, I  Saw Your Sons At War, was 
published by the Billy Graham Evangelical Association in 1953 and widely circulated in 
the United States. When Graham returned to the United States three weeks later, he 
presented to President Eisenhower one of the North Korean Christians’ blood-signed 
petitions that he had been given.168 The President ordered the petition book to be 
preserved, and wrote back to Graham, “I am enormously touched by the book which you 
brought me containing the names and finger prints of the prisoners of war in some of the 
camps in South Korea. For me, as I am sure you know, it has a very special meaning.”169 
Religious groups were encouraged to see that the Eisenhower administration had 
no intention of yielding on the POW issue. Dulles was firmly committed to voluntary 
repatriation because it might encourage defections, thus making Soviet leaders more 
cautious in initiating military operations outside Russia.170 When Representative Walter 
Judd, a major leader of the “China Bloc” in the House of Representatives, a group of pro- 
Chiang Kai-shek Congressmen, asked the President for his opinion on voluntary
168 Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace, 95.
169 Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Billy Graham, 3 November 1953, Billy Graham Files, Box 996, 
Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-1961, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
170 Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory, 161.
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repatriation, Eisenhower told him, “Walter, this is one you don’t need to worry about. I 
had the job of putting thousands of anti-Communists in Eastern Europe, including 
refugees from Russia who had fled to escape it, in box cars like cattle and sending them 
back to Soviet concentration camps or slaughter. You’ll never find me yielding on this 
one.”171 In his message to Congress in February 1953, Eisenhower declared, “We shall 
never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people in order to purchase fancied gain for 
ourselves.”172 Eisenhower’s plan was not to yield, but to pressure the Communists to 
concede.
In February 1953, the administration seriously considered using atomic weapons 
against Communist positions in Korea. Since Manchuria and the Kaesong sanctuaries 
provided cover from UN bombings, atomic weapons were examined as a way to bring the 
enemies out of hiding at once, and break the deadlock by destroying their war-making 
capacity.173 In order to put more pressure on the Communist side, Dulles informed 
Beijing, through India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi and other foreign 
intermediaries, that the United States would extend the war to mainland China and use 
atomic weapons if the armistice negotiations collapsed.174
Eisenhower’s nuclear preparations coincided with the death of Stalin in March 
1953. The new leadership in Moscow favored an armistice in Korea. Beijing also 
needed to re-deploy its resources for national reconstruction and was eager to make 
peace.175 The Communist side showed their change of attitude by accepting a UN
171 Quote in Oral History Interview with Walter Judd #1, by Paul Hopper on 29 August 1968, Columbia 
University Oral History Project (Oral History Research Office, Bulter Library, Columbia University, New  
York, NY 10027).
172 A report on Eisenhower, Austin Daily Herald, 11 February 1953.
173 Immerman, John Foster Dulles, 69.
174 Immerman, John Foster Dulles, 70-71.
175 Stueck, The Korean War: An International History, 325-330.
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proposal for the exchange of sick and wounded POWs in April. Shortly after Dulles 
delivered his warning, the Communist side agreed to the principle of non-forceful 
repatriation (a toned-down version of voluntary repatriation). The United States agreed 
to transfer the non-repatriates to the custody of neutral nations in the DMZ.
The Objection from South Korea
With a possible armistice in sight, South Korean president Syngman Rhee 
dropped a bombshell on the negotiating table by unilaterally releasing all North Korean 
non-repatriates on June 18. This operation was executed by Rhee’s loyal Christian 
General Won Yong-d6k, the commander of the Military Police Command, which was 
established under the direct order of Rhee in early 1953. General Won’s troops seized 
the camp guards on June 18. At the predetermined hour, they cut the barbed wire and 
extinguished the camps’ lights so that the prisoners could escape under cover of 
darkness.176 In the end, about 27,451 North Korean prisoners escaped (see Table 8.10), 
and the UN troops could only catch about one thousand of them.
Rhee’s action also signaled that he would withdraw ROK forces from the UNC if 
the United States continued to ignore his views. Certainly, this action was Syngman 
Rhee’s attempt to sabotage the truce, but it was more a failure of US diplomacy. Since 
the beginning of the truce talks, the ROK government had been excluded from the 
negotiations. A superpower sought to dictate the fate of a weaker nation. Many 
Americans might have viewed Rhee as their most ungrateful client in East Asia, but, 
objectively speaking, if the armistice had been concluded at that point, it would have left 
the South Korean government with no security guarantees should the Communists 
reinvade after UN forces left the peninsula. Many South Koreans viewed the outbreak of
176 Sun Yup Paik, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1992), 229-230.
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the Korean War as the avoidable consequence of the US’s noncommittal stance on the 
defense of South Korea. Therefore, as the president of South Korea, Rhee was compelled 
to protect the interests of his country. His decision to release the prisoners actually 
earned him great praise from his people. His popularity rose to “intoxicating heights,” in 
the words of Dean Acheson.177
From a position of weakness, Rhee showed himself to be a skillful practitioner of 
the “madman theory.” An act of such rashness was almost an attempt at committing 
national suicide -  angering his superpower protector and threatening to withdraw his own 
troops from the alliance defending his country. Nonetheless, Rhee’s gamble was well- 
calculated; he put the United States into such a position that it had to choose between a 
complete withdrawal or a full commitment to the security of South Korea.178
Most South Koreans sided with Rhee. According to Marion L. Conrow, a 
Methodist missionary in Ewha University, the whole country felt the same way: that “the 
truce was a mistake,” that it was not to the advantage of the Korean people, and that they
170were being treated unfairly by the United States. Lt. Horace G. Underwood at 
P’anmunjom also recognized the unpopularity of the US policy among the South 
Koreans.180 Korean Christians were mostly against the truce, even though they were 
usually divided among themselves on other religious issues. On June 15, three days 
before the mass escape, Korean Christian leaders released a statement protesting the
177 Acheson, The Korean War, 150.
178 Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, Master o f  Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance 
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armistice. They were against “any attempt at compromise” with the Communist side, 
appealed to the US to “[make] provision against another aggression,” and asked for 
support from churches all over the world.181 Together with other residents in South 
Korea, Christian families, churches, and refugees were mobilized to assist and house 
these runaway prisoners. General Won’s operation was a remarkable success.
President Eisenhower was so upset at Rhee’s action that he threatened to 
withdraw US troops from South Korea and remove Rhee from power. A military coup 
against President Rhee, known as Operation EVERYDAY, was seriously considered by 
the US government. Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles and his advisers in the National 
Security Council were able to convince the President to change his mind and push 
forward with an armistice to justify U.S. sacrifices and safeguard America’s political 
position in East Asia.182 A three-track campaign to win Rhee over began immediately. 
The President sent a private letter with some strong words to Rhee, threatening to 
withdraw US troops from Korea. The administration mobilized Rhee’s friends in the 
United States, such as Senator William Knowland and General James Alward Van Fleet, 
to persuade the old man to make concessions. Secretary Dulles dispatched Walter S. 
Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to negotiate with Rhee.
Since Rhee had long played his religious card to mobilize Christian opinion to 
support him, Secretary Dulles also thought to use international religious opinion to quash 
Rhee’s attempt. He first planned to ask a missionary, Rev. Archibald Campbell, to speak 
with Rhee. But when Dulles’s friend, Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, Director of the
181 A Statement o f Korea Christians to Dr. Frederick Nolde, 15 June 1953, Documents o f  the WCC Library: 
The Korean War, 346-347.
182 Edward C. Keefer, “President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War,” Diplomatic 
History 10 (Summer 1986): 285-286.
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Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), a sub-organization of the 
World Council of Churches (WCC), volunteered to bring word to Rhee during his visit to 
Korea, Dulles gladly accepted.183 Although Dr. Nolde’s mission from Dulles was secret, 
many observers speculated that he was sent as a special envoy.
Dr. Nolde met with Rhee on July 3. His job was to inform the South Korean 
President that the opinion of Western churches favored an armistice. Rhee responded 
that his foreign policy approach relied upon divine guidance. In analyzing the current 
political situation, Rhee regarded Korea as “Joseph” in the Bible, who was betrayed and 
sold into slavery by his older brothers -  the United States and other Western countries. 
Nolde saw Rhee’s attitude as “messianic” and believed his mindset was “undergirded by
1 Rdreligious conviction.” To make sure that Rhee got the correct idea of opinions in the 
Christian world, he wrote Rhee a letter after the meeting, telling him frankly that 
“Christian opinion around the world, as expressed in formal statements of the Christian 
agencies which our Commission represents, strongly [supported] the effort promptly to 
seek a truce on honorable terms and [considered] the present conditions favorable for a 
step of this kind.”185 Rhee realized that American Christians were at odds with Korean 
Christians over the truce issue. Rhee’s opinion of liberal Christian institutions, such as 
the NCCC and the WCC, turned sour. He began to denounce the WCC as a pro- 
Communist religious organization and mobilized Korean Christians to support his stance 
in defiance of the opinion of WCC leaders.
183 See Telephone Conversation with Dr. Fred Nolde, 23 June 1953, John Foster Dulles Files, Box 10,
Papers o f Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-1961, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
184 A Statement of Korean Christians to Dr. Frederick Nolde, 15 June 1953, Documents o f  the WCC Library: 
The Korean War, 372.
185 Ibid., 378.
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It is hard to measure the effect of Dr. Nolde’s mission, but it demonstrates that 
Dulles attempted to use American religious leaders to nullify the religious pressure from 
Rhee. Rhee had long been sensitive to US public opinion, particularly church opinion. 
Many times, Rhee had instructed his ambassador in Washington D.C. to recruit support 
from American church leaders. With American and Western churches calling for a truce, 
Rhee’s bargaining position was undoubtedly weakened. As soon as Dr. Nolde returned 
to Washington, he reported to Secretary Dulles and told him that the Korean situation 
was one in which religious factors needed to be emphasized in Rhee’s mind. The 
Secretary said that he thought that Dr. Nolde had helped the situation.186
Eventually, Rhee agreed not to obstruct the truce once the United States promised 
him a security pact and an economic and military aid package. The Korean Armistice 
was finally signed at P’anmunjom on July 27. In Operation BIG SWITCH, the United 
Nations received back their 12,773 UNC POWs (see Table 8.12b), while 70,183 North 
Koreans and 5,640 Chinese were sent back to the Communist side (see Table 8.12a). In 
September 1953, non-repatriates from both sides (359 UN prisoners, 22,604 North 
Korean and Chinese prisoners) were sent to the Demilitarized Zone under Indian custody, 
and a few hundred changed their minds (see Tables 13a and 13b). After the 90-day 
interview period, the remaining non-repatriates were released. 14,227 Chinese went to 
Taiwan and 7,593 Koreans stayed in South Korea.
186 Telephone Conversation with Dr. Nolde, 17 July 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 10, Eisenhower 
Library.
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Obtaining a Psychological Victory in the Korean War
As soon as the Armistice was signed, the Eisenhower administration began to 
explore the existence of 22,604 non-repatriates in UN custody.187 Allen Dulles, the 
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, described the POW exchange as “one of the 
greatest psychological victories so far achieved by the free world against 
Communism.”188 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also agreed with his brother’s 
statement. In an address on September 2, 1953 to the American Legion Convention, he 
declared that “a new and healthy principle [had] been established” because “this time, no 
Red Army prisoners who [wanted] freedom [would] be sent back to captivity.” He 
believed that “the Red Army [would] be less dependable as tools of aggression” and 
therefore, the United States had “increased the prospect of peace and added to [the 
nation’s] security.”189
Echoes of winning a psychological victory in the Korean War were heard across 
the country. In North Carolina, Colonel Gordon Singles, the chief of the psychological 
warfare center at Fort Bragg, told a group of enrolled officers on September 11, 1953, 
that evidence of a psychological victory in Korea was supported by the refusal of almost 
half the captured Communists, “the equivalent of eight divisions,” to be repatriated.190 
Again and again, American officials emphasized the number of non-repatriates. The idea
187 This figure (22,604) was the final number of prisoners in UN custody in August 1953. The UN 
authorities had released 27,000 North Korean non-repatriated civilian internees earlier in September 1952 
(Operation HOMECOMING & Operation THANKSGIVING) and the South Korean government had 
unilaterally released another 26,000 North Korean non-repatriated soldiers in June 1953. Therefore, the 
total number of non-repatriates had been reduced to only 22,604.
188 Quoted in Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory, 190.
189 Quoted in “CCB Staff Proposal for Exploiting Chinese and North Korean POWs Refusal to be 
Repatriated,” 29 December 1953, NSCS Files, Box 117, Eisenhower Library.
190 “Great Psychological Victory for U.S. in Korea Acclaimed,” The Daily Courier, 12 September 1953. 
See also “Psychological Victory Hailed in Korea; More Trouble for Reds Seen,” The Coshocton Ohio 
Tribune, 11 September 1953.
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of winning a psychological victory was vital, because after suffering 140,000 US and 
15,431 UN casualties, the US government and the United Nations needed to have a 
legitimate claim of achievement in order to maintain its credibility as a peace-keeping 
body.191
The decision of 33,462 North Koreans (soldiers and civilians), and 14,227 
Chinese not to return to the Iron Curtain resonated with all Americans. Comparisons 
between the 47,689 enemy troops who chose to stay free, and the 347 UN and ROK 
troops that preferred Communism, spoke volumes, corroborating what people had heard 
from the millions of northern refugees, and the reports of Communist atrocities 
uncovered in the North and the South. All these facts were seen as proof to Americans 
that their system of government was better, and that given the choice, people would 
choose it.
According to C. H. Peake of the Far Eastern Division in the State Department, the 
struggle in Korea had gone beyond its initial objective of stopping aggression. The 
aggression had been stopped and new meaning had been found in the Korean War.192 
Korea became a major symbol in the Cold War struggle. The Korean War was 
commemorated in Washington, D.C. with a monument proclaiming that “freedom is not 
free,” to signify the sacrifices the American people and government made from July 1950 
to July 1953.
191 See also Callum A. MacDonald, ‘“Horeos Behind Barbed Wire’ -  The United States, Britain and the 
POW issue in the Korean War,” The Korean War in History, eds. James Cotton and Ian Neary (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989), 144.
192 Memo from Mr. Peake to Allison and Johnson, 1 December 1952, 695A.0024/10-2952 -  12-2952] 
“International Political Relations, 1950-1954/Acheson, Dean/ US Dept of State, Records of the US Dept of 
State relating to Korea: International political relations, 1950-1954, National Archives.
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By upholding the humanitarian principle of voluntary repatriation, Peake 
observed, the struggle of the free world had shifted “to maintain the principle of 
individual human rights against the totalitarian state and the assertion of the rulers of such 
states that the individual lives only to serve the state.” 193 The case of Korea was 
universalized, Peake explained, “raising it above a local tactical effort to stop aggression 
and merely ‘contain’ the Communist world, and [provided] as the foundation for a 
continuing long-term struggle against totalitarianism as well as against aggression, 
fundamental principles which respect human dignity and rights.”194
In American churches, POW camps were perceived as being of great religious 
significance due to the success of missionary activities. The American Bible Society sent
150.000 Scripture portions to the prisoners. The Moody Bible Institute of Chicago sent
500.000 Korean tracts. Bob Pierce’s World Vision, Inc. supplied musical instruments, 
such as portable organs, trumpets, trombones, accordions, flutes, and harmonicas, for use 
in the worship services held in prison camps. American churches also sent stationery, 
clocks, and athletic equipment for the Bible Institutes inside the prison camps.
Chaplain Voelkel’s ministry received the most recognition and praise. In 1952, 
the US Army awarded Voelkel the Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian 
decoration. The South Korean government presented him with its Welfare Medal to 
recognize his contribution to the conversion of many prisoners. A school in Inch’on built 
by released prisoners was named after him. His book, Behind Barbed Wire in Korea 
(1953), which told the POW story, with an introduction by Billy Graham, sold 50,000
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
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copies.195 Rodger R. Venzke, US Chaplain Corps historian, praised Voelkel’s ministry as 
“one of the most remarkable in history.”196 Venzke also considered his work “one of the 
influences that ultimately convinced some 60,000 North Korean prisoners not to return to 
the Communist state following the war.”197
Chaplain Woodberry also received a lot of attention. In three separate memoirs 
written by Chinese non-repatriate prisoners, Chaplain Woodberry was well respected by 
many anti-Communist prisoners.198 They described him as their most trust worthy friend, 
who constantly gave them comfort and encouragement. On the other hand, most 
memoirs by Chinese Communist prisoners reflected a hatred of Woodberry, calling him a 
fox or a spy.199 They distrusted his work and questioned the sincerity of his faith.
UN prison authorities, however, praised Woodberry for his work. According to 
reports submitted by Woodberry’s superior officers, the Chaplain was “of inestimable 
value to the military authorities.”200 “His friendship and the deep respect in which he was 
held by the majority of the prisoners,” Colonel William B. Estes, Chief of Chaplains, 
KCOMZ, testified, “were the decisive factors in averting riot and revolt.”201 For his
195 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f  the Korea Mission Vol.2, 51.
196 Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace, 78.
197 Venzke’s figure included the ROK troops and civilians as well. See ibid., 79. See also Brown, Mission 
to Korea, 198.
198 Jian-guo Wang, Renhai Da Beiju A 'M A fM lif  (The Tragedy of human-wave tactics); Lang Liu, Liuxie 
Dao Mingtian fi& lM SIA ftyf (Bleeding till tomorrow). See also Min-jin Guo, Hanzhanyiwang: Yuxue 
Rensheng Huarenquan 'MlMMfkE~£A:f S (Memoir of the Korean War: Human Rights of the 
POWs in the Contest o f Bloody Survival).
199 Zhe-shi Zhang, ed., Meijun Jizhongying Qinli Ji M M M tpE ifA M E B (Personal records in the American 
prison camps).
200 A summary of reports on Chaplain Woodberry by Colonel William B. Estes, Chief of Chaplains, 
KCOMZ, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 360, Folder: Earle J. Woodberry -  Presbyterian 
Historical Society, Philadelphia.
201 Ibid.
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contributions he was awarded the U.S. Medal of Freedom in 1955.202 The Nationalist 
Government in Taiwan gave him another medal and invited him to continue his ministry 
in Taiwan.
Church leaders in the United States also praised the influence of Christianity on 
the conversions of these prisoners and claimed a victory over Communism by 
Christianity. “Liberation comes through the Christian faith,” Harold E. Fey, Managing 
Editor of The Christian Century proclaimed, “brought to this place by missionaries and 
Korean pastors.... Under these circumstances Communists are being converted by tens of 
thousands. Here where the ideological struggle is conducted fairly, truth triumphs as it 
has always done, as it will always do.” Although his observations on the actual 
situation in the camp might not be fair or even accurate, they reflected a popular 
contemporary religious opinion, that Christianity had a key role to play in the ideological 
battle against Communism.
CONCLUSION
A limited war was hard to fight and difficult to win. General MacArthur pushed 
to expand the war and pursue a complete victory, but President Truman wanted to limit 
the war to Korea and pursue peace. Although the country was sharply divided, most 
Americans and most religious leaders favored a truce. Despite the desire for peace, 
negotiations became deadlocked because over half of the prisoners refused to be
202 According to both statistics and the testimony o f prisoners and the UN authorities, the influence of 
Chaplain Woodberry on the Chinese POWs was undeniable. He was very popular among the anti- 
Communist POWs. After they went to Taiwan, Woodberry was invited by the Taiwanese government to 
continue his ministry in Taiwan. After he retired, when he visited Taiwan again, ex-POWs gathered 
together to host his trip during his visit. Guo, Hanzhanyiwang:, 169. 
i Harold E. Fey, “Korea Must Live!” The Christian Century 75 (20 February 1952): 217.
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repatriated. UN authorities faced a moral dilemma that caused the war to drag on for 
another two years.
Religion was an important factor in this controversy. To many Americans, the 
conversion of 20,000 prisoners to the Christian faith added appeal to the idea of non­
repatriation. Church leaders lobbied the government and helped shape public opinion to 
support voluntary repatriation on humanitarian principles. That the final 22,604 non­
repatriated prisoners, not including those who escaped earlier, could enjoy a real choice 
of freedom was perceived as a significant achievement by many who had participated in 
the war. While the United States government claimed a psychological victory over the 
non-repatriated prisoners, church leaders also claimed a victory of Christianity over 
Communism in the prison camps.
Missionary activities in the POW camps highlighted the power of religion in the 
battle against Communism. Their success made many US officials realize that Christian 
workers and Christian institutions were useful allies in conducting US policy. For 
example, in the aftermath of Rev. Pang’s death, the efforts of missionaries and church 
leaders to obtain compensation for the family helped to dissipate some of the anti- 
American feelings that tragedy had aroused. Christian relief efforts also proved effective 
not only in healing the destruction of war, but also, in the process, in projecting a 
benevolent image of America that would impact U.S.-Korean relations for decades to 
come. American policy-makers therefore became more willing to recognize the 
usefulness of Christian beliefs, actors, and institutions in fighting the Cold War. In the 
end, the Korean War not only established a firm military alliance between the United
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States and South Korea, but also brought forth a solid partnership between political and 
religious actors in the conduct of foreign affairs.
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CONCLUSION
In order to appreciate the religious factors at work during the years of the Korean 
War, a great deal of background material was presented in this dissertation. During the 
Late Choson period, Korea was surrounded by stronger neighbors. Could Korea remain 
independent if it was not modernized? Initially, Korean rulers wanted Korea to remain a 
Hermit Kingdom, but that was not a viable option when many foreign powers and their 
gunboats came knocking on its door. Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910 showed that, 
without building a strong country, Korea could not survive as an independent nation. 
Many forward-thinking men looked to the Western model. A young Syngman Rhee, who 
later became the first president of South Korea, for example, envisioned a modernized 
and Christianized Korea. Perhaps his ideas were influenced by the American 
missionaries who were working to develop the country. By their works, these 
missionaries earned themselves a good reputation among members of the royal family 
and many in the general population.
In some quarters of academia, the work of missionaries around the world has been 
viewed with skepticism. Their efforts to Westernize native peoples have been criticized 
as culturally destructive and racist. Missionaries are sometimes considered tools or 
promoters of imperialism. Korea serves as a good contrast. Western imperialism was not 
a major issue in the case of Korea because it was Japanese colonialism that threatened 
Korean independence and that sought to replace Korean culture. On the contrary,
518
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Christianity and American missionaries were important influences in the rise of Korean 
nationalism and anti-colonialism. They were a significant factor in Korea’s path to 
modernity. In fact, the case can be made that, in the context of Japanese imperialism, 
Christian institutions served to preserve Korean heritage -  for example, through the 
mission schools’ teaching of the Korean language and history.
These religious factors grew in significance during the years of national rebirth 
that followed World War II. By 1945, most of Korea’s well-known patriots shared 
similar Christian backgrounds. The influence of Christianity reached an unprecedented 
level during the Korean War, due to the humanitarian crisis that the war produced. The 
legacy of these religious activities continues to be felt today, fifty-seven years later, as 
South Korea has now become one of the most Christianized nations in the world. And 
yet, because the influence of religion is so subtle, its role in the Korean War has until 
now been poorly understood and insufficiently documented.
The following sections review Christian influences present in Korea from 1884 to 
1950, as developed in the dissertation. The purpose here is to remind the reader of the 
most essential lessons from the decades leading up to and through the Korean War, so as 
to recognize the big picture of religious developments over this 66-year period.
The Influence of American Missionaries in the Early Period 
Since the beginning of the arrival of the first Protestant missionary to Korea in 
1884, by 1905, Americans comprised the majority of the foreign missionaries residing in 
Korea. Although Jesuit priests had arrived earlier, it was American missionaries who had 
the strongest influence within the Korean Christian community. Unlike the case of 
China, where foreign missionaries were generally distrusted and condemned as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
520
collaborators with Western imperialists, many Koreans regarded missionaries as their 
allies and friends. Even as the United States pursued a pro-Japanese policy, American 
missionaries remained well-liked and respected. When the US government withdrew its 
minister from Korea in 1905, American missionaries stayed behind. Over the next four 
decades of harsh Japanese colonial rule, missionaries kept watch over the survival of the 
Korean churches, and yet working within the limits set by the Japanese authorities. Many 
of their children later inherited their passion and love for Korea. Some chose to become 
missionaries themselves, while others returned as reporters, educators, or diplomats when 
the US government liberated the southern part of Korea in 1945.
Part of the reason for the positive image of American missionaries was that their 
efforts brought many positive benefits to the Korean people. They established hospitals, 
mission schools, churches, seminaries, and publication companies. Their activities 
brought important changes to traditional Korean society. By 1910, a third of all schools 
in Korea were run by foreign missionaries.
The Western education offered by these missionaries and their mission schools 
introduced American ideals of liberalism, freedom, and democracy. These principles 
provided essential guidance for the development of modem Korea. Yet, even as 
missionaries and their mission schools sought to transform Korean society, their use of 
han’giil and their teaching of Korean history and culture contributed to the rediscovery of 
a national identity. This awakening nationalism would prove a significant obstacle to 
Japanese imperialistic ambitions. Christianity became Korea’s fastest growing religion 
during the colonial period. Despite Japan’s efforts to nullify the influence of Christianity 
in Korea and its deportation of all foreign missionaries in 1941, the churches survived
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and Christianity’s influence expanded rapidly in the postwar period under American 
occupation.
Missionaries had a great influence on a number of important Korean leaders. 
Missionaries assisted Yun Chi-ho and Philip Jaisohn, progressive reformers of the late 
Choson period, in receiving a Western education in the United States. Upon their return 
to Korea, Yun and Jaisohn organized the Independence Club to advocate Western 
democratic ideals and to call for reforms and modernization. Meanwhile, the mission 
schools were graduating many of the young patriots who would later lead the 
independence movement, both at home and abroad, such as Syngman Rhee, An Chang- 
ho, Yo Un-hyong and Kim Kyu-sik. Through their contact with the West at the mission 
schools, many of these leaders believed that the best hope for Korea's future lay in 
following the Western model, even in the embracing of Christianity. Looking to the 
future, they foresaw a radically transformed Korea: Westernized and Christianized, but 
also strong and independent.1 In the end, the South Korea of today has many similarities 
to their vision.
The Growth o f Christian Churches and their Role in Korean Nationalism
As the twentieth century dawned, Christianity was beginning to experience 
exceptional growth throughout Korea but particularly in the north. By 1930, P’yongyang
1 For a significant period of time, these four men all conducted their nationalist efforts from overseas, each 
pursuing a different approach to Korean independence. An Ch’ang-ho, a leader of the Korean Provisional 
Government (KPG), focused on Christian education for Koreans around the world. Pak Yong-man sought 
a military solution to independence through training nationalist fighters both in the United States and later 
in China. Syngman Rhee, the first Premier of the KPG, looked to diplomacy and led the diplomatic 
mission in Washington. Kim Kyu-sik, another leader of the KPG, also pursued diplomacy until, 
disillusioned with American racism, he went to China to join the KPG. Korean-Americans in Hawaii and 
the continental United States provided most of the financial support for exile nationalist activities, 
including the KPG in Shanghai and the Korean Commission, a diplomatic office of the KPG in Washington 
— and the great majority of Korean Americans were churchgoers. Korean churches in Manchuria also 
contributed to these efforts.
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had become the “Christian Capital of Korea.”2 The P’yongyang Presbyterian Mission 
Station was the largest Presbyterian mission station in the world, ministering to more than
100,000 native believers. The northern provinces not only had the highest per capita 
Christian population, but also some of the largest churches, mission schools, and 
seminaries.
Religious motivations aside, another significant factor in Christianity’s rapid 
expansion was the churches’ involvement in the rise of Korean nationalism. Confronted 
with the loss of independence and the harsh policies of Japanese colonial rule, a number 
of prominent Protestant clergymen developed a form of “liberation theology.”3 They 
found hope in the pages of the Bible, by reading of Israel's deliverance from slavery and 
from oppression by its more-powerful neighbors.4 Ministers preached the promise of a 
national deliverance with true conviction and great persuasive power. Their message 
attracted many nationalists, who found refuge and comfort in the church. Churches 
became convenient places for secret meetings of the anti-Japanese and anti-colonial 
underground. Christian nationalists were involved in organizing and supporting the 
March First Independence Movement of 1919. When March 1st came, missionaries
2 This was a term commonly used by missionaries and Korea Christian in referring to P’ydngyang. See 
Chapter 1, the section on Christianity and Korea’s Struggle for Independence.
3 Liberation theology focuses on the earthly Christian life. Jesus Christ is seen as the redeemer of the 
oppressed in this life and not just as the redeemer of Christians at the resurrection. As such, the teaching of 
these Korean pastors is a form of liberation theology, but it should not be confused with the more familiar 
form of liberation theology that much later came to have a significant influence in Latin America, and 
which contained elements of Communist ideology.
4 See Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
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assisted the participants.5 When the colonial government brutally suppressed the 
movement, churches suffered great losses of both property and personnel -  especially 
church leaders. In the years that followed, the church’s losses continued mounting, as 
some of its most influential clergy were arrested for opposing the forced establishment of 
Shinto worship. Yet, for all of their losses, Christian churches gained a positive 
reputation in the independence movement, and those clergymen who survived 
imprisonment earned such fame that many would go on to become famous church leaders 
following Japan's defeat in World War H
The importance of Christianity to the Korean nationalist movement can be seen in 
Kim Il-sung’s autobiography. Although it is a biased account, one would expect that any 
such bias would seek to downplay the importance of Christian churches. Kim’s 
concessions, therefore, of the churches' importance to the independence movement must 
carry significance. Kim's autobiography provided details of his Christian upbringing and 
his family’s connections to several churches and to Christian education. One can also see 
the influence of Kim's church background in his co-opting of Christian themes in 
developing his personality cult. In his book, Kim states that many nationalists, including 
Communists, took advantage of church gatherings and drew support from churchgoers 
for their anti-Japanese activities in Manchuria and Korea. These claims are consistent 
with the developments of 1945, when, for a brief period following Japan's surrender,
5 Although Korean churches were active organizers o f the March First Independence Movement (1919), 
there is no evidence that American missionaries helped in this planning. Perhaps certain missionaries had 
prior knowledge of the movement, but most were caught by surprise when March 1st came. Missionaries 
performed an important role in the movement, nonetheless, by sheltering student demonstrators, by 
allowing organizers to use their facilities, by documenting the atrocities with photographs, and by publicly 
condemning Japanese brutality. See Donald N. Clark, ‘“Surely God Will Work Out Their Salvation:’ 
Protestant Missionaries in the March First Movement,” Korean Studies 13 (1989): 41-42.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
524
Communists, leftists, and Christians all worked together to form the People’s Republic 
under the leadership of Yo Un-hyong, a famous Christian socialist.
Growing Conflicts between Communism and Christianity 
The division of Korea following the conclusion of World War II set the stage for 
a national tragedy greater than any that had come before. When the Russians took over 
the north, they had to contend with a strong Christian presence in all the major northern 
cities. These Christians were politically active and supported Cho Man-sik's bid for 
leadership. Many rightists, especially intellectuals and landowners, also rallied around 
Cho, hoping that he would protect their interests. Because Cho’s popularity far 
overshadowed that of the local Communists, the Russians agreed to put Cho in charge of 
a coalition government in P’yongyang. When Cho refused to support the Moscow 
Agreement, however, the Soviets put him under house arrest. Into Cho’s place stepped 
Kim Il-sung, as the new political leader in the north.
Communists in the north sought to increase their control over the churches by 
gradual steps. Over the next year, as the noose began to tighten around the Church’s 
neck, increasing conflict was inevitable. Christian students rioted when their leaders 
were arrested by the police. Seeing little hope of religious freedom and liberty, some 
Christian clergymen and a large number of laymen followed the capitalists, landowners 
and ex-collaborators in marching south.
These refugees brought with them news of Communist persecutions and the lack 
of religious freedom in the north. Their reports frightened many Christian leaders of the 
south. P’yongyang had once been called the “Christian Capital of Korea,” but it was now 
lost. The political battlefield had moved to the south. Christian leaders began to rethink
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their initial policy of seeking cooperation with leftists. Some switched to the 
conservative camp and allied themselves with the ex-collaborators and landowners.
American occupation forces were challenged by leftists who supported the 
People’s Republic organized by Y6 Un-hyong and his supporters. The situation was 
further complicated by the fact that many political factions competed for popular support 
and political domination. Rightists took the upper hand when they gained the trust of 
Commander George Z. Williams, who was in charge of hiring officials for the American 
Military Government (AMG). Song Chin-u, leader of the Korean Democratic Party, was 
Williams’ favorite because he believed Song to be sternly anti-Communist and pro­
democracy. Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku were also helped by Williams. As the son of a 
missionary, Williams was understandably sympathetic towards Korean Christians. He 
hired many of them to work for the AMG. Christian clergymen and laymen who could 
speak English were in high demand because only a very small number of American 
officers spoke Korean.
As rightists were gaining power in the AMG, leftists sought support from urban 
workers and the landless masses. In Seoul, violence, terrorism, and political 
assassination were the order of the day. Communists not only succeeded in infiltrating 
Yo Un-hyong’s People’s Party, but also established strongholds in the mountains of the 
Cholla provinces. When the AMG finally outlawed the Communist Party, most of its 
leaders fled north, but the fight between the left and the right had already spilled into the 
streets and countryside. Christians and churches were a common target of Communist 
attacks. Seeking revenge for their losses in the north, some refugees joined rightist terror 
groups that launched reprisal attacks against the Communists. The rift between
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Communists and Christians grew deeper as violence on both sides of the 38th parallel 
intensified in the form of religious persecutions in the north and guerilla attacks in the 
south.
Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee represented two different kinds of Korean 
nationalists, and they embraced two different visions of a modem Korea. A political 
competition between the two groups was inevitable. While Communists saw Christianity 
as a political threat and began persecuting the Church in the north, Christians in the south 
allied themselves with other rightists in order to contain the spread of Communism. By 
1948, two separate regimes had arisen in Korea, each competing for national domination.
The Role o f Missionaries in the Inter-War Years
The role of missionaries was essential in the political development of South Korea 
during the inter-war years. From 1945 to 1948, missionaries and their children played a 
critical role in assisting the Christian community in the south gain political power and 
social influence. Some of these missionaries were hired by the AMG as advisors, 
because of their valuable language skills and local connections. Others, particularly 
children of missionaries, like Commander Williams, were still enlisted following the end 
of World War II. They returned to Korea through military transfers because of the need 
for language experts. Because the missionaries enjoyed the support of the AMG, they 
exercised greater influence than they ever had before, even though their numbers were 
initially small. As conditions stabilized, more civilian missionaries were allowed to 
return by late 1946.
Missionary activities promoted positive relations between the United States and 
the American-occupied southern part of Korea. Though difficult to definitively measure,
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missionaries’ service for the AMG and their assistance to Korean churches strengthened 
the general influence of Christianity in postwar South Korea. They not only re-connected 
Korean churches with their American supporters, but also laid the foundation for the later 
development of many Christian institutions, including schools, universities, hospitals, and 
health care centers.
Better educated than most of those in the general population, Korean Christians 
had an unprecedented opportunity to gain political influence. Many Christians were 
elected into the First National Assembly, thereby marking 1948 as the beginning of a new 
era of Christian political power in South Korea. After establishing the Constitution of the 
Republic of Korea (ROK), the National Assembly members elected Syngman Rhee as the 
first president. Rhee’s political fortunes depended heavily on the loyalty of Christians 
and refugees from the north. Most of Rhee’s closest advisors and trusted generals were 
well-known Christian laymen. At the same time, Rhee was exceptionally friendly 
towards missionaries. His own experiences in the United States had shown him the 
influence of the church in American society.
During the early period of his presidency, and with very limited funds, Rhee’s 
publicity team in Washington depended on the support of church leaders and Christian 
journalists to lobby the American government and to publish information about Korea. 
For example, as part of his efforts to obtain a defense commitment from the US prior to 
the outbreak of the Korean War, Rhee specifically mobilized the Korean Church to 
demonstrate and write petitions, knowing that their message and the missionaries’ reports 
of church activities would resonate with American Christians. The effort temporarily
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failed when US troops withdrew in 1949 and when South Korea was excluded from the 
American vision of a Pacific defense perimeter
Nevertheless, American missionaries continued to work tirelessly to raise 
American interest in the defense of South Korea. Although they had no direct access to 
the State Department, they used whatever resources and religious connections that they 
had. When John Foster Dulles visited Seoul in his capacity as President Truman’s 
special envoy to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan, American missionaries invited him 
to dinner and tried to impress upon him the achievements of Christianity in Korea. 
Deeply influenced by their efforts, Dulles later became the most pro-Korean diplomat in 
the State Department and remained so throughout the Korean War. He recognized Korea 
as a model of the “Asiatic experiment in democracy” 6 and argued strongly for US 
intervention through the United Nations, when war broke out on June 25, 1950. In his 
public speeches during the early months of the war, Dulles even defined the Korean War 
as a battle for religious freedom.
The Rise o f Religious Anti-Communism in the Early Cold War 
Ever since the Bolsheviks took power in Russia in 1917, many Americans had 
harbored anti-Communist sentiments. Yet, in religious circles, anti-Communism did not 
become a strong influence until the Cold War began. During the 1930s and early 1940s, 
there had been no great outcry against Communism in the United States — except from 
the Catholic Church -  even though it was known that the Soviets were persecuting 
Christians and promoting atheism. Instead, Communism was gaining ground in America, 
among labor workers and the Protestant elite. Even some Christian socialists and liberal
6 “Speech: Re. Korea and Japan, CBS Broadcast,” dated July 1, 1950, John Foster Dulles Papers, Speech, 
Statement, Press Conference, etc: 1950 January to August, Box 301, Seeley Mudd Library.
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theologians, such as Harry F. Ward, praised the Soviets and embraced certain elements of 
socialist principles.7
Things began to change when World War II came to an end in 1945. The Soviet- 
American rivalry in Europe and the ideological competition between Communism and 
capitalism began to intensify. In his 1946 Long Telegram to the State Department, 
George F. Kennan, a Russian specialist in the US Foreign Service, warned against the 
potential Soviet threat and argued that the best strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union 
would be to strengthen Western institutions and an American commitment to assist 
endangered nations. His ideas became the backbone of the Truman Doctrine, the 
Marshall Plan, and later the containment strategy during the Cold War.
In response to Kennan’s warning, many policymakers began work on promoting 
Western institutions. From the point of view of public relations, espousing the virtues of 
capitalism as an economic model did not have great marketing appeal. Instead, leaders 
pointed to freedom, including religious freedom. They also argued that Western 
institutions had their origins in Christianity. To confront and contain the spread of 
Communism, Christian beliefs were brought back to the center of American society. 
President Truman described the American way of life as being “based upon the will of 
the majority, and distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free 
elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom
o
from political oppression.” Freedom, especially the freedom of religion, would emerge 
as a key theme of American Cold War ideology. In his 1947 State of the Union Address,
7 See David Nelson Duke, In the Trenches with Jesus and Marx: Harry F. Ward and the Struggle fo r  Social 
Justice (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2003).
8 Harry Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, 12 March 
1947, Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: Harry S. Truman 1947 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1963), 178.
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President Truman envisioned that the American people would spread their freedom and 
democracy to the whole earth so that “free men everywhere will share our devotion to 
those ideals.”9 American Christians in particular frequently viewed the competition 
between Communism and democracy as a competition between Communism and 
Christianity, because many leaders argued that democracy was built upon the foundation 
of Christian principles.
The Impact o f Atomic Fear 
During these interwar years, religion continued to capture public interest because 
of the invention of atomic weapons. The discovery and use of atomic bombs against 
Japan caused much controversy in the United States. Americans felt pride, but also guilt 
and fear. For some people, the horrifying pictures of suffering in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki brought to mind the Biblical prophecies concerning the end of the world. 
When the Soviet Union then detonated its own atomic device in September 1949, the 
nation became gripped with fear of a possible nuclear war. Led by preachers such as 
Rev. Billy Graham, a revival built up steam in late 1949, perhaps in response to the 
uncertainties of the era.
With the outbreak of the Korean War and later the entrance of China into the 
conflict, many people worried that the Korean War would escalate into another world war 
with atomic weapons. Mainstream religious leaders from the National Council of 
Churches of Christ (NCCC) began to warn against adopting an aggressive policy of 
punishing enemies with atomic bombs, whereas military leaders were favoring such 
tactics as a means of achieving a quick victory. With public opinion divided over the
9 Harry Truman, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 6 January 1947, ibid., 12.
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proper strategy for ending the war, the opinion of the NCCC had a strong influence on 
President Truman, who decided to seek peace instead of expanding the war to China.
Ideological Battles o f the Korean War
The Korean War was more than merely a physical war; it was also an ideological 
war, as the battle between the ideologies of Communism and Freedom was being fought 
in the minds of millions of Koreans. Despite propaganda promising a Communist utopia, 
an estimated 1,500,000 people from the North had made the painful decision to leave 
everything and migrate south prior to the outbreak of the war. This was a startling 18 
percent of the entire northern population.10 They had voted with their feet for freedom. 
And whereas many of them were persecuted Christians, they were particularly voting for 
religious freedom. The refugees kept coming throughout the war. In a mass exodus, 
hundreds of thousands of northerners fled south with the retreating UN forces, risking the 
harrowing journey across the battle lines and a life of destitution once they arrived in the 
South. Perhaps the most dramatic decisions were not made by the refugees, but by North 
Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who adamantly refused to be repatriated to their 
homelands. Their decision shocked both their own governments and their captors.
Although the repatriation issue developed out of the presence of a large number of 
ex-Nationalist soldiers in the Chinese Volunteers’ Army and ex-ROK soldiers and 
civilians in the North Korean People’s Army, the US government and American 
missionaries were also partially responsible for the decision of these prisoners. The 
CI&E (Civilian Information and Education) programs and the religious activities, 
organized by prison camp authorities but operated by missionaries serving as civilian
10 Another estimated 1,000,000 fled south during the war. An additional 50,000 prisoners of war refused to 
be repatriated. By war’s end nearly a third of the northern population lived in the south, and another 20 
percent had died.
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chaplains, intensified the existing ideological conflicts between Communists and anti­
communists. Many prisoners embraced the democratic ideals and religious messages 
that they heard at these meetings. Once a man accepted Christianity or embraced 
Western ideas, however, he often found himself the target of Communist attacks. 
Soldiers from the same regiment and ex-comrades in arms became deadly enemies. 
Prison camps became a new battlefield, and each compound a new war zone. The 
ideological pressure on each prisoner was so strong that there was no middle ground. 
With the help of missionary chaplains, Christian converts petitioned UN authorities with 
blood petitions for non-repatriation. Their requests generated a great deal of sympathy 
from religious groups in the United States.
Religious Ideology in the Cold War 
The suffering caused by the brutal war and the violence in the prison camps 
hardened the ice of the Cold War. In particular, many American religious and political 
leaders were awakened by the conditions in Korea and began to take a tougher stand 
against Communism. The war weakened the political power of liberals and strengthened 
conservatives. Religious rhetoric by politicians and public sentiment against atheistic 
Communism made things more black and white, connecting moral justification and 
religious righteousness to America’s democracy, freedom, and capitalistic market 
economy.
From the very beginning of the Korean War, President Truman had regarded the 
war as a battle for freedom, and therefore, despite the long delay for peace caused by the 
deadlock over POWs, he refused to yield on the principle of voluntary repatriation. His 
firm commitment to humanitarian principles reflected his deep religious convictions. His
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stand on the POW issue can be interpreted as a measure of his resolve to support freedom 
of religion and choice. Although the development of the Korean War was disappointing 
to many Americans, the actions of President Truman, with the exception of firing General 
MacArthur, were consistent with the general public sentiment, especially the opinion of 
mainstream Protestant groups.
The Legacy o f the Religious Factors in the Korean War 
The Korean War was the period when religious factors in Korea took on 
international significance. These religious factors traced their roots primarily to the 
arrival of the first American missionaries sixty-six years before the war. In the years 
following the war, these religious factors, having been brought into prominence by the 
conflict, continued to impact history. It is worthwhile, in these final pages, to analyze the 
influence of these religious factors on later historical events. Two follow-up questions 
should be considered in assessing the significance of these factors. First, what effect did 
these religious factors have on developments after the Korean War? Second, what effect 
did the Korean War itself have on the development of Christianity in both Korea and the 
United States? In answer to these questions, four areas of impact can be identified: 1) 
the development of the Cold War and religious revival, 2) the development of US-Korean 
relations, 3) the development of South Korea, and 4) the development of Christianity in 
South Korea.
1) The Impact on the Cold War and Religious Revival in the United States
John Lewis Gaddis, who has long stressed the importance of geopolitics and 
power balances, has pointed out that historians failed to grasp what was a simple fact for 
those living in the Cold War -  people, from the top to the bottom, saw the Cold War as a
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straggle between good and evil.11 America was able to sustain the Cold War over so 
many years, at such a high expense, through two psychological motivations: the sense of 
moral rightness and the fear of the spread of Communism. Such fear was particularly 
intensified by the war in Korea.
On November 27, 1950, Time Magazine reported that “a growing interest in 
religion [was] evident all over the U.S.” 12 For example, Billy Graham’s Portland, 
Oregon Crusade in September was attended by 520,000,13 doubling the attendance of his 
Columbia, South Carolina Crusade in July, before the war began (see Table 4.1). On one 
evening of the Portland Crusade, Rev. Bob Pierce was invited to report on his travels in 
East Asia, especially Korea and Japan, before an audience of 17,000.14 On the last day of 
the crusade, September 4 (Labor Day), at the “Crusade for Freedom” Rally in Multnomah 
Stadium, the governors of both Washington and Oregon joined a crowd of 22,000.15 
When Graham led another crusade in Atlanta, Georgia, from November to December, 
another half million attended (see Table 4.1).
Churches all over the United States were reporting a significant increase in 
regular worship attendance as well. The response to the Army Church Program was also 
unexpectedly high. Chaplain Clauda R. Ingram (Lt. Colonel), 45th Division Chaplain, 
reported from Camp Polk, Louisiana: “During my twenty years’ experience I have never 
had church attendance as large or as enthusiastic as I find it here.” His experience 
paralleled that of Chaplain Leonard A. Ellis (Captain), from Camp Custer in Michigan
11 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 286- 
287.
12 ‘Trend,” TIME, 27 November 1950.
13 According to data provided by the Billy Graham Evangelical Association, TIME at that time reported a 
higher number: 632,000. See “Revival” TIME, 18 September 1950.
14 Billy Graham, Just as I am: The Autobiography o f Billy Graham (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 
1997), 178.
15 Ibid., 174.
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where “94 percent of the soldiers attended services regularly each Sunday.” 16 In 
particular, dispensational Christian sects, such as the Seventh-Day Adventists and the 
Jehovah Witnesses, which advocated the end of the world and the second coming of 
Christ, enjoyed the largest percentage gain in church membership.17
While most editors in the press attributed this growth to the “psychological 
insecurity” of the American people, some credited the trend to the improved promotional 
efforts of religious groups.18 Even the US government became involved in promoting 
religion. In late November, as soon as the Chinese intervention in Korea was public 
knowledge, President Truman called attention to the fundamental place of religion and 
religious institutions in American life. He gave a statement in support of the nonsectarian 
Religion in American Life Movement, urging “all Americans to attend and support the 
church, chapel, or synagogue of their individual choice.”19 Thousands of giant outdoor 
posters were displayed, saying, “Take your problems to Church this week -  millions
leave them there!” It was the first time in American history that a nationwide campaign
00had employed mass advertising facilities in support of religion.
According to the prominent theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, mass evangelism and 
the increased intellectual interest in religion were undeniable proof of a shift in American 
culture toward religiosity.21 “There is scarcely a college or university,” Niebuhr 
explained, “which has not recently either created a department of religious studies or
16 “Response Unusually Good to Army Church Program,” Presbyterian Life, 20 January 1951, 23.
17 For the Adventists, see “Signs of the Times,” TIME, 31 July 1950; and for the Jehovah’s Witnesses, see 
“Waiting for Armageddon,” TIME, 14 August 1950.
18 ‘Trend,” TIME, 27 November 1950. See also “Religion in 1950,” Presbyterian Life, 20 January 1951, 
21.
19 “Religion in American Life,” The United Presbyterian, 20 November 1950, 9.
20 Ibid.
21 ‘Trend,” TIME, 27 November 1950.
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99substantially enlarged existing departments.” With more Americans turning to religion 
not only for answers to their personal problems but also for answers to international 
crises, religious public opinion became a stronger influence upon foreign policy.
The religious revival that started during the late 1940s and which was accelerated 
by the outbreak of the Korean War persisted throughout the war and postwar years (see 
Table 4.1). Through both the secular press and also religious publications, especially the 
reports of missionaries, the situation in Korea shocked millions of Americans with the 
horror and suffering of war. The public arose to provide humanitarian relief for those 
ravaged by the war, and turned to a more determined and aggressive diplomatic and 
military effort against further Communist expansion in other parts of the globe. In 
addition, both religious and political leaders advocated a deeper commitment to the cause 
of religion as a part of the battle against Communist influence, both at home and abroad. 
This was the decade in which the words "under God" were added to the Pledge of 
Allegiance. Taking the advice of Rev. Billy Graham, President Eisenhower, who had not 
been a church member, joined the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A) after he entered the 
White House in order to show his commitment to organized religion. He expressed his 
idea of the importance of religion this way: "Our government makes no sense unless it is 
founded on a deeply felt religious belief — and I don't care what it is."23 Coincidentally, 
both the President and the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, belonged to the 
Protestant denomination, which had a close relationship with the Korean Protestant 
churches and financed the largest share of Christian reconstruction programs in South 
Korea.
22 Quote in ibid.
23 James M. Wall, “Changes in Attitude: the Lost World of the 1950s,” The Christian Century, 18 October 
1995,947-948.
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2) The Impact on the Development o f Korean-American Relations
Although there was no missionary-diplomat like Dr. Horace Allen during the 
Korean War, missionaries remained a strong force in facilitating the development of 
Korean-American relations. Dr. Harold Noble, son of American missionaries in 
P’yongyang before World War n, served as the political attache and first secretary at the 
US embassy in Seoul from 1948 to 1951. He was an important official who acted as 
liaison between the American embassy and President Syngman Rhee. During the initial 
stages of the war, he was sent by Ambassador John J. Muccio to stay with Rhee and 
advise him on the policy of the United States.24 Noble’s missionary background also 
made him a useful go-between for the missionary community and the embassy. 
Missionaries in the war zone needed such a helper as they sought embassy permission to 
allow their missionary colleagues, who had evacuated to Japan, to return to Korea.
When John Foster Dulles became Secretary of State in 1953, American religious 
interests had direct access to the State Department. Dulles handled Rhee’s efforts to 
sabotage the truce talks with great care, utilizing the influence of American church 
leaders to convince Rhee to cooperate. A military alliance between the two countries was 
finally established with the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1, 1953. 
Since then, the bilateral relationship between the two countries has often been described 
as “an alliance forged in blood.” South Korea has grown to be one of the closest US 
allies in East Asia. During the Vietnam War, South Korea was the only Asian country to 
send two divisions to fight on the US side. In the recent war against Iraq, South Korea is
24 Harold Joyce Noble, Embassy at War edited with introduction by Frank Baldwin (Seattle, WA:
University o f Washington Press, 1975), 104-122.
25 Quoted in William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 186.
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again a strong US ally. Even though the United States government closed most of its 
military bases in Philippines and Japan, those in South Korea remain open.
Apart from the strong official ties between the two governments, Korean- 
American relations also grew at the non-state level throughout the 1950s. Every year 
since the war, while the best brains in Korea came to receive their education in the United 
States, more American missionaries left for South Korea. The social, cultural, and 
religious ties between the two nations were tightening. American churches continued 
sending relief packages and also money to rebuild the Christian social and religious 
institutions that had been destroyed by the war. Dr. Bob Pierce, who produced two well- 
known documentary films on Korea and the suffering of the war, started America’s first 
international adoption agency, World Vision, Inc., in September 1950. Three times in the 
1960s, Dr. Pierce’s Korean Orphans Choir toured the United States to give concerts to 
raise money for orphanages in Korea.26 Wherever they went, they attracted huge crowds 
and received wide publicity among television and radio audiences. Many American 
families answered the call to adopt Korean War orphans. Another source of Korean 
immigration into the United States was the many marriages between American soldiers 
and Korean women. And since the US maintained a military presence in Korea after the 
war, such marriages continued. The Korean-American community, with an eighty 
percent Christian population, has become a prominent minority in American society 
today.
26 Bob Pierce, The Korean Orphan Choir: They Sing Their Thanks (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1965), 12. On the first tour (1961-1962), they sang in 62 cities in the United States and 
Canada over 90 days. On their second tour (1962-1963), they visited 15 countries in the Orient and Europe 
and then sang in 70 cities in the United States and in leading Canadian cities. On their third tour (1965- 
1966), they visited 23 states and 4 Canadian provinces in a period of seven and a half months.
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Americans and South Koreans continue to work closely on issues involving North 
Korea. Although there are differences between the two governments in terms of how to 
approach unification and how to handle the North Korean nuclear threat, there is 
cooperation at the non-state level. Since the 1990s, Christian churches in South Korea 
have been at the forefront of re-unification efforts. In addition to prayer, religious relief 
agencies in both South Korea and the United States sent food and relief packages to 
North Korea during the devastating famine of the 1990s. Church leaders, perhaps 
recalling P’yongyang’s Christian heritage, are looking for ways to re-enter North 
Korea.27
According to Professor Thomas Hong-soon Han of the Hankuk University of 
Foreign Studies in Seoul, the religious factor will continue to be an essential part of 
efforts to open a dialogue with North Korea, and, ultimately, of efforts to achieve the 
peaceful reunification of the country.28 Korean churches in the northeastern part of China, 
for example, have established a modern-day underground railroad that has cared for and 
transported thousands of North Korean refugees into South Korea via China. At the 
present time, just as during the inter-war period, churches remain the major source of 
information on conditions inside North Korea. Their reports and information continue to 
affect American public opinion and US policy on the Korean peninsula.
27 For example, in 2003, Dr. James Jin-Kyung Kim, a famous South Korean Christian educator who built a 
private university in Yanji known as Yanbian University of Science and Technology (YUST), was given 
permission to build a new university in P’yOngyang, P’ySngyang University of Science and Technology 
(PUST). The project was funded by private sources, especially Christian churches and institutions from all 
over the world. Educators will soon be allowed to enter P’ybngyang to teach in PUST. If the North 
Korean government does not alter the schedule, PUST should be opened in the Fall o f 2007.
28 Thomas Hong-soon Han, “The Role of the Church in South-North Dialogue,” 
http://www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/corea/proc/022.pdf.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
540
3) The Impact on the Political Development o f South Korea
The power and influence of the Christian community in South Korea continued to 
grow during the Korean War, even though a significant number of clergymen and lay 
workers were executed or carried off by North Korean authorities when the Communists 
overran and later evacuated the South. The number of Christians increased rapidly 
because of the influx of about 100,000 new Christian refugees during the war. Their 
arrival strengthened not only the Christian community, but also Rhee’s political power 
base as well. Refugees, Christian and otherwise, were the backbone supporters for 
Rhee’s policy of pukchin t ’ongil (advance northward and achieve unification).
Christianity’s influence on Korean politics continued even after Syngman Rhee’s 
regime ended in 1960. Rhee’s shortlived successor, Chang Myon (John M. Chang), was 
a devout Catholic. Following Chang Myon, the Second Republic was established under 
the new president Yun Po-son, a Presbyterian elder. Dr. Paek Nak-chun (George Paik), 
President of the at that time still religious Yonsei University, became President of the 
House of Councilors. The cabinet was also filled with Christian laymen. Over the next 
four decades, the power and influence of Christians continued to grow in Korean politics, 
despite military dictatorships. The Christian community was one of the principal 
opposition groups to General Park Chung-hee’s military government, and one of the 
leading forces in the movement to democratize the nation, which finally occurred in 
1992.
Since democracy was reestablished, all of Korea’s presidents have been Christian: 
Kim Young-sam (1992-1998), Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-
29 Alan Carter Covell, “Korean Conversion to Christianity,” Asian & Pacific Quarterly o f  Cultural and 
Social Affairs 19 (1987): 36.
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present). Today, of the 299 representatives of the Korean National Assembly, 103 are 
Protestants and 70 are Catholics, which is about 58 percent of the whole legislative 
body.30 In addition to its earlier growth, the Christian population in South Korea doubled 
every decade from 1960 to 1980.31 By 2005, about one third of South Korea’s 45 million 
people were Christians (11 million Protestants and 3 million Roman Catholics).32 
Christianity is currently the leading political and religious force in South Korea.
4) The Impact on the Development o f Christianity in South Korea
Following the Communist takeover of China in 1949, missionary-sending 
churches in America looked to Korea as the hope for reaching Asia with the gospel. In 
1950, keeping South Korea free from Communism was a key interest of the American 
churches. When war broke out and the US government entered the fray, they began to 
appreciate that Korea did, in fact, hold a key strategic value in holding back 
Communism’s advance. Having reached this conclusion, the American government 
found its interests coincided with those of the American churches.
Some Korean church leaders perceive the Korean War as a negative influence on 
the development of Korean Christianity. Korean Protestant churches had begun as self-
30 Data is taken from the web page of JoongAng Daily, a member of Korea’s leading newspaper group, 
http://news.joins.com/et/200502/25/200502251850590931 aOOOalOOal 20.html.
31 Table: Comparative Church Growth Statistics __________ ____________________________________
Year Population Size Size of Protestant 
Church
% of
Population
Size of Catholic 
Church
% of Population % of Christians 
in Population
1957 22,949,000 844,000 3.7 285,000 1.2 4.9
1968 31,093,000 1,873,000 6.0 751,000 2.4 8.4
1970 31,569,000 3,193,000 10.1 788,000 2.5 12.6
1972 32,459,000 3,452,000 10.6 804,000 2.5 13.1
1974 33,450,000 4,019,000 11.9 1,012,000 3.0 14.9
1976 35,860,000 4,659,000 13.0 1,053,000 2.9 15.9
1978 37,019,000 5,294,000 14.3 1,144,000 3.1 17.4
1981 38,723,000 7,637,000 19.8 1,439,000 3.7 23.5
See James Huntley Grayson, Early Buddhism and Christianity in Korea: A Study in the Emplantation o f
Religion (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), 126.
32 Andrew E. Kim, “History o f Christianity in Korea: From Its Troubled Beginning to Its Contemporary 
Success,” http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/xhist.htm].
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governing and self-reliant, but they became, after the outbreak of the war, more strongly 
dependent upon America. Many Korean Pastors depended on foreign support during the 
Korean War and during the postwar period. Much of the church leadership had been 
killed by the Communists; missionaries were needed to lead and to train new leaders. 
Much of the churches’ infrastructure and institutions had been destroyed by the war; 
American money was needed to rebuild them. After years of war, the Korean people 
were left destitute; American supplies were needed to help people get back on their feet. 
During the 1950s many new American missionaries arrived in Korea, and found their 
services in high demand, particularly in addressing poverty. Even many non-believers 
looked to churches for food and medicine.
This new dependency of the Korean Church upon America can be interpreted 
more positively, however, as the forging of a stronger partnership between churches in 
America and Korea. Even though Korean churches became dependent on American 
support, there was no lack because American churches were eager to provide help to the 
war-torn country. Much of the money that was sent to rebuild this impoverished country 
flowed through churches and Christian institutions. If even non-Christians looked to 
churches for help, then this underscores the growing importance of churches in Korean 
social life. The result, after five decades of American support, is not a dependent and 
weak church, but a vibrant and growing one. The financial power and the missionary 
zeal of the Korean churches have out-grown many Western churches. According to the 
latest statistics, South Korea is now the second largest missionary sending country in the 
world.33 Each year since 2000, South Korea has sent out an average of 1,100 
missionaries. This was more than the number sent by all European countries combined
33 Rob Moll, “Mission Incredible,” Christianity Today 50 (March 2006): 28.
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(Protestant or Catholic). It has also taken the lead in sending out mission workers to 
Asia, Africa, and many Muslim countries in the Middle East. It may well turn out that 
the early missionaries were right, and Korea will become the key to Christianity’s growth 
in Asia.
In fact, rather than lamenting the temporary loss of church independence caused 
by the war, the war can be recognized as ultimately strengthening churches in Korea. 
The ravages of war further weakened the Confucian structure of traditional Korean 
society because most young men were either killed in combat or were at least separated 
from their families for several years.34 Women and children depended more on 
government or private relief for survival. As a result, Christian humanitarian relief 
efforts enhanced the prestige of Christianity and its influence in Korea society. Without 
the Korean War, Christianity would not have grown as rapidly as it did and Korean 
churches would not have received as much financial support from American churches. 
American overseas missions would have continued to focus on Japan, the Philippines, 
India, and various countries in Africa, with Korea as only a secondary interest.
Final Thoughts
To appreciate the fundamental importance of religious -  particularly Christian -  
factors in the growth of modem Korea and in Korean-American relations, perhaps it is 
helpful to consider a world without them. If missionaries had never come to Korea, the 
development of modem Korea would have been different -  whether better or worse,
34 The Korean War significantly weakened the structure of traditional Korean life. The breakdown of the 
self-sufficient farm economy, the loosening of the bonds of the old family system, and the rise of women 
and youth as breadwinners all eroded the foundations of the long-established Confucian society. The war 
created a vacuum that would be filled, in time, by Christianity. The same stresses were at work on 
Confucianism in the North. In this case, however, the central government would fill the vacuum with its 
personality cult and more controlled economic and social programs. The religious transformation o f the 
North is perhaps more startling than that in the South, although few tangible facts are available..
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certainly very different. There would have been no Syngman Rhee (nor his book, Spirit 
o f Independence, the most well-known nationalist writing) -  nor any other Christian 
patriots, no “non-violent” March First Independence Movement (1919), no Cho Man-sik, 
no George Z. Williams, no Underwood family, no Christian schools and institutions, and 
no churches. The resistance to a Communist- controlled North and a leftist dominated 
South would have been significantly weakened during the interwar years. Perhaps the 
war in Korea would not even have been necessary if the Communists had succeeded in 
sabotaging the American-sponsored South Korean government.
But if the war had come and the United States had still intervened without a 
Christian connection to America, perhaps the “police action” in Korea would not have 
aroused as much interest and support from the American public. Without a clear moral 
justification for American intervention, a war in distant Korea, bogged down in a bloody 
conflict with China, and coming right on the heels of World War II, could have become 
as unpopular as Vietnam. The United States might have been eager to extricate itself and 
shortened the war by yielding on the POW controversy. Indeed, the POW controversy 
might have been smaller scale and have captured less public attention without camp 
conversions and blood letters given to Billy Graham. Also, without moral guidance, the 
United States could have adopted a more aggressive position, expanding the war to China 
or using the atomic bomb as General Douglas MacArthur and his supporters demanded. 
Nor, following the war (if one imagines the war progressing along the same course even 
in the absence of religious factors), would America and Korea have developed such close 
ties at the non-state level. Moreover, the development of modem Korea would probably 
have taken along a different path.
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The religious factors of the Korean War are important components in the study of 
the rise of modem Korea. Therefore, through understanding the religious factors at work 
prior to and during the Korean War, historians can better appreciate later historical 
events, namely the unfolding of the Cold War and the development of the modem ties 
that still persist between America and South Korea.
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APPENDIX 1.1: Tables for CHAPTER 1
Table 1.1: Funding for Foreign Missionary work in East and Southeast Asia (Methodist 
Episcopal Church)____________________ _____ ________ __________________________
Country Name 1891 1894 1897 1900 1903 1906 1907 1908*
China 108,519 118,711 114,011 119,376 126,630 142,750 150,550 157,550
India 114,000 117,537 133,058 144,241 149,589 175,200 182,900 188,806
Japan 61,666 54,408 48,576 49,739 54,000 59,300 62,500 62,500
Korea 15,924 15,967 14,285 16,911 23,000 26,940 28,465 28,465
Malaysia 7,250 8,889 9,378 10,500 11,981 16,580 21,380 21,380
Philippine Islands - - - - 14,000 21,350 23,650 25,630
Foreign Mission 566,347 592,940 586,800 629,625 683,942 777,275 820,000 missing**
* Data for 1909 not available.
** Incomplete materials.
Source: Annual Report o f  the Board o f Foreign Missions o f the Methodist Episcopal Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: 
The Institute for Korean Church History, 2001).
Table 1.2: Comparison of the number of overall Christian converts in Korea and in Japan
Country
Name
1887 1898 % increase from  
1887 to 1898
1907 % increase from  
1898 to 1907
Japan 20,000 41,000 105% 50,000 22%
Korea 20 5,000 24900% 41,000 720%
Source: Data quoted by Jongsuk Chay, Diplomacy o f Asymmetry: Korean American Relations to 1910 (Honolulu, HI: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1990), 5.
Table 1.3: The Growth of Protestant Christianity, 1905-1907
Year Churches Stations Baptized Adherents Probationers
1905 321 470 9,761 30,136
1907 642 1,047 18,964 99,300
% Increase 200% 222.3% 194.2% 329.5%
Source: Horace G. Underwood, The Call o/Korea (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1908), 146-48, Quoted by Chung-shin Park, 
Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003): 29.
Table 1.4: Comparison of the Method ist Ministry in Korea (1912' and in Japan
1903 in 
Korea
1907 in 
Korea
1912 in 
Korea*
1918 in 
Japan
Missionaries 39 42 64 113
Ordained Preachers 4 6 30 145
Evangelists (Un-ordained 
Preachers in Korea)
15 *29 269 111
Bible Women Unknown Unknown 26 85
Churches (Churches and 
Chapels in Korea)
67 219 437 298
Membership 1,616 3,885 10,507 15,852
Resident Members Unknown Unknown Unknown 8,608
Probationers 5,299 19,570 15,618 Unknown
Other adherents Unknown 16,158 21,119 Unknown
* Data in 1918 is not available.
Source: For the data of the Korean Methodist Church, see “Foreign Missions Report: Korea Conference (1912),” Annual Report o f the 
Board o f Foreign Missions o f  the Methodist Episcopal Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The
Institute for Korean Church History, 2001): 430-433. For the data of the Japanese Methodist Church, see Bishop Herbert Welch, 
“Seoul Area -  Japan and Korea,” (1921), ibid., 655.
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Table 1.5: Number of Presbyterian Churches in 1910
Province #  o f  churches % Main city
Seoul (Capital city) 11 1.6 -
Hamgyong (NK) 31 4.5 Hamhung
P’yong’an (NK) 260 37.8 Pyongyang
Hwanghae (NK) 103 15.0 Haeju
Kyonggi (SK) 56 8.2 Seoul
Ch’ungch’ong (SK) 25 3.7 Taegu
Cholla (SK) 76 11.0 Kwangju
Kyongsang (SK) 125 18.2 Pusan
Total 687 100 -
Source: Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003): 33.
Table 1.6: Christianity in Korea: Basic Statistics in 1941
Denominations #  o f  Churches #  o f  workers Membership
Roman Catholic 499 320 109,210
Greek Orthodox 6 5 115
Korea Presbyterian 3,348 3,075 262,075
Methodist Episcopal 876 295 50,286
Episcopal 136 104 7,738
Seventh-Day Adventist 185 80 4,510
Holiness 205 221 9,169
Salvation Army 140 156 4,876
Korean Missionary Society 15 14 518
Pentecostal 4 4 80
Christian Church 6 6 285
Japan Christian Church 53 63 5,381
Plymouth Brethren 2 3 98
Korean Christian Church 30 8 1,415
Korean Congregational 26 26 550
Church of God 14 14 968
Church o f Christ 13 5 140
Korean Christian Church 8 5 Unknown
Church o f Jesus 8 5 Unknown
Korean Evangelical Church 19 7 422
Church o f Christ 19 19 Unknown
Japan Union Church 1 Unknown Unknown
Nazarene 3 3 86
Pure Evangelical Church 1 1 106
East Asia Christian Church 30 32 1,311
Total 5,640 4,471 459,339
(Source: “The List of Worship & Religions in Korea” By the Training Dept., Education Bureau of the Governor General of Chosen, 
December, 1941, pp.55-57 recorded in “Statistics -  Japan & Korea” / General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allies 
Powers, Box#5780, RG331 GHQ/SCAP records, CIE ©, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington National 
Records Center.)
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Table 1.7: Number of Modern Schools, 1910
Category Numbers Percentage
Public School 80 3.6%
Semipublic School 73 3.3%
Subtotal 153 6.9%
Private School *1,325 59.3%
Religious related Private School 755 33.8%
Subtotal 2,080 93.1%
Total 2,233 100%
Source: Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003), 122.
* According to Professor Park, “many of the non-church affiliated private schools were founded by native Christians on the model of, 
and with stimulation from, successful church-related schools.”
Table 1.8: Number of W esterners in 1894
Occupation Number Percentage
Diplomatic service 14 12%
Business 69 58%
Missionaries 35 30%
Total 118 100%
Source: Samuel H. Moffett, “The Westerner,” in First Encounters: Korea 1880-1910 ed. by Peter A. Underwood (Seoul: Dragan’s 
Eye Graphics, 1982), 36.
Table 1.9: Sic ners of the Declaration of Independence (March 1,1919)
Religious
Groups
Number o f  
Signers
Examples
Chondoists 15 Choe Nam-son, Son Pyong-hui
Christians 16 Yi Sunghun, Kil Son-ju, Kim Pyong-jo, Yu Yo-dae
Buddhists 2 Han Yong-un, Paek Yong-ong
Sources: Wanne J. Joe, A Cultural History o f Modem Korea: A History o f Korean Civilization (Elizabeth, NJ & Seoul: Hollyn, 2000), 
808.
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Table 1.10: Religious Affiliation of People Arrested During the March First Independence
Movement 1919
Denomination Male Female Total Percentage
Ch’ondogyo 2,268 15 2,283 11.69
Shich’ongyon 14 0 14 0.07
Buddhist 220 0 220 1.13
Confucianist 346 0 346 1.77
Methodist 518 42 560 2.87
Presbyterian 2,254 232 2,486 12.74
Congregational 7 0 7 0.04
Other Protestants 286 34 320 1.64
Catholics 54 1 55 0.28
Other Religions 21 0 21 0.11
No religious affiliation 9,255 49 9,304 47.65
Unknown 3,809 98 3,907 20.01
Total: 19,054 471 19,525 100
(Source: Korean Government-General, Governor’s Office, Chosen no dokuritsu shiso oyobi undo [The Korean Independence Thought 
and Movement] (Seoul, 1924), pp.98-106.) See also Chong-sik Lee, The Politics o f  Korean Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
CA: University of California Press, 1963): 115-118.
Table 1.11: The Growth of the Presbyterian Church before and after the 1919 Uprising
Year Churches Newly Established Churches Adherents
1917 1,648 52 149,526
1918 1,778 102 160,919
1919 1,705 115 144,062
1920 1,738 184 153,915
1921 1,879 267 179,158
Source: Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003): 36.
Table 1.12: Korean Church Membership
Year Adherents Notes
1937 374,085 Sino-Japanese War
1939 370,462 Shinto Shrine worship enforced
1941 332,607* Missionaries were imprisoned and forced to leave
1943 208,758
Source: Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003): 36.
* Compared to Table 1.6, the figure is much lower here because o f  the different sources. The Japanese data might reflect the inactive 
members while the church data here might reflect the actual attendant. In other words, some Christians, who refused to bow down to 
the Shinto Shrine, chose to leave or forced to leave their churches.
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APPENDIX 1.2: Tables for CHAPTER 2:
Table 2.1: Reported Membership in Religious Organization, 1911-1944
Religion 1911 1928 1939 1944 % in 1944
Buddhists 340,000 270,000 194,000 187,000 20.1
Christians 201,000 340,000 500,000 621,000 66.6
Chondokyo 109,000 111,000 80,000 72,000 7.7
Others 119,000 83,000 50,000 52,000 5.6
Total 769,000 804,000 824,000 932,000 100%
% of population 5.7% 4.3% 3.8% 3.7%
Source: Data for 1911,1928, and 1939, from Office of the Overseas Minister, Takumu tokei, 1939; for 1944 from Annual Report on 
the Administration o f Chosen 1944. See Joungwon Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics o f  Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1976), 21.
Table 2.2: The Provincial Distribution of the Young Friends’ Party
Southern Provinces Northern Provinces
Kyonggi 103 Kangwon 13
North Chungchong 0 Hwanghae 79
South Chungchong 15 South Pyongan 815
North Cholla 23 North Pyongan 1,668
South Cholla 0 South Hamgyong 1,400
North Kyongsang 21 North Hamyong 54
South Kyongsang 56
Total 218 Total 4,017
Source: Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution 1945-1950 (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 
15.
Table 2.3: Religious Membership in Korea in between 1939-1941
Religion ChurchesI 
Temples
Workers Overall
Membership
%
Christianity 5,640 4,471 459,339** 33.5
Japanese Buddhism 1,560 1,733 339,512* 24.8
Sectarian Shinto 324 710 93,110* 6.8
State Shinto 73 157 No register membership n.a.
Korean Buddhism 1,727 6,639 196,135 14.3
Togaku 973 Unknown 117,585 8.6
Hunchi 1,091 Unknown 137,807 10.0
Buddhistic 26 Unknown 23,054 1.7
Shamanism 29 Unknown 4,707 0.3
Confucianism missing missing Missing n.a.
Total 11,443 13,710 1,371,249 100
* The membership was mostly Japanese population in Korea. If these two groups were deducted from the total, it would become 
938,627, which is similar to the total in Table 2.2.
**The percentage of Christian could be as high as 49% of the overall religious population if the Japanese groups are taken out of the 
calculation.
Source: ‘T he List of Worship & Religions in Korea” By the Training Dept., Education Bureau of the Governor General of Chosen, 
December, 1941, pp.55-57 recorded in “Statistics -  Japan & Korea” /  General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allies 
Powers, Box#5780, RG331 GHQ/SCAP records, CIE ©, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington National 
Records Center.
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Table 2.4a: Percentage of Foreign Population in Korea
1941 %
Japanese 717,011 2.9%
Foreigners 73,823 0.3%
Koreans 23,913,063 96.8%
Total Population 24,703,897 100%
♦not exact data, but approximate amount
Source: CIC (<$-%$) M JZ * f 1 9 4 5 .9 -  1 9 49 .1 ,1:213.
Table 2.4b: Distribution of Nort h and South Korean Population (1
Southern 15,408,237* 62.4%
Northern 9,295,659* 37.6%
Total Korean population 23,913,063 100%
♦not exact data, but approximate amount
Source: 0 ? ¥ & K 9 1 ffm jg W M  CIC 1 9 4 5 .9 -  1 9 4 9 .1 ,1:213.
Table 2.5: Major Christian Churches in Korea i 1941)
Denominations #  o f  Churches #  o f  workers Membership
Roman Catholic* 499 320 109,210
Korea Presbyterian* 3,348 3,075 262,075
Methodist Episcopal 876 295 50,286
Episcopal 136 104 7,738
Seventh-Day Adventist 185 80 4,510
Holiness 205 221 9,169
Total 5,249 4,094 442,988
♦ Majority of its membership were in North Korea.
Source: “The List of Worship & Religions in Korea” By the Training Dept., Education Bureau of the Governor General of Chosen, 
December, 1941, pp.55-57 recorded in “Statistics -  Japan & Korea” / General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allies 
Powers, Box#5780, RG331 GHQ/SCAP records, CIE ©, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington National 
Records Center.
Table 2,6: Survey of Presbyterian Stations** in 1940
Station Ratio o f  Presbyterian Population to 
the total population in the area
Syenchun (N)* 1:13
Chairyung (N) 1:28
Pyongyang (N) 1:28
Kangkei (N) 1:34
Pusan (S) 1:38
Manchuria (Korean) 1:60
Andong (S) 1:68
Taegu (S)* 1:77
Chungju (S) 1:100
Seoul(S)* d.n.a.
♦ These stations had a significant amount of Catholic population as well. If Catholics were added, the ratio in Taegu, for example, 
was 1:13.
♦♦ These stations were run by Presbyterian Church (USA).
Sources: H. A. Rhodes’ presentation “Survey of the Stations” during the Korean Consultative Conference (September 20-22,1944), 
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 30 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Table 2.7a: Proportion of Population Reached by the Church in Villages with Churches by
Regions i n ' 925* (25 sam ples)
Region Total Village 
Population
Resident Church- 
Membership
% o f Population in 
Church
North 2 ,3 7 0 817 34.5
Center 5 ,599 1,120 2 0 .0
South 10,226 1,278 12.5
* Data not available in 1945.
Source: Edmund deSchweinitz Brunner, Ph.D. “The Christian Mission in Relation to Rural Problems,” The Jerusalem Meeting o f the 
International Missionary Council (March 2 4 - April 8,1928), 52. Records of the U.S. Department of State relating to internal affairs 
of Korea (Chosen), 1910-1929, RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration.
Table 2.7b: Landownership by General Farming Population and by Church Membership
Compared by Regions (35 villages) in 1925
Region Number Non Christian Families Christian Families
of
Village
Number % Owning 
Land Tilled
Number % Owning Land 
Tilled
North 10 1336 33.4 120 37.5
Central 12 1085 24.9 211 11.0
South 13 1487 16.5 281 18.8
Source: Edmund deSchweinitz Brunner, Ph.D. “The Christian Mission in Relation to Rural Problems,” The Jerusalem Meeting o f the 
International Missionary Council (March 2 4 -A p ril 8,1928), 24. Records of the U.S. Department of State relating to internal affairs 
of Korea (Chosen), 1910-1929, RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration.
Table 2.8: Population Growth in the Southern Zone (1946-1948)
Origins 1946 1948
Existing Population (May 1944) 15 ,879 ,110 19 ,369 ,270
Repatriation from Japan 898 ,219 2 1 2 ,9 8 0
Repatriation from other areas 85,529 21 ,318
Migration from NK (recorded) 4 01 ,685 4 6 8 ,5 8 9
Natural increase (approximate) 650 ,0 0 0 4 0 0 ,0 0 0
Subtotal 17,914,543 20,472,152
Unprocessed entries (estimated)** 1,454,727 430,000
Total 19,369,270 20,902,152
Total unnatural population increase* 2,840,160 1,132,887
* Total unnatural population increase from  1946 to 1948 is 3,973,042.
** These probably were the unprocessed refugees from North Korea and Japan.
Source: “Food Report for South Korea as of March 1948,” Food Supplies, Korea 1945-1948, RG 59, Records of the US Dept of State 
relating to internal affairs of Korea, 1945-1949, File 895, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
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Table 2.9: The S tate of Christianity in Korea at the Time of Annexation
Presbyterian Methodists New Sects Catholics Orthodox Total
Missionary
Premises
1,211 402 168 149 4 1,934
(Church hall) 456 131 101 47 3 738
Missionaries 125 69 13 46 1 254
(Americans) 86 64 7 1 0 158
Korean
Pastors
1,317 625 179 197 8 2,326
Members 115,072 37,620 7,897 38,197 188 198,974
Japanese 39 0 108 192 0 339
School 1,193 430 42 73 0 1,738
Students 102,113 29,285 782 778 0 132,958
Hospitals 6 3 2 1 0 12
Source: Takakyoshi Matsuo, “The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary Activity of the Japan Congregational 
Church in Korea,” translated by S. Takiguchu, Modem Asian Studies 13 (1979), 419.
Table 2.10:1939 Statistics for various Missions ( r ederal Council of Missionary Bodies)
Mission Total Total
Missionaries Membership
Church o f Christ Mission 4 330
English Church Mission 14 6,102
Methodist Missionary Society 108 28,439
Oriental Missionary Society 4 7,195
Australian Presbyterian Mission 29 19,435
Presbyterian Church in U.S.A. Mission 118 120,560
Presbyterian Church in U.S. Mission 66 21,980
United Church of Canada Mission 38 17,508
Salvation Army 16 18,002
Seventh Day Adventist Mission 19 7,288
Roman Catholic Totals (Four Mission) 278 141,243
Grant Totals 694 388,082
Source: Rev. Edward Adam, “Information of Christian Work in Korea, October 12, 1945,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record 
Group 140, Folder 29 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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APPENDIX 1.3: Tables for CHAPTER 3
Table 3.1 : Percentage of Christians in the AMG and First Republic (19416-1948)
Position Total Christians %
American Military Government (high position) 50 35 70.0%
Advisory Council 11 6 54 .5%
Korean Interim Legislative Assembly* 90 21 23 .3%
Korean Legislative Assembly** 190 38 20 .0%
* Half by election and half by appointment.
** 100% election.
Source: For the data on Advisory Council, see Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University 
of Washington Press, 2003), 168. For the others, see Harry A. Rhodes and Archibald Campbell, History o f the Korean Mission: 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., V ol.2 ,1939-1959 (New York: Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations, The 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1964), 380-381.
Table 3.2: Population Growth in the Southern Zone (1946-1948)
Origins 1946 1948
Existing Population (May 1944) 15 ,879 ,110 19 ,369 ,270
Repatriation from Japan 898 ,219 21 2 ,9 8 0
Repatriation from other areas 85 ,529 21 ,318
Migration from NK (recorded) 401 ,685 4 6 8 ,5 8 9
Natural increase (approximate) 650 ,000 4 0 0 ,0 0 0
Subtotal 17,914,543 20,472,152
Unprocessed entries (estimated)** 1,454,727 430,000
Total 19,369,270 20,902,152
Total unnatural population increase* 2,840,160 1,132,887
* Total unnatural population increase from  1946 to 1948 is 3,973,042.
** These probably were the unprocessed refugees from North Korea and Japan.
Source: “Food Report for South Korea as of March 1948,” Food Supplies, Korea 1945-1948, RG 59, Records of the US Dept of State 
relating to internal affairs of Korea, 1945-1949, File 895, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
Table 3.3: Population Growth in Major Southern Cities and Se ected Ration Store Data in 1947
City Population 
in 1941
Population 
in 1947
N et Population 
Growth from  1941 
to 1947
Number o f  
Ration 
Stores
Average 
number o f  
persons served 
by store each 
ration period
Percentage
o f
Population
growth
Seoul 935,464 1,141,766 206,302* 194 5,885 22%
Pusan 249,734 400,156 150,422* 59 6,782 60%
Taegu 178,923 269,113 90,190 45 5,980 50%
Inchon 171,165 215,784 44,619 54 3,996 26%
Kwangju 64,520 100,451 35,931 8 12,556 56%
Taejon 45,541 96,207 50,666 40 2,405 111%
Kaesong 72,062 87,173 15,111 22 3,962 21%
Chonju 47,230 83,333 36,103 11 7,576 76%
Pohang n.a. 45,147 n.a. 8 5,643 n.a.
Suwon n.a. 42,173 n.a. 50 843 n.a.
* Seoul got most of its net increase from the northern refugees while Pusan got its share from Japan.
Source: Data for 1941 is taken from f S W j & f f l l l f f C I C  (Hf f j t f l )  M J2Ai 1 9 4 5 .9 -  1 9 4 9 .1 ,1:218 and data for 1947 is 
taken from “Food Distribution In South Korea,” Food Supplies, Korea 1945-1948, RG 59, Records of the US Dept of State relating to 
internal affairs of Korea, 1945-1949, File 895, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
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Table 3.4: Statistical Summary of Civil Disturbances in South Korea during the election 
month (May 1-15,1948)_______________________ _______________
Rightists killed 59
Leftists killed 43
Police killed 6
Total 162
Rightist wounded 25
Leftists wounded 10
Police wounded 15
Total 50
Rioters Apprehended 211
Rightist home Burned 20
Rightist home Bombed 6
Rightist home Attacked 13
Total 39
Leftists homes Attacked 3
Attacks on police boxes 22
Attacks on polling places 36
Myun offices of city halls attacked 4
Christian churches Attacked* 2
Missionary home** 1
US Army Bus*** 1
* one in Kaesong and one in Kanggyong
** one Catholic Missionary’s home was in Chunchon
*** one U.S. Army Bus in Seoul
Source: Report by Lt Col. Joseph Huckins, CIC C g -g iff)  1 9 4 5 .9 -  1949.1, 3:424.
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APPENDIX 1.4: Tables for CHAPTER 4
Table 4.1 Data of Billy Graham C rusades (1947-1954)
Crusade’s Name Location Date Attendance Inquirers
YFC Evangelistic Campaign Grand Rapids, MI 09/17/1947-09/21/1947 30,000 500
Charlotte Revival Charlotte, NC 11/09/1947-11/23/1947 42,000 1,200
Augusta Crusade 
Christ for Greater lais
Augusta. GA 
Los Angeles. CA
10/03/1947-10/19/1948
09/25/t949-l 1/20/1949
65,000
350,000
1,400
3,000*
Boston Crusade Boston, MA 12/31/1949-01/16/1950 105,000 3,000
Columbia Crusade Columbia, SC 02/19/1950-03/12/1950 190,000 12,000
New Enoland Tour 
t, I rP  111 Ul( 
1 A i im j h
S f t i i t l i p m  S t a t p c  t A i i f
T lr t  Word 
Great hhrevc^
Christ for Hollywood 
Greensboro Crusade
Raleigh rallies _____
Washington D.C. Crusade
Jackson Crusade 
US cities tour
03/27/1950-04/23/1950
Hollywood, CA  
Givcnshui.i. NC 
Raliegh. NC
10/14/1951-01/26/1951
11/16/1951-11/18/1951
lat-kM'l, MS . 06/15/1952-07/11/1952
Aug 1952
160,000
135,000
3 9 1 . 0 5 0
'34,000
362,300
126,000
6000
125,000
hi W m ui. 1
Cincmnati rallies Cincinnati, OH 05/12/1951-05/13/1951 21.000
09/19/1951-10/06/1951
1,450
Washington. IX 13/1952
Pittsburgh Crusade Pittsburgh, PA 09/07/1952-10/07/1952 263,500 5,986
Albuquerque Crusade Albuquerque, NM 11/02/1952-12/02/1952 133,030 3,011
Florida cities tour Jan-Feb 1953 120,000
Chattanooga Crusade
St. Louis Revival
West Texas tour
Chattanooga, TN 
.Si L m i s  M C I
EU&'X* :
03/15/1953-04/14/1953 
/16/1953-05/16/1953
June-July 1953
283,300
318,400
77,000
4.406 
3 06
3 W
Amarillo rally Amarillo, TX 06/30/1953 20,000 600-800
Syracuse Crusade Syracuse, NY 08/02/1953-08/31/1953 105,200 2.630 
6 men
2.653
Detroit Crusade_
Asheville Crusade
European tour 
Nashville Oiisade
New Orleans Crusade
Detroit, M l 09/27/ 1953-11/01/1933
Ashesill NC 11/08/1953-11/22/1953
Nashville, TN
Source: The History of the Billy Graham Evangelical Association. 
* Some other data suggest a higher figure from 4,200 to 6,000.
363,030
112,100
06/16/1954-06/30/1954  303,800
08/22/! 914-09'19/1954 ____  652 000 9 067
New Orleans, LA " l(V3/1954-10/31/1954 1 19. too 4,932
Table 4.2a: Religious Bodies -  C hurch Membership* (1926-1956)
1926 1940 1950 1955 1956
All Protestant bodies 31,511,701 37,814,606 51,079,578 58,448,567 60,148,980
The Roman Catholic Church 18,605,003 21,284,455 28,634,878 33,396,647 34,563,851
Other 4,459,642 5,402,533 7,116,034 8,317,315 8,512,123
Total number of members 54,576,346 64,501,594 86,830,490 100,162,529 103,224,954
Percent o f total population 47% 49% 57% 61% 62%
Average number per local church 235 265 304 328 334
Source: N a tio n a l C ouncil o f  C hurches o f  C h ris t in  th e  U n ited  S tates o f  A m erica; Y earbook o f  A m erican  C hurches . 
* Membership 13 years of age and over
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Table 4.2b: Religious Bodies -  Number of Churches and Membership^
Year 1947 1950 1953
Religious Bodies Member Church Member Church Member Church
Roman Catholic Church 25,286,178 14,523 28,635,000 15,533 31,476,261 20,618
Eastern Orthodox Churches 600,000 586 1,650,000 882 2,021,000 1,138
Jewish Congregations 4,641,000 3,728 5,000,000 3,728 5,000,000 3,990
“Protestant” bodies over 50,000 44,571,486 224,479 49,969,000 257,640 54,654,814 249,668
Other bodies 2,287,524 22,267 1,576,000 19,153 1,690,770 18,945
Total 77,386,188 265,583 86,830,000 281,511 94,842,845 294,359
1947-1953)
Source: Yearbook o f American Churches, 1949,1951,1954. 
* Membership 13 years of age and over
Table 4.2c: Growth R ates (1947-1953)
Year 1950 1953
Religious Bodies Member Church Member Church
Roman Catholic Church 13.2% 7.0% 9.9% 32.7%
Eastern Orthodox Churches 175% 50.5% 22.5% 29.0%
Jewish Congregations 7.7% 0% 0% 7.0%
“Protestant” bodies over 50,000 12.1% 14.8% 9.3% -3.1%
Other bodies -31.1% -14.0% 7.3% -1.1%
Total 12.2% 6.0% 9.2% 4.6%
Source: Yearbook o f American Churches 1949,1951,1954.
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APPENDIX 1.5: Tables for CHAPTER 5
Table 5.1: Population of Major Cities in South Korea (1941-1947)
City 1941 1947 Growth Rate
Seoul 935,464 1,141,766 22%
Pusan 249,734 400,156 60%
Taegu 178,923 269,113 50%
Inchon 171,165 215,784 26%
Kwangju 64,520 100,451 56%
Taejon 45,541 96,207 111%
Kaesong 72,062 87,173 21%
Chonju 47,230 83,333 76%
Pohang n.a. 45,147 n.a.
Suwon n.a. 42,173 n.a.
Source: Data for 1941 is taken from j iW M c M W M X ffM  CIC (%hJ^ 1 9 4 5 . 9 -  1949 .1 , 1:218 and data for 1947 is 
taken from “Food Distribution In South Korea,” Food Supplies, Korea 1945-1948, RG 59, Records of the US Dept of State relating to 
internal affairs of Korea, 1945-1949, File 895, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
Table 5.2: Statistics of the “Save the Nation Evangelistic C rusade” (April-May 1950)
City Venue Natural
Capacity
Expanded 
Max. Capacity
Numbers 
o f  Days
Taegu Town Hall 2000 11
Gil Dodd’s Exhibition Race 
in the City stadium
60,000 1
Pusan d.n.a. d.n.a. d.n.a. 5
Gil Dodd’s Exhibition Race 
in the City stadium
30,000 1
Seoul Presbyterian Church 3000 20,000 10
Taejon High School Hall 2000 6,000 d.n.a.
Inchon Methodist Church 1,200 20,000 1
“d.n.a.” means data not available.
Source: Bob Pierce, The Untold Korean Story (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1951).
Table 5.3: Southern Presbyterian Missionaries who Stayed Behind
Kwangju Station Chonju Station
Dr. Herbert Codington
Rev. H. Petrie Mitchel and his wife (Mary
Belle)
Miss Florence Root
Dr. Ovid B. Bush,
Dr. Paul S. Crane and his wife (Mariella) 
Rev. William A. Linton and his wife 
(Charlotte)
Miss Gene N. Lindler 
Miss Margaret Pritchard
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Table 5.4: Foreign Civilians Held Captive by the North Koreans, 1950-1953
Died in Captivity Survived Captivity Total
Diplomats 0 6 6
Catholic Priests 7 4 11
Catholic Nuns 4 5 9
Catholic Laymen 1 0 1
Male Missionaries 2 4 6
Female Missionaries 1 3 4
Foreign officials 0 1 1
Business persons 1 1 2
Journalists 0 2 2
USA Engineers 2 0 2
White Russians 5 4 9
Turkish 0 5 5
Civilians 0 2 2
Children below 18 0 8 8
Total 23 45 68
Source: Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2003), 381- 
383.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
560
APPENDIX 1.6: Tables for CHAPTER 6
Table 6.1: Foreign Civilians Held Captive by the North Koreas, 1950-53
Died in Captivity Survived Captivity Total
Diplomats 0 6 6
Catholic Priests 7 4 11
Catholic Nuns 4 5 9
Catholic Laymen 1 0 1
Male Missionaries 2 4 6
Female Missionaries 1 3 4
Foreign officials 0 1 1
Business persons 1 1 2
Journalists 0 2 2
USA Engineers 2 0 2
White Russians 5 4 9
Turkish 0 5 5
Civilians 0 2 2
Children below 18 0 8 8
Total 23 45 68
Source: Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2003), 381-383.
Table 6.2: Materials donated by American Churches distributed through the UN
$ worth of Supplies
American Friends Service Committee $234,153
Church World Services $700,663
General Conference of Seventh Day Adventist $10,000
Lutheran World Relief $184,265
Oriental Missionary Society $102,883
Religious Denominations of Fort Devens, Mass $1,000
War Relief Service-National Catholic Welfare Conference $3,623,492
Total $4,856,446
The total amount of contributions by all US voluntary agencies was US$10,952,657. Church donations were about 44 percent of the 
total.
Source: Heung-soo Kim, A1 71 2) ^1 cfs)] °] (Relief Activities of Foreign Christian Voluntary
Agencies during the Korean War), £ 7 ^ . 7 / Of*)- History o f Korean Christianity 23 (2005): 107.
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Table 6.3: The Executive Committee of Korea Church World Service
Position Name Organization
President Dr. Edward Adams Presbyterian, USA
Vice President Mr. Chang Salvation Army
Secretary Rev. Kim Sa Keun
Treasurer Dr, EJ.O. Fraser United Church of Canada
Executive Director Dr. Henry D. Appenzeller Methodist
Executive Assistant Mr. Gregory B. Votaw
Field Supervisor Mr. James Atkinson
Secretary for Child Welfare Miss Anne Davison
Training Midwives Miss Edith J. Galt
Source: Ibid., 109-110.
Table 6.4: Number of Christian Pastors and Evangelists Arrested by Communist in South Korea 
(1950-1951)___________________________ __________________ ___________ __________________
Denomination Ministers Evangelists Total Families members
Methodist 35 8 43 156
Presbyterian 111 9 120 488
Holiness 8 3 11 51
Salvation Army 6 6 42
Total: 154 26 180 737
Source: Documents o f  the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed. Heung Soo Kim (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 
2003), 312-317.
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Table 6.5: The Civilian Calamity of War (June 1952)
Civilian Calamity Number Total
(1) Broken residence 600,000
Entirely broken or burned down 380,000
Partially broken 220,000
(2) Victims 938,761
captured 42,732
slaughtered 122,799
The deceased 236,475
The wounded 228,580
missing 298,175
(3) Refugees 4,000,000
Sources: “The situation of Calamity of War in Korea as at June 1952,” Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed. Heung 
Soo Kim (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 309-310.
Table 6.6: Church Destruction after the Communist Invasion (June 20,1952)
Denomination Destroy by fire Area (pyung) Broke down Area (pyung)
Methodist 84 4,800 155
Presbyterian 152 8,850 468 26,480
Holiness 27 79
Salvation 4 455 4 874
Total 267 706
Source: Documents o f  the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed. Heung Soo Kim (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 
2003), 311.
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Table 8.1: Official List of membership denominations of the National Council of Churches of Christ
Denominations Membership
African Methodist Episcopal Church 1,166,301
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church 530,116
American Baptist Convention 1,561,073
Augustan Evangelical Lutheran Church 440,244
Church of the Brethren 186,201
Colored Methodist Episcopal Church 381,000
Congregational-Christian Churches 1,204,789
Czech-Moravian Brethren Church 5,000
Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church 19,404
Evangelical and Reformed Church 726,361
Evangelical United Brethren Church 717,531
Friends -  Five Year Meeting 68,612
Friends of Philadelphia and Vicinity 5,509
International Convention of Disciples of Christ 1,767,964
Methodist Church 8,935,647
Moravian 47,271
National Baptist Conventions 4,445,605
Presbyterian Church in the U.S. 678,206
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. 2,318,615
Protestant Episcopal Church 2,540,548
Reformed Church in America 183,178
Roumanian Orthodox Church of America 390
Russian Orthodox Church 400,000
Seventh Day Baptist 6,430
Syrian Antiochan Orthodox Church 40,061
United Lutheran Church 1,954,342
United Presbyterian Church 213,810
Total: 30,629,225
Source: “Ministry of Disruption: A brief study of the activities of Carl Mclntire and the American Council of Christian Churches,” 
Presbyterian Church Archives, RG197, Box 6, Folder 34 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Table 8.2a: US Casual ty Figures of the Korean War
June 1950 -  June 1951 July 1951 -  July 1953
Killed 21,300 12,300
Wounded 53,100 50,200
Missing or capture 4,400 700
Total 78,800 63,200
Source: Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969,1971), 129.
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Table 8.2b: War-re ated Korean War Casualties
KIA MIA WIN Civilian
South Korea 187,712 30,000 429,000 500,000>
North Korea 1.5 million
China 152,400 238,000 n/a
USA 33,741 (+ 2,827) 103,284 n/a
Other UNC 3,063 11,817 n/a
Source: Allan R. Millett, Their War For Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and civilians 1945-1953 (Washington, 
D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2002), 266.
Table 8.2c: United Nations Forces (Non-ROK, Non-U.S.)
Force Deaths Wounded
Australia 2,282 272 1,034
Belgium and Luxembourg 944 104 350
Canada 6,146 309 1,202
Colombia 1,068 210 610
Ethiopia 1,271 122 566
France 1,119 271 1,008
Greece 1,263 194 459
Netherlands
ON00 120 645
New Zealand 1,389 22 79
Philippines 1,496 128 299
South Africa 826 34 0
Thailand 1,294 136 469
Turkey 5,455 889 2,111
United Kingdom 14,198 1,078 2,674
Total 39,570 3,925 11,506
Source: Data on the amount of force taken from “The Forgotten War: Three Long Years in Korea,” National Geographic Maps fo r  
National Geographic Magazine (Washington, D.C., 2003). Data on deaths and wounds taken from the table “Casualties, United 
Nations Forces (Non-ROK, Non-U.S.)” Encyclopedia o f  the Korean War ed. by Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 
2002), 100.
Table 8.3: Distribution of POWs
Location Dec. 1950 Feb. 1951 Mar 1951 May 1951 Jun 1951
Enclosure 1 9,539 5,787 d.n.a. 38,850 7,000-
10,000Enclosure 2 34,703 d.n.a.
Enclosure 3 39,518 38,395 d.n.a.
Enclosure 4 12,715 d.n.a.
Enclosure 5 31,800 31,880 d.n.a.
14th Field Hospital 7,237 10,146 d.n.a.
Labor force 1,663 d.n.a.
Chinese POWs 616 d.n.a.
Koje-do 53,588 98,799 115,884 140,000
Total 137,791 139,196 d.n.a 154,734 d.n.a.
Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 9 ,13 ,14 ,
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Table 8.4: Result of Second Screening of Prisoners (April 13,1952)
NKs % CCF % SKs % CIs % Total
Togo 21,102 22 3,075 15 3,559 22 2,628 1 30,364
To stay 30,389 32 14,126 69 11,057 69 18,675 47 74,247
Total screened 51,491 54 17,201 84 14,616 91 21,303 54 104,611
Unscreened *44,345 46 3,193 16 1,284 9 18,015 46 66,837
Total 95,836 20,394 15,900 39,318 171,448
*Includes 37,872 Communists who refuse to be screened.
Source: Allan E. Goodman, ed. Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary o f Admiral C. Turner Joy and the Korean Armistice 
Conference (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 356.
Table 8.5: Prisoners in CI&E-sponsored Educational Activities  (July 4 ,1952)
Activities # o f participants
Orientation classes 69,998
Literacy classes 11,307
Juvenile classes 3,525
Adult continuation classes 3,958
Reading groups 42,000
Agriculture classes 13,674
Health classes 15,007
Vocational classes 2,577
Vocational production 1,994
Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 117.
Table 8.6: Number of POWs Receiving Baptism and admissions to the catechum enate during 
Communion Services
May 6,1951 October 7,1951 April 13,1952
Number Baptized 84 202 614
New Catechumens 111 465 1,397
Total Communicants 500 1,712 2,317
Source: “Chaplain’s Report: Kojedo Prisoner of War Camp, March 1951 -  April 1952,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 16, Folder 40 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Table 8.7: Number of Protestant North Korean POWs in Kojedo
March 1951 April 1952
Baptized d.n.a. 2,266
Catechumens d.n.a. 1,571
Preparing for the Catechumenate d.n.a. 11,225
Total 4,261* 15,062
* Data provided by Chaplain Harold Voelkel. Christians already existed in the POW Camps prior to their relocation to Kojedo. 
Source: “Chaplain’s Report: Kojedo Prisoner of War Camp, March 1951 -  April 1952,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 
140, Box 16, Folder 40 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
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Table 8.8: Number of Chinese POWs Attending Worship Services in Chejudo (May 1952)
# o f Service #  o f Attendance Average #  per meeting
Sunday Worship 8 34,800 4,350
Weekday Worship 21 32,195 1,533
Source: “Copies of EJW’s reports for April, May, and June 1952,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 
7 -  Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Table 8.9: POWs in UN Custody
Non-repatriates Repatriates
ROK soldiers 10,216 6,027
ROK civilians 37,000 Unknown
NK soldiers 25,452 61,411
NK civilians 8,010 9,151
Chinese Soldiers 14,704* 5,650
Total 95,382 82,239
* Estimate number given by the UNC negotiators.
** Data taken from Table 8.12.
Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 37,40-41.
Table 8.10: The Prison Outbreak in Non-Repatria te Camps
Camp Population Escaped Injured Dead Recaptured
2 3,033 158 0 0 0
4 1,140 869 0 1 0
4a 489 16 0 0 0
5 10,614 9,906 8 6 236
6 10,998 8,374 2 2 505
7 3,836 2,814 7 3 178
9 3,885 3,883 2 0 37
10 1,477 400 107 30 75
Total 35,472 26,420 126 42 1,031
Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 69.
Table 8.11: Disposition of the 98,714 POWs and Cl’s on July 31 ,1953
Repatriate Non-Repatriate
Camp POW’s C l’s Camp POW’s C l’s
1 45,475 806 2 4,611 85
la 11,320 3 3 14,273
lb 2,421 6 4,383 167
lc 14 8,429
8 4,328
Munsan-ni 600
Yondong-po 1,799
Total 65,957 9,238 23,267 252
Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 85.
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Table 8.12a: Prisoners Returned to Communist Control under Operation BIG SWITCH (Septem ber
1953)
Korean Chinese
Male 60,788 5,639
Female 473 1
Children 23 0
Cl’s 8,899 0
Total 70,183 5,640
Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 89.
Table 8.12b: Prisoners Returned to UNC Control under Operation BIG SWITCH (Septem ber 1953)
Countries Number o f POWs
South Koreans 7,862
Americans 3,597
British 945
Turks 229
Filipinos 40
Canadians 30
Columbians 22
Australians 21
Frenchmen 12
South Africans 8
Greeks 2
Dutch 2
Belgium 1
New Zealand 1
Japan 1
Total 12,773
Source: Clayton D. Laurie, “Big Switch/Little Switch, Operation,” Encyclopedia o f the Korean War ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New 
York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 76.
Table 8.13a: Disposition of Non-repatriate Prisoners (Communist) in January 1954
Chinese Korean Total
Returned to Communist Control 441 188 629
Escaped and missing 2 11 13
Died in custody of CFI 15 23 38
Remaining in custody * 19 85 104
Returned to UNC control 14,227 7,593 21,820
Total 14,704 7,900 22,604
*Of those remaining in the DMZ, 12 Chinese and 74 Koreans desired to go to neutral countries, 7 Chinese and 10 Koreans were being 
held for disciplinary action, and 1 Korean was being held as a witness.
Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 97.
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Table 8.13b: Disposition of Non-repatriate Prisoners (UNC) in January 1954
Prisoners
Returned to UNC Control 9
Escaped 1
Shipped to India 2
Returned to Communist control 347
Total 359
Source: Rosemary Foot, A Substitute fo r  Victory: The Politics o f  Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, NY and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), 191.
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APPENDIX 2.1
Map 1: Allocation of Territory among Major Protestant Denominations
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Source: Edmund deSchweinitz Brunner, Ph.D. ‘The Christian Mission in Relation to 
Rural Problems,” The Jerusalem Meeting o f the International Missionary Council 
(March 24 -A p ril 8, 1928), Map HI. Records of the U.S. Department of State relating to 
internal affairs of Korea (Chosen), 1910-1929, RG 59, National Archives and Records 
Administration.
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APPENDIX 2.2
Map 2: Map of North Korea
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APPENDIX 2.3
Map 3: The Population Density of the Korean Peninsula (1936)
Source: Hermann Lautensach, Korea: A Geography Based on the Author's Travels and 
Literature, trans. and ed. Katherine Dege and Eckart Dege (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
1988; originally published in German, 1945).
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APPENDIX 2.4
Map 4: Map of the Korean Peninsula
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APPENDIX 2.5
Map 5: The Evacuation of the American Protestant Missionaries (June-July 1950)
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APPENDIX 2.6
Map 6: Major Korean Cities (June 1950)
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APPENDIX 2.7
Map 7: South Korea Under the Attack of the North Korean Army
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APPENDIX 2.8
Map 8: UN Forces in North Korea
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